Belarus

Additional trade and financial sanctions imposed on Russian Federation as evidence of atrocities in Ukraine by Russian soldiers mounts

As the Russian troops withdrew from around Kyiv, images of dead civilians in the town of Bucha led to further outrage among many countries resulting in a new round of trade and financial sanctions being imposed by the U.S., EU, U.K., Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The atrocities also led to a vote at the U.N. to suspend the Russian Federation from the Human Rights Council. See White House, Statement of President Joe Biden on the UN Vote Suspending Russia from the Human Rights Council, April 7, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/07/statement-of-president-joe-biden-on-the-un-vote-suspending-russia-from-the-human-rights-council/.

Keeping up with all sanctions being imposed is challenging in light of the expanding set of actions being taken although different organizations have compiled lists. For example, Reuters posts a time and country based list in Tracking sanctions against Russia, https://graphics.reuters.com/UKRAINE-CRISIS/SANCTIONS/byvrjenzmve/. The version I reviewed was updated on April 8, 2022 and shows actions through April 7. “Reuters is tracking government sanctions and actions against Russia taken by large companies and organisations around the world in the lead up to and following its invasion of Ukraine.” Reuters shows sanctions imposed by 41 governments (viewing the EU as 27) and 99 actions taken by large companies and organizations.

A fact sheet released by the White House on April 6 summarizes actions being taken by the United States in light of the continuing Russian aggression and atrocities. The White House, FACT SHEET: United States, G7 and EU Impose Severe and Immediate Costs on Russia, April 6, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/06/fact-sheet-united-states-g7-and-eu-impose-severe-and-immediate-costs-on-russia/. The fact sheet is copied below.

“Today, the United States, with the G7 and the European Union, will continue to impose severe and immediate economic costs on the Putin regime for its atrocities in Ukraine, including in Bucha. We will document and share information on these atrocities and use all appropriate mechanisms to hold accountable those responsible. As one part of this effort, the United States is announcing devastating economic measures to ban new investment in Russia, and impose the most severe financial sanctions on Russia’s largest bank and several of its most critical state-owned enterprises and on Russian government officials and their family members. These sweeping financial sanctions follow our action earlier this week to cut off Russia’s frozen funds in the United States to make debt payments. Importantly, these measures are designed to reinforce each other to generate intensifying impact over time.

“The United States and more than 30 allies and partners across the world have levied the most impactful, coordinated, and wide-ranging economic restrictions in history. Experts predict Russia’s GDP will contract up to 15 percent this year, wiping out the last fifteen years of economic gains. Inflation is already spiking above 15 percent and forecast to accelerate higher. More than 600 private sector companies have already left the Russian market. Supply chains in Russia have been severely disrupted. Russia will very likely lose its status as a major economy, and it will continue a long descent into economic, financial, and technological isolation. Compared to last year, U.S. exports to Russia of items subject to our new export controls have decreased 99 percent by value – and the power of these restrictions will compound over time as Russia draws down any remaining stockpiles of spare parts for certain planes, tanks, and other resources needed for Putin’s war machine.

“As long as Russia continues its brutal assault on Ukraine, we will stand unified with our allies and partners in imposing additional costs on Russia for its actions. Today, the United States is announcing the following actions:

Full blocking sanctions on Russia’s largest financial institution, Sberbank, and Russia’s largest private bank, Alfa Bank. This action will freeze any of Sberbank’s and Alfa Bank’s assets touching the U.S financial system and prohibit U.S. persons from doing business with them. Sberbank holds nearly one-third of the overall Russian banking sector’s assets and is systemically critical to the Russian economy. Alfa Bank is Russia’s largest privately-owned financial institution and Russia’s fourth largest financial institution overall.

Prohibiting new investment in the Russian Federation. President Biden will sign a new Executive Order (E.O.) that includes a prohibition on new investment in Russia by U.S. persons wherever located, which will further isolate Russia from the global economy. This action builds on the decision made by more than 600 multinational businesses to exit from Russia. The exodus of the private sector includes manufacturers, energy companies, large retailers, financial institutions, as well as other service providers such as law and consulting firms. Today’s E.O. will ensure the enduring weakening of the Russian Federation’s global competitiveness.

Full blocking sanctions on critical major Russian state-owned enterprises. This will prohibit any U.S. person from transacting with these entities and freeze any of their assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction, thereby damaging the Kremlin’s ability to use these entities it depends on to enable and fund its war in Ukraine. The Department of Treasury will announce these entities tomorrow.

Full blocking sanctions on Russian elites and their family members, including sanctions on: President Putin’s adult children, Foreign Minister Lavrov’s wife and daughter, and members of Russia’s Security Council including former President and Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. These individuals have enriched themselves at the expense of the Russian people.  Some of them are responsible for providing the support necessary to underpin Putin’s war on Ukraine. This action cuts them off from the U.S. financial system and freezes any assets they hold in the United States.

The U.S. Treasury prohibited Russia from making debt payments with funds subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Sanctions do not preclude payments on Russian sovereign debt at this time, provided Russia uses funds outside of U.S. jurisdiction. However, Russia is a global financial pariah — and it will now need to choose between draining its available funds to make debt payments or default. 

Commitment to supporting sectors essential to humanitarian activities. As we continue escalating our sanctions and other economic measures against Russia for its brutal war against Ukraine, we reiterate our commitment to exempting essential humanitarian and related activities that benefit the Russian people and people around the world: ensuring the availability of basic foodstuffs and agricultural commodities, safeguarding access to medicine and medical devices, and enabling telecommunications services to support the flow of information and access to the internet which provides outside perspectives to the Russian people. These activities are not the target of our efforts, and U.S. and Western companies can continue to operate in these sectors in Russia. When necessary, relevant departments and agencies will issue appropriate exemptions and carveouts to ensure such activity is not disrupted.”

Similarly, the European Commission announced proposed additional sanctions (fifth round) on April 5 and agreed sanctions were announced by the Council of the European Union on April 8. See Press statement by President von der Leyen on the fifth round of sanctions against Russia, Strasbourg, 5 April 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_22_2281; Council of the EU Press release, 8 April 2022, EU adopts fifth round of sanctions against Russia over its military aggression against
Ukraine, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/04/08/eu-adopts-fifth-round-of-sanctions-against-russia-over-its-military-aggression-against-ukraine/; Official Journal of the European Union, L111, 8 April 2022. The Council’s statement is copied below.

“In light of Russia’s continuing war of aggression against Ukraine, and the reported atrocities committed by Russian armed forces in Ukraine, the Council decided today to impose a fifth package of economic and individual sanctions against Russia.

“The agreed package includes a series of measures intended to reinforce pressure on the Russian government and economy, and to limit the Kremlin’s resources for the aggression.

“‘These latest sanctions were adopted following the atrocities committed by Russian armed forces in Bucha and other places under Russian occupation. The aim of our sanctions is to stop the reckless, inhuman and aggressive behaviour of the Russian troops and make clear to the decision makers in the Kremlin that their illegal aggression comes at a heavy cost.’ Josep Borrell, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

“The package comprises:

“- a prohibition to purchase, import or transfer coal and other solid fossil fuels into the EU if they originate in Russia or are exported from Russia, as from August 2022. Imports of coal into the EU are currently worth EUR 8 billion per year.

“- a prohibition to provide access to EU ports to vessels registered under the flag of Russia. Derogations are granted for agricultural and food products, humanitarian aid, and energy.

“- a ban on any Russian and Belarusian road transport undertaking preventing them from transporting goods by road within the EU, including in transit. Derogations are nonetheless granted for a number of products, such as pharmaceutical, medical, agricultural and food products, including wheat, and for road transport for humanitarian purposes.

“- further export bans, targeting jet fuel and other goods such as quantum computers and advanced semiconductors, high-end electronics, software, sensitive machinery and transportation equipment, and new import bans on products such as: wood, cement, fertilisers, seafood and liquor. The agreed export and import bans only account for EUR 10 billion and EUR 5.5 billion respectively.

“- a series of targeted economic measures intended to strengthen existing measures and close loopholes, such as: a general EU ban on participation of Russian companies in public procurement in member states, the exclusion of all financial support to Russian public bodies. an extended prohibition on deposits to crypto-wallets, and on the sale of banknotes and transferrable securities denominated in any official currencies of the EU member states to Russia and Belarus, or to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia and Belarus,.

“Furthermore, the Council decided to sanction companies whose products or technology have played a role in the invasion, key oligarchs and businesspeople, high-ranking Kremlin officialsproponents of disinformation and information manipulation, systematically spreading the Kremlin’s narrative on Russia’s war aggression in Ukraine, as well as family members of already sanctioned individuals, in order to make sure that EU sanctions are not circumvented.

“Moreover a full transaction ban is imposed on four key Russian banks representing 23% of market share in the Russian banking sector. After being de-SWIFTed these banks will now be subject to an asset freeze, thereby being completely cut off from EU markets.

