European Union

World Trade Organization — possible deliverables for the 12th Ministerial Conference to be held in Geneva November 30-December 3, 2021

On May 3, 2021, the WTO held a Trade Negotiations Committee (“TNC”) session combined with an informal session of the Heads of Delegation in Geneva. Because the WTO over time has eliminated the immediate release of statements of the Chair of the TNC and the Chairs of different negotiating groups who provide updates on the status of negotiations, there is very limited public information on the meeting at the present time. The WTO released a news release on the meeting entitled “Members discuss contours of potential MC12 deliverables”. See TNC and Heads of Delegation Meeting, Members discuss contours of potential MC12 deliverables, May 3, 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/hod_03may21_e.htm. A review of WTO documents listed on the WTO website reveals that Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala provided a seven page Chair’s statement at the meeting, although the document is not publicly available. See JOB/TNC/91. There was at least one other statement made by chairs of negotiating groups, though the statement is not publicly available. See Council for Trade in Services – Special Session – Report by Ambassador Zhanar Altzhanova, Chair of the CTS Special Session, to the informal TNC and HODs meeting – 3 May 2021, JOB/SERV/307, May 4, 2021. One would assume there were reports on the fisheries subsidies negotiations, on agriculture and on various Joint Statement Initiatives though there is no listing of any such statements.

Copied below is the May 3 WTO news release.

“Heads of WTO member delegations today exchanged views about issues on which they can realistically reach agreements in the run-up to the 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) later this year, and what needs to happen to make such deals possible. Fisheries subsidies, agriculture and the COVID-19 pandemic featured prominently in the discussions, with several members stressing that delivering concrete negotiated results was critical for the WTO’s credibility. The 3 May gathering was both a formal session of the Trade Negotiations Committee and an informal meeting of Heads of Delegation.

“Summing up members’ interventions at the end of the day, WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala said what she had heard matched what she had been told in her own consultations: ‘Views are coalescing around the most feasible priorities for delivery between now and MC12 — although of course there are gaps on how we get there and on the content of prospective results.’

“She said three concrete deliverables stood out: an agreement to curb harmful fisheries subsidies; outcomes on agriculture, with a focus on food security; and a framework that would better equip the WTO to support efforts against the COVID-19 pandemic and future health crises.

“Looking to the weeks and months ahead, the Director-General expressed hope that by July members would be able to finalize an agreement on fisheries subsidies and achieve clarity about what can be delivered by MC12, scheduled to run from 30 November to 3 December in Geneva.

“On fisheries subsidies, she urged members to exercise the necessary flexibility to overcome the remaining hurdles. With ministerial involvement likely required to finalize an agreement in July, she called on delegations to work with the chair of the negotiations, Ambassador Santiago Wills of Colombia, to prepare a draft negotiating text with a minimal number of outstanding issues for ministers to resolve. ‘We are almost there, we can see the light at the end of the tunnel,’ she said, stressing she stood ready to help members and the chair translate increased flexibility into an agreement.

“Noting that for many members, meaningful outcomes on agriculture were necessary to make MC12 a success, DG Okonjo-Iweala said that the pandemic, and rising hunger around the world, made a strong case for a WTO ‘food security package’. Elements for a prospective package included public stockholding, the proposed exemption from export restrictions of World Food Programme humanitarian purchases, domestic support and transparency, with some delegations also raising cotton and the special safeguard mechanism.

“The Director-General welcomed the view expressed by many delegations that MC12 can deliver concrete responses on trade and health. The WTO’s spotlight on export restrictions and the need to increase vaccine production volumes was gaining attention and engagement from leaders, she said.

“Reporting on a 14 April event where vaccine manufacturers, international organizations, civil society and members looked at how the WTO could contribute to efforts to combat the global scarcity of COVID-19 vaccines, she said it was clear that underused manufacturing capacity existed in several developing countries.

“DG Okonjo-Iweala praised members’ support to India amid the upsurge in COVID-19 cases there, which followed India’s own exports of a large number of vaccines. ‘That is what the WTO membership should be about — working together, supporting each other,’ she said. She asked members to bring the same sense of common purpose to bear on engaging in text-based negotiations on the TRIPS waiver proposal aimed at finding a pragmatic compromise that works for all.

“With regard to dispute settlement, where many members called for resolution to the impasse over the Appellate Body, the Director-General expressed hope that by MC12 members ‘can reach a shared understanding on the types of reforms needed’.

“The General Council chair, Ambassador Dacio Castillo of Honduras, is consulting on proposals about issues specific to least-developed countries such as the G-90 proposals on special and differential treatment as well as on small economies and areas such as the e-commerce Work Programme, she said.

“She noted that groups of members had signalled a desire to move ahead in areas such as services domestic regulation, e-commerce, investment facilitation, women’s economic empowerment, micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises as well as issues related to trade and climate change.

“For issues not in a position to be concluded this year, the Director-General said members had called for post-MC12 work programmes on multilateral issues relating to agriculture, services, and special and differential treatment as well as in joint statement initiatives in areas including plastics pollution and environmental sustainability.

“DG Okonjo-Iweala said that in the coming days, she would intensify her own outreach with heads of delegation, organizing meetings “in various configurations large and small” to support the chairs of negotiating groups in their efforts to broker compromise among members. She reiterated her commitment to ensuring adequate representation and transparency in these meetings ‘Nothing will be done behind closed doors that people don’t know about,’ she emphasised. She indicated that she would work closely with the General Council chair and the chairs of the negotiating bodies as well as MC12 chair Kazakhstan to conduct these meetings.

“Emphasising the tight timeframe for members to resolve their outstanding differences, the Director-General said the ‘path to July’ would involve a large number of intensive meetings aimed at narrowing gaps. ‘Week in, week out, this is what we will do now.’”

It is often the case that the U.S., European Union and China release their statements at events like the May 3 TNC session. Reviewing the webpages for the three Members’ WTO operations shows a statement only for the EU. See EU Statement at the Trade Negotiations Committee/Heads of Delegation meeting, 3 May 2021, Statement delivered by Ambassador João Aguiar Machado, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/world-trade-organization-wto/97682/eu-statement-trade-negotiations-committeeheads-delegation-meeting-3-may-2021_en.

The EU seeks a number of specific outcomes for the 12th Ministerial Conference and emphasizes the need to keep the agenda limited to permit success. The EU’s list starts with the conclusion of the fisheries subsidies agreement negotiations and secondly achieving agreement on trade and health including increasing COVID-19 vaccine production.

“Firstly, on fisheries subsidies; the EU supports the Chair’s efforts to move the negotiations forward and the
Director-General’s involvement and intent to achieve an outcome already in July. With this in mind, we need to
consider how best to use the short time ahead. These negotiations are a test case of the ability of the WTO to
deliver on the Sustainable Development Goals, in this case SDG 14.6. We are already late, well passed the
deadline that Heads of State and Government instructed us, here at the WTO, to deliver. We have full
confidence that Ambassador Wills will find the best way forward for these negotiations.

“Secondly, on trade and health, we must work towards a Ministerial Declaration that brings together key
elements of the Ottawa Group proposal on Trade & Health (export restrictions, transparency, trade facilitation)
as well as progress on the expansion of production capacities through voluntary licensing and, where necessary,
supporting the use of the available TRIPs flexibilities.”

Beyond these two deliverables, the EU looks for an agreed work program for reform of the WTO’s three core functions — negotiations, transparency/monitoring, and dispute settlement. Restoring a functioning two-tier dispute settlement system is the top priority in this area followed by improved notification practices.

The EU supports the various Joint Statement Initiatives and intends to propose additional ones on industrial subsidies, state-owned enterprises, and trade and environment topics.

The EU’s proposal on agriculture differs in part from the summary of views presented by DG Okonjo-Iweala as addressing export restraints, particularly for World Food Programme purchases is a priority while other issues including public stockholding (and other forms of domestic support) is viewed as more appropriate for a work program outcome from the 12th Ministerial.

Developments in the last week

The WTO held a two day General Council meeting on May 5-6 with the big news being the United States’ indication that because of the extraordinary circumstances of the global COVID-19 pandemic, the United States would support the proposed waiver of certain TRIPS obligations on medical goods for the duration of the pandemic, more specifically being willing to enter into text negotiations in the TRIPS Council. See May 6, 2021, COVID-19 vaccines — role of WTO and developments at May 5-6, 2021 General Council meeting on TRIPS Waiver, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/05/06/covid-19-vaccines-role-of-wto-and-developments-at-may-5-6-2021-general-council-on-trips-waiver/.

The major countries within the EU have come out opposing the U.S. change of position on the waiver proposal and have urged the United States to remove export restrictions on vaccines and raw materials and other inputs, See The Hill, EU leaders criticize Biden push to waive COVID-19 vaccine patents: Not a ‘magic bullet’, May 8, 2021, https://thehill.com/policy/international/europe/552459-eu-leaders-criticize-biden-push-to-waive-covid-19-patents-not-a; Euronews, EU leaders urge US to end COVID-19 vaccine export limits amid patents controversy, 8 May 2021, https://www.euronews.com/2021/05/07/european-leaders-urge-u-s-britain-to-match-eu-generosity-on-vaccine-exports. Not surprisingly, the move was also criticized by the pharmaceutical and biotech industries. See, e.g., McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP – JDSupra, BIO & IPO Issue Statements on Biden Administration’s Support for Proposed WTO Waiver, May 7, 2021, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/bio-ipo-issue-statements-on-biden-3271048/.

There have been additional announcements by the WHO on vaccines receiving emergency use authorization (first of two Chinese vaccines was approved on May 7, 2021; a second is pending), additional vaccine producers have reached agreements with COVAX for supplying vaccines once their vaccines are approved by the WHO (Moderna, Novavax), and increased production targets by major COVID-19 producers (e.g., Pfizer raised its target for 2021 to 3 billion doses from 2.5 billion and increased 2022 from 3 billion doses to 4 billion doses; Moderna increases production forecast for 2021 to 800 million to 1 billion and is making investments to increase production in 2022 to 3 billion doses). See, e.g., World Health Organization, WHO lists additional COVID-19 vaccine for emergency use and issues interim policy recommendations, 7 May 2021, https://www.who.int/news/item/07-05-2021-who-lists-additional-covid-19-vaccine-for-emergency-use-and-issues-interim-policy-recommendations; Gavi, Gavi signs agreement with Moderna to secure doses on behalf of COVAX Facility, 3 May 2021, https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/gavi-signs-agreement-moderna-secure-doses-behalf-covax-facility; Gavi, Gavi signs agreement with Novavax to secure doses on behalf of COVAX Facility, 6 May 2021,https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/gavi-signs-agreement-novavax-secure-doses-behalf-covax-facility; Wall Street Journal, Pfizer Lifts Covid-19 Vaccine Production Targets for 2021, 2022, May 7, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/pfizer-lifts-covid-19-vaccine-production-targets-for-2021-2022-11620425904; Moderna, Moderna Reports First Quarter Fiscal Year 2021 Financial Results and Provides Business Updates, May 6, 2021, https://investors.modernatx.com/news-releases/news-release-details/moderna-reports-first-quarter-fiscal-year-2021-financial-results

What is clear is that the increased attention that will be paid by WTO Members on the waiver proposal within the TRIPS Council will likely suck a lot of oxygen out of the WTO in the coming months for other negotiating issues, many of which remain controversial in their own right. Any text based agreement on a TRIPS waiver is unlikely until close to the 12th Ministerial (and unlikely then if EU opposition remains or the U.S. is unable to achieve acceptable text). Thus, the remaining months before the 12th Ministerial Conference will present some major challenges to the WTO Members in their efforts to come up with achievements to keep the WTO relevant going forward. The U.S. move also creates a division with European allies and appears to have been taken without consultation with those allies ahead of last week’s announcement — a departure from the Biden Administration’s approach to date.

COVID-19 vaccines — role of WTO and developments at May 5-6, 2021 General Council meeting on TRIPS Waiver

As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to create problems around the world, there has been increased activity in many countries and at multilateral organizations seeking to expand COVID-19 vaccine production and increase access to vaccines for low- and middle-income countries. While a number of vaccines have been approved by one or more countries (usually on an emergency use authorization basis) and a few have been approved the World Health Organization, a number of others are seeking approval or are in final stages of trials.

The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control now issues a weekly update on the COVID-19 situation worldwide. Today’s release of data for week 17 of 2021 shows global cases since the beginning at 153,220,576 of which the Americas has the largest share with 41.16% (63,068,547 cases; U.S. being 32.4 million; Brazil being 14.8 million; Argentina being 3.0 million; Colombia being 2.9 million and Mexico being 2.3 million). Europe is second with 33.10% of the total cases (50,722,884; France with 5.7 million, Turkey with 4.9 million, Russia with 4.8 million, the U.K. with 4.4 million and Italy with 4.0 million). Asia represents 22.70% of cases (34,785,351 of which India is 19.9 million, Iran is 2.5 million, Indonesia is 1.7 million, Iraq is 1.1 million and the Philippines is 1.1 million). Africa accounts for 2.98% of cases (4,571,789 of which South Africa has reported 1.6 million and no other countries have more than 0.5 million). Oceania accounts for 0.05% of cases (71,300). See European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, COVID-19 situation update worldwide, as of week 17, updated 6 May 2021, https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases.

Deaths are similarly distributed globally with the Americas having 47.79% of global deaths (1,533,740 of 3,209,416); Europe having 33.47% (1,074,175), Asia having 14.89% (477,851), Africa having 3.81% (122,304) and Oceania having 0.04% (1,340). Id.

The world has seen increases in new cases for the last ten weeks in a row and has had the highest number of cases per week in the most recent weeks as the copied graphic from today’s ECDC publication shows.

Distribution of COVID-19 cases worldwide, as of week 17 2021

Distribution of COVID-19 cases worldwide, as of week 17 2021
“Distribution of cases of COVID-19 by continent (according to the applied case definition and testing strategies in the affected countries)

“Cases reported in accordance with the applied case definition and testing strategies in the affected countries.”

As the news accounts make clear, India is facing major challenges and has accounted for a very large part of new cases in recent weeks. For example, over the last 14 days, India reported 4.86 million new cases. This is the first time any country has amassed more than four million cases in a two week period. India has accounted for 42.61% of the world total of new cases in that two week period. Id.

Press accounts have shown a health care system in India struggling to keep up with shortages of everything from ICU units to PPE to medications to oxygen and with a small part of the population totally vaccinated or having received the first of two shots. BBC News, Coronavirus: How India descended into Covid-19 chaos, 5 May 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-56977653.

In response to its internal crisis, India has diverted production of COVID-19 vaccines to domestic use, essentially halting exports, complicating the efforts of the COVAX facility to get vaccines to the 91 low- and middle-income countries (other than India which also is supposed to receive vaccines from COVAX). While COVAX has shipped more than 53 million doses to 121 countries as of May 4, as much as 90 million additional vaccine doses were supposed to be supplied by Indian producers to COVAX during April and May that will not make it into the system. See, e.g., Gavi, COVAX vaccine rollout, https://www.gavi.org/covax-facility; Gavi, COVAX updates participants on delivery delays for vaccines from Serum Institute of India (SII) and AstraZeneca, 25 March 2021, https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/covax-updates-participants-delivery-delays-vaccines-serum-institute-india-sii-az.

Considering the challenges that India is facing, many nations have been providing assistance in an effort to support India as it attempts to cope with the current surge of cases, hospitalizations and deaths. The U.S. assistance is summarized in a fact sheet from the White House which is embedded below.

FACT-SHEET_-Biden-Harris-Administration-Delivers-Emergency-COVID-19-Assistance-for-India-_-The-White-House

A number of countries in South America are also seeing major problems — e.g., Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Peru — though receiving far less attention than India.

Vaccination development, production and distribution

Efforts have been made over the last decade to develop tools and organizations to develop, produce and distribute vaccines to achieve greater equity in access and affordability of vaccines. The WHO, Gavi, CEPI and UNICEF along with important private sector actors like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation have worked hard to both support research of potential vaccines to address the COVID-19 pandemic, worked with companies to arrange purchases of vaccines if approved for use, raised funds from governments and private sector participants to pay for the efforts on research and procurement, and organized distribution to the 92 low- and middle-income countries sufficient to address 20% of the populations as well as for any other countries choosing to work through the COVAX facility.

At the same time, a number of countries have negotiated contracts with companies developing vaccines. Because at the time of contracting, it was not known which vaccines would be effective or achieve approval from which governments, major advanced economies often contracted for quantities far in excess of likely needs (assuming all vaccines were eventually approved).

Because of the unprecedented government funding and industry cooperation, a number of vaccines were developed and approved on at least an emergency use basis and production efforts began in late 2020 and have been ramping up in 2021. This includes vaccines developed in the U.S., the European Union, the United Kingdom, China, India and Russia. While all have not yet been approved by the WHO, all have been approved by at least a number of governments. A number of others are either in the approval process or in final stage trials with vaccine approvals likely in the second half of 2021.

It is expected that capacity to produce more than 10 billion doses of vaccines to fight COVID-19 will be operational by the end of 2021. COVAX contracts and deliveries to economies outside of COVAX have anticipated relatively small volumes in the 1st quarter of 2021, with increases in each of the next three quarters. UNICEF has a “COVID-19 Vaccine Market Dashboard” which it describes as follows (https://www.unicef.org/supply/covid-19-vaccine-market-dashboard):

“The COVID-19 Vaccine Market Dashboard is the go-to public resource for the latest information on the world’s COVID-19 vaccine market and the COVAX Facility’s vaccine deliveries.

“From a global vaccine market perspective, the dashboard gives an overview of:  

“- COVID-19 vaccine development and progress towards vaccine approvals

“- Reported global vaccine production capacity

“- Manufacturing agreements  

“- Vaccines secured and optioned through bilateral and multilateral supply agreements  

“- Reported vaccine prices

“The ‘Delivery’ tab of the dashboard provides daily updates on total COVAX vaccine deliveries, doses allocated, and doses ordered. It also includes country- and economy level data on vaccine deliveries and planned shipments over a seven-day period. This information covers both UNICEF-procured doses and deliveries, as well as other national and institutional buyers participating in the COVAX Facility. It further tracks globally reported vaccine deliveries and vaccine donations outside of COVAX.”

For example, looking at the capacity figures from the dashboard by development stage shows 4 billion dose capacity approved for use in the first half of 2021, growing to 8 billion dose capacity approved for use in the second half of 2021, with 19 billion dose capacity projected for each of 2022 and 2023 as being approved for use.

There have been challenges in ramping up production, including manufacturing issues at individual companies, bottlenecks in supply chains for particular inputs, export restrictions in place for some, etc. In prior posts I have reviewed data pulled together by industry and others on the challenges as well as the enormous level of voluntary licensing, and other arrangements to grow capacity and production. Industry estimates have consistently been that capacity will be at 10-15 billion doses by the end of 2021 — an extraordinary accomplishment considering global capacity for vaccines previously (roughly 5 billion doses for all vaccines). See, e.g., April 18, 2021, WTO’s April 14th virtual meeting to review COVID-19 vaccine availability, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/04/18/wtos-april-14th-virtual-meeting-to-review-covid-19-vaccine-availability/ (” One of the private sector participants, the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) included its statement on the IFPMA website. See IFPMA, IFPMA statement at WTO event ‘COVID-19 and Vaccine Equity: What can the WTO Contribute’, 14 April 2021, https://www.ifpma.org/resource-centre/ifpma-statement-at-wto-event-covid-19-and-vaccine-equity-what-can-the-wto-contribute/. The IFPMA statement is embedded below but highlights the extraordinary effort of the private sector in ramping up production which is expected to be 10 billion doses by the end of 2021 with some 272 partnerships entered into and 200 technology transfer agreements.” (emphasis added)); April 13, 2021, April 15, 2021 — U.S and Gavi co-host event for additional funding for COVAX amid concerns about two workhorse vaccines for COVAX, ttps://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/04/13/april-15-2021-u-s-and-gavi-co-host-event-for-additional-funding-for-covax-amid-concerns-about-two-workhorse-vaccines-for-covax/; April 8, 2021, COVAX delivers COVID-19 vaccines to 100th country; India surge in infections likely to reduce product availability for COVAX through May and likely longer, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/04/08/covax-delivers-covid-19-vaccines-to-100th-country-india-surge-in-infections-likely-to-reduce-product-availability-for-covax-through-may-and-likely-longer/; April 2, 2021, Global vaccinations against COVID-19; developments and challenges in the roll-out for many countries, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/04/02/global-vaccinations-against-covid-19-developments-and-challenges-in-the-roll-out-for-many-countries/; March 25, 2021, Global vaccinations for COVID-19 — continued supply chain and production issues and a new wave of infections in many countries delay greater ramp up for some until late in the second quarter of 2021, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/25/global-vaccinations-for-covid-19-continued-supply-chain-and-production-issues-and-a-new-wave-of-infections-in-many-countries-delay-greater-ramp-up-for-some-until-late-in-the-second-quarter-of-2021/; March 12, 2021, COVID-19 vaccines – U.S., Japan, India and Australia agree to one billion doses for Indo-Pacific countries, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/12/covid-19-vaccines-u-s-japan-india-and-australia-agree-to-one-billion-doses-for-indo-pacific-countries/; March 12, 2021, The 8-9 March  “Global C19 Vaccine Supply Chain and Manufacturing Summit” – efforts to ramp-up production, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/12/the-8-9-march-global-c19-vaccine-supply-chain-and-manufacturing-summit-efforts-to-ramp-up-production/; March 5, 2021, COVID-19 vaccines — France supports Italy’s blockage of a shipment to Australia; while Australia has asked the EU to permit the shipment, Australia will have its own production of AstraZeneca product by the end of March, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/05/covid-19-vaccines-france-supports-italys-blockage-of-a-shipment-to-australia-while-australia-has-asked-the-eu-to-permit-the-shipment-australia-will-have-its-own-production-of-astrazeneca-produc/; March 4, 2021, Italy blocks exports of COVID-19 vaccines to Australia, first blockage of export authorization by the EU or its member states, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/04/italy-blocks-exports-of-covid-19-vaccines-to-australia-first-blockage-of-export-authorization-by-the-eu-or-its-member-states/; March 4, 2021, The EU’s response to challenges to its actions on COVID-19 vaccine exports, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/04/the-eus-response-to-challenges-to-its-actions-on-covid-19-vaccine-exports/; March 3, 2021, WTO Director-General opinion piece in the Financial Times and recent actions by the U.S., https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/03/wto-director-general-opinion-piece-in-the-financial-times-and-recent-actions-by-the-u-s/; March 1, 2021, WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala’s opening statement at the March 1 General Council meeting, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/01/wto-director-general-ngozi-okonjo-iwealas-opening-statement-at-the-march-1-general-council-meeting/.

As of May 5, 3032, Bloomberg reports that more than 1.21 billion COVID-19 doses have been administered. The top six areas for vaccinations are China (284.6 million doses administered), the United States (249.6 million), India (162.4 million), the EU (158.6 million), the U.K. (50.7 million) and Brazil (50.2 million). See Bloomberg, More Than 1.21 Billion Shots Given: Covid-19 Tracker, updated May 5, 2021 at 5:38 p.m. EDT, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-vaccine-tracker-global-distribution/. Not surprisingly, with the exception of China which has one of the lowest rates of infection of any country in the world, vaccinations have been concentrated in countries with high rates of infection — both developed and developing.

Because of the disruption in supplies from India because of their current challenges, far fewer doses have been administered in low-income countries as COVAX is behind its schedule for deliveries. There are, of course, other challenges in a number of low-income countries, where poor health care infrastructure has resulted in many of the vaccine doses that have been received not being used. See NPR, They Desperately Need COVID Vaccines. So Why Are Some Countries Throwing Out Doses?, May 5, 2021, https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2021/05/05/991684096/they-desperately-need-covid-vaccines-so-why-are-some-countries-throwing-out-dose (“It seems incredible: At a time when low-income nations are clamoring for vaccines against COVID-19, at least three countries — Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi and South Sudan — are either discarding doses or giving them to other countries. What’s going on?”).

The Proposal for a TRIPs Waiver from India and South Africa

Back in October 2020, India and South Africa filed a proposal for a waiver from many TRIPS Agreement obligations for all WTO Members for a period of years on vaccines, therapeutics and other medical goods relevant to handling the COVID-19 pandemic. There has not been agreement within the TRIPS Council on approving the proposed waiver with a number of advanced pharmaceutical producing countries (U.S., EU, U.K., Switzerland) opposing the proposal or disagreeing that a waiver would address the current availability challenges. The issue has been discussed on a number of occasions in the TRIPS Council. See, e.g., WTO press release, TRIPS Council to continue to discuss temporary IP waiver, revised proposal expected in May, 30 April 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/trip_30apr21_e.htm. There have also been efforts to identify challenges to increasing capacity and production faster and addressing concerns over equitable access. Those issues have been addressed in prior posts, listed above.

There has been considerable pressure from NGOs and, in the U.S., from Democratic members of Congress to agree to the waiver despite concerns within the Biden Administration on whether agreeing to a waiver would actually improve production or access. The Biden Administration in late April announced its decision to make 60 million doses of AstraZeneca vaccines available for redistribution in the coming months (including 10 million doses in current inventory once FDA approves release). AstraZeneca has not yet applied for authorization for its vaccine in the United States, and the U.S. believes it has sufficient other supplies to permit sharing the 60 million doses expected to be available through June. See Financial Times, U.S. plans to share 60m doses of AstraZeneca’s Covid vaccine, 26 April 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/db461dd7-b132-4f08-a94e-b23a6764bdb3. And as part of the relief the U.S. is providing to India, the U.S. has directed inputs for 20 million doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine to be sent to India instead of to U.S. facilities.

Leading nations through groupings like the G-7, G-20 and others have been looking at the options for further increasing production in the coming months to give greater coverage, as well as looking at sending doses not needed to COVAX or particular countries in need. See, e.g., Gavi, France makes important vaccine dose donation to COVAX, 23 April 2021, https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/france-makes-important-vaccine-dose-donation-covax.

On May 5, 2021, the G-7 Foreign Ministers completed a meeting in London and issued a communique which included language about access to vaccines. The G-7 consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom with the European Union as an observed. The U.K. as host also invited Australia, South Korea, India, South Africa and Brunei (as Chair for the ASEAN group of countries). The communique from the G-7 and the EU can be found here and the section on access to vaccines is copied below. See G7 Foreign and Development Ministers’ Meeting Communiqué, London, May 5, 2021, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/983631/G7-foreign-and-development-ministers-meeting-communique-london-5-may-2021.pdf.

“Enabling equitable global access to Covid-19 Vaccines, Therapeutics and Diagnostics (VTDs)

“62. We affirm our belief that commitment to an open, transparent and multilateral approach is essential in responding to the global health impacts of Covid-19. A global health emergency on this scale requires co-ordinated action and global solidarity. We reaffirm our support for all existing pillars of Access to Covid-19 Tools Accelerator
(ACT-A), including its COVAX facility. We recognise that equipping the ACTAccelerator with adequate funding is central. We support the strengthening of health systems, and affordable and equitable global access to vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics, and we will further increase our efforts to support affordable and equitable access for people in need, taking approaches consistent with members’ commitments to incentivise innovation. We recall in this regard the Charter for Equitable Access to Covid-19 Tools. We recognise the importance of effective and well-functioning global
value chains for VTD supply and will work with industry to encourage and support on a voluntary basis and on mutually agreed terms, including licensing, technology and know-how transfers, contract manufacturing , transparency, and data sharing, public private costs and risk sharing.
We recognise the need to enable a sustainable environment for local, regional and global productions, beyond Covid-19 products for long-term impact. We welcome the collective G7 commitments of over $10.7 billion USD to date in funding to these initiatives and encourage all partners to increase their support as the next critical step in controlling the pandemic and strengthening health security. In this context, we look forward to the COVAX Advance Market Commitment (AMC) Summit to be co-hosted by Gavi and Japan following the COVAX AMC One World Protected Event co-hosted by Gavi and US. (Emphasis added)

“63. We commit to the G7 Foreign and Development Ministers’ Equitable Access and Collaboration Statement to help accelerate the end of the acute phase of the Covid19 pandemic. We commit to supporting COVAX financially, including by encouraging pledges to the Facility, including at the COVAX AMC Summit in June, disbursing as soon as possible, providing in-kind contributions, and coordinating with and using COVAX, which is the key mechanism for global sharing of vaccines to supplement its own direct procurement, to enable the rapid equitable deployment of vaccines.

“64. We support the work of G7 Health Ministers and continued G7 efforts to work with partners to improve pandemic preparedness and global health security, with WHO as the leading and co-ordinating authority, to strengthen health systems, develop solutions that embed a One Health approach, tackle antimicrobial resistance, and accelerate progress towards universal health coverage and the health-related Sustainable Development Goals. We welcome the establishment of the One Health High Level Experts Panel supported by WHO, FAO, OIE and UNEP. We are determined to ensure that lessons are learned and applied from the pandemic. We look forward to the forthcoming G20 Global Health Summit in Rome and to its Declaration, and to further close cooperation on strengthening the global health
architecture, including longer-term considerations such as exploring the potential value of a global health treaty, to strengthen global pandemic preparedness and response. We will deploy our foreign and development policies and programmes to build a more resilient world that is better protected against health threats, including encouraging new public health guidance in consultation with national and relevant international organisations on international travel by sea or air, including cruise ships, and supporting an expert-driven, transparent, and independent process for the next
phase of the WHO-convened Covid-19 origins study, and for expeditiously investigating future outbreaks of unknown origin. Together with G7 Health Ministers, we commit to work in partnership with low- and lower-middle income countries by improving coordination of G7 support for, and collaboration with, public health and health security capacities and their regional bodies in Africa, Asia and other regions, building on the G7 commitment to support implementation of and compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR) in 76 countries, taking into account the recommendations from the IHR Review Committee. We will align with and support national and regional health priorities and leadership to improve public health. We look forward to the publication of the G7 Carbis Bay Progress Report on global health and what we can learn from its conclusions on G7 commitments to strengthening health systems to advance universal health coverage and global health security.

“65. We note the continuing need to support health systems and health security and secure sustainable financing, together with partner countries’ domestic resources, to help accelerate global vaccine development and deployment, recover and then sustain access to essential health and nutrition services and health commodities, including in
humanitarian settings and for sexual and reproductive health and rights, and to bolster the global health architecture for pandemic preparedness, including through stronger rapid response mechanisms. We look forward to working with G7 Finance Ministers to build consensus on practical actions to facilitate access to existing global financing
sources to meet demands for access to Covid-19 vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics, as well as how best to tackle the ACT-A funding gaps, with the aim of shortening the lifespan of the pandemic and with particular focus on the needs of vulnerable countries. In this regard, we look forward to the outcomes of the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response (IPPPR) initiated by the WHO, and the High Level Independent Panel on financing the global commons for pandemic preparedness and response (HLIP) established by the G20.”

At the same time that G-7 foreign ministers were concluding their work in London, the WTO was holding the first of two days of a General Council meeting. The WTO’s Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala urged the resolution of addressing equitable access to vaccines. The U.S. Trade Representative issued a statement changing the U.S. position (and contradicting what they had agreed with other G-7 foreign ministers hours before) by indicating that the U.S. would support the waiver of TRIPS rights and obligations during the pandemic and would work on text in the TRIPS Council to see if a consensus could be achieved. The Director-General’s statement from May 5, the USTR statement and the Director-General’s comments on the USTR statement are embedded below.

WTO-_-News-Speech-DG-Ngozi-Okonjo-Iweala-General-Council

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WTO-_-2021-News-items-Statement-of-Director-General-Ngozi-Okonjo-Iweala-on-USTR-Tais-statement-on-the-TRIPS-waiver

While the pharmaceutical industry in advanced countries is unquestionably shocked by the shift in U.S. position (and stocks of vaccine producers suffered stock market price declines on May 5), the EU President has indicated a willingness to look at the issue and the French President has indicated his support of the U.S. position. See Financial Times, Pharma industry fears Biden’s patent move sets dangerous precedent, 6 May 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/f54bf71b-87be-4290-9c95-4d110eec7a90; The Guardian, EU ‘ready to discuss’ waiver on Covidvaccine patents, 6 May 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/06/eu-ready-to-discuss-waiver-on-covid-vaccine-patents (“The head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen , has said the bloc is ‘ready to discuss’ a US-backed proposal for a waiver on the patents for Covid-19 vaccines and the French president, Emmanuel Macron, said he was ‘absolutely in favour’ of the plan as pressure built for a move that could boost their production and distribution around the world.”).

The concerns of industry have been identified in prior posts of mine and are summarized in yesterday’s Financial Times article on what if any benefit there will be should a waiver be agreed to. See Financial Times, Will a suspension of Covid vaccine patents lead to more jabs?, 6 May 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/b0f42409-6fdf-43eb-96c7-d166e090ab99 (“[T]he drug makers’ main argument is that waiving intellectual property is not the solution. Vaccine makers have already pulled out all the stops to supply billions of doses at an unprecedented speed, including signing unusual partnerships with rivals to expand production. Moderna put its patents online last summer but they are not useful alone.”).

The Road Forward

It is unclear where the process at the WTO goes from here. The WTO TRIPS Council is expecting a revised document from India and South Africa in May that arguably could become the basis for WTO Members, including the U.S. and EU and others who have been opposed to a waiver, to consider and negotiate from. If a consensus emerges around a text, then it would go to the General Council for a vote/approval. But while the formal process is understood, it is unclear what an agreement would actually look like. It is hard to imagine that the U.S., EU, Switzerland, Japan and possibly others would agree to waive the pharmaceutical companies rights within their own territories. So there is a question whether rights could be waived selectively? If so, what possible liability would exist for governments and/or companies exploiting the IP rights of others? It is unclear if there will be a requirement for some/all countries who engage in use of others intellectual property to provide compensation similar to a compulsory license fee. Will countries that have existing voluntary licensing agreements with producers be able to void those agreements or have the same IP rights used by other companies? Will there be limitations on where goods produced can be shipped (e.g., only to low- and middle-income countries)? What will the basis be for getting IP holders to transfer technology where there is no compensation? There are undoubtedly dozens of other issues that the industry and their lawyers have besides the above. If waiver is the direction the world goes, presumably there needs to be transparency and full opportunity for vetting proposals so that all issues are identified, understood and properly addressed.

In my prior posts, I have argued that to date vaccines have largely gone to the countries with large levels of infections and deaths. Those pushing for greater equity in access based on a simple percent of global population approach abandon those concerns when a large developing country runs into a surge and finds itself in serious difficulty, such as is happening with India. I support targeting relief to address fire situations like India. See April 29, 2021, COVID-19 — Efforts to help India during its current surge of cases, hospitalizations and deaths, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/04/29/covid-19-efforts-to-help-india-during-its-current-surge-of-cases-hospitalizations-and-deaths/. There are equally important fire situations in other countries that deserve the attention and concern of the world as well.

The WTO has been and should be encouraging Members to eliminate export restrictions as quickly as possible. The new Director-General has used the power of convening to probe what are the barriers to increased production and greater distribution to low- and middle-income countries. Many of the barriers are bottlenecks in supply chains, shortages of various inputs as the industry drastically ramps up production of vaccines, lack of trained personnel in some countries where there may be existing vaccine capacity for other vaccines. Governments can and should be working with industry to address bottlenecks on an expedited basis. Encouraging voluntary licensing is useful and there are some 272 agreements around the world already in place with others being worked on. However, as Johnson & Johnson’s experience (where it talked to 100 companies but only found 10 they could work with) shows, the presence of a facility in a country is not the same as a facility with trained personnel who can actually produce a safe vaccine of the types currently approved for use on COVID-19.