“In its conclusions of 24 March 2022, the European Council stated that the Union remains ready to close loopholes and target actual and possible circumvention of the restrictive measures already adopted, as well as to move quickly with further coordinated robust sanctions on Russia and Belarus to effectively thwart Russian abilities to continue the aggression.

“Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine grossly violates international law and is causing massive loss of life and injury to civilians. Russia is directing attacks against the civilian population and is targeting civilian objects, including hospitals, medical facilities, schools and shelters. These war crimes must stop immediately. Those responsible, and their accomplices, will be held to account in accordance with international law. The siege of Mariupol and other Ukrainian cities, and the denial of humanitarian access by Russian military forces are unacceptable. Russian forces must immediately provide for safe pathways to other parts of Ukraine, as well as humanitarian aid to be delivered to Mariupol and other besieged cities.

“The European Council demands that Russia immediately stop its military aggression in the territory of Ukraine, immediately and unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine, and fully respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders.

“The relevant legal acts will soon be published in the Official Journal.”

As listed above, the Official Journal with the legal actions identified was published on April 8 (OJ L111).

The United Kingdom also took action on April 6 to expand sanctions. Government of the United Kingdom Press Release, UK imposes sweeping new sanctions to starve Putin’s war machine, 6 April 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-imposes-sweeping-new-sanctions-to-starve-putins-war-machine. The sanctions announced in the press release are listed below.

“Key sanctions announced today include:

“asset freezes against Sberbank and Credit Bank of Moscow. Sberbank is Russia’s largest bank and this freeze is being taken in co-ordination with the US

“an outright ban on all new outward investment to Russia. In 2020 UK investment in Russia was worth over £11 billion. This will be another major hit to the Russian economy and further limit their future capabilities

“by the end of 2022, the UK will end all dependency on Russian coal and oil, and end imports of gas as soon as possible thereafter. From next week, the export of key oil refining equipment and catalysts will also be banned, degrading Russia’s ability to produce and export oil – targeting not only the industry’s finances but its capabilities as a whole

“action against key Russian strategic industries and state owned enterprises. This includes a ban on imports of iron and steel products, a key source of revenue. Russia’s military ambitions are also being thwarted by new restrictions on its ability to acquire the UK’s world-renowned quantum and advanced material technologies

“and targeting a further eight oligarchs active in these industries, which Putin uses to prop up his war economy.”

Canada, Japan and Australia also announced additional sanctions. See Government of Canada, Canada announces it will impose additional sanctionson Russian and Belarusian regimes, April 4, 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/04/canada-announces-it-will-impose-additional-sanctions-on-russian-and-belarusian-regimes.html; Reuters, Japan bans Russian coal imports, expels eight diplomats, April 8, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-considers-restrictions-coal-imports-russia-jiji-2022-04-07/; The Japan Times, Japan to expel eight Russians, including diplomats, as Kishida announces new sanctions, 8 April 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/04/08/national/japan-russia-expel-diplomats/ (“Kishida, however, announced a sweeping new round of sanctions, declaring that Japan will phase out imports of Russian coal, ban imports of Russian machinery, lumber and vodka, bar new investments in Russia and freeze assets held by major Russian lenders Sberbank and Alfa Bank. Japan will also freeze the assets of an additional 400 or so military personnel and lawmakers and some 20 military-related organizations, including state-run companies, Kishida said.”); Reuters, Australia to impose sanctions on 67 more Russians over Ukraine, April 7, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/australia-impose-sanctions-67-russians-over-ukraine-2022-04-07/; New Zealand to apply trade sanctions in response to Russian atrocities, April 6, 2022, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-apply-trade-sanctions-response-russian-atrocities (“The Government have announced that they will apply 35% tariffs to all imports from Russia, and extend the existing export prohibitions to industrial products closely connected to strategic Russian industries. This is New Zealand’s most significant economic response to the Russian invasion to date. ‘The images and reports emerging of atrocities committed against civilians in Bucha and other regions of Ukraine is abhorrent and reprehensible, and New Zealand continues to respond to Putin’s mindless acts of aggression,’ Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta said. ‘Under the Russia Sanctions Act, New Zealand will apply tariffs across the board to all Russian imports, as well as ban the export of industrial products such as ICT equipment and engines, sending a clear message that New Zealand will not fund or support the Russia war machine,’ Trade and Export Growth Minister Damien O’Connor said.”).

On April 8, President Biden also signed two Congressional bills into law, one suspending normal trade relations with Russia and Belarus and one banning imports of oil, gas and coal from Russia (President Biden had already banned such imports). See White House, Bills Signed: H.R. 6968 and H.R. 7108, APRIL 08, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/legislation/2022/04/08/bills-signed-h-r-6968-and-h-r-7108/ (“On Friday, April 8, 2022, the President signed into law: H.R. 6968, the ‘Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act,’ which statutorily prohibits the importation of energy products from the Russian Federation; and H.R. 7108, the ‘Suspending Normal Trade Relations with Russia and Belarus Act,’ which suspends normal trade relations with the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus and seeks to further leverage trade and human rights sanctions.”).

While major importing nations of Russian oil and gas have been unable or unwilling to date to cut off purchases of oil and gas, the level of economic and financial sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation and Belarus coupled with the withdrawal of major businesses (temporarily or permanently) from Russia are having significant negative effects on the Russian economy both short term and longer term. These effects coupled with the damage to the Ukrainian economy inflicted by the Russian war on Ukraine will have global effects. As reviewed in an earlier post, Ukraine and Russia are major exporters of various agricultural products. The war is both creating increased food insecurity and driving inflation on agricultural products which hurts all consumers but the poorest the hardest. See March 30, 2022:  Food security challenges posed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2022/03/30/food-security-challenges-posed-by-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine/. Indeed, global food prices reached an all time high in March. UN News, Ukraine war drives international food prices to ‘new all-time high’, 8 April 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115852

The WTO’s Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala has indicated that global trade growth will be nearly 50% lower than previously projected for 2022 (2.5% vs. 4.7%) flowing from the war in Ukraine and ongoing supply chain issues. Sunday Observer, Ukraine war to halve global trade growth – WTO, 10 April 2022, ww.sundayobserver.lk/2022/04/10/business/ukraine-war-halve-global-trade-growth-wto. The war and individual countries reactions to Russia’s aggression are also likely to have longer term effects on global integration and supply chains. One is already seeing significant reductions in foreign investment flows into China. China’s actions or inactions towards Russia’s aggression may reduce foreign investor confidence in the Chinese economy as a place for investment at least for exports. A return to isolation of some countries from the larger global community is certainly afoot. The only question is whether states besides Russia and Belarus will be in the ostracized group.

With Russia continuing its aggression against Ukraine and with apparent scorched earth tactics being pursued, it is likely that the latest round of sanctions will not be the last. The strains on the global economy are likely to worsen in the coming months.

Banned imports, higher tariffs, other actions by trading partners as Russia and Belarus lose most favored nation treatment by G-7 countries and EU during the conflict in Ukraine

In prior posts, I reviewed the joint statement by G-7 countries on their intention to suspend most favored nation treatment on Russia and stop the accession process into the WTO for Belarus in light of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine as well as actions to ban imports of petroleum and coal products and other economic sanctions. See, e.g., March 13, 2022:  Additional trade and other sanctions imposed by G-7 and EU countries on Russia and Belarus on March 11, 2022, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2022/03/13/additional-trade-and-other-sanctions-imposed-by-g-7-and-eu-countries-on-russia-and-belarus-on-march-11-2022/; March 9, 2022:  U.S. joins Canada in banning imports of Russian oil and gas; EU announces plan to drastically reduce reliance on Russian gas; United Kingdom will phase out imports of oil and gas from Russia by end of 2022; Australian oil companies stop purchasing Russian oil; https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2022/03/09/u-s-joins-canada-in-banning-imports-of-russian-oil-and-gas-eu-announces-plan-to-drastically-reduce-reliance-on-russian-gas-united-kingdom-will-phase-out-imports-of-oil-and-gas-from-russia-by-end-of/.

Press accounts review Japan suspending most favored nation treatment as part of the G-7 effort last week. Kyodo News, Japan to revoke Russia’s “most favored nation” status over Ukraine, March 16, 2022, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2022/03/2f6fbf6da2af-update1-japan-to-revoke-russias-most-favored-nation-status-over-ukraine.html.