The biggest short term availability of more supplies for low- and middle-income countries is not from the waiver but rather from governments redirecting volumes that are not needed for their own populations. The U.S. and EU are each starting that, but more can and should be done. Such actions have real potential.

Similarly, pursuit of new vaccines, such as one being tested in a number of developing countries that is far lower cost than some currently being used to vaccinate against COVID-19 and which apparently can be easily used in many countries in existing vaccine facilities makes a lot of sense. See New York Times, Researchers Are Hatching a Low-Cost Coronavirus Vaccine, A new formulation entering clinical trials in Brazil, Mexico, Thailand and Vietnam could change how the world fights the pandemic, April 5, 2021, updated April 17, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/05/health/hexapro-mclellan-vaccine.html.

While there are lots of groups and individuals arguing there is a moral imperative to wave the IP rights of pharmaceutical companies during the global pandemic, there is little practical evidence that such an approach will get the world to the place presumably everybody wants — the quickest curtailment of the pandemic for the benefit of all.

Time will tell whether an effort to negotiate a waiver is an aid or a hindrance to actually ending the pandemic.

WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala announces selection of four Deputy Directors-General

A little over two months after assuming the position of Director-General (“DG”) of the World Trade Organization, DG Okonjo-Iweala announced her four Deputy Directors-General (“DDGs”). Two of the four DDGs are women, marking the first time that there is gender balance among the DDGs. The press release from the WTO is embedded below.

WTO-_-2021-News-items-DG-Okonjo-Iweala-announces-her-four-Deputy-Directors-General

DG Okonjo-Iweala’s selections follow past practice of picking DDGs from the four regions other than the region of the DG (Africa). The U.S. and the EU (France this time) continue to hold a DDG slot (Angela Ellard and Amb. Jean-Marie Paugam respectively). The Asian slot goes to China (Amb. Xiangchen Zhang) for the second time in a row (potentially indicating that three of the five slots will be going to the US, EU and China going forward). The Latin slot goes to Anabel Gonzalez of Costa Rica. Three of the four have extensive experience in Geneva with Amb. Xiangchen Zhang having recently concluded his role as China’s Permanent Representative to the WTO, with Amb. Jean-Marie Paugam having been France’s Permanent Representative to the WTO and with Ms. Anabel Gonzalez having had many roles both within the WTO Secretariat and with the Government of Costa Rica including Minister of Foreign Trade. All four have extensive experience with trade issues as the short bios included in the press release review. Ms. Angela Ellard from the U.S. has decades of experience in the interaction between the legislative and executive branches in the U.S. in the trade arena having served in a senior staff capacity for the House Ways and Means Republicans.

Today’s press release did not identify areas of responsibility for each of the four DDGs. That information will presumably be released in the coming days.

In prior posts I have urged the selection of strong individuals for the four DDG slots, people able to help DG Okonjo-Iweala with the myriad challenges facing the organization. See February 13, 2021, Leadership change at the WTO — with Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala’s arrival next week, what support team and early changes in the role of the Secretariat could help WTO Members move forward?, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/02/13/leadership-change-at-the-wto-with-dr-ngozi-okonjo-iwealas-arrival-next-week-what-support-team-and-early-changes-in-the-role-of-the-secretariat-could-help-wto-members-move-forward/; March 31, 2021, When will WTO DG Okonjo-Iweala reveal choices for Deputy Directors-General?, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/31/when-will-wto-dg-okonjo-iweala-reveal-choices-for-deputy-directors-general/.  The four individuals who have been selected all appear to be strong individuals with the ability to help the DG in outreach to major Members. They bring a lot of talent and depth of understanding of current challenges to their jobs. Chemistry among the group and with the DG is something that will develop over time and hopefully will have them being a cohesive and highly supportive team for the DG.

With much to accomplish to restore credibility for the WTO and its ability to help move global trade forward in a more sustainable and equitable manner, I join all those wishing the new DDGs success in their new positions.

COVID-19 — Efforts to help India during its current surge of cases, hospitalizations and deaths

India has been setting daily records for new infections almost every day for the last week or so and reported more than two million infections in the last week. See European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, COVID-19 situation update worldwide, as of week 16, updated 29 April 2021, https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases; European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Data on 14-day notification rate of new COVID-19 cases and deaths, https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/data-national-14-day-notification-rate-covid-19 (week 15, 1,534,202 new cases reported; week 16, 2,056,121 new cases reported). Thus, India is the first country to record more than two million cases in a single week and the second to record more than three million in a two week period (the United States exceeded three million during the two weeks 50 and 51 of 2020). With total cases reported by India of 17,118,040, India has the second largest number of cases after the United States (32,125,099) but has a population more than four times that of the United States. However, press reports suggest that information on COVID-19 cases and deaths in India are substantially underreported, perhaps representing only 10-20% of actual cases and deaths. See, e.g., New York Times, As Covid-19 Devastates India, Deaths Go Undercounted, April 24, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/24/world/asia/india-coronavirus-deaths.html.

What is clear is that India is being overwhelmed at the present time with India’s health care system struggling to handle the huge number of people needing assistance, with many hospitals unable to handle the case load, with acute shortages reported on oxygen, ICU beds and much more. See, e.g., The Financial Times, Editorial Board, The tragedy of India’s second wave, April 26, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/90281790-fb9e-468c-b3fa-c7549bd3bb39 (“The suffering of the Indian people in the country’s second wave of Covid-19 is a human tragedy on a vast scale. It is also a warning, and a danger, for the world. Many nations have been through dark times in the global pandemic; several with smaller populations still have higher death tolls. But with reports of people dying in the streets outside overwhelmed hospitals running short of oxygen, India today perhaps most closely resembles the worst-case scenarios painted when the virus was identified 16 months ago.”); New York Times, ‘This Is a Catastrophe.’ In India, Illness Is Everywhere, April 27, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/27/world/asia/India-delhi-covid-cases.html. The extent of human suffering from people not able to obtain timely care has been described by the Director-General of the World Health Organization as “beyond heartbreaking”. World Health Organization, Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 – 26 April 2021, 26 April 2021, https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19-26-april-2021.

Many countries, the WHO and business organizations and others are scrambling to provide assistance to India. See, e.g., MENAFN, Euronews, EU, UK and US offer support as COVID-19 ‘swallowing’ people in India, 27 April 2021, https://menafn.com/1101987528/EU-UK-and-US-Offer-Support-as-COVID-19-Swallowing-People-in-India; Politico, Von der Leyen: EU preparing ‘rapid’ assistance to COVID-hit India, April 26, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-india-coronavirus-crisis-variant-asia-ursula-von-der-leyen/; U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation, India COVID Crisis: How Businesses Can Help, April 27, 2021, https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/event/india-covid-crisis-how-businesses-can-help; Reuters, WHO steps up aid to India to stem COVID surge, 27 April 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/india/rush-hospitals-big-gatherings-worsen-india-covid-crisis-who-2021-04-27/..

In the United States, the Biden Administration has indicated it is providing assistance and yesterday released a fact sheet on actions being taken. See White House Briefing Room, FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Delivers Emergency COVID-19 Assistance for India, April 28, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/28/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-delivers-emergency-covid-19-assistance-for-india/. The fact sheet is copied below.

“Reflecting the United States’ solidarity with India as it battles a new wave of COVID-19 cases, the United States is delivering supplies worth more than $100 million in the coming days to provide urgent relief to our partners in India.  In addition, U.S. state governments, private companies, non-government organizations, and thousands of Americans from across the country have mobilized to deliver vital oxygen, related equipment, and essential supplies for Indian hospitals to support frontline health care workers and the people of India most affected during the current outbreak.  U.S. Government assistance flights will start arriving in India on Thursday, April 29 and will continue into next week.

“Just as India sent assistance to the United States when our hospitals were strained early in the pandemic, the United States is determined to help India in its time of need.

“Immediate U.S. Emergency COVID-19 Assistance

“The United States is providing: 

“- Oxygen Support:  An initial delivery of 1,100 cylinders will remain in India and can be repeatedly refilled at local supply centers, with more planeloads to come.  The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has also locally procured oxygen cylinders and will deliver them to support hospital systems in coordination with the Government of India.

“- Oxygen Concentrators: 1700 oxygen concentrators to obtain oxygen from ambient air, these mobile units provide options for flexible patient treatment.

“- Oxygen Generation Units (PSA Systems): Multiple large-scale units to support up to 20 patients each, and additional mobile units will provide an ability to target specific shortages. A team of U.S. experts will support these units, working hand-in-hand on the ground with Indian medical personnel. 

“- Personal Protective Equipment: 15 million N95 masks to protect both patients and Indian health care personnel. 

“- Vaccine-Manufacturing Supplies:  The U.S. has re-directed its own order of Astra Zeneca manufacturing supplies to India.  This will allow India to make over 20 million doses of COVID-19 vaccine.

“- Rapid Diagnostic Tests (RDTs):  1 million rapid diagnostic tests – the same type used by the White House — to provide reliable results in less than 15 minutes to help identify and prevent community spread.     

“- Therapeutics:  The first tranche of a planned 20,000 treatment courses of the antiviral drug remdesivir to help treat hospitalized patients.

“- Public Health Assistance: U.S. CDC experts will work hand-in- hand with India’s experts in the following areas: laboratory, surveillance and epidemiology, bioinformatics for genomic sequencing and modeling, infection prevention and control, vaccine rollout, and risk communication.

“U.S. Support for India from the Outset of the Pandemic 

“The United States and India have closely worked together to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.  U.S. COVID-19 assistance has reached more than 9.7 million Indians across more than 20 states and union territories, providing life-saving treatments, disseminating public health messages to local communities; strengthening case-finding and surveillance; and mobilizing innovative financing mechanisms to bolster emergency preparedness: 

“- Partnered with more than 1,000 Indian healthcare facilities to strengthen preparedness, including training of over 14,000 people on infection prevention and control.

“- Helped keep more than 213,000 frontline workers safe — including risk mitigation training for doctors, nurses, midwives, community volunteers, sanitation workers, and others who are actively responding to COVID-19 in India.

“- Launched joint public messaging with UNICEF on COVID prevention that has reached more than 84 million people.

“- Provided 200 state-of-the-art ventilators to 29 healthcare facilities in 15 states to care for critically-ill COVID-19 patients.

U.S.-India Health Partnership: Seven Decades Strong

“- For seventy years, U.S. public health experts from across the government, including USAID, HHS, CDC, FDA, and NIH, have worked in partnership with Indian officials to improve the health of India’s most vulnerable communities and the well-being of its people. 

“- Over the last 20 years, U.S. foreign assistance to India has exceeded $2.8 billion, including more than $1.4 billion for health care. 

“- The United States, India, and other partners have worked together to reduce new HIV infections by 37 percent between 2010 and 2019.

“- Since 1998, the United States and India have worked together to combat tuberculosis (TB) through improved patient-centered diagnosis, treatment and prevention, helping treat 15 million people with the disease.

“- In the last five years, the United States has helped 40 million pregnant women receive vital health information and services.

“- The United States, in partnership with the Government of India and World Health Organization, has supported initiatives at the District, State and National level to build frontline disease detection capacity.

“- The United States and India are working together to advance global health security and fight outbreaks before they become pandemics.”

Conclusion

India is a critical part of the global effort to vaccinate the world both with vaccines developed within India and with vaccines (e.g., AstraZeneca and Novavax) that are licensed for production in India with large commitments to supply COVAX for distribution to low- and middle-income countries and with other vaccines licensed from other countries (China and Russia). The immediate challenges in India has shifted the focus of the Indian government and its vaccine producers to supply almost exclusively for the Indian market while India struggles through the current surge in new cases and hospitalizations. The focus of the world on the need to help India is an interesting departure from the discussion of vaccine distribution based on population that has dominated focus through March.

Many parts of the world have been able to keep the COVID-19 pandemic under control to a large extent and hence have relatively few COVID-19 cases. Other countries — the U.S., India, Brazil, the EU countries and UK — have had far less success in controlling the spread of COVID-19 and have recorded very large numbers of cases, hospitalizations and deaths.

In a prior post, I reviewed that if one looks at percent of vaccinations compared to the percent of COVID-19 cases, there has been better matching for many countries (U.S., EU, UK, India) while a few major vaccine producers have much larger vaccinations as a percent of global vaccinations compared to the share of global COVID-19 cases they have. See April 18, 2021, WTO’s April 14th virtual meeting to review COVID-19 vaccine availability, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/04/18/wtos-april-14th-virtual-meeting-to-review-covid-19-vaccine-availability/.

Looking at current data, China has achieved the largest number of vaccinations — 235,976,000 vaccinations or 21.82% of global totals til April 28, 2021) — but a very low percent of global COVID-19 cases — 102,384 cases or 0.07% of global cases. The U.S. has the largest number of cases and second largest number of vaccinations (21.79% of cases; 21.69% of vaccinations). India has the second largest number of cases and the third largest number of vaccinations (11.61% of cases; 13.86% of vaccinations). The EU (27 countries) has 20.46% of COVID-19 cases (2nd largest if looking at the 27 countries together) and 12.75% of vaccinations. The United Kingdom has 2.99% of cases and 4.39% of vaccinations. Brazil has 9.75% of cases (3rd highest for an individual country) and 4.17% of vaccinations.

Both China and India are major vaccine producers and have comparable populations. But China has had only 0.6% of the COVID-19 cases that India has had, but has 157.45% of the vaccinations that India has accomplished. Vaccination data is from Bloomberg, More than 1.08 Billion Shots Given: Cover-19 Tracker, updated April 28, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-vaccine-tracker-global-distribution/.

The problems India is facing are daunting and emphasize the need for the global community to respond to emergencies as they arise while global production of vaccines continue to ratchet up in the coming months. That doesn’t mean that efforts to roll out vaccines to all countries is not an important initiative (COVAX has now shipped more than 48 million doses to 120 countries and various countries are shipping vaccines to ow- and middle-income countries outside of COVAX). But pandemics do not wreak havoc uniformly across the world. Fires need to be addressed urgently while capacities are increased to deal with all needs. The last several weeks have shown India to be suffering such a “fire”. Diverting resources from other parts of the world to India makes sense at the moment. Brazil’s fire continues as well and undoubtedly needs more attention.

While vaccines will help get the world out of the pandemic, all countries need to be vigilant on the non-vaccine tools available to minimize the spread of the pandemic within markets until there is sufficient vaccine capacity to address all needs — capacity that should be here by the end of 2021.

WTO’s April 14th virtual meeting to review COVID-19 vaccine availability

WTO’s Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala had indicated when she took office that she would be gathering industry, multilateral groups, and some governments to look at how vaccine production could be expanded and the role the WTO could play in that effort. At the same time, with the proposal from India and South Africa for waiver from most TRIPS obligations on medical products relevant to addressing the COVID-19 pandemic still under consideration in the TRIPS Council, with opposition from a number of important Members, DG Okonjo-Iweala has been seeking an approach that in fact expands production in developing and least developed countries and greater distribution to low- and middle-income countries. without needing an all or nothing resolution to the proposed waiver.

I have previously reviewed the issue of vaccine availability and prior DG Okonjo-Iweala statements in a number of posts. See, e.g., April 13, 2021, April 15, 2021 — U.S and Gavi co-host event for additional funding for COVAX amid concerns about two workhorse vaccines for COVAX, ttps://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/04/13/april-15-2021-u-s-and-gavi-co-host-event-for-additional-funding-for-covax-amid-concerns-about-two-workhorse-vaccines-for-covax/; April 8, 2021, COVAX delivers COVID-19 vaccines to 100th country; India surge in infections likely to reduce product availability for COVAX through May and likely longer, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/04/08/covax-delivers-covid-19-vaccines-to-100th-country-india-surge-in-infections-likely-to-reduce-product-availability-for-covax-through-may-and-likely-longer/; April 2, 2021, Global vaccinations against COVID-19; developments and challenges in the roll-out for many countries, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/04/02/global-vaccinations-against-covid-19-developments-and-challenges-in-the-roll-out-for-many-countries/; March 25, 2021, Global vaccinations for COVID-19 — continued supply chain and production issues and a new wave of infections in many countries delay greater ramp up for some until late in the second quarter of 2021, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/25/global-vaccinations-for-covid-19-continued-supply-chain-and-production-issues-and-a-new-wave-of-infections-in-many-countries-delay-greater-ramp-up-for-some-until-late-in-the-second-quarter-of-2021/; March 12, 2021, COVID-19 vaccines – U.S., Japan, India and Australia agree to one billion doses for Indo-Pacific countries, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/12/covid-19-vaccines-u-s-japan-india-and-australia-agree-to-one-billion-doses-for-indo-pacific-countries/; March 12, 2021, The 8-9 March  “Global C19 Vaccine Supply Chain and Manufacturing Summit” – efforts to ramp-up production, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/12/the-8-9-march-global-c19-vaccine-supply-chain-and-manufacturing-summit-efforts-to-ramp-up-production/; March 5, 2021, COVID-19 vaccines — France supports Italy’s blockage of a shipment to Australia; while Australia has asked the EU to permit the shipment, Australia will have its own production of AstraZeneca product by the end of March, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/05/covid-19-vaccines-france-supports-italys-blockage-of-a-shipment-to-australia-while-australia-has-asked-the-eu-to-permit-the-shipment-australia-will-have-its-own-production-of-astrazeneca-produc/; March 4, 2021, Italy blocks exports of COVID-19 vaccines to Australia, first blockage of export authorization by the EU or its member states, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/04/italy-blocks-exports-of-covid-19-vaccines-to-australia-first-blockage-of-export-authorization-by-the-eu-or-its-member-states/; March 4, 2021, The EU’s response to challenges to its actions on COVID-19 vaccine exports, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/04/the-eus-response-to-challenges-to-its-actions-on-covid-19-vaccine-exports/; March 3, 2021, WTO Director-General opinion piece in the Financial Times and recent actions by the U.S., https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/03/wto-director-general-opinion-piece-in-the-financial-times-and-recent-actions-by-the-u-s/; March 1, 2021, WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala’s opening statement at the March 1 General Council meeting, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/01/wto-director-general-ngozi-okonjo-iwealas-opening-statement-at-the-march-1-general-council-meeting/.

“COVID-19 and Vaccine Equity: What Can the WTO Contribute?”

While the virtual meeting convened by DG Okonjo-Iweala was conducted under Chatham House rules, a number of participants made their prepared comments public and there was some press coverage.

DG Okonjo-Iweala provided a wrap-up at the end of the session which was posted on the WTO website. See WTO news, DG Okonjo-Iweala calls for follow-up action after WTO vaccine equity event, April 14, 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/dgno_14apr21_e.htm (“Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala today (14 April) called on WTO members, vaccine manufacturers and international organizations to act to address trade-related obstacles to the scale-up of COVID-19 vaccine production to save lives, hasten the end of the pandemic and accelerate the global economic recovery.”). DG Okonjo-Iweala’s summary comments are copied below. See WTO speeches, Chair Summary following “COVID-19 and Vaccine Equity: What Can the WTO Contribute?”, April 14, 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spno_e/spno7_e.htm.

“One thing that came out of today’s discussions is that it was only through working together across borders that scientists developed safe and effective vaccines in record time. And it is only by working together, across borders, that we’ll be able to solve the problems [of vaccine scarcity and equitable access] discussed today. This is a problem of the global commons, and we have to solve it together.

“Our purpose today was to contribute to efforts to increase vaccine production and broaden access, starting with the immediate term.

“Specifically we had three goals:

“The first was to pinpoint the obstacles, particularly the trade-related obstacles, to ramping up production, and to equitably distributing and administering vaccines — and we looked at how the WTO could contribute to these solutions.

“The second was to bring together people who are able to increase and to scale up manufacturing, people in a position to share technology and knowhow, and people willing to finance additional manufacturing capacity.

“And third, to think about the road ahead, including on the TRIPS waiver and incentives for research and development, so that we get the medical technologies we need, and no country is left at the back of the line waiting. If there is one refrain we heard continuously from everyone today it is that no one is safe until everyone is safe.

“We heard first-hand from governments and vaccine manufacturers from developed, developing, and least developed countries, as well as a wide range of other stakeholders from international organizations, civil society and development finance institutions.

“And we heard good news: that supplies are ramping up and companies are learning by doing, that there have been major gains in productivity, and that there is still capacity. We also heard that there is a willingness to finance investment in vaccine manufacturing both in the short- and long-term, and there are ideas and energy to do things differently.

“However, we heard from many that we need to do more. It hasn’t really been business as usual, so we may need to move on to ‘business unusual’ to solve the problems before us.

“In the discussions today we heard a great deal of agreement. We agree that it’s not acceptable for people and countries to have to wait indefinitely for vaccines. We do not want to repeat experiences of the past.

“We heard a consensus on the urgent need to scale up production and vaccinate everyone, because every day the shortage continues, scope for dangerous new variants will increase, and the number of prevent preventable deaths will grow. The economic impact of these delays can and has been quantified by many institutions, including the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO.

“It was agreed that production capacity needs to be expanded, particularly in developing and least developed countries and emerging markets. And that vaccine distribution needs to be more effective and more equitable.

“We heard that open cross-border trade in raw materials, and other inputs, was essential for maintaining and scaling up production, and that supply chains in these inputs must be maintained.

“Also widely shared was the view that innovation, research and development will be vital for dealing with COVID-19 variants and in other health crises.

“We had useful exchanges on issues where some perspectives were different, such as on the future shape of vaccine supply chains, on the appropriate role for intellectual property protections, on issues of vaccine contract transparency — which was pointed to by many as an important factor in appropriate pricing and distribution and a critical part of access and equity.

“Concerns expressed by some about cross-border supply chain operations, including export restrictions and shortages of skilled personnel reinforced my view, and hopefully that of members, that the WTO must and can play a central part in the response to this crisis.

“Various perspectives about the TRIPS Agreement, and whether the existing flexibilities are enough to address developing country needs were put on the table. These echoed the discussions on the waiver proposal going on in the TRIPS Council, and I want to reiterate that today is a way of contributing to that discussion.

“I agree with the view that the WTO is a logical forum for finding a way forward on these issues, and I hope that the ideas raised here will contribute to convergence in the TRIPS Council on meaningful results that can contribute to the goals that we have.

“I hope that the discussion today, listening to each other, seeing that we all share a common goal, and that we may not be so far apart, will lead to the willingness to come to the middle,  and work out something that will be acceptable to all.

“Participants were generally of the view that ramping up vaccine manufacturing capacity is a complex process. It requires large, long-term investment and sustainable business models. It relies on open international supply lines for ingredients and equipment. We heard how shortages of even a single piece of equipment, filters, can halt operations at a production facility. Vaccine manufacturing necessitates collaboration, and the movement of skilled labour, to facilitate transfer of technology and knowhow.

“Safety is a paramount consideration, and quality is the other part of safety. This demands effective regulatory capacity and stringent compliance, down to the factory floor. Indeed we heard this is a big risk companies factor in when making decisions as to where to produce, and how to produce. I hope that they’ve heard sufficient encouragement today, to enable us to move towards leveraging the existing capacities in emerging markets and developing countries mentioned repeatedly today, which could actually help to take care of the shortages talked about.

“Turning capacity around to produce COVID-19 vaccines is not only about the physical space alone. We heard repeatedly that it requires transfer of technology and knowhow, together with investment and support for quality assurance.

“We also learned about how existing licensing arrangements have operated — including an example of how skills transfer was carried out in a few as six months. We also heard calls for support to build human capital, and to help build regulatory cooperation.

“Some participants suggested more active matchmaking to connect companies that have the investment capacity with those that have potential for expanding production capacity, even in the short term.

“We also heard about ongoing efforts to build new manufacturing capacity, and the lessons that can be learned from that.

“We also began to see the aspects of the collaboration we need to make things happen. We had many international organizations show they are willing to work together to bring to fruition things like putting in place technical expertise, helping with capacity building and quality control, and investing directly in production.

“I believe that today’s exchanges have advanced our understanding of the challenges we face for scaling up vaccine production, and that working together is the only way ahead.

“In the coming weeks and months, we expect concrete follow-up action. These issues are not easy, but the political will and engagement from the private sector displayed today, suggests it is possible.

“As we move forward, I expect:

“- From WTO members:

“- Action to further reduce export restrictions and supply chain barriers, and to work with other organizations to facilitate logistics and customs procedures.  We are monitoring this as part of our regular work, and we’ll continue doing so to increase supplies and maintain robust supply chains. Trade has been underlined as a critical factor in production; it is incumbent upon WTO members to act.

‘- Advance negotiations in the TRIPS Council on the waiver proposal and incentives for research and innovation. I hope that the ideas and the open dialogue heard will move us closer to agreement. 

‘- For vaccine manufacturers:

‘- Concrete moves to scale up vaccine manufacturing, both short-term turnaround of existing capacities, milking whatever productivity gains we can from current facilities, and taking steps to invest.

“- Increased technology and knowhow transfer, which many participants stressed would be necessary to make additional production work.

“- We need transparency in contract agreements and product pricing. We hope to continue this dialogue and to help monitoring steps in that direction.

“- For international organisations and financial institutions:

“- We noted your willingness to finance, both existing and new capacity, your willingness to work on capacity building for regulatory issues, not just for vaccines, but also for therapeutics and diagnostics, which are equally important.

“I trust that we have found a good basis to deliver concrete action, and to continue this discussion that we’ve had today.

“This should not be a one-off, we should continue to talk to each other, and make sure that we can deliver.

“I hope that besides concrete action to increase capacity, this discussion has given us elements of a framework on trade and health that we can put together at the WTO, and that can be put before ministers at the 12th Ministerial Conference in mid-December. Such a framework should provide for trade-related preparedness to handle this pandemic, and the next one.”

Press accounts indicate that the United States, European Union, India and South Africa participated. Statements from USTR Katherine Tai and Executive Vice President Dombrovskis are available from government websites. See USTR press release, Ambassador Katherine Tai’s remarks at a WTO virtual conference on Covid-19 vaccine equity, April 14, 2021, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/april/ambassador-katherine-tais-remarks-wto-virtual-conference-covid-19-vaccine-equity; European Commission press release, Speech by Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis at the WTO Webinar “Covid and Vaccine Equity,” 14 April 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/dombrovskis/announcements/speech-executive-vice-president-valdis-dombrovskis-wto-webinar-covid-and-vaccine-equity_en.

The Biden Administration has been meeting with various interest groups on the TRIPS wavier proposal (both pro and con) and is receiving pressure from some Members of Congress and prior government officials to agree to a waiver. Ambassador Tai’s statement stresses the need for equity in vaccine availability. “These losses have been disproportionately borne by vulnerable and economically disadvantaged communities within our countries. And the significant inequities we are seeing in access to vaccines between developed and developing countries are completely unacceptable. Extraordinary times require extraordinary leadership, communication, and creativity. Extraordinary crises challenge all of us to break out of our comfortable molds, our in-the-box thinking, our instinctive habits. This is not just a challenge for governments. This challenge applies equally to the industry responsible for developing and manufacturing the vaccines. The desperate needs that our people face in the current pandemic provide these companies with an opportunity to be the heroes they claim to be – and can be. As governments and leaders of international institutions, the highest standards of courage and sacrifice are demanded of us in times of crisis. The same needs to be demanded of industry.”

The EU statement is consistent with their views that equity is necessary and that the EU has been working to contribute to that result through production ramp up and large exports in fact, including to the COVAX facility. The EU summed up what the WTO should be doing. “To sum up, the WTO can support vaccine equity through five sets of actions:
Promoting best practices in terms of trade facilitation and regulatory cooperation to maintain open supply chains; Facilitating cooperation with the private sector, both to ramp up production in the short term, and to enhance manufacturing in global regions with under-capacity, focusing in particular on Africa; Supporting Members’ use of the available TRIPs flexibilities; Continuing to seek joint approaches with the World Health Organisation and the World
Intellectual Property Organisation; and Ensuring transparency and effective monitoring of any temporary export restriction, as proposed by the Ottawa Group.”

I have not found statements from either India or South Africa but at least one publication indicated they stressed the need for a TRIPS waiver for all Members. See Washington Trade Daily, WTO’s Role in Vaccine Equity, April 15, 2021, https://files.constantcontact.com/ef5f8ffe501/63ac7508-8034-44b3-8c3c-045c1bedec43.pdf.

The World Health Organization also participated and the Director-General’s statement is available from the WHO website. See WHO press release, COVID-19 and vaccine equity panel: what can the World Trade Organization contribute?, 14 April 2021, https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/covid-19-and-vaccine-equity-panel-what-can-the-world-trade-organization-contribute (“COVAX was created, as you know, almost a year ago to avoid the same thing happening again. And although COVAX has distributed almost 40 million doses of vaccine to 110 countries and economies, vaccine nationalism, vaccine diplomacy and severe supply constraints have so far prevented COVAX from realizing its full potential. Global manufacturing capacity and supply chains have not been sufficient to deliver vaccines quickly and equitably where they are needed most.  More funding is needed, but that’s only part of the solution. Money doesn’t help if there are no vaccines to buy. We need to dramatically scale up the number of vaccines being produced. To address this challenge, WHO and our partners have established a COVAX manufacturing task force, to increase supply in the short term, but also to build a platform for sustainable vaccine manufacturing to support regional health security. We need to go beyond the traditional modus operandi to provide sustainable and effective solutions to address this extraordinary crisis. Some manufacturers have begun sharing the know-how and technologies to produce more vaccines, but only under restrictive conditions, on a very limited basis. The current company-controlled production sharing agreements are not coming close to meeting the overwhelming public health and socio-economic needs for effective, affordable and equitable access to vaccines, as well as therapeutics and other critical health technologies.  This is an unprecedented emergency that demands unprecedented measures.”).

One of the private sector participants, the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) included its statement on the IFPMA website. See IFPMA, IFPMA statement at WTO event “COVID-19 and Vaccine Equity: What can the WTO Contribute”, 14 April 2021, https://www.ifpma.org/resource-centre/ifpma-statement-at-wto-event-covid-19-and-vaccine-equity-what-can-the-wto-contribute/. The IFPMA statement is embedded below but highlights the extraordinary effort of the private sector in ramping up production which is expected to be 10 billion doses by the end of 2021 with some 272 partnerships entered into and 200 technology transfer agreements.

IFPMA_WTO_Event_COVID-19_and_Vaccine_Equity_Statement_15April2021

Rising Infections; dramatically ramped up production

Last Thursday’s summary from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) shows the world going through a massive ramp up of new infections such that week 14 of 2021 is the second highest week during the pandemic of new infections with the vast majority of the cases and increase in Asia, the Americas and Europe. See ECDC, COVID-19 situation update worldwide, as of week 14, updated 15April 2021, https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases.

Distribution of COVID-19 cases worldwide, as of week 14 2021

Distribution of COVID-19 cases worldwide, as of week 14 2021
“Distribution of cases of COVID-19 by continent (according to the applied case definition and testing strategies in the affected countries)

“Cases reported in accordance with the applied case definition and testing strategies in the affected countries.”

The ECDC data show Africa as accounting for 3.18% of total infections during the pandemic, Asia accounting for 19.50% (India is 9.91%; China is 0.07%), the Americas for 43.18% (United States 22.91% and Brazil 9.90%), Europe 34.08% (the Eu is 20.79%, the UK is 3.20%, Russia is 3.4%), and Oceania 0.05%.

At the same time as new infections are ramping up, vaccinations are also increasing sharply. Bloomberg data through April 17, 2021 shows a global total of 884 million vaccinations having been given globally. See Bloomberg, More Than 884 Million Shots Given: Covid-19 Tracker, updated April 17, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-vaccine-tracker-global-distribution/.

While there are countries who have fewer or more vaccinations as a percent of the global total than their share of infections, considering distribution equity from that vantage point has some surprising results.

Country Percent of infections Percent of vaccinations

United States 22.91% 23.16%

European Union 20.79% 12.36%

United Kingdom 3.20% 4.76%

Japan 0.37% 0.21%

Republic of Korea 0.08% 0.17%

India 9.91% 13.85%

China 0.07% 21.18%

South Africa 1.14% 0.33%

Brazil 9.90% 3.92%

The pharmaceutical industry is projecting that 10 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccine will ship in 2021. That means that in the next eight and a half months, some nine billion doses will ship. If 10 billion doses are shipped in 2021, that is sufficient to fully vaccinate 5-6 billion people in 2021 (depending on number of doses that are for single shot vaccines). That is sufficient doses to vaccinate 63.3-75.9% of the current estimate of the global population (7.9 billion). See Worldometer, Current World Population, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/#:~:text=The%20current%20world%20population%20is,currently%20living)%20of%20the%20world./ With the continued efforts to expand production and approve additional vaccines, 10 billion doses may be exceeded in fact by the end of the year.

This suggests, just as the COVAX and UNICEF distribution plans indicate, that low- and middle-income countries will see a large increase in supplies in the second half of 2021, just as will be true for the rest of the world.

The U.S.-Gavi event on April 15 talked about increasing funding for COVAX to go from 20% to 30% of populations the COVAX facility is serving. See U.S. Department of State, Video Remarks of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Launch of GAVI’s COVAX Commitment, April 15, 2021, https://www.state.gov/launch-of-gavis-covax-commitment/. Moreover, the World Bank is committing billions to increases purchases of vaccines for low- and middle-income countries. And many countries are executing their own contracts with vaccine producers.

If there are issues besides assistance in resolving bottlenecks that would appear to be important to speeding up distribution and ensuring access by all, it would be to ensure that all countries with vaccine supplies greater than their internal needs, work to get those vaccines distributed to other countries later this year as their internal needs clarify.

Moreover, there are very exciting developments on the vaccine front with the start up of trials in a number of developing countries of a new vaccine where the potential exists for low costs with a vaccine that can be produced locally by many countries based on technology similar to what is already used for other vaccines. See New York Times, Researchers Are Hatching a Low-Cost Coronavirus Vaccine, A new formulation entering clinical trials in Brazil, Mexico, Thailand and Vietnam could change how the world fights the pandemic, April 5, 2021, updated April 17, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/05/health/hexapro-mclellan-vaccine.html.

All to say, there is considerable reason for optimism with the current efforts and progress. Efforts by governments, multilateral institutions, industry and others are helping identify challenges both to production and distribution but also to the needs for a speedy recovery once the pandemic is brought under control. While everyone needs to continue to focus on resolving bottlenecks, securing cooperation to ensure all are reached, and addressing developments as they arise, 2021 is not a repeat of the HIV situation.

The WTO has an important role in monitoring trade restrictions and looking forward to what actions Members are willing to take to advance trade and health needs and help ensure a next pandemic is handled more quickly than the COVID-19 has been. The effort to obtain a waiver from TRIPS obligations is, in this writer’s view, missing where the challenges are and seeking an outcome that will not advance improved vaccinations in 2021. While it is common for countries to continue to fight yesterday’s problems instead of addressing the current challenges, such an approach will not secure equitable and affordable access to vaccines in 2021-2022.

USTR 2021 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers — areas of concern with a focus on China

Every year for the last 36 years, USTR releases a National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. This year’s forward provides a little background on the report. See USTR, 2021 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, page 1, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2021/2021NTE.pdf.

“The 2021 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE) is the 36th in an annual series that highlights significant foreign barriers to U.S. exports, U.S. foreign direct investment, and U.S. electronic commerce. This document is a companion piece to the President’s 2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report, published by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in March.