Canada, a G-7 member, took action first, both banning imports of oil and applying 35% tariffs to other imports from Russia and Belarus. Government of Canada, Canada cuts Russia and Belarus from Most-Favoured-Nation Tariff treatment, March 3, 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2022/03/canada-cuts-russia-and-belarus-from-most-favoured-nation-tariff-treatment.html (“Today, the Honourable Chrystia Freeland, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, and the Honourable Mary Ng, Minister of International Trade, Export Promotion, Small Business and Economic Development, announced that the Government of Canada has issued the Most-Favoured-Nation Tariff Withdrawal Order (2022-1), removing these countries’ entitlement to the Most-Favoured-Nation Tariff (MFN) treatment under the Customs Tariff.  This Order results in the application of the General Tariff for goods imported into Canada that originate from Russia or Belarus. Under the General Tariff, a tariff rate of 35 per cent will now be applicable on virtually all of these imports. Russia and Belarus will join North Korea as the only countries whose imports are subject to the General Tariff.”); Government of Canada, Government of Canada Moves to Prohibit Import of Russian Oil, February 28, 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/natural-resources-canada/news/2022/02/government-of-canada-moves-to-prohibit-import-of-russian-oil.html

The United Kingdom has also taken action on revoking MFN treatment of Russian goods. UK Government Press Release, UK announces new economic sanctions against Russia and Belarus, 15 March 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-new-economic-sanctions-against-russia (“UK to deny Russia and Belarus access to Most Favoured Nation tariff for hundreds of their exports, depriving both nations key benefits of WTO membership. UK government publishes initial list of goods worth £900 million – including vodka – which will now face additional 35 percent tariff, on top of current tariffs.”).

In the European Union, action has been announced denying most favored nation status to Russia. European Commission, Statement by President von der Leyen on the fourth package of restrictive measures against Russia, 11 March 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_22_1724 (” First, we will deny Russia the status of most-favoured-nation in our markets. This will revoke important benefits that Russia enjoys as a WTO member. Russian companies will no longer receive privileged treatment in our economies.” “Fifth, very importantly, we will prohibit the import of key goods in the iron and steel sector from the Russian Federation.”). The fourth package of restrictive measures are contained in regulations and decisions included in L81I of volume 65 of the European Union Official Journal, March 15, 2022, Fifth, very importantly, we will prohibit the import of key goods in the iron and steel sector from the Russian Federation.”). The European Commission provided the following question and answer about denying Russia MFN treatment.

“What are the consequences of denying Russia most-favoured-nation (MFN) status?

“Removal of MFN status means suspending the benefits that come from being a WTO Member, more specifically the benefit of not being discriminated against by other Members. For example, MFN treatment guarantees that a Member will not be subject to higher tariffs than other Members, or to import bans that do not apply to other Members. Suspension of MFN treatment means that the Member concerned – in this case Russia – may be subject to higher tariffs and import bans.

“The EU has decided to act not through an increase on import tariffs, but through set of sanctions that comprise bans on the imports or exports of goods, as this is much quicker and more effective than preparing a completely new tariff schedule from scratch.

“In practice, the EU has already removed a number of trade benefits that Russia previously enjoyed through the imposition of sanctions. Additionally, the EU has restricted the provision of SWIFT financial services to certain Russian banks, which constitutes a disapplication of MFN vis-à-vis Russia under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Today’s sanctions remove further trade benefits from Russia.”

European Commission, Question and Answers: fourth package of restrictive measures against Russia, 15 March 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_22_1776.

In the United States, the President through executive order has restricted exports of luxury goods and many other items to Russia and Belarus and banned imports of oil, gas, coal and a number of other products reviewed in earlier posts. March 13, 2022:  Additional trade and other sanctions imposed by G-7 and EU countries on Russia and Belarus on March 11, 2022, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2022/03/13/additional-trade-and-other-sanctions-imposed-by-g-7-and-eu-countries-on-russia-and-belarus-on-march-11-2022/; March 9, 2022:  U.S. joins Canada in banning imports of Russian oil and gas; EU announces plan to drastically reduce reliance on Russian gas; United Kingdom will phase out imports of oil and gas from Russia by end of 2022; Australian oil companies stop purchasing Russian oil. https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2022/03/09/u-s-joins-canada-in-banning-imports-of-russian-oil-and-gas-eu-announces-plan-to-drastically-reduce-reliance-on-russian-gas-united-kingdom-will-phase-out-imports-of-oil-and-gas-from-russia-by-end-of/; February 28, 2022:  Trade sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2022/02/28/trade-sanctions-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/.

Such actions constitute treating Russia and Belarus differently (though Belarus is not a WTO Member and hence not entitled to MFN treatment by reason of WTO membership). To formally remove most favored nation treatment from Russia in the U.S., Congress must act. On Thursday, March 17, 2022, the House of Representatives passed a bill that would, inter alia, deny MFN treatment to Russia and Belarus and encourage USTR to take other actions at the WTO to block forward movement on Belarus’ accession to the WTO and urge other WTO Members to similarly deny MFN treatment to Russia. H.R. 7108 is embedded below.

House-bill-to-strip-PNTR-from-Russia-passed-House-on-3-17-2022

The United States tariff schedule has two columns of rates. Column 1 is the most favored nation rate. Column 2 is the other rate, often considerably higher. The House bill would have all imports from Russia and Belarus subject to the Column 2 rate. Moreover, the bill gives the President the authority to raise rates on products from those two countries above the Column 2 rate. The vast majority of imports from Russia are oil and gas products ($17.4 billion of $29.7 bill total imports in 2021) which already banned by Executive Order. Other products (worth about $1.5 billion) have also been banned by Executive order. Of the remaining imports the following fourteen 4-digit HS categories accounted for $8.14 billion of the imports from Russia in 2021

HS7110 PLATINUM  $ 2,449,856,890

HS7201 PIG IRON AND SPIEGELEISEN IN PIGS, BLOCKS OR OTHER PRIMARY FORMS  $1,157,617,274

HS7207 SEMIFINISHED PRODUCTS OF IRON OR NONALLOY STEEL  $886,744,073

HS3102 MINERAL OR CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS, NITROGENOUS  $723,784,769

HS2844 RADIOACTIVE CHEMICAL ELEMENTS AND ISOTOPES AND THEIR COMPOUNDS  $669,931,951

HS7601 ALUMINUM, UNWROUGHT  $423,969,585

HS7202 FERROALLOYS  $419,659,133

HS3104 MINERAL OR CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS, POTASSIC  $366,158,625

HS4412 PLYWOOD, VENEERED PANELS AND SIMILAR LAMINATED WOOD  $345,745,434

HS9306 BOMBS, GRENADES, TORPEDOES, ETC., AMMO  $173,633,545

HS7106 SILVER (INCLUDING SILVER PLATED WITH GOLD OR PLATINUM)  $144,208,220

HS8412 ENGINES AND MOTORS NESOI, AND PARTS THEREOF  $133,429,434

HS8108 TITANIUM AND ARTICLES THEREOF, INCLUDING WASTE AND SCRAP  $130,833,908

HS4002 SYNTHETIC RUBBER AND FATICE IN PRIMARY FORMS, ETC.  $114,129,678  

For three of the 14 categories, the column 2 rate is duty free just like the column 1 rate — HS7110, HS3102, HS 3104. For three others, column 2 rates range free to 45% (HS2844, HS8108) or 65% (HS7106. The other 8 categories had column 2 rates that were all above free and generally substantially higher than column 1 rates.

HS 7201, column 2 rates rom 2.5% to $1.10/ton

HS7207, 20%

HS7601, 10.5-25%

HS7202, 6.5-35%; up to 6.6cents/kg.

HS4412, 40-50%

HS 9306, 30-45%

HS8412, 27.5-35%

HS4002, 20%.

When the legislation becomes law (likely by end of March), the higher column 2 rates will apply to all imports from Russia and Belarus not banned from entry. For those categories that would remain duty free under column 2, President Biden will have the authority to raise rates (actually he will have the authority to raise rates on any products from the two countries).

While the trade actions outlined above are but one part of a much broader set of sanctions imposed by many trading partners, they add to the breadth of sanctions being imposed in light of the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the complicity of Belarus. The sanctions will remain in place and will likely continue to be increased until Ukraine’s sovereignty is respected, Russian troops (and various mercenaries brought in by Russia) withdrawn and a freely elected Ukrainian government either remains in place or is elected.

U.S. joins Canada in banning imports of Russian oil and gas; EU announces plan to drastically reduce reliance on Russian gas; United Kingdom will phase out imports of oil and gas from Russia by end of 2022; Australian oil companies stop purchasing Russian oil.

March 8, 2022 saw major announcements on new sanctions on the Russian Federation and/or Belarus from the United States, European Union and the United Kingdom and a continued exodus of major oil companies from Russian involvement.

In the United States, President Biden announced new actions in the form of an Executive order which bans –

“The importation into the United States of Russian crude oil and certain petroleum products, liquefied natural gas, and coal.

“* * *

“New U.S. investment in Russia’s energy sector, which will ensure that American companies and American investors are not underwriting Vladimir Putin’s eff orts to expand energy production inside Russia.
Americans will also be prohibited from financing or enabling foreign companies that are making investment to produce energy in Russia.”

The White House, FACT SHEET: United States Bans Imports of Russian Oil, Liquefied Natural Gas, and Coal, March 8, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/08/fact-sheet-united-states-bans-imports-of-russian-oil-liquefied-natural-gas-and-coal/.