“In accordance with section 181 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by section 303 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 and amended by section 1304 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, section 311 of the Uruguay Round Trade Agreements Act, and section 1202 of the Internet Tax Freedom Act, USTR is required to submit to the President, the Senate Finance Committee, and appropriate committees in the House of Representatives, an annual report on significant foreign trade barriers. The statute requires an inventory of the most important foreign barriers affecting U.S. exports of goods and services, including agricultural commodities and U.S. intellectual property; foreign direct investment by U.S. persons, especially if such investment has implications for trade in goods or services; and U.S. electronic commerce. Such an inventory enhances awareness of these trade restrictions, facilitates U.S. negotiations aimed at reducing or eliminating these barriers, and is a valuable tool in enforcing U.S. trade laws and strengthening the rules-based system.”

This year’s report covers 65 countries or country groups, so not all trading partners are covered by the annual report. China has the largest section of the report for an individual country (36 pages) while the European Union (covering 27 countries) has the largest section overall (52 pages). Other important trading partners with significant sections in the report include India (24 pages), Russian Federation (20 pages), Japan (18 pages), Indonesia (16 pages), Republic of Korea (14 pages), Brazil (14 pages), Vietnam (14 pages). the USMCA partners had smaller sections — Canada (8 pages) and Mexico (12 pages). the countries covered account for nearly 100 percent of U.S. trade in goods and nearly 90% of U.S. services trade.

The USTR press release from March 31, 2021 (majority of release copied below) provides an outline of some of the major areas of concern. See USTR, Ambassador Tai releases 2021 National Trade Estimate Report, March 31, 2021, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/march/ambassador-tai-releases-2021-national-trade-estimate-report.

Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports in 65 Trading Partners Detailed

“WASHINGTON – United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai today released the 2021 National Trade Estimate (NTE) Report, providing a detailed inventory of significant foreign barriers to U.S. exports of goods and services, investment, and electronic commerce.

“’The President’s Trade Agenda released earlier this month outlined a clear vision for supporting America’s working families by promoting a fair international trading system that boosts inclusive economic growth,’” said Ambassador Tai. ‘The 2021 NTE Report identifies a range of important challenges and priorities to guide the Biden Administration’s effort to craft trade policy that reflects America’s values and builds back better.’

“Published annually since 1985, the NTE Report is a comprehensive review of significant foreign trade barriers affecting U.S. exports of goods and services. The 570-page report examines 65 trading partners and country groups, including the U.S.’ largest trading partners, all 20 U.S. FTA partners, and other economies and country groupings of interest such as the Arab League, the United Kingdom (included as a separate entity for the first time in this report), and the European Union. Together, these economies account for 99 percent of U.S. goods trade and 87 percent of U.S. services trade. 

“The NTE Report covers significant trade barriers in 11 areas, including (1) import policies such as tariffs, import licensing and customs barriers; (2) technical barriers to trade; (3) sanitary and phytosanitary measures; (4) subsidies; (5) government procurement; (6) intellectual property protection; (7) services barriers; (8) barriers to digital trade and electronic commerce; (9) investment barriers; (10) competition; and (11) other barriers. 

“Taken as a whole, the NTE Report highlights significant barriers that present major policy challenges with implications for future U.S. growth opportunities, and the fairness of the global economy. Examples of these significant obstacles include: 

Agricultural Trade Barriers:  The NTE Report details an array of tariff and nontariff barriers to U.S. agricultural exports across trading partners and regions, ranging from non-science-based regulatory measures, opaque approval processes for products of agricultural biotechnology, burdensome import licensing and certification requirements, and restrictions on the ability of U.S. producers to use the common names of the products that they produce and export. USTR will continue to engage foreign governments on barriers that hamper the ability of U.S. farmers, ranchers and food processors to access markets worldwide. 

Digital Trade:  The 2021 NTE Report details restrictive data policies in India, China, Korea, Vietnam, and Turkey, among other countries; local software pre-installation requirements in Russia, Indonesian tariffs on digital products, and existing or proposed local content requirements for online streaming services in Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, EU, Mexico, Ukraine, and Vietnam; and discriminatory tax measures in Austria, India, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the UK. USTR will continue to engage foreign governments on digital policies that threaten the regulatory landscape for U.S. exporters of digital products and services and undermine U.S. manufacturers’ and service suppliers’ ability to move data across borders. 

Excess Capacity:  China’s state-led approach to the economy and trade makes it the world’s leading offender in creating non-economic capacity, as evidenced by the severe and persistent excess capacity situations in several industries, including steel, aluminum, and solar, among others. China also is well on its way to creating severe excess capacity in other industries through its pursuit of industrial plans such as Made in China 2025, pursuant to which the Chinese government is doling out hundreds of billions of dollars to support Chinese companies and requiring them to achieve preset targets for domestic market share–at the expense of imports–and global market share in several advanced manufacturing industries. USTR will continue its bilateral and multilateral efforts to address these harmful trade practices.

Technical Barriers to Trade:   Technical regulations or conformity assessment procedures that unnecessarily restrict trade or curb the movement of innovative products risk lost opportunities to capitalize on America’s leadership in science and high-tech manufacturing, services, and agriculture. The NTE Report’s many examples of this challenge range from non-transparent European Union chemical regulations to Chinese Information Technology cybersecurity and encryption standards, to Indian and Brazilian testing and certification rules for telecommunications equipment, to technology. 

“The United States is taking steps to address these issues, and encourage flexible regulatory approaches and transparent, open processes, with these and many other partners. Within APEC, for example, the United States is engaged in projects on cybersecurity and blockchain to identify key public policy issues, and has projects in development on aerial drones and 3D printing. Another key example is USTR’s bilateral and multilateral work on standards and regulations related to electric cars, to ensure that vehicles from different manufacturers can all be charged reliably.

“The NTE Report details thousands of individual barriers to specific manufactured goods, farm products, and services. Each can reduce U.S. opportunities to export, invent, support jobs, and raise wages and incomes. These range from Argentina’s imposition of quota limits on imported books in September 2020 to India’s 38.8 percent average tariff on agricultural goods; the anomalous technical standards Saudi Arabia applies to shoes and electronic equipment; Ecuador’s mandatory and cumbersome process for allocating import licenses for agriculture products such as meats and dairy products; Indonesian local content requirements across a broad range of sectors; and Russian bans on imported food.”

What the NTE has to say about China 

The United States has for many years raised multiple concerns with China’s practices which the U.S. views as distorting trade flows and impeding market access to China. While the U.S. and China have engaged bilaterally extensively since China’s WTO accession and the U.S. has pursued several dozen disputes against Chinese practices that were clearly contrary to WTO obligations of China, little overall progress has been made in resolving the wide array of Chinese government distortions created and maintained over the years. These distortions contribute to the extraordinary trade deficit the United States has with China. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, MONTHLY U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES, FEBRUARY 2021, April 7, 2021, https://www.bea.gov/news/2021/us-international-trade-goods-and-services-february-2021 (U.S. trade deficit in 2020 in goods with China was $310.2 billion; U.S. trade surplus in services was $22.1 billion; U.S. deficit in goods with China increased to $50.9 billion in the January – February 2021 period versus $42.1 billion in the first two months of 2020).

The Trump Administration pursued a 301 investigation on a number of intellectual property concerns with China, conducted Section 232 national security investigations on steel and aluminum — two sectors where Chinese actions have created massive global excess capacity — and negotiated with China the U.S.-China Phase I Agreement which took effect in mid-February 2020. The Agreement both addressed a number of problems in agriculture, intellectual property and services and committed China to expanded purchases of goods and services from the United States in 2021-2022 (and going forward). The NTE reviews where Chinese commitments under the Phase I Agreement apply and what progress is being seen. On the purchase commitments, China has not come close to meeting the commitments in 2021 though there were increased imports from the U.S. of agricultural products and energy products. See, e.g., March 20, 2021, The U.S.-China Phase 1 Trade Agreement under the Biden Administration, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/20/the-u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-under-the-biden-administration/. The U.S. has a long history of China promising reforms that are either not carried out or are undermined by additional restrictions. The list of areas of concern making it into the annual NTE is not exhaustive but illustrative of the challenges to obtaining conditions of fair trade with the world’s most populous nation and second largest economy.

Areas of concern for the United States with China shown in the 2021 NTE include:

Tariffs (there are some high agricultural tariffs, and the large tariffs imposed in retaliation to U.S. Section 232 actions on steel and aluminum and U.S. Section 301 actions for Chinese practices reviewed in the investigation).

Non-tariff barriers include

  • Industrial Policies (such as “Made in China 2025” and described generally as follows, “China continues to pursue a wide array of industrial policies that seek to limit market access for imported goods, foreign manufacturers, and foreign services suppliers, while offering substantial government guidance, resources, and regulatory support to Chinese industries. The beneficiaries of these constantly evolving policies are not only state-owned enterprises (SOEs) but also other domestic companies attempting to move up the economic value chain.),
  • State-Owned Enterprises (a number of concerns are raised including “China has also previously indicated that it would consider adopting the principle of ‘competitive neutrality’ for SOEs. However, China has continued to pursue policies that further enshrine the dominant role of the state and its industrial plans when it comes to the operation of state-owned and state-invested enterprises.”),
  • Industrial Subsidies (massive subsidies to industries creating excess capacity and causing harm to U.S. producers globally; U.S. is working with the EU and Japan on possible amendments to Subsidies Agreement to address certain aspects not effectively handled under existing rules)
  • Fisheries Subsidies (size of subsidies by China to its industry),
  • Excess Capacity (problem created in many sectors including steel, aluminum, solar panels and others through state programs, subsidies, etc.),
  • Indigenous Innovation (including preferences for IP developed in China),
  • Technology Transfer (301 investigation looked at “(1) the use of a variety of tools to require or pressure the transfer of technologies and IP to Chinese companies; (2) depriving U.S. companies of the ability to set market based terms in technology licensing negotiations with Chinese companies; (3) intervention in markets by directing or unfairly facilitating the acquisition of U.S. companies and assets by Chinese companies to obtain cutting-edge technologies and IP; and, (4) conducting or supporting cyber-enabled theft and unauthorized intrusions into U.S. commercial computer networks for commercial gains.”)
  • Investment Restrictions (different systems for domestic and foreign investment; discriminatory treatment),
  • Administrative Licensing (problems continue to be experienced in a wide array of licensing situations)
  • Standards (ability of foreign companies to participate in establishing; development of Chinese standards regardless of international standards),
  • Secure and Controllable ICT Policies (cybersecurity law used to discriminate against foreign ICT prducts),
  • Encryption (“Onerous requirements on the use of encryption, including intrusive approval processes and, in many cases, mandatory use of indigenous encryption algorithms (e.g., for WiFi and 4G cellular products), continue to be cited by stakeholders as a significant trade barrier.”),
  • Competition Policy (“Many U.S. companies have cited selective enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law against foreign companies seeking to do business in China as a major concern, and they have highlighted the limited enforcement of this law against SOEs.” “Instead, these remedies seem to be designed to further industrial policy goals. Another concern relates to the procedural fairness of Anti-monopoly Law investigations of foreign companies. U.S. industry has expressed concern about insufficient predictability, fairness, and transparency in Antimonopoly Law investigative processes.”),
  • Pharmaceuticals (some long standing issues addressed in U.S.-China Phase I Agreement; others to be addressed in the future),
  • Medical devices (China’s “pricing and tendering procedures for medical devices and its discriminatory treatment of imported medical devices”),
  • Cosmetics (“concerns with China’s regulation of cosmetics.” “Despite years of United States engagement with China via the JCCT, the International Cooperation on Cosmetics Regulation, and other fora to share views and expertise regarding the regulation of cosmetics, as of March 2021 China has not yet addressed key U.S. trade concerns, including basic concerns such as the need to use international standards to facilitate cosmetics conformity assessment, nor has it provided assurances that U.S. intellectual property will be protected.”),
  • Export restraints (need to bring multiple cases at WTO on inputs where violate Protocol of Accession),
  • Value-added Tax Rebates and Related Policies (modifications of rates to change trade flows),
  • Import Ban on Remanufactured Products
  • Import Ban on Recyclable Materials
  • Trade Remedies (problems in transparency and procedural fairness; problems also in apparent use of trade remedies to go after trading partners who use WTO rights against Chinese products),
  • Government Procurement (failure to join the WTO GPA yet),
  • Corporate Social Credit System (“Foreign companies are concerned that the corporate social credit system will also be used by the Chinese Government to pressure them to act in accordance with relevant Chinese industrial policies or otherwise to make investments or conduct their business operations in ways that run counter to market principles or their own business strategies. Foreign companies are also concerned about the opaque nature of the corporate social credit system.”),
  • Other Non-Tariff Measures (“Key areas include China’s labor laws, laws governing land use in China, commercial dispute resolution and the treatment of non-governmental organizations. Corruption among Chinese Government officials, enabled in part by China’s incomplete adoption of the rule of law, is also a key concern.”).

Intellectual Property Protection (many issues were included in the U.S.-China Phase I Agreement, some progress on issues raised).

  • Trade Secrets (major area of concern and theft, some believed from government-supported entities; some improvements from U.S.-China Phase I Agreement),
  • Bad Faith Trademark Registration (a continuing major concern; some progress in U.S.-China Phase I Agreement),
  • Online Infringement (“Online piracy continues on a large scale in China, affecting a wide range of industries, including those involved in distributing legitimate music, motion pictures, books and journals, software, and video games.” Some progress made in the U.S.-China Phase I Agreement),
  • Counterfeit Goods (a major problem. “The Phase One Agreement requires China to take effective enforcement action against counterfeit pharmaceuticals and related products, including active pharmaceutical ingredients, and to significantly increase actions to stop the manufacture and distribution of counterfeits with significant health or safety risks. The Phase One Agreement also requires China to provide that its judicial authorities shall order the forfeiture and destruction of pirated and counterfeit goods, along with the materials and implements predominantly used in their manufacture. In addition, the Agreement requires China to significantly increase the number of enforcement actions at physical markets in China and against goods that are exported or in transit. It further requires China to ensure, through third party audits, that government agencies and SOEs only use licensed software.”).

Agriculture (“China remains a difficult and unpredictable market for U.S. agricultural exporters, largely because of
inconsistent enforcement of regulations and selective intervention in the market by China’s regulatory authorities. The failure of China’s regulators to routinely follow science-based, international standards, and guidelines further complicates and impedes agricultural trade. The Phase One Agreement addresses structural barriers to trade and aims to support a dramatic expansion of U.S. food, agriculture, and seafood product exports, which will increase U.S. farm and fishery income, generate more rural economic activity, and promote job growth. The Phase One Agreement addresses a multitude of non-tariff barriers to U.S. agriculture and seafood products, including for meat and meat
products, poultry, seafood, rice, dairy, infant formula, horticultural products, animal feed and feed additives, pet food, and products of agricultural biotechnology. The Agreement also includes enforceable commitments requiring China to purchase and import on average at least $40 billion of U.S. agricultural and seafood products per year in 2021 and 2022, representing an average annual increase of at least $16 billion over 2017 levels. China also agreed that it will strive to purchase and import an additional $5 billion of U.S. agricultural and seafood products each year.”).

  • Agricultural Domestic Support (China exceeds the limits allowed it; WTO dispute confirms China in violation of WTO obligations; U.S. seeking authorization to retaliate),
  • Tariff-rate Quota Administration (U.S. challenged China’s administration of TRQs on various products and won WTO dispute; U.S.-China Phase I Agreement requires China to comply on the products of concern),
  • Agricultural Biotechnology Approvals (China’s system has been a major problem for U.S. producers. U.S>-China Phase I Agreement includes commitments by China to address the major concerns of the U.S. in this area),
  • Food Safety Law (China’s actions have been quite burdensome and have failed to provide notices to the WTO in many cases. U.S>-China Phase I Agreement addresses the main concerns),
  • Poultry (China restricted U.S. exports after avian influenza in the U.S. and maintained restrictions despite actions by the U.S. that complied with World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) guidelines. U.S.-China Phase I Agreement has China committing to follow OIE guidelines and limiting restrictions to the region where there is a problem in future outbreaks),
  • Beef (“In the Phase One Agreement, China agreed to expand the scope of U.S. beef products allowed to be imported, to eliminate age restrictions on cattle slaughtered for export to China, and to recognize the U.S. beef and beef products’ traceability system. China also agreed to establish MRLs for three synthetic hormones legally used for decades in the United States consistent with Codex standards and guidelines. Where Codex standards and guidelines do not yet exist, China agreed to use MRLs established by other countries that have performed science-based risk assessments.”),
  • Pork (“China bans the use of certain veterinary drugs and growth promotants instead of accepting the MRLs set by Codex.” Some progress on opening the China market to U.S. pork products was made in the U.S.-China Phase I Agreement),
  • Horticultural Products (market access barriers for many U.S. products. U.S.-China Phase I Agreement obtains access for a number of products — fresh potatoes for processing, blueberries, nectarines and avocados from California, and barley, timothy hay and some other products.),
  • Value-added Tax Rebates and Related Policies (practice of varying rates on agricultural commodities).

Services (“In 2020, numerous challenges persisted in a number of services sectors. As in past years, Chinese regulators
continued to use discriminatory regulatory processes, informal bans on entry and expansion, case-by-case approvals in some services sectors, overly burdensome licensing and operating requirements, and other means to frustrate the efforts of U.S. suppliers of services to achieve their full market potential in China. These policies and practices affect U.S. service suppliers across a wide range of sectors, including express delivery, cloud computing, telecommunications, film production and distribution, online video and entertainment software, and legal services. In addition, China’s Cybersecurity Law and related draft and final implementing measures include mandates to purchase domestic ICT products and services, restrictions on cross-border data flows, and requirements to store and process data locally. China’s draft Personal Information Protection Law also includes restrictions on cross-border data flows and requirements to store and process data locally. These types of data restrictions undermine U.S. services suppliers’ ability to take advantage of market access opportunities in China. China also had failed to fully address U.S. concerns in
areas that have been the subject of WTO dispute settlement, including electronic payment services and theatrical film importation and distribution. The Phase One Agreement addresses a number of longstanding trade and investment barriers to U.S. providers of a wide range of financial services, including banking, insurance, securities, asset management, credit rating, and electronic payment services, among others. The barriers addressed in that Agreement
include joint venture requirements, foreign equity limitations, and various discriminatory regulatory requirements. Removal of these barriers should allow U.S. financial service providers to compete on a more level playing field and expand their services export offerings in the China market.”)

  • Banking Services (U.S.-China Phase I Agreement addresses some concerns re access including bank branches and supplying securities investment fund custody services),
  • Securities, Asset Management, and Futures Services (U.S.-China Phase I Agreement resulted in China eliminating limits on equity ownership and commits to nondiscrimination for U.S. suppliers of these services),
  • Insurance Services (despite commitments by China as part of the U.S.-China Phase I Agreement, U.S. participation in China’s insurance market remains very limited),
  • Electronic Payment Services (China has restricted access to foreign electronic payment services providers. U.S. won a WTO dispute and included provisions in U.S.-China Phase I Agreement. So far just one foreign electronic payment services provider has been licensed in China),
  • Internet-enabled Payment Services (major problems for foreign companies to obtain license to provide such services),
  • Telecommunications Services (range of barriers have limited foreign suppliers access to both basic telecom services and to value added services),
  • Internet Regulatory Regime (“China’s Internet regulatory regime is restrictive and non-transparent, affecting a broad range of commercial services activities conducted via the Internet, and is overseen by multiple agencies without clear lines of jurisdiction. China’s Internet economy had boomed over the past decade and is second in size only to that of the United States. Growth in China has been marked in service sectors similar to those found in the United States, including retail websites, search engines, online education, travel, advertising, audio-visual and computer gaming services, electronic mail and text, online job searches, Internet consulting, mapping services, applications, web domain registration, and electronic trading. However, in the Chinese market, Chinese companies dominate due in large part to restrictions imposed on foreign companies by the Chinese Government. At the same time, foreign companies continue to encounter major difficulties in attempting to offer these and other Internet-based services on a cross-border basis. China continues to engage in extensive blocking of legitimate websites and apps, imposing significant costs on both suppliers and users of web-based services and products. According to the latest data, China currently blocks a significant portion of the largest global sites. U.S. industry research has calculated that more than 10,000 foreign sites are blocked, affecting billions of dollars in business, including communications, networking, app stores, news, and other sites. Even when sites are not permanently blocked, the often arbitrary implementation of blocking, and the performance-degrading effect of filtering all traffic into and outside of China, significantly impair the supply of many cross-border services, often to the point of making them unviable.”),
  • Voice-over-Internet Protocol Services (“China’s regulatory authorities have restricted the ability to offer VOIP services interconnected to the public switched telecommunications network (i.e., to call a traditional phone number) to basic telecommunications service licensees.”),
  • Cloud Computing Services (foreign service providers can only operate in China by using a Chinese company and turning over brand, IP and other aspects; serious concern for U.S.),
  • Audio-visual and Related Services (“China prohibits retransmission of foreign TV channels, prohibits foreign investment in TV production, prohibits foreign investment in TV stations and channels in China, and imposes quotas on the amount of foreign programming that can be shown on a Chinese TV channel each day.”),
  • Theatrical Films (despite a WTO dispute and a resulting MOU where China agreed to expand number of U.S. films, China has not fulfilled its commitments)
  • Online Video and Entertainment Software Services (foreign suppliers are severely restricted),
  • Legal Services (very limited ability for foreign firms or foreign lawyers to practice in China)
  • Express Delivery Services (foreign service providers are banned from document delivery and face discriminatory and burdensome actions on package participation),
  • Data Restrictions (activities in China are likely to result in local storage requirements and limits on cross-border transfer; major concern to U.S. and many other countries).

Transparency (much work needed by China to meet obligations)

  • Publication of Trade-related Measures (WTO obligation to publish in one journal; spotty performance and many types of measures not published in the journal),
  • Notice-and-comment Procedures (little progress at sub-central government level; some progress at central government; U.S.-China Phase I Agreement commits China to provide 45 days notice and comment period for matters relating to the Agreement),
  • Translations (WTO commitment to provide translations in one of the three official WTO languages. “China does not publish translations of trade-related laws and administrative regulations in a timely manner (i.e., before implementation), nor does it publish any translations of trade-related measures issued by sub-central governments at all.”).

Conclusion

While the U.S. was the first country to produce a national trade estimate, a number of countries do so today. All trading partners have some practices which concern other trading partners, including the United States.

The length of the entry in the NTE for a give country is a reasonable indication both of the importance of the trade relationship and of the breadth of issues of concern. For the United States, the National Trade Estimate is a useful compilation of many of the major concerns raised by industries about problems in access to markets abroad or distortions created by practices of trading partners. Typically items found in the NTE will be part of USTR’s focus during the year in interactions with particular trading partners.

China is the country with the longest entry in the NTE and has been for many years. Considering the array of distortions and other problems identified in this year’s NTE, the focus on China is not surprising.

Some of the problems identified in this year’s NTE with China could be addressed through WTO reform, though China has indicated opposition to such an approach. On some of the issues, the U.S. has received repeated promises from China to address but without meaningful results to date.

What is clear is that U.S. trade relations with China are not balanced and haven’t been for the entire time of WTO membership for China. The challenge for the U.S. and the world is how to restore balance and save the global trading system. There are no obvious answers.

“Blowing up the trading system” — Clyde Prestowitz’s suggested way for the world to move forward in light of China’s economic system

The Global Business Dialogue (GBD) publishes periodically “THE TTALK QUOTES”. On March 30, 2021, GBD posted a TTALK Quotes on “CHINA, THE TRADING SYSTEM, AND THE ALTERNATIVES” with a quote from Clyde Prestowitz, ‘[There is] only one alternative – “blowing up the system” or, more politely, creating a new or alternative system.”

The quote is from a Washington Monthly article by Mr. Prestowitz from March 24, 2021 entitled, “Blow Up the Global Trading System, Yes, really. U.S. and international efforts to stop Beijing’s economic onslaught haven’t worked. It’s time for President Biden to go big,” https://washingtonmonthly.com/2021/03/24/blow-up-the-global-trading-system/. Mr. Prestowitz has a new book out, The World Turned Upside Down (Yale University Press, 2021) and some of the recommendations in the Washington Monthly article reflect his thinking from his new book.

While the title is provocative, the concerns expressed are similar to the ones reviewed in Amb. Dennis Shea’s remarks to the Coalition for a Prosperous America and those expressed last year by Mogens Peter Carl that China’s economic system isn’t consistent with the WTO rules and China has no intention of modifying its approach to global trade. See March 29, 2021:  China and the WTO – remarks by Dennis C. Shea to the Coalition for a Prosperous America, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/29/china-and-the-wto-remarks-by-dennis-c-shea-to-the-coalition-for-a-prosperous-america/.

Unlike Mr. Carl’s call for market economy countries to withdraw from the WTO and start a new organization, Mr. Prestowitz proposes in the Washington Monthly article “Reinventing the Globalization System” which involves seven action steps.

The first is for the United States “to impose a Market Adjustment Charge (MAC) on all non-direct investment (not in new means of production) into the United States.” The MAC is explained in his new book (pages 276-277) but is a charge that would vary based on the size and trend of the U.S. trade deficit.

The second step “would be for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to adopt Keynes’ Bretton Woods proposal that all countries should have balanced trade in the medium to long term.” To achieve this result, a duty would be applied on imports from countries that run persistent trade surpluses.

The third step would be for the United States to seek strong enforcement within the IMF and by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

The fourth step would be forming a supersized FTA including USMCA, CPTPP and the EU, and open to other market economies. Prestowitz calls this grouping the “Free World Free Trade Agreement”.

The firth step addresses the need for market economies to improve their competitiveness against the state directed and massively subsidized world of China. The step calls for the creation of “a free world high technology leadership project”

The sixth step calls on the U.S. to reorganize government and concentrate resources to support the technology leadership initiative.

The final step involves actions the U.S. can take to spur domestic manufacturing (use of Defense Production Act, curbing corporate lobbying, and review corporate overseas investment plans.

In his book, Mr. Prestowitz has a chapter on actions the U.S. should take to regain its leadership position. It starts with a Market Access Charge, calls for the imposition of a value added tax and a host of actions to ensure the U.S. is “the world’s most competitive economy.” Page 278.

U.S. actions are aimed at improving U.S. competitiveness

A number of the actions Mr. Prestowitz calls for on U.S. competitiveness are similar to actions being introduced today in part 1 of President Biden’s American Jobs Plan (est. cost of $2.5 trillion). See White House Briefing Room, FACT SHEET: The American Jobs Plan, March 31, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan/. Excerpts are copied below. The full fact sheet is then embedded.

“While the American Rescue Plan is changing the course of the pandemic and delivering relief for working families, this is no time to build back to the way things were. This is the moment to reimagine and rebuild a new economy. The American Jobs Plan is an investment in America that will create millions of good jobs, rebuild our country’s infrastructure, and position the United States to out-compete China. Public domestic investment as a share of the economy has fallen by more than 40 percent since the 1960s. The American Jobs Plan will invest in America in a way we have not invested since we built the interstate highways and won the Space Race.

“The United States of America is the wealthiest country in the world, yet we rank 13th when it comes to the overall quality of our infrastructure. After decades of disinvestment, our roads, bridges, and water systems are crumbling. Our electric grid is vulnerable to catastrophic outages. Too many lack access to affordable, high-speed Internet and to quality housing. The past year has led to job losses and threatened economic security, eroding more than 30 years of progress in women’s labor force participation. It has unmasked the fragility of our caregiving infrastructure. And, our nation is falling behind its biggest competitors on research and development (R&D), manufacturing, and training. It has never been more important for us to invest in strengthening our infrastructure and competitiveness, and in creating the good-paying, union jobs of the future.

“Like great projects of the past, the President’s plan will unify and mobilize the country to meet the great challenges of our time: the climate crisis and the ambitions of an autocratic China. It will invest in Americans and deliver the jobs and opportunities they deserve. But unlike past major investments, the plan prioritizes addressing long-standing and persistent racial injustice. The plan targets 40 percent of the benefits of climate and clean infrastructure investments to disadvantaged communities. And, the plan invests in rural communities and communities impacted by the market-based transition to clean energy.”

FACT-SHEET_-The-American-Jobs-Plan-_-The-White-House

Reform of the WTO or a different approach?

The U.S. is looking to push WTO reform and work with trading partners to address challenges posed by China’s economic model. The EU and Japan are similarly looking at WTO reform as a way forward. See, e.g., February 18, 2021, The European Commission’s 18 February 2021 Trade Policy Review paper and Annex — WTO reform and much more proposed, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/02/18/the-european-commissions-18-february-2021-trade-policy-review-paper-wto-reform-and-much-more-proposed/.

The G7 trade ministers are meeting today. See Reuters, UK trade minister tells G7: We must stop fragmentation of global trade, March 31, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/britain-trade-truss-idUSS8N2L708T. The seven G7 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US (EU participates as a guest). WTO reform is one of the topics being discussed today. The U.S., EU and Japan have been working on potential reforms to the Subsidies Agreement to address the massive industrial subsidies provided by China as well as looking at potential disciplines on state-owned/invested enterprises and forced technology transfer. However, in a consensus system like the WTO, it is hard to imagine meaningful reforms that will address Chinese distortions achieving results within the WTO.

The U.S. is not presently considering a “Free World Free Trade Agreement” as proposed by Mr. Prestowitz. The U.S. is also not proposing pulling out of the WTO as suggested last year by Mogens Peter Carl and entering into a new organization that is limited to market economies. Each of the U.S. and the EU have the ability to act unilaterally if necessary but obviously that is a less desirable approach to global governance.

So it is likely that the U.S., EU, Japan and other leading market economies will continue to seek reform within the WTO but with likely limited results putting pressure on free trade agreements or on plurilateral arrangements to achieve a trade regime acceptable to the major market economies.

Mr. Prestowitz’s article and recent book are well done and raise some interesting ideas for addressing U.S. trade concerns with China. Some of his ideas have been advocated for by others before and have significant potential whether they have much political possibility for adoption. But in a changing global trade environment, his writings are a useful contribution and worth reading by those in trade policy positions.

For the Biden Administration, new trade agreements do not appear to be a short-term objective. Getting control of the pandemic through vaccinations and building back better through the jobs bill are the two major priorities. Trade can contribute to both, but a push for Free World Free Trade Agreement is not likely in the Biden years.

Still China’s economic system and incompatibility with the WTO are major concerns for many countries including the United States. Reform of the WTO would obviously be the best outcome for addressing China’s distortions. While hope spring eternal, the Ministerial Conference in late November 2021 in Geneva will give an idea of whether meaningful WTO reform is likely in the cards in the coming years. Such reform is highly unlikely to happen during the 2020s, if ever.

Mr. Carl’s suggestion of mass withdrawal from the WTO and creation of a new entity of market economies is interesting in addressing the blocking capacity of China but seems improbable because of China’s size and importance. With no major economy having suggested any interest in the idea, it seems implausible in the 2020s, if ever.

Mr. Prestowitz’s idea for a super-FTA of market economies is doable within the WTO and simply depends on majors like the U.S., EU, Japan and others being willing to put in the effort. But the U.S. and EU have not been able to make meaningful progress on an FTA or even harmonization of regulations over recent decades. If past is prologue, it is unlikely that such an undertaking will occur in the 2020s either, if ever.

 As British trade minister Liz Truss is reported to have said to her G7 fellow trade ministers, “We need to reverse the fragmentation of global trade and get the global system and WTO working again, otherwise we risk big countries going their own way and operating outside an agreed set of rules, which always spells trouble.” Reuters, UK trade minister tells G7: We must stop fragmentation of global trade, March 31, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/britain-trade-truss-idUSS8N2L708T. China has effectively been going its own way even after joining the WTO at the end of 2001. Actions by the U.S., EU and others in recent years have occasionally been outside of the agreed set of rules as well. So a fourth option is that of the collapse of the global trading system (actually or practically) with a law of the jungle reasserting itself.

Time will tell which direction global trade will take.

China and the WTO – remarks by Dennis C. Shea to the Coalition for a Prosperous America

On March 26, 2021, the former Deputy USTR in Geneva during the Trump Administration, Amb. Dennis C. Shea, spoke to the Coalition for a Prosperous America. While the remarks were made in his individual capacity, the remarks reviewed the challenges for the World Trade Organization remaining relevant with the current activities of the People’s Republic of China. His remarks, entitled “Three hard truths” can be found on his linkedin page. See Remarks to CPA, 3.26.2021, https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6781608096750956544/?updateEntityUrn=urn%3Ali%3Afs_feedUpdate%3A%28V2%2Curn%3Ali%3Aactivity%3A6781608096750956544%29.

The three hard truths from his remarks are copied below.

“The first of these hard truths is that China’s economic system – with its unique melding of public, private, and Chinese Communist Party resources, all harnessed to advance industrial policy objectives – is incompatible with the WTO norms of market orientation, transparency, non-discrimination, and reciprocity.”

“The second hard truth is that the WTO has proven itself incapable of restraining the trade disruptive activities of the Chinese non-market economic system.”

“The third hard truth is that China does not want change at the WTO.”

Amb. Shea reviews in some detail the actions of China post-accession to move away from market reforms that trading partners expected from China’s accession to the WTO and why such actions frustrate the proper functioning of the WTO. He also reviews China’s willingness to retaliate against trading partners for their legitimate use of WTO rights and to punish trading partners for comments China views as against their interests. The import bans against Australian products when Australia urged an independent investigation into the source of the COVID-19 virus is one example mentioned. Finally, on the issue of not wanting change at the WTO, Amb. Shea reviews China’s opposition to every reform issue raised by the United States.

Amb. Shea’s remarks are worth a close read. While he doesn’t address a road forward, his well founded concerns about China’s role in the trading system and its incompatible economic system with WTO rules bring to mind a piece by a former EC Director General for Trade, Mogens Peter Carl which I reviewed in an earlier post. See July 25, 2020, A new WTO without China?  The July 20, 2020 Les Echos opinion piece by Mogens Peter Carl, a former EC Director General for Trade and then Environment, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/07/25/a-new-wto-without-china-the-july-20-2020-les-echos-opinion-piece-by-mogens-peter-carl-a-former-ec-director-general-for-trade-and-then-environment/ . I reproduce much of that post below.

“Earlier this week (July 20), a former EC Director General for Trade, Peter Carl, penned an opinion piece in Les Echos with the provocative title, “A new WTO is needed without China” (literally A new WTO must see the day without China). https://www.lesechos.fr/idees-debats/cercle/opinion-une-nouvelle-omc-doit-voir-le-jour-sans-la-chine-1224748.

“Mr. Carl indicates in the opinion piece that ‘Europe’s trade policy has stagnated for twenty years. It no longer meets the demands of today’s world and the European public attributes the loss of millions of jobs to China.’ (all quotes from the opinion piece are informal translations by Google Translate ). The opinion is remarkable as it comes from a former senior EC trade official.

“‘Our policy is outdated and based on an outdated ideology that is identical to what it was before the arrival of China on the world state, after its accession to the WTO in 2001. Its centralized economy, its powerful industrial policy in all the key sectors, its enormous state subsidies, combined with a government apparatus and a political repression as powerful as those of the ex-USSR, swept large swathes of European and American industry. However, we act as if we were in the heyday of the 1990s, when our main competitors were other market economies, Japan, Korea, the United States. Our inaction resembles the ostrich policy and unilateral pacifism of the 1930s. We know the results. We must therefore protect our liberal economies and our open societies against adversaries. This requires a fundamental review of the trade policy of the European Union and the WTO.’