The Executive Order reads in full –

“By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

“I, JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR., President of the United States of America, hereby expand the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14024 of April 15, 2021, and relied on for additional steps taken in Executive Order 14039 of August 20, 2021, finding that the Russian Federation’s unjustified, unprovoked, unyielding, and unconscionable war against Ukraine, including its recent further invasion in violation of international law, including the United Nations Charter, further threatens the peace, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and thereby constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.  Accordingly, I hereby order:

     “Section 1.  (a)  The following are prohibited:

“(i)    the importation into the United States of the following products of Russian Federation origin:  crude oil; petroleum; petroleum fuels, oils, and products of their distillation; liquefied natural gas; coal; and coal products;

“(ii)   new investment in the energy sector in the Russian Federation by a United States person, wherever located; and

“(iii)  any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a United States person, wherever located, of a transaction by a foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person would be prohibited by this section if performed by a United States person or within the United States.

     “(b)  The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or license or permit granted prior to the date of this order.

     “Sec. 2.  (a)  Any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

     “(b)  Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

     “Sec. 3.  Nothing in this order shall prohibit transactions for the conduct of the official business of the Federal Government or the United Nations (including its specialized agencies, programs, funds, and related organizations) by employees, grantees, or contractors thereof.

     “Sec. 4.  For the purposes of this order:

     “(a)  the term ‘entity’ means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization;

     “b)  the term ‘person’ means an individual or entity; and

     “(c)  the term ‘United States person’ means any United States citizen, lawful permanent resident, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States.

     “Sec. 5.  The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order.  The Secretary of the Treasury may, consistent with applicable law, redelegate any of these functions within the Department of the Treasury.  All executive departments and agencies of the United States shall take all appropriate measures within their authority to implement this order.

     “Sec. 6.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

“(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

“(ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

     “(b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

     “(c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

                             “JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

“THE WHITE HOUSE,

    “March 8, 2022.”

Executive Order on Prohibiting Certain Imports and New Investments With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, March 8, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/03/08/executive-order-on-prohibiting-certain-imports-and-new-investments-with-respect-to-continued-russian-federation-efforts-to-undermine-the-sovereignty-and-territorial-integrity-of-ukraine/.

The new prohibitions do not prevent honoring existing contracts in the next 45 days. President Biden reviewed that the steps were taken after consultations with allies realizing that many allies were not in a position to take identical action at the moment reflecting very different situations in terms of domestic production of oil and gas and dependency on imports from Russia. See The White House, Remarks by President Biden Announcing U.S. Ban on Imports of Russian Oil, Liquefied Natural Gas, and Coal, March 8, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/03/08/remarks-by-president-biden-announcing-u-s-ban-on-imports-of-russian-oil-liquefied-natural-gas-and-coal/ (“We’re moving forward on this ban, understanding that many of our European Allies and partners may not be in a position to join us.  The United States produces far more oil domestically than all of European — all the European countries combined.  In fact, we’re a net exporter of energy.  So we can take this step when others cannot. But we’re working closely with Europe and our partners to develop a long-term strategy to reduce their dependence on Russian energy as well.”).

The United Kingdom announced that it would phase out imports of oil from Russia during 2022. See Financial Times, US and UK ban Russian oil and gas imports in drive to punish Putin, March 8, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/2e0b1d84-e595-4c5a-be4e-928417b9c7cc (“UK prime minister Boris Johnson’s government said it would phase out the import of Russian oil by the end of the year. Kwasi Kwarteng, UK business secretary, said the British government would organise an ‘orderly transition’ away from Russian oil imports. But Rishi Sunak, UK chancellor, told a cabinet meeting that consumers would pay a price for the ban, with lower-income households particularly hard hit. The UK is less dependent on Russia than much of mainland Europe, with Russian supplies making up 8 per cent of overall oil imports into the UK. Johnson is expected to make a statement later this week on reducing British imports of Russian gas.”).

The European Commission announced a proposed ambitious program to diversify gas supplies and expand renewables to achieve a potential two-thirds reduction in dependence on Russian oil and gas by the end of 2022 for the European Union. The program, RePowerEU, was announced on March 8th and contains a number of documents. The opening statement of Executive Vice-President Timmermans is copied below in part.

“Opening remarks by Executive Vice-President Timmermans

“* * *

“It is abundantly clear that we are too dependent on Russia for our energy needs. It is not a free
market if there is a state actor willing to manipulate it.

“The answer to this concern for our security lies in renewable energy and diversification of supply.

“Renewables give us the freedom to choose an energy source that is clean, cheap, reliable, and ours.
And, instead of continuing to fund fossil fuel imports and fund Russian oligarchs, renewables create
new jobs here in Europe.

“With the plan we outline today, the EU can end its dependence on Russian gas and repower Europe.
Fit for 55, once implemented, will reduce the EU’s total gas consumption by 30% by 2030. That’s
100 billion cubic meters of gas we will no longer need.

“Now, we will take it to the next level.

“By the end of this year, we can replace 100 bcm of gas imports from Russia. That is two-thirds of
what we import from them. This will end our over-dependency and give us much needed room to
maneuver. Two thirds by the end of this year.

“It is hard, bloody hard. But, it is possible, if we are willing to go further and faster than we have
done before.

“REPowerEU is our plan to make Europe independent from Russian gas.

“It is based on two tracks:

“First: we will diversify supply and bring in more renewable gases.

“With more LNG and pipeline imports, we can replace 60 bcm of Russian gas within the next
12 months.

“By doubling sustainable production of biomethane we can replace another 18 bcm, using
the Common Agricultural Policy to help farmers become energy producers.

“We can also increase the production and import of renewable hydrogen. A Hydrogen
Accelerator will develop integrated infrastructure and offer all Member States access to
affordable renewable hydrogen. 20 million tonnes of hydrogen can replace 50 bcm of Russian
gas.

“We will also start replacing natural gas with renewable gases. This, in sum, is the first pillar of
REPowerEU.

“In parallel, we must accelerate our clean energy transition. Renewables make us more
independent, and they are more affordable and reliable than the volatile gas market.

“So, we need to put millions more photovoltaic panels on the roofs of our homes,
businesses, and farms. We must also double the installation rate of heat pumps over the
next 5 years.

“This is low-hanging fruit. By the end of this year, almost 25% of Europe’s current electricity
production could come from solar energy.

“In addition to this, we need to speed up permitting procedures to grow our on- and offshore wind capacity, and rollout large-scale solar projects. This is a matter of overriding public interest.

“Some of these changes will not happen overnight, and that’s why we also need to prepare for next
winter.

“By October, gas storage facilities in the EU must be filled up to 90% capacity. And the Commission is
ready to support joint procurement of gas.

“Finally, and most importantly, we need to protect those who are struggling to pay their energy bills.

“Our plan today proposes several ways to help the most exposed households and businesses.

“Kadri will go through these in more detail.

“To conclude, RePowerEU is our plan to break our dependency on Russian gas, and to find freedom in
our energy choices.

“We can do it, and we can do it fast.

“All we need is the courage and grit to get us there. If ever there was a time to do it, it is now.

European Commission, Opening remarks by Executive Vice-President Timmermans and Commissioner Simson at the press conference on the REPowerEU Communication, Brussels, 8 March 2022.

See European Commission, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy, Strasbourg, 8.3.2022, COM(2022) 108 final.

While Australia does not appear to have announced a ban on imports of Russian oil into Australia, its two oil companies have announced cessation of procurement or lack of procurement from Russia. See Reuters, Australian refiners cease purchase of Russian crude oil, voice support for Ukraine, March 8, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/australias-viva-energy-cease-purchase-russian-crude-oil-2022-03-08/.

Other actions

While the U.S. Congress has bills pending before both the House of Representatives and the Senate that would remove normal trade relations status on Russia (i.e., end most favored nation treatment) and instruct the US Trade Representative to seek suspension or removal of Russia from the WTO, press reports indicate that with President Biden’s action on Russian oil, gas and coal, the Administration has asked for a different piece of legislation from Congress, one that wouldn’t (at least at present) address normal trade relations or Russia in the WTO. See Inside U.S. Trade’s World Trade Online, House drops push to strip Russia of PNTR at administration’s request, March 8, 2022, https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/house-drops-push-strip-russia-pntr-administration%E2%80%99s-request. While Canada has suspended normal trade relations on goods from Russia and Belarus, U.S. inaction presumably reflects the focus of the U.S. and European allies on other sanction issues while seeking internal support for the step of suspending normal trade relations.

On March 9, 2022, the EU announced additional financial sanctions of Belarus and an expansion of individuals being sanctioned in Russia. See European Commission press release, Ukraine: EU agrees to extend the scope ofsanctions on Russia and Belarus, 9 March 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1649. Most of the press release is copied below.

“The European Commission welcomes today’s agreement of Member States to adopt further targeted sanctions in view of the situation in Ukraine and in response to Belarus’s involvement in the aggression. In particular, the new measures impose restrictive measures on 160 individuals and amend Regulation (EC) 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and Regulation (EU) 833/2014 concerning Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. These amendments create a closer alignment of EU sanctions regarding Russia and Belarus and will help to ensure even more effectively that Russian sanctions cannot be circumvented, including through Belarus.

“For Belarus, the measures introduce SWIFT prohibitions similar to those in the Russia regime, clarify that crypto assets fall under the scope of “transferable securities” and further expand the existing financial restrictions by mirroring the measures already in place regarding Russia sanctions.

“In particular, the agreed measures will:

“Restrict the provision of SWIFT services to Belagroprombank, Bank Dabrabyt, and the Development Bank of the Republic of Belarus, as well as their Belarusian subsidiaries.

“Prohibit transactions with the Central Bank of Belarus related to the management of reserves or assets, and the provision of public financing for trade with and investment in Belarus.

“Prohibit the listing and provision of services in relation to shares of Belarus state-owned entities on EU trading venues as of 12 April 2022.

“Significantly limit the financial inflows from Belarus to the EU, by prohibiting the acceptance of deposits exceeding €100.000 from Belarusian nationals or residents, the holding of accounts of Belarusian clients by the EU central securities depositories, as well as the selling of euro-denominated securities to Belarusian clients.

“Prohibit the provision of euro denominated banknotes to Belarus.

“For Russia, the amendment introduces new restrictions on the export of maritime navigation and radio communication technology, adds Russian Maritime Register of Shipping to the list of state-owned enterprises subject to financing limitations and introduces a prior information sharing provision for exports of maritime safety equipment.

“In addition, it also extends the exemption relating to the acceptance of deposits exceeding €100.000 in EU banks to Swiss and EEA nationals.

“Finally, the EU confirmed the common understanding that loans and credit can be provided by any means, including crypto assets, as well as further clarified the notion of “transferable securities”, so as to clearly include crypto-assets, and thus ensure the proper implementation of the restrictions in place.

“Furthermore, the amendment introduces new restrictions.

“Furthermore, an additional 160 individuals have been listed in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

“The listed individuals include:

“- 14 oligarchs and prominent businesspeople involved in key economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Federation – notably in the metallurgical, agriculture, pharmaceutical, telecom and digital industries -, as well as their family members.

“- 146 members of the Russian Federation Council, who ratified the government decisions of the ‘Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Donetsk People’s Republic’ and the ‘Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Luhansk People’s Republic’.

“Altogether, EU restrictive measures now apply to a total of 862 individuals and 53 entities.”

As Russia continues to escalate its hostilities in Ukraine, the U.S., EU, G7 and other countries continue to make clear that there will be major costs imposed on Russia for the unprovoked war. While many of the sanctions are financial, some are trade focused. The move away from Russian oil and gas and the restrictions on the export to Russia of materials and technology for the sector will significantly reduce Russian gross domestic product over time with so much of the economy currently tied to oil, gas and coal.

Removal of MFN benefits for goods from Russia and Belarus — Canada moves first; Ukraine applies economic embargo on Russia; EU and US consider removal of MFN benefits

  1. Canada

Amid the global outcry at the actions of the Russian Federation in waging war on Ukraine, countries are reviewing options to increase the economic pain on Russia and Belarus which has permitted its country to be used for staging and other purposes. Canada acted on March 3, 2022 by removing both the Russian Federation and Belarus from receiving most favored nation treatment on any imports into Canada. See Department of Finance Canada, Canada cuts Russia and Belarus from Most-Favoured-Nation Tariff treatment, March 3, 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2022/03/canada-cuts-russia-and-belarus-from-most-favoured-nation-tariff-treatment.html; Deputy Prime Minister of Canada Chrystia Freeland, Canada cuts Russia and Belarus from Most-Favoured-Nation Tariff treatment, March 3, 2022, https://deputypm.canada.ca/en/news/news-releases/2022/03/03/canada-cuts-russia-and-belarus-most-favoured-nation-tariff-treatment; Canada Border Services Agency, Order withdrawing the Most-Favoured-Nation status from Russia and Belarus, Customs Notice 22-02, https://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/publications/cn-ad/cn22-02-eng.html. The press releases contain the following explanation of the action being taken.

“Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, supported by Belarus, is a violation of international law and threat to the rules-based international order. Canada is taking further action to ensure those who do not support the rules-based international order cannot benefit from it.

“Today, the Honourable Chrystia Freeland, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, and The Honourable Mary Ng, Minister of International Trade, Export Promotion, Small Business and Economic Development, announced that the Government of Canada has issued the Most-Favoured-Nation Tariff Withdrawal Order (2022-1), removing these countries’ entitlement to the Most-Favoured-Nation Tariff (MFN) treatment under the Customs Tariff.

“This Order results in the application of the General Tariff for goods imported into Canada that originate from Russia or Belarus. Under the General Tariff, a tariff rate of 35 per cent will now be applicable on virtually all of these imports. Russia and Belarus will join North Korea as the only countries whose imports are subject to the General Tariff.

“This measure is in addition to the many punitive actions that Canada and its allies have already taken against Russia and Belarus as a result of the illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, including other trade restrictions under the Special Economic Measures Act.

“Quotes

“‘Today, I am announcing that Canada will be the first country to revoke Russia’s and Belarus’s Most-Favoured-Nation status as a trading partner under Canadian law. We are working closely with our partners and allies to encourage them to take the same step. Simply put, this means that Russia and Belarus will no longer receive the benefits – particularly low tariffs – that Canada offers to other countries that are fellow members of the WTO. The economic costs of the Kremlin’s barbaric war are already high, and they will continue to rise. Canada and our allies are united in our condemnation of President Putin and his war of aggression, and we are united in our support for the remarkable Ukrainians who are so bravely resisting his assault.’

“– The Honourable Chrystia Freeland, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance

“‘It is the direct result of Russia’s unjustified invasion of Ukraine that has triggered our government’s removal of the Most-Favoured-Nation Tariff (MFN) treatment on almost all imports from Russia and Belarus. Canada is stepping up by putting significant economic pressure on Russia, and is providing resources to Ukraine including military equipment and emergency humanitarian support. Canada remains resolute in our solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, and we will continue supporting them as they fight to defend their freedom and democracy.’

“– The Honourable Mary Ng, Minister of International Trade, Export Promotion, Small Business
and Economic Development”.

Later in the press release there is a list of other actions Canada has taken in response to the Russian war against Ukraine including the following.

“This measure complements other recent measures targeting trade with Russia and Belarus, which will come into force imminently, including the ban on crude oil imports from Russia and Belarus, announced on February 28, 2022, and the ban on Russian owned or registered ships and fishing vessels from Canadian ports and internal waters, announced on March 1, 2022.

2. Ukraine

Ukraine notified the WTO on March 2, 2022 that “Ukraine severed its diplomatic relations with the aggressor state, decided to impose a complete economic embargo and no longer apply the WTO agreements in its relations with the Russian Federation.” The Ukrainian letter to the Chairman of the WTO General Council is included below.

Letter-from-Ukraine-to-WTO-re-not-applying-WTO-obligations-to-Russia

3. United States

In the United States, withdrawal of MFN treatment is being considered by the Congress with bills introduced in both the House and the Senate as well as bills to ban imports of oil and petroleum products from Russia. See February 28, 2022:  Trade sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2022/02/28/trade-sanctions-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/ (reviewing H.R. 6835); see also S.3717 introduced by Senators Cassidy and Brown (“A bill to withdraw normal trade relations treatment from, and apply certain provisions of title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 to, products of the Russian Federation, and for other purposes”); S.3722 introduced by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Wyden (“a bill to withdraw normal trade relations treatment from, and apply certain provisions of title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 to products of the Russian Federation, and for other purposes”); S.3718 introduced by Senator Marshall and eight others (a bill to prohibit the importation of petroleum and petroleum products from the Russian Federation”). These bills are in addition to many others looking to impose additional sanctions on the Russian Federation.

While the U.S. has applied some sanctions on Belarus, at present the bills before Congress do not seek removal of MFN treatment from goods from Belarus. As Belarus is not yet a WTO Member (it is going through the accession process), there are not the same WTO considerations in removal of MFN treatment on goods from Belarus.

4. European Union

Press articles indicate that the EU is actively considering whether to remove MFN treatment for Russia. See, e.g., Bloomberg, EU Seeks to End Russia’s Most-Favored Nation Status at WTO, March 3, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-03/eu-seeks-to-suspend-russia-s-most-favored-nation-status-at-wto (“‘In reaction to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the EU has adopted sweeping sanctions vis-a-vis Russia, which undoubtedly have a major impact on trade,’ European Commission Spokeswoman Miriam Garcia Ferrer said in an emailed reply to Bloomberg. ‘We are discussing options available to us in the WTO context. This includes the possibility of removing MFN treatment to Russia on the basis of the WTO national security exception.’”); Financial Times, Canada imposes tariffs on Russian imports by using WTO exemption, March 4, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/88b1b680-cc23-4e69-ba2d-69c7d96910b0 (“Bernd lange, chair of the European parliament’s international trade committee, tweeted: ‘We cannot continue with business as usual in WTO when it comes to trade with Russia. One step could be to remove MFN status.'”).