“Mr. Carl calls for a complete reform of the WTO with the EU teaming up with the U.S. and other like-minded Members but recognizes that meaningful reform will be blocked by China. ‘The solution: withdraw from the WTO and create a new international trade organization without China. Most countries would follow our example. We would return to an open world economic order between market economy countries sharing the same ideas, on the basis of clear and reinforced principles in favor of the free market.’ Mr. Carl advocates for the adoption of rules that would deal with ‘abuses’ of the China model including improved subsidy disciplines and ‘rules against social, environmental dumping and inaction on climate change.’ Such new rules are needed to permit the EU to green its economy.

“Mr. Carl, addressing concerns that his proposal represents a turn to managed trade, says simply that ‘This is what we already have, although only China manages it, and we are suffering the consequences.’

“That Mr. Carl felt the need to publish such a strongly worded opinion shows the underlying and growing tensions felt by major trading partners from a major economic power with a fundamentally different economic system than that pursued by the historic major players in world trade.

“For WTO Members and their businesses and workers, the rising discontent by many with the functioning of the WTO and its ability to achieve meaningful reform should be a wake-up call. The WTO to be relevant must have rules that address the world in the 21st century. The WTO must also be able to have Members assume increased responsibilities as their stage of economic development evolves. Similarly, the WTO must confront whether existing rules can be modified to generate greater coverage of practices by different types of economic systems. If not, the WTO must consider whether it can survive where all Members don’t follow similar economic systems.

“Unfortunately, there appears little likelihood that many of these critical reforms will be addressed in the coming years. China has objected to WTO Members trying to modify existing agreements to address distortions caused by China’s economic system. China has also objected to the U.S. effort to have Members consider whether WTO rules require Members to operate market-economy based systems. China and others have objected to U.S. efforts to define ‘developing country’ and effectively have Members take on obligations commensurate to their stage of economic development. Stated differently, China is working hard to defend the status quo and prevent consideration of reforms that would achieve greater balance among all WTO Members.

“While USTR Lighthizer and others have said that if the WTO didn’t exist, it would have to be created, Mr. Carl’s opinion suggests that one option that may take on greater appeal is the withdrawal from the WTO and the creation of a new international trade regime among countries with similar economic systems. Such a move away from the WTO would certainly involve enormous economic upheaval and political tensions. The more desirable course of action is to achieve timely reform of the WTO so that all Members feel the system achieves reasonable reciprocity.

“Time will tell whether WTO Members find a path forward or whether the WTO becomes less and less relevant and even ceases to function. In a Member driven organization, the answer lies with the membership.”

The WTO now has a new Director-General who is working to see if Members can achieve breakthroughs on the existing fisheries subsidies, make significant progress on Joint Statement Initiatives, while encouraging Members to limit export restraints on medical goods needed to address the COVID-19 pandemic, promote rapid return to trade growth post pandemic, and work on WTO reform.

The Biden Administration has a desire to work with trading partners in multilateral organizations like the WTO and has articulated the need of allies to work together to address problems caused by non-market economies like China. While the Biden Administration will certainly pursue WTO reform, Amb. Shea’s final paragraph of his remarks is on point.

“The Biden Administration has made working with friends and allies a hallmark of its diplomatic approach, particularly when it comes to China. When the Administration brings this approach to the WTO, I sincerely hope our friends and allies will appreciate the gravity of the moment and what’s at stake.”

U.S. blocks inclusion of Venezuelan request for panel on U.S. sanctions at WTO, Dispute Settlement Body meeting of March 26, 2021 postponed

The monthly regular meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body was scheduled for March 26, 2021. The proposed agenda was circulated earlier and contained as item 4, “United States – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, A. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Venezuela (WT/DS54/2/Rev.1)”. See Dispute Settlement Body, 26 March 2021, Proposed Agenda, WT/DSB/W/679 (24 March 2021). For background, the Venezuelan request for a panel is embedded below.

WTDS574-2R1

The United States objected to the inclusion of agenda item 4. USTR released a short statement on March 26. “The United States will reject any effort by Maduro to misuse the WTO to attack U.S. sanctions aimed at restoring human rights and democracy to Venezuela. The United States exercised its rights as a WTO Member to object to this illegitimate panel request because representatives of the Maduro regime do not speak on behalf of the Venezuelan people.” See USTR, Statement from USTR Spokesperson Adam Hodge on U.S. Action to Prevent Maduro Regime’s Attempt to Undermine U.S. Sanctions, March 26, 2021, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/march/statement-ustr-spokesperson-adam-hodge-us-action-prevent-maduro-regimes-attempt-undermine-us.

Venezuela did not agree to withdraw its request for a panel from the agenda with the result that Dispute Settlement Body meetings cannot proceed until there is a resolution. See Blomberg, U.S. Disrupts WTO Dispute Meeting Over Venezuela Sanctions Fight, March 26, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-26/u-s-disrupts-wto-dispute-meeting-over-venezuela-sanctions-fight (“The meeting ended prematurely after Venezuela refused Washington’s demand that the WTO remove Venezuela’s dispute request from the meeting agenda, according to the official attending the meeting. The impasse means that the WTO can’t hold any regular dispute settlement meetings unless and until the U.S. or Venezuela back down.”); Inside U.S. Trade’s World Trade Online, WTO: DSB meeting postponed over U.S. objection to Venezuela panel request, March 26, 2021, https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/wto-dsb-meeting-postponed-over-us-objection-venezuela-panel-request; Reuters, U.S. blocks Venezuela bid to seek WTO review of sanctions, March 26, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-wto-usa-venezuela/u-s-blocks-venezuela-bid-to-seek-wto-review-of-sanctions-idUSKBN2BI1ZT (“Were the United States and other members to allow representatives of the illegitimate Maduro regime to exercise rights at the WTO on behalf of Venezuela, it would be tantamount to recognizing the Maduro regime itself,” the official said. “This would be contrary to the Biden-Harris administration’s firm policy supporting the people of Venezuela.”).

Background

The Maduro government in Venezuela is viewed as illegitimate by the United States and dozens of other governments based on the 2013 election. The U.S. has recognized Juan Guaido as the interim President and has imposed a series of sanctions on Venezuela and the Maduro government. While the sanctions were imposed during the Trump Administration, no changes have yet occurred in the Biden Administration. A 2020 write-up from the State Department describes the problems and justifications for the sanctions. See U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations With Venezuela, Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, July 6, 2020, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/. Much of the fact sheet is copied below.

U.S.-VENEZUELA RELATIONS

“The United States recognizes Interim President Juan Guaido and considers the Venezuelan National Assembly, which he currently leads, to be the only legitimate federal institution, according to the Venezuelan Constitution. Nearly sixty other countries have joined in this recognition.

“The United States works with Interim President Juan Guaido and his team on a number of areas of mutual concern, including humanitarian and migration issues, health issues, security, anti-narcotrafficking initiatives, and reestablishment of the rule of law. The United States proposed a Democratic Transition Framework in 2020 as a guide to help Venezuelan society achieve a peaceful, democratic transition. Venezuela’s previous presidents, the late Hugo Chavez (1999-2013) and Nicolas Maduro (2013-2019), defined themselves in large part through their opposition to the United States, regularly criticizing and sowing disinformation about the U.S. government, its policies, and its relations with Latin America. Maduro, who was not reelected via free and fair elections, clings to power through the use of force. His policies are marked by authoritarianism, intolerance for dissent, and violent and systematic repression of human rights and fundamental freedoms – including the use of torture, arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings, and the holding of more than 400 prisoners of conscience. Maduro has been sanctioned by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, and in 2020 the Department of Justice charged him with offenses related to narco-terrorism and drug trafficking The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) posted a $15-million reward for information to bring him to justice. The Maduro regime’s irresponsible intervention in the economy has facilitated widespread corruption and stoked hyperinflation leading to negative economic growth and a humanitarian crisis, including food, energy, and water shortages, in a country with the world’s largest proven oil reserves.

“U.S. Assistance to Venezuela

“Through its assistance to the legitimate Guaido Interim Government and democratic organizations within and outside Venezuela, the United States supports the protection of human rights, the promotion of civil society, the strengthening of democratic institutions, and transparency and accountability in the country. From Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 to 2019, the United States has committed approximately $58.6million in bilateral democracy assistance to Venezuela. Assistance to Venezuela is subject to a number of restrictions, including those under Section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228) (the so-called Drug Majors restriction), the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, and restrictions contained in the annual appropriations laws

“Since 2005, the President has determined annually that Venezuela, and more recently the illegitimate Maduro regime, has “failed demonstrably” to adhere to its drug control obligations under international counternarcotics agreements. The President has issued a national interest waiver to enable certain assistance programs vital to the national interests of the United States, such as human rights and civil society programs, to continue.

“Pursuant to Section 40A of the AECA, since 2006 the Department of State has determined annually that Venezuela was “not cooperating fully” with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Under this provision, defense articles and services may not be sold or licensed for export to Venezuela during the relevant fiscal year.

“U.S. Assistance in Response to the Venezuela Regional Crisis

“The United States is answering Interim President Guaido’s call to help the people of Venezuela cope with severe food, water, energy, and medicine shortages. Since FY 2017, the United States has provided more than $856 million in assistance to support the response to the crisis inside Venezuela and the region, which includes $611 million in humanitarian assistance and $245 million in economic and development assistance. The United States is the single largest donor to the combat the crisis, and supports sixteen countries hosting Venezuelan refugees. USG-provided humanitarian assistance addresses critical life-saving needs, including food and nutrition, water, sanitation, hygiene and health, and temporary shelter. Our development assistance is helping countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean meet longer term needs, such as education deficits, caused by the man-made regional crisis.

“Bilateral Economic Relations

“Before the United States suspended diplomatic operations in Venezuela, the United States was Venezuela’s largest trading partner. Bilateral trade in goods between both countries reached $3.2 billion in 2019. U.S. goods exports to Venezuela totaled $1.2 billion in 2019. U.S. imports from Venezuela totaled $1.9 billion. U.S. exports to Venezuela have historically included petroleum and refined petroleum products, machinery, organic chemicals, and agricultural products. Crude oil dominated U.S. imports from Venezuela, which was one of the top five suppliers of foreign oil to the United States. In early 2019, imports of Venezuelan crude oil averaged roughly 500,000 barrels per day, but sanctions imposed by the United States have now cut this to zero. Previously, U.S. foreign direct investment in Venezuela was concentrated largely in the petroleum sector, but sanctions, coupled with the poor business environment, have significantly reduced these investment.

“Hyperinflation, state intervention in the economy including expropriations, macroeconomic distortions, physical insecurity, corruption, violations of labor rights, and a volatile regulatory framework make Venezuela an extremely challenging climate for U.S. and multinational companies. A complex foreign exchange system, capital controls, and the lack of dollars, coupled with increasing sanctions from the United States and other countries, have prevented firms from repatriating their earnings out of Venezuela and importing industrial inputs and finished goods into Venezuela. Lack of access to dollars, price controls, and rigid labor regulations have compelled many U.S. and multinational firms to reduce or shut down their Venezuelan operations.

“Since 2017, the United States has made over 300 Venezuelan-related designations, pursuant to various Executive Orders (E.O.), including under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. Designations include former President

“Maduro and those involved in public corruption and undermining democracy under E.O. 13692 (Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela) issued by the President in March 2015 and E.O. 13850 (Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela) issued by the President in November 2018, each as amended. Since 2017, the Department of Treasury has designated two individuals for involvement in narcotrafficking under the Kingpin Act, including former Vice President (and nominal Minister of Oil) Tareck El Aissami.

“Additionally, E.O. 13850, in conjunction with determinations made by the Secretary of the Treasury, authorizes sanctions against persons determined to be operating in the gold, oil, financial, and defense and security sectors of the Venezuelan economy and was the basis for the January 2019 designation of Venezuelan national oil company Petreoleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA). The Central Bank of Venezuela is also designated under E.O. 13850.

“On August 5, 2019, the President signed E.O. 13884 which blocks all property and interests in property of the Government of Venezuela that are in the United States or that are within the possession or control of any United States person. In conjunction with E.O. 13884, Treasury also issued or , including those that authorize, among other things, transactions with Guaido and the National Assembly, activities for the official business of certain international organizations, and activities NGOs undertake to support humanitarian projects to meet basic human needs in Venezuela.

“For additional information about the Venezuela sanctions program, please visit the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) website.

“On March 26, 2020, the Department of Justice charged former President Maduro and 14 other current and former Venezuelan officials, including his vice president for the economy, his Minister of Defense, and the Chief Supreme Court Justice with offenses related to narco-terrorism, corruption, and drug trafficking, and other criminal charges.

“Venezuela’s Membership in International Organizations

“Venezuela and the United States belong to a number of the same international organizations, including the United Nations, Organization of American States, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Monetary Fund, Interpol, World Bank, World Trade Organization and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

“Venezuela is a founding member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and PetroCaribe. Venezuela is also a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, , the G-15, the G-24, and the G-77. On August 5, 2017 Venezuela was indefinitely suspended from Southern Common Market (Mercosur).

“With the recognition of Juan Guaido as interim President by 57 countries, Venezuela’s participation or representation in some of these organizations has come under debate.

“On April 26, 2017, Maduro announced Venezuela would withdraw from the Organization of American States (OAS), a process that requires two years. This decision was reversed by Interim President Guaido and the National Assembly. On January 10, 2019, the OAS Permanent Council voted not to recognize the second term of former President Nicolas Maduro and on April 9, 2019 the OAS Permanent Council approved a resolution to accept interim President Guaido’s nominee Gustavo Tarre as Venezuela’s representative to the Permanent Council on April 9.

“The interim Guaido government is also an active member of the Lima Group, an important group of likeminded nations founded in 2017 to facilitate regional coordination in the pursuit of a democratic resolution to the Venezuela crisis.

“On March 15, 2019, the IDB approved a resolution recognizing Guaido’s representative, Ricardo Hausmann. The current representative is Alejandro Plaz.

“Bilateral Representation

“On March 12, 2019, the United States suspended embassy operations in Caracas. The United States maintains formal diplomatic relations with Venezuela and the Guaido interim government through its accredited Ambassador to the United States.

“On August 28, 2019, the Department of State announced the opening of the Venezuela Affairs Unit (VAU). The VAU is the interim diplomatic office of the U.S. Government to Venezuela, located at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, Colombia. It continues the U.S. mission to the legitimate Government of Venezuela and to the Venezuelan people.”

While the Biden Administration is reviewing its approach to Venezuela and some in the Democratic party have questioned the sanction program in terms of effectiveness, the sanctions remain in place as of March 28, 2021. See, e.g., White House Briefing Room, Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on Venezuela, March 08, 2021,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/03/08/background-press-call-by-senior-administration-officials-on-venezuela/; PBS News Hour, Democrats pressure Biden to review U.S. sanctions on Venezuela, March 23, 2021, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/democrats-pressure-biden-to-review-u-s-sanctions-on-venezuela.

WTO history of the dispute

Venezuela requested consultations with the United States in late December 2018. See UNITED STATES – MEASURES RELATING TO TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES, REQUEST FOR CONSULTATIONS BY VENEZUELA (28 December 2018), WT/DS574/1, G/L/1289, S/L/420, 8 January 2019.

The United States refused the request for consultations. Venezuela requested a panel on 14 March 2019. See UNITED STATES – MEASURES RELATING TO TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY VENEZUELA, WT/DS574/2, 15 March 2019.

The request was included in the draft agenda for the DSB meeting of March 26, 2019. See Dispute Settlement Body, 26 March 2019, Proposed Agenda, WT/DSB/W/641, 22 March 2019 (agenda item 6, “UNITED STATES – MEASURES RELATING TO TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES, A. REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY VENEZUELA (WT/DS574/2)”).

The U.S. objected to the inclusion of the Venezuelan request on the agenda. No DSB meeting was held on March 26, 2019. Venezuela agreed to withdraw its request, and the DSB meeting was rescheduled for April 26, 2019. See Dispute Settlement Body, 26 April 2019, Proposed Agenda, WT/DSB/W/643, 24 April 2019.

The minutes of the April 26, 2019 DSB meeting included the following statement ahead of the adoption of the agenda.

“Prior to the adoption of the Agenda, the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela said that his delegation wished to make a short statement for the record to the effect that Venezuela was not asking to modify the proposed Agenda of the present meeting to request an inclusion of an item. However, Venezuela wished to reserve its right to do so at any future DSB meeting. Subsequently, Japan said that it wished to include on the proposed Agenda an item under “Other Business” regarding its communication contained in Job/DSB/3. The Agenda was adopted as amended. Following the adoption of the Agenda, the representative of Peru, speaking on behalf of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama and Paraguay said that the members of the Lima Group supported the functioning of the DSB at the present meeting.
However, their Governments wished to indicate that they did not recognize the legitimacy of Nicolás Maduro’s regime nor that of its representatives. The representative of Venezuela said that the DSB was not the appropriate forum to discuss this matter. The representative of the Russian Federation said that her country supported the legitimate government of Nicolás Maduro and underlined that the WTO was not the appropriate international forum vested with the authority to discuss issues raised by the members of the Lima Group.” Dispute Settlement Body, 26 April 2019, MINUTES OF MEETING HELD, WT/DSB/M/428
25 June 2019, page 1.

March 26, 2021 DSB Meeting

Thus, based on the history of U.S. concerns with the Maduro government in Venezuela, it was hardly surprising that the United States would block inclusion of the request for a panel from the agenda this past Friday. Press accounts report that Peru, Brazil and Colombia supported the U.S. position and that the Russian Federation and Cuba supported Venezuela. See, e.g., Reuters, U.S. blocks Venezuela bid to seek WTO review of sanctions, March 26, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-wto-usa-venezuela/u-s-blocks-venezuela-bid-to-seek-wto-review-of-sanctions-idUSKBN2BI1ZT.

The EU made a statement at the truncated meeting which is copied below. See Permanent Mission of the European Union to the World Trade Organization (WTO), EU Statement at the Regular meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), 26 March 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/world-trade-organization-wto/95717/eu-statement-regular-meeting-dispute-settlement-body-dsb-26-march-2021_en.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA:

“If the EU understands correctly, the US is not ready to accept this panel request by Venezuela as being valid, as it was submitted by a government which the US no longer recognises as the legitimate government representing Venezuela.