The EU has been Russia’s largest trading partner, importing $188 billion worth of goods in 2021. See https://www.statista.com/statistics/1099626/russia-value-of-trade-in-goods-with-eu/. A large portion of EU imports from the Russian Federation are oil and gas. The Financial Times articles indicates that in 2020 more than two thirds of imports from Russia into the EU were oil and gas.

Comments

One can expect that there will be continuing efforts to increase the sanctions and trade costs on Russia and Belarus for the unprovoked war in Ukraine. Denying both countries MFN treatment can be expected by some countries. Canada’s lead hopefully will be followed by the U.S. and EU and others.

In a number of countries, informal bans on Russian goods, including oil and gas is already occurring. See, e.g., BBC News, Ukraine sanctions: UK dockers refuse tanker of Russian gas, March 4, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-kent-60619112.

The larger issue of whether WTO Members should exclude Russia from the organization is also attracting at least private sector comments. See, e.g., March 2, 2022:  A former Appellate Body Chair argues WTO Members have the ability to remove the Russian Federation from WTO Membership; other proposals to strip MFN benefits from Russia and services restrictions, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2022/03/02/a-former-appellate-body-chair-argues-wto-members-have-the-ability-to-remove-the-russian-federation-from-wto-membership-other-proposals-to-strip-mfn-benefits-from-russia-and-services-restrictions/; Kevin D. Williamson, National Review, Force Russia from WTO?, February 28, 2022, https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/force-russia-from-wto/.

Many countries have raised the conflict at the WTO during the recent February 23-24, 2022 General Council meeting and at the recent February 28, 2022 Dispute Settlement Body meeting. See, e.g., EU Statements at the General Council Meeting, 23 and 24 February 2022, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/world-trade-organization-wto/111430/eu-statements-general-council-meeting-23-and-24-february-2022_en (“Thursday 24 February 2022 (morning), STATEMENT ON THE INVASION OF UKRAINE BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, We heard many Delegations talking about the tragedy to human lives brought about by the Covid pandemic. Today the tragedy is people being killed by the use of force following the invasion of Ukraine this morning. This is a sad day for Europe, a sad day for the world. The European Union strongly condemns this unjustified attack on Ukraine, an independent and sovereign State. This constitutes a gross violation of international law. In these dark hours, our thoughts are with the innocent women, men and children as they face this unprovoked attack and fear for their lives.“); Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
Geneva, February 28, 2022, https://uploads.mwp.mprod.getusinfo.com/uploads/sites/25/2022/03/Feb28.DSB_.Stmt_.as_.deliv_.fin_.pdf “• Before addressing the present agenda item, the United States will comment on the atrocious situation that we see happening on the ground in Ukraine. • The United States stands with Ukraine. The United States condemns Russia’s further invasion of and continuing military assault against the sovereign nation and people of Ukraine, and condemns this violation of the core principles that uphold global peace and security. The United States will continue to support the Ukrainian people as they defend their country from this unprovoked attack and we commend the true and tremendous courage we are seeing from the Ukrainian people, the armed forces, and Ukrainian leaders. The United States has expressed its views before and after the UN Security Council vote and I refer Members to our previous official statements for more details.”).

While the WTO news releases include a statement from the Director-General on the Ukraine conflict, the press releases reviewing meetings where the Ukraine conflict has been raised by Members is silent on the issue being raised. See, e.g., WTO news release, WTO dispute panel to review Chinese complaint regarding Australian duties, February 28, 2022, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/dsb_28feb22_e.htm; WTO news release, WTO chairpersons for 2022, February 24, 2022, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres22_e/pr898_e.htm; WTO news release, WTO members agree on mid-June dates for reconvening MC12, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/mc12_23feb22_e.htm; WTO news release, WTO members initiate membership talks for Turkmenistan, February 23, 2022, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/acc_23feb22_e.htm.

It is not clear if major Members like the U.S. and EU will seek specific action against Russia within the WTO in the coming weeks or simply pursue any action unilaterally (or in coordination with certain other trading partners). Hopefully, concerned nations will see that Russia is held accountable at all multilateral organizations, including the WTO. One can assume that accession negotiations with Belarus will stop progressing until there is a satisfactory resolution of the conflict from the view of many of the existing WTO Members (other than the Russian Federation).

It is possible that WTO Members at least on a plurilateral basis will look at steps to facilitate medical and food assistance to Ukraine during the crisis. Such action is occurring and will certainly continue to occur by certain WTO Members outside of the context of the WTO, but the WTO has a role it could play. Similarly, the WHO recently took action to get 36 tons of medical supplies to the Polish border with Ukraine as the following tweet reviews. More can and should be done.

WHO-medical-assistance

Just as the COVID-19 pandemic has tested the world and involve trade elements for its resolution, so too the unprovoked war on Ukraine started by Russia and facilitated by Belarus is testing the world and needs a meaningful trade response as part of the effort to achieve a peaceful resolution.

WTO Information Notes on COVID-19 Vaccine Production and Potential Bottlenecks

On October 8, 2021, the WTO released the latest in a series of Information Notes pertaining to the COVID-19 pandemic. The first one is entitled “COVID-19 Vaccine Production and Tariffs on Vaccine Inputs”. The purpose of the information note was to examine public information to see if import tariffs in any of the 27 major vaccine manufacturing countries could pose challenges or create “choke” points in vaccine production. The second Information Note is entitled “Indicative List of Trade-Related Bottlenecks and Trade-Facilitating Measures on Critical Products to Combat COVID-19” and is an update on an earlier version released 20 July 2020. Both Information Notes are linked to a WTO press release from 8 October. See WTO news, WTO issues papers on vaccine inputs tariffs and bottlenecks on critical COVID-19 products, 8 October 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/covid_08oct21_e.htm

The second Information Note is the more important of the two papers as it identifies a range of challenges to the expedited movement of vaccines and inputs. However, the first paper is interesting in terms of identifying tariffs on critical materials in major producing countries. However, as the paper acknowledges, the analysis has its limitations.

” 2. TECHNICAL DETAILS
“The MFN applied tariffs were based on the dataset used for World Tariff Profiles 2021, and 2020
imports were based on the TDM dataset3. Even if the national tariff line data (i.e. eight-digit tariff
line codes) were available, beyond the standard HS six-digit level there is no uniformity of codes
across national tariff nomenclatures. Thus, even if only a portion of the HS six-digit code pertains to
the COVID-19 vaccine input, the data used in the analysis both for tariffs and imports were the
six-digit MFN tariff average and the total six-digit imports from the world. Preferential tariffs were
not taken into consideration and thus intra-EU imports, imports from partners of free trade
agreements (FTAs) or any other preferential imports were treated as if MFN tariffs were levied.
Furthermore, there was definitely an over-estimation of the import value of the inputs, since
identification of the national breakdown pertaining to the actual product used in vaccine
manufacturing cannot be easily done. Sometimes even within the most detailed national tariff line
(or specific product) code available (eight digits or longer), the product coverage does not
necessarily refer only to the specific vaccine input and includes non-vaccine-related inputs. While
tariff estimates can be arguably good enough,4 the same cannot be said of the estimated imports
value.” (footnotes omitted)

Certainly for the EU, U.S. and some others, many of the potentially dutiable imports will have been duty free from FTAs or other preferential partners. But the Information is nonetheless useful in flagging general categories of products important to vaccine production that have bound tariffs at 5% or greater. While neither the U.S. nor Japan have any such categories, many other vaccine producing countries have one, several or many product categories where bound tariffs are 5% or higher. Table 4 of the Information Note provides a useful summary of the findings made.

Table 2 of the Information Note presents a summary of the weighted average MFN tariff rate by country.
Thus, from a bound tariff perspective, some countries, particularly developing countries are assessing ordinary customs duties on materials needed for the production of COVIDE-19 vaccines at relatively high rates that at a minimum increase costs, making it more expensive to provide vaccines to the domestic population or export populations.

A detailed review of each of the 27 countries is provided in the WTO’s Vaccine Production and Tariffs on Vaccine Inputs which is attached to the first Information Note.

The second note is the more interesting as it reflects issues and suggestions from various stakeholders on how to expand production and access to vaccines, therapeutics and medical devices needed to combat COVID-19. The introduction to the Information note provides useful background.

“1. INTRODUCTION
“This information note seeks to facilitate access to information on possible trade-related bottlenecks and trade-facilitating measures on critical products to combat COVID-19, including inputs used in vaccine manufacturing, vaccine distribution and approval, therapeutics and pharmaceuticals, diagnostics and medical devices. It is not meant to be an exhaustive list of all specific trade measures, nor does it make any judgement on the effect or significance of the reported bottlenecks, nor on the desirability of implementing any of the suggestions on trade-facilitating measures.3

“The indicative list is based on issues identified and suggestions made by stakeholders at various events and consultations convened by the WTO, as well as with vaccine manufacturers in the context of meetings organized by the Multilateral Leaders Task Force on COVID-19,4 which includes the heads of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank Group, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the WTO.5 This revision includes information as of 4 October 2021. Entries under each subheading are presented in no particular order. One common theme that emerges is that essential goods and inputs need to flow efficiently and expeditiously to support the rapid scaling up of COVID-19 production capacity worldwide. As manufacturers scale up production and establish new sites in different countries, the production network is not only becoming larger but also increasingly complex and international. The delay of a single component may significantly slow down or even bring vaccine manufacturing to a halt, so it follows that inputs need to flow expeditiously, and each node within the supply chain network needs to operate seamlessly with the others.” (footnotes omitted)

There are a large number of potential trade-related bottlenecks including export restrictions (13 WTO Members are reported to have one or more), such restrictions as applied by manufacturers to “fill and finish” sites, effect of such restrictions on clinical trials, high applied tariffs, customs administration challenges (no green channels for expedited clearance, limited hours of customs operation, treatment of non-commercial samples sent for testing ad quality control, import barriers/delays on manufacturing equipment), challenges in completing consular transactions.

There are also many bottlenecks identified from vaccine regulatory approval including when looking at WHO Emergency Use Listing, requirements for application/registration and authorization, inspection, release, post-approval changes, donations, EUA and regular approval, scaling up production and other issues.

The paper also identifies bottlenecks in the distribution of finished vaccines and immunization supplies, bottlenecks in trade in pharmaceuticals, bottlenecks in trade in diagnostics and other medical devices.

All in all, a daunting list of challenges the vast majority of which involve the importing country and the complexity of systems for approval of medical goods and vaccines.

The last four pages of the Information Note then identify “possible trade-facilitating measures” that could be taken to improve movement of goods. Because the information note is providing a summary of proposals put forward by stakeholders and is not an agreed set of steps by WTO Members, the note states that “no judgement is made on the desirability of implementing any of these suggestions.” Page 7. That said, many of the suggestions relate to streamlining import operations, e.g., through implementation of the Trade Facilitation Agreement, seeing that customs operates 24 hours/7 days a week, exemptions from export restrictions, harmonization of regulatory approaches and many more.

Conclusion

The Information Notes developed by the WTO provide useful information either from public sources, such as the bound tariff rates of COVID-19 vaccine input materials or summaries of information gathered from stakeholders at events looking at how to ramp up production and distribution of vaccines. It is clear that the challenges for all WTO Members in addressing the global pandemic are many and not easily addressed. The Information Notes provide a data base that can be used by WTO Members to see that the current pandemic is fully addressed in fact in the coming months, and that Members consider ways to prepare for a better outcome to future pandemics.

WTO Accessions — perhaps the most valuable benefit for Members in the first 25 years of the WTO’s existence

Much has been written about the challenges facing the World Trade Organization twenty-five years after its birth at the beginning of 1995.

The Appellate Body (“AB”) has ceased functioning with the United States blocking the appointment of new AB members based on longstanding problems with the Dispute Settlement system that have not been addressed. There are fundamental differences among major Members in what the proper role of the dispute settlement system is. Because the AB’s view of its role has differed from that of at least some of the Members, many delegations have opted to litigate instead of negotiate on issues which are not covered by the actual language of existing agreements.

The negotiating function of the WTO has had limited success in the first 25 years of the WTO reflecting deep differences among Members in priorities and the core function of the WTO. The inability to update rules or develop new rules to address 21st century commercial realities has called into question the ongoing relevance of the organization Members have failed to honor agreement directions for periodic liberalization updates in agriculture and services trade. Members have also taken decades to tackle issues of pressing time sensitivity, such as fisheries subsidies.

And there are problems in the timeliness and completeness of notifications required by many agreements and the quality of the work of many of the Committees.

A bright spot for an organization in trouble has been the success of bringing additional countries and territories into the organization. Of the 164 members at present, 36 have joined since the WTO opened in 1995 and some 23 countries or territories are in the accession process at the moment. Some 98% of global trade is now covered by WTO Members. While there are many reasons for countries or territories to join the WTO, including integrating into the global economy and improving the competitiveness of the economy (Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff describes the benefits of accession as being a catalyst for domestic reform and economic growth), there is no doubt that accessions are of benefit to the global trading system and bring the benefits of liberalization in the acceding country or territory to the existing WTO membership. Indeed, commitments of acceding Members in terms of tariff liberalization and other obligations typically are far higher than the commitments of existing Members at the same economic stage of development. Yet, accession is of great benefit to acceding countries. See WTO press release, 8 November 2020, DDG Wolff: WTO accession is a catalyst for domestic reform and economic growth, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/ddgaw_06nov20_e.htm. DDG Wolff, in speaking to Arab countries in the accession process made the following comments:

“Furthermore, during the last eight months, the world has experienced unprecedented levels of disruptions in people’s daily lives and their economic activities due to Covid-19. The world is not near the end of this crisis. Despite these challenging times, trade has played a key role in addressing local shortages of food, medical supplies and other essentials during the pandemic.

“Trade will have to play an even greater role in supporting recovery of the global economy going forward. In this context, we should recognise the important role played by Saudi Arabia in steering the G20 during this difficult year, urging collective and multilateral cooperation. The Riyadh Initiative is a praiseworthy effort endorsed by the G20 nations.

“The Arab region has not escaped the dire economic consequences of this pandemic. For some, the steep fall in oil prices has aggravated existing problems. A crisis, however, also presents opportunities for closer international cooperation to limit the harm from the pandemic and to spur the recovery.

“These issues demonstrate that more, not less, global and regional trade integration is required. Integration into the world economy goes hand in hand with necessary domestic reforms. This is where WTO accession makes particularly valuable contributions. Those engaged in the reform-driven accession process are likely to experience a quicker recovery and greater resilience in the future.

“Based on evidence from the 36 accessions which have been successfully completed, the WTO accession process has served as an effective external anchor for domestic reforms, acting as a catalyst in realizing the potential of their economies. According to the last WTO Director-General’s Annual Report on WTO Accessions, Article XII Members have registered higher growth rates of GDP and trade (exports and imports), as well as increased flows of inward FDI stocks, in the years following their accession compared to the rest of the world. These results indicate that integrated, open economies tend to grow faster. In addition, by signalling a government’s commitment to international rules, WTO membership appears to also encourage the inflow of foreign investment.

“The accession process has been used by resource-based countries to diversify their economies. Economic diversification is one of the major priorities for the governments in the Arab region. Our 2016 study examined whether countries’ export structures became more diversified after gaining WTO membership. This was true for about half of the recently acceded
Members, which increased the number of exported products, measured in HS chapters, accounting for more than 60% of their exports after accession. This was achieved often through rebranding their economies with WTO membership and attracting increased FDI.”

From 1995-2016, the thirty-six countries or territories that joined the WTO included many of the major economies that were not original Members of the WTO. These included China, Chinese Taipei, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation. The other countries or territories who have joined represent a wide cross-section of geographic regions and levels of development: Ecuador, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Panama, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Jordan, Georgia, Albania, Oman, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova, Armenia, North Macedonia, Nepal, Cambodia, Tonga, Cabo Verde, Montenegro, Samoa, Vanuatu, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Tajikistan, Yemen, Seychelles, Kazakhstan, Liberia, and Afghanistan. No accessions have been completed since 2016.

The twenty-three countries and territories that are in the process of accession often are countries or territories that have suffered from years of conflict. This has led the WTO to host the first “Trade for Peace Week” from November 30-December 4, 2020. See WTO press release, 25 November 2020, WTO to host first Trade for Peace Week, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/acc_25nov20_e.htm.

“In announcing the Trade for Peace Week, Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff noted: ‘The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development recognizes international trade as an engine for inclusive economic growth and poverty reduction that contributes to the promotion of sustainable development. This in turn can facilitate building and maintaining peace. The connection between trade and peace is the raison d’être for the creation of the rules-based multilateral trading system that led to economic recovery and prosperity after the devastation from World War II.’

“Currently, 23 countries are in the process of joining the WTO, and over a half of them suffer from a fragile situation from years of conflicts. Launched in 2017, the Trade for Peace initiative aims to assist fragile and conflict-affected (FCA) countries through WTO accession, with the emphasis on institution building based on the principles of non-discrimination, predictability, transparency and the rule of law. Based on experiences of former FAC countries, WTO accession can help set the conditions to move out of a state of fragility or conflict into a state of stability, economic well-being and peace.”

There are ten events this week. The public can register to participate in the virtual panels. See WTO Accessions, Trade for Peace Week, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/t4peace2020_e.htm.

DDG Wolff spoke at one of today’s event and his comments are embedded below. See WTO press release, November 30, 2020, DDG Alan Wolff – DDG Wolff calls for more structured WTO cooperation with humanitarian and peace communities, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/ddgaw_30nov20_e.htm.

WTO-_-2020-News-items-Speech-DDG-Alan-Wolff-DDG-Wolff-calls-for-more-s

The twenty-three countries and territories in the process of accession include: Algeria, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belarus, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros, Curacao, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanese Republic, Libya, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Timor-Leste, and Uzbekistan.