“In fact, in this case, the EU would have expected the US to rely on the security exceptions in Article XXI of the GATT and Article XIVbis of the GATS for justifying any departures from basic GATT and GATS provisions that may lie in the measures taken against Venezuela. 

Indeed, we note that the United States measures at issue appear justified by the security exceptions, so the challenge at issue cannot in any event succeed.

“All this being said, the EU has to react for systemic reasons and express its concern at the prospect of the DSB being prevented from holding its meeting on all items of today’s agenda simply because that agenda is not adopted. 

“There is a longstanding and widely recognised principle that DSB agendas cannot be blocked to the extent that they include items governed by negative consensus. This includes first panel requests (governed by consensus), since they are a necessary pre-condition to a second panel request. This principle is of utmost importance because the binding nature of WTO dispute settlement rests on it. 

“That said, the EU expects this meeting to be suspended now, as a result of the US objection to the agenda adoption. This should allow the Chairperson and the WTO Members most involved to consult in search of a solution. The EU hopes that these efforts will rapidly yield a solution, so that this meeting can continue and the DSB discharge the important duties with which it is entrusted.”

Conclusion

Friday’s events at the Dispute Settlement Body meeting were not surprising once the request for a panel had been filed by Venezuela. What is surprising is the Maduro government’s effort to re-raise a matter that had no possibility of being considered in light of the well understood U.S. position (a position agreed to by many WTO Members).

WTO Members have historically shown an inability to evaluate disputes they pursue from the vantage point of whether the result desired is at all politically possible for the Member whose action is being challenged. Yet pursuing disputes that cannot be resolved through the dispute settlement system is a disservice to the WTO and to the proper functioning of the Dispute Settlement Body. The Maduro government dispute with the United States first and foremost is a question of the legitimacy of the Maduro government and its refusal to transfer power to the interim President. No WTO dispute will help resolve the underlying dispute. Besides the question raised by the United States (blocking requests from entities which are not the true representatives of the people), getting rid of the request properly reflects the political realities of the underlying dispute.

U.S. Section 301 investigations on digital services taxes by trading partners — USTR seeks public comment on proposed tariffs in six of ten investigations and terminates investigations on Brazil, the Czech Republic, the European Union and Indonesia

While the Biden Administration is looking to develop agreed international taxation rules for digital services through the OECD/G20 Integrated Framework process, on Friday, March 26, 2021, USTR Katherine Tai announced next steps to maintain options while negotiations at the OECD continue. See USTR, USTR Announces Next Steps of Section 301 Digital Services Taxes Investigations, March 26, 2021, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/march/ustr-announces-next-steps-section-301-digital-services-taxes-investigations. Part of the press release is copied below.

Six countries remain subject to potential action while broader international tax negotiations continue

“WASHINGTON – The United States Trade Representative (USTR) today announced the next steps in its Section 301 investigations of Digital Service Taxes (DSTs) adopted or under consideration by ten U.S. trading partners.  In January, USTR found that the DSTs adopted by Austria, India, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom were subject to action under Section 301 because they discriminated against U.S. digital companies, were inconsistent with principles of international taxation, and burdened U.S. companies.  USTR is proceeding with the public notice and comment process on possible trade actions to preserve procedural options before the conclusion of the statutory one-year time period for completing the investigations.
  
“’The United States is committed to working with its trading partners to resolve its concerns with digital services taxes, and to addressing broader issues of international taxation,’ said Ambassador Katherine Tai.  ‘The United States remains committed to reaching an international consensus through the OECD process on international tax issues.  However, until such a consensus is reached, we will maintain our options under the Section 301 process, including, if necessary, the imposition of tariffs.’

“The remaining four jurisdictions – Brazil, the Czech Republic, the European Union, and Indonesia – have not adopted or not implemented the DSTs under consideration when the investigations were initiated.  Accordingly, USTR is terminating these four investigations without further proceedings.  If any of these jurisdictions proceeds to adopt or implement a DST, USTR may initiate new investigations.” 

In prior posts, I have reviewed the investigations and reports released on the six investigations and on the French investigation which was completed earlier but where tariffs were postponed in mid-January 2021. See January 15, 2021, U.S. Section 301 investigations on digital services taxes by trading partners – USTR releases additional reports on January 14, 2021, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/15/u-s-section-301-investigations-on-digital-service-taxes-by-trading-partners-ustr-releases-additional-reports-on-january-14-2021/ (release of reports on Austria, Spain and the United Kingdom); January 8, 2021, U.S. Section 301 investigations on digital service taxes by trading partners – an update, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/08/u-s-section-301-investigations-on-digital-service-taxes-by-trading-partners-an-update/ (release of reports on India, Italy and Turkey); June 3, 2020, Digital Services Taxes – New U.S. Section 301 Investigations on Nine Countries and the European Union, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/06/03/digital-services-taxes-new-u-s-section-301-investigations-on-nine-countries-and-the-european-union/

Yesterday’s USTR press release included links to the Federal Register notices that will appear presumably next week. Each notice provides a timeline for written comments and a virtual hearing as well as the proposed list of products that could be imposed.

For example, the Federal Register notice on Austria states that “In particular, USTR proposes to impose additional tariffs of up to 25 percent ad valorem on an aggregate level of trade that would collect duties on goods of Austria in the range of the amount of the DST that Austria is expected to collect from U.S. companies. Initial estimates indicate that the value of the DST payable by U.S.-based company groups to Austria will be up to approximately $45 million per year. USTR further proposes that the goods of Austria subject to additional tariffs would be drawn from the preliminary list of products in the Annex to this notice, as
specified by the listed eight-digit tariff subheadings.” Similar language appears in each of the notices with the estimated taxes on U.S. digital services estimated at $55 million per year for India, $140 million for Italy, $155 million for Spain, $160 million for Turkey, $325 million for the United Kingdom. At an ad valorem additional duty of 25%, this means that if there is not a resolution to the issues at the OECD, duties could be applied by the U.S. on $180 million of goods from Austria, $220 million from India, $560 million from Italy, $620 million from Spain, $640 million from Turkey and $1.3 billion from the United Kingdom. Products listed in the Annex are the products from which USTR is proposing the U.S. would choose for additional duties.

All Federal Register notices seek comments on a range of issues. The language from the Turkey notice is copied below and is similar to that in each of the other five Federal Register notices.

III. Request for Public Comments

“In accordance with section 304(b) of the Trade Act (19 U.S.C. 2414(b)), USTR invites comments from interested persons with respect to whether action is appropriate, and if so, the appropriate action to be taken.

“USTR requests comments with respect to any issue related to the action to be taken in this investigation. With respect to the proposed tariff action outline above, USTR specifically invites comments regarding:

“• The level of the burden or restriction on U.S. commerce resulting from Turkey’s DST, including the amount of DST payments owed by U.S. companies, the annual growth rate of such payments, and other effects, such as compliance costs.

“• The appropriate aggregate level of trade to be covered by additional duties.

“• The level of the increase, if any, in the rate of duty.

“• The specific products to be subject to increased duties, including whether the tariff subheadings listed in the Annex should be retained or removed, or whether tariff subheadings not currently on the list should be added.

“In commenting on the inclusion or removal of particular products on the preliminary list of products subject to the proposed additional duties, USTR requests that commenters address specifically whether imposing increased duties on a particular product would be practicable or effective to obtain the elimination of Turkey’s acts, policies, and practices, and whether imposing additional duties on a particular product would cause disproportionate economic harm to U.S. interests, including small- or medium-size businesses and consumers.

“Simultaneously with this notice, USTR also is requesting public comments on proposed trade actions in five other DST investigations initiated at the same time as the Turkey DST investigation. Certain interested persons may wish to provide written comments or oral testimony on multi-jurisdictional issues common to two or more investigations. To avoid duplication, the USTR portal will have a separate docket for multi-jurisdictional submissions, and USTR will hold a separate multi-jurisdictional hearing.

“To be assured of consideration, you must submit written comments on the proposed action by April 30, 2021, and post-hearing rebuttal comments by May 10, 2021 for the multi-jurisdictional hearing, and by May 14, 2021 for the Turkey DST hearing.”

All six notices provide the dates for requesting to appear, for submitting comments and for the hearing. The dates from the notices are copied below.

Austria notice

DATES:
April 21, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit requests to appear at a hearing, along with a summary of the testimony, by this date.

April 30, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit written comments by this date.

May 3, 2021: Multi-jurisdictional virtual hearing on proposed actions.

May 10, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit multi-jurisdictional hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

May 11, 2021 at 9:30 am: Virtual hearing on Austria DST proposed action.

May 18, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit Austria DST hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

India notice

DATES:
April 21, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit requests to appear at a hearing, along with a summary of the testimony, by this date.

April 30, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit written comments by this date.

May 3, 2021: Multi-jurisdictional virtual hearing on proposed actions.

May 10, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit multi-jurisdictional hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

May 10, 2021 at 9:30 am: Virtual hearing on India DST proposed action.

May 17, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit India DST hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

Italy notice

DATES:
April 21, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit requests to appear at a hearing, along with a summary of the testimony, by this date.

April 30, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit written comments by this date.

May 3, 2021: Multi-jurisdictional virtual hearing on proposed actions.

May 5, 2021 at 9:30 am: Virtual hearing on Italy DST proposed action.

May 10, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit multi-jurisdictional hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

May 12, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit Italy DST hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

Spain notice

DATES:
April 21, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit requests to appear at a hearing, along with a summary of the testimony, by this date.

April 30, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit written comments by this date.

May 3, 2021: Multi-jurisdictional virtual hearing on proposed actions.

May 6, 2021 at 9:30 a.: Virtual hearing on Spain DST proposed action.

May 10, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit multi-jurisdictional hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

May 13, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit Spain DST hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

Turkey notice

DATES:
April 21, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit requests to appear at a hearing, along with a summary of the testimony, by this date.

April 30, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit written comments by this date.

May 3, 2021: Multi-jurisdictional virtual hearing on proposed actions.

May 7, 2021 at 9:30 am: Virtual hearing on Turkey DST proposed action.

May 10, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit multi-jurisdictional hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

May 14, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit Turkey DST hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

United Kingdom notice

DATES:
April 21, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit requests to appear at a hearing, along with a summary of the testimony, by this date.

April 30, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit written comments by this date.

May 3, 2021: Multi-jurisdictional virtual hearing on proposed actions.

May 4, 2021 at 9:30 a.m.: Virtual hearing on the United Kingdom DST proposed action.

May 10, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit multi-jurisdictional hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

May 11, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit the United Kingdom DST hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

The Federal Register notices issued by USTR on the six countries and the notice on terminating 301 investigations on Brazil, Czech Republic, European Union and Indonesia are embedded below and will appear in the Federal Register in the next week or so.

FRNAustria

FRNIndia

FRNItaly

FRNSpain

FRNTurkey

FRNUK

FRNDSTterminations

Conclusion

The Biden Administration has rejoined the effort to find an acceptable solution to the digital services tax issue within the OECD/G20 Integrated Framework and has reportedly made a major concession to facilitate movement in the talks. See Wall Street Journal, Yellen Removes Obstacle to Global Corporate-Tax Deal, February 26, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/yellen-removes-obstacle-to-global-corporate-tax-deal-11614363591 (“Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said Friday that the U.S. would no longer insist on a “safe harbor” under which some elements of the tax rules would be optional. The idea, proposed in late 2019 by her predecessor, Steven Mnuchin, drew objections from European counterparts, though talks on how it would work never advanced very far.”).

At the same time, the U.S. has been and remains concerned about what it views as efforts by major trading partners to impose discriminatory taxes on major U.S. digital services companies. There were many U.S. Senators who expresssed deep concerns with the practices of trading partners in this area during Ambassador Tai’s confirmation hearing to become USTR. The action taken yesterday by USTR reflects the willingness of the Biden Administration to be prepared to impose tariffs on products from selected countries where investigations have resulted in previously released reports that identified significant problems under U.S. law. At the same time, USTR has made clear that the Administration’s preferred approach is through the OECD/G20 Integrated Framework process. And USTR has terminated the remaining four investigations where reports were not released.

All of the above indicate that the U.S. will put primary focus on the ongoing OECD negotiations while preserving options under U.S. law on investigations that had proceeded to a determination by holding public hearings and considering potential products on which to impose additional tariffs. USTR’s actions should generally be acceptable to the U.S. Congress while also letting the OECD negotiations play out in the coming months while preserving options if a negotiated outcome proves illusive.

Global vaccinations for COVID-19 — continued supply chain and production issues and a new wave of infections in many countries delay greater ramp up for some until late in the second quarter of 2021

The world has witnessed the unprecedented development of a number of vaccines in record time to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic. The development has been the result of widespread cooperation in sharing information and the funding in part by governments and early orders for hundreds of millions of doses if vaccines proved efficacious and safe. In roughly one year since the virus was declared a pandemic by the WHO, individual vaccines have been produced and authorized by one or more governments (some by as many as 70 along with WHO approval).

According to the Financial Times COVID-19 vaccine tracker, as of March 25, nearly 490 million vaccine shots have been administered around the world (based on data from 166 locations). See Financial Times, Covid-19 vaccine tracker: the global race to vaccinate, 25 March 2021, https://ig.ft.com/coronavirus-vaccine-tracker/?areas=gbr&areas=isr&areas=usa&areas=eue&cumulative=1&populationAdjusted=1. The companies with approved vaccines have been ramping up production at their own and at licensed facilities in other countries. Because companies are racing to put in place 3-4 times the global capacity for all vaccines (3.5 billion doses) to produce COVID-19 vaccines (10-14 billion doses by the end of 2021) and because there are complex supply chains and production processes for the new vaccines, there have been various delays which have occurred both at manufacturers and at suppliers. This has been true in the U.S., in the EU, in India and other producing countries. While countries and producers are working on solutions, shortages of certain materials exist and can reduce production of finished vaccines globally.

While the WHO, GAVI, CEPI and UNICEF have set up COVAX to get vaccines to a total of 192 countries, including 92 low- and middle-income countries where materials will be supplied at discounted prices or for free and have a target of two billion doses to participating countries in 2021, there is an early reliance on AstraZeneca’s vaccine whether produced by AstraZeneca or through license by the Serum Institute (SII) in India, the world’s largest vaccine producer.

Unfortunately, many countries are going through a new wave of COVID-19 infections which puts pressure on governments to secure sufficient supplies to address domestic demand. See, e.g., European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, COVID-19 situation update worldwide, as of week 11, updated 25 March 2021, https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases (shows total new reported infections going up globally for the fourth week after a sharp decline after New Year’s). Countries showing large numbers of cases over the last two weeks (whether increases or decreases) include Ethiopia (21,227), Kenya (12,083), Libya (12,852), South Africa (17,646), Argentina (91,023), Brazil (995,861), Canada (48,021), Chile (77,561), Colombia (63,417), Ecuador (18,223), Mexico (66,683), Paraguay (26,252), Peru (98,323), United States (830,346), Uruguay (19,512), Bangladesh (19,938), India (416,683), Indonesia (80,522), Iran (119,383), Iraq (67,344), Jordan (109,594), Lebanon (43,964), Pakistan (38,371), Philippines 969,382), United Arab Emirates (29,506), Austria (39,842), Belgium (50,670), Bulgaria (43,115), Czechia (142,042), Estonia (20211), France (378,370), Germany (162,032), Greece (32,005), Hungary (111,929), Italy (308,890), Moldova (19,82), Netherlands (83,797), Poland (272,046), Romania (70,295), Russian Federation (133,24), Serbia (65,689), Spain (67,833), Sweden (61,666), Turkey (232,705), Ukraine (147,456), United Kingdom (78,063). While many countries do not produce COVID-19 vaccines, the list of countries includes many in the EU as well as Brazil, the United States and India. Brazil’s production of COVID-19 vaccines is not expected to start until May. Below I review developments on vaccination roll-outs in the United States, the European Union and India.

Vaccination roll-out in the U.S., EU and India — three important COVID-19 vaccination production areas

Under the Biden Administration, the United States has drastically improved its performance on COVID-19 vaccinations with 129.3 million vaccinations given by March 24 and with the President announcing his Administration’s revised goal of 200 million shots in arms in his first 100 days in office (April 29). See Financial Times, Biden doubles vaccine goal to 200m in first 100 days, 25 March 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/a1accbdf-0010-426c-9442-feb73b5c8a1d. While the U.S. focus is on getting the U.S. population vaccinated as the first priority, the U.S. has agreed to “loan” 1.5 million doses of AstraZeneca’s vaccine to Canada and 2.5 million doses to Mexico. The U.S., following a leader’s remote meeting of the Quad (U.S., Japan, India, Australia), agreed to work with the other Quad partners to produce one billion doses in India of a vaccine by the end of 2022 from a U.S. company that would be paid for by Japan and the U.S. and would receive distribution support from Australia for countries in the Indo-Pacific region. See March 12, 2021, COVID-19 vaccines – U.S., Japan, India and Australia agree to one billion doses for Indo-Pacific countries, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/12/covid-19-vaccines-u-s-japan-india-and-australia-agree-to-one-billion-doses-for-indo-pacific-countries/.

The European Union, a major producing location for COVID-19 vaccines and various inputs and a major exporter, has had rollout problems flowing from production problems at AstraZeneca’s EU facilities, concerns by many EU members on whether the vaccine from AstraZeneca was safe (small number of blot clot problems in those vaccinated) and other issues. See New York Times, Where Europe Went Wrong in Its Vaccine Rollout, and Why, March 20, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/20/world/europe/europe-vaccine-rollout-astrazeneca.html; Financial Times, Nordic nations hold off on AstraZeneca jab as scientists probe safety, 21 March 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/0ef3a623-f3a2-4e76-afbd-94a915b24ad5. With vaccination rates in the EU far behind the U.K. and the U.S. and a number of other countries, this has led to significant internal pressures to ensure that manufacturers