Conclusion

The genesis for the GATT and the other Bretton Woods institutions was a desire to provide an infrastructure and global rules to minimize the likelihood of future world wars. Cooperation, collaboration and integration would all reduce the likelihood of global conflict.

The WTO provides the opportunity for countries or territories struggling to escape violence to embark on a path of hope. That is a core mission of the WTO today just as it was for the GATT in the late 1940s.

Moreover, the record over the first twenty-five years of the WTO’s existence has been that those countries and territories who take the challenging steps to become Members of the WTO improve their economies and speed growth, development and foreign direct investment. Accessions also offer real improvements in market access for existing WTO Members. A true win-win situation.

For an organization struggling to maintain relevance amidst deep divisions among Members who seem to have lost the consensus on the core purpose of the organization, the pilgrimage of non-member countries and territories to join the organization is a beacon of hope. Serious reforms and updating of the rule book are desperately needed for a better functioning system where outcomes are based on underlying economic strengths and not the interference of governments. A willingness of Members to refocus on what the purpose of the WTO is in fact and to be supporters of contributing to the maximum of one’s ability will be key to forward movement. Inspiration can be drawn from the efforts of non-members to join.

The COVID-19 Pandemic – An Update on Shifting Patterns of Infections and Implications for Medical Goods Needs

Since late March there have been significant shifts in the number of COVID-19 cases being reported by countries and within countries. Many countries where the virus hit hardest in the first months of the year have been seeing steady progress in the reduction of cases. Some in Asia, Oceania and in Europe are close to no new cases. Others in Europe and some in Asia have seen significant contractions in the number of new cases. Other countries have seen a flattening of new cases and the beginnings of reductions (e.g., the U.S. and Canada). And, of course, other countries are caught up in a rapid increase of cases (e.g., Russia, Brazil, Ghana, Nigeria, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia).

As reviewed in a prior post, the shifting pattern of infections has implications for the needs for medical goods and open trade on those products. https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/04/28/shifting-trade-needs-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/. As the growth in number of cases is seen in developing and least developed countries, it is important that countries who have gotten past the worst part of Phase 1 of the pandemic eliminate or reduce export restraints, if any, that were imposed to address medical needs in country during the crush of the pandemic in country. It is also critical that the global efforts to increase production of medical goods including test kits and personal protective equipment continue to eliminate the imbalance between global demand and global supply and to permit the restoration and/or creation of national and regional buffer stocks needed now and to address any second phase to the pandemic. And as tests for therapeutics and vaccines advance, it is critical that there be coordinated efforts to see that products are available to all populations with needs at affordable prices.

While there is some effort at greater coordination on research and development as reviewed in a post last week (https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/05/06/covid-19-the-race-for-diagnostics-therapeutics-and-vaccines-and-availability-for-all/), concerns exist that as nations get past the first phase of the pandemic, countries will turn their focus to other needs and not in fact address the severe gaps between pandemic supply needs and existing capacity and inventories. Such an outcome would exacerbate the challenges the world is facing from the current pandemic and its likely phase 2 later this year.

The following table shows total cases as of May 11 and the number of cases over fourteen day periods ending April 11, April 27 and May 11 as reported by the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control. The data are self-explanatory but show generally sharply reduced rates of new infections in Europe and in a number of Asian countries, though there are increases in a few, including in India and Pakistan and in a number of countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia. North America has seen a flattening of the number of new infections in the U.S. and Canada with some small reductions in numbers while Mexico is seeing growth from currently relatively low levels. Central and South America have some countries with rapid increases (e.g., Brazil, Chile, Peru). The Russian Federation is going through a period of huge increases. While there are still relatively few cases in Africa, there are countries who are showing significant increases, albeit from small bases.

Countrycases
through 5-11
14 days
to 4-11
14 days
to 4-27
14 days
to 5-11
Austria15,7875,8631,252598
Belgium53,08119,38316,4876,947
Bulgaria1,965342625665
Croatia2,187909430157
Cyprus89843318481
Czechia8,1233,4531,413719
Denmark10,4293,7732,4011,854
Estonia1,73968333496
Finland5,9621,7441,6021,386
France139,06357,71229,17214,488
Germany169,57569,07632,17714,382
Greece2,7161,045392210
Hungary3,2849671,125701
Ireland22,9965,9689,6073,734
Italy219,07061,07941,31221,395
Latvia939332161127
Lithuania1,47964138730
Luxembourg3,8861,618442163
Malta4962117048
Netherlands42,62714,49412,2584,782
Poland15,9964,5664,9434,379
Portugal27,58111,2047,2793,717
Romania15,3624,1754,7364,326
Slovakia1,45742063778
Slovenia1,45752820250
Spain224,39092,96343,04516,756
Sweden26,3226,6398,1577,682
EU271,018,867370,221220,830109,551
United Kingdom219,18355,72968,56166,343
EU27 + UK1,238,050425,950289,391175,894
United States1,329,799396,874408,339363,889
Canada68,84817,45822,51921,964
Mexico35,0223,12710,01620,345
North America1,433,669417,459440,874406,198
Japan15,7983,8486,1302,413
South Korea10,909972201171
Singapore23,3361,17711,0929,712
Australia6,9412,860391228
New Zealand 1,1476195825
Subtotal58,1319,47617,87212,549
China84,0101,058990-189
India67,1526,57418,74039,260
Indonesia14,0322,4664,6415,150
Iran107,60335,86018,79517,122
Turkey138,65741,33153,17428,527
Israel16,4777,3734,2531,079
Bangladesh14,6573764,7959,241
Kazakhstan5,1266471,7562,409
Krygyzstan1,016281276321
Malaysia6,6562,1851,097876
Pakistan30,9413,5917,95417,613
Saudi Arabia39,0482,54713,06021,526
Taiwan4401134111
Thailand3,0151,38234393
Vietnam2888660
Sri Lanka86391313340
Subtotal529,981105,961130,234143,397
Russian Federation209,68810,88165,179128,739
Ukraine15,2321,9856,2326,223
Belarus22,9731,8877,88512,510
Georgia635153229149
Subtotal248,52814,90679,525147,621
South Africa10,0158332,3735,469
Egypt9,4001,2992,2545,081
Morocco6,0631,1032,4041,998
Algeria5,7231,4561,4682,341
Burkina Faso751302135119
Cameroon2,579715801958
Cote d’Ivoire1,700379576550
D.R. of the Congo1,024165225565
Djibouti1,280137809187
Ghana4,2632419842,713
Guinea2,1462078441,052
Kenya672158158317
Mali70483273315
Mauritius33222480
Niger821428167125
Nigeria4,3992249503,126
Senegal1,7091463911,038
Somalia1,05418411618
Sudan1,363122181,126
Tunisia1,03244424283
U.R. of Tanzania50919268209
subtotal57,4698,59315,95927,990
Switzerland30,22212,1243,7581,244
Liechtenstein832030
Norway8,0992,6631,090594
Iceland1,801785919
Subtotal40,20515,5924,9421,847
Argentina5,7761,2851,5642,009
Brazil162,69916,22139,719100,811
Chile28,8661,9346,11815,535
Colombia11,0631,9342,6035,684
Dominican Republic10,3472,0393,1684,212
Ecuador29,5595,53415,2536,840
Panama8,4482,1882,3792,669
Peru67,3075,26219,99839,790
Costa Rica79229510097
El Salvador958105173660
Subtotal325,81536,79791,075178,307
All Other Countries131,67726,78038,80955,215
Total of all countries4,063,5251,061,5141,108,6811,149,018

The WTO maintains a data base of actions by WTO members in response to the COVID-19 pandemic which either restrict medical goods exports or which liberalize and expedite imports of such products. As of May 8, the WTO showed 173 measures that the WTO Secretariat had been able to confirm, with many countries having temporary export restrictions on medical goods, some restraints on exports of food products, and a variety of measures to reduce tariffs on imported medical goods or expedite their entry. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_goods_measure_e.htm. Some WTO Members other than those included in the list have had and may still have informal restrictions.

The EU and its member states are presumably in a position now or should be soon to eliminate any export restrictions based on the sharp contraction of cases in the EU as a whole over the last six weeks – last 14 days are roughly 59% lower than the 14 days ending on April 11. Similarly, countries with small numbers of cases and rates of growth which seem small may be candidates for eliminating export restrictions. Costa Rica, Kyrgyzstan, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Georgia, Norway and Switzerland would appear to fit into this latter category. Most other countries with restrictions notified to the WTO appear to be either in stages where cases continue at very high levels (e.g., United States) or where the number of cases is growing rapidly (e.g., Russia, Belarus, Saudi Arabia, Ecuador, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan). Time will tell whether the WTO obligation of such measures being “temporary” is honored by those who have imposed restrictions. Failure to do so will complicate the efforts to see that medical goods including medicines are available to all on an equitable basis and at affordable prices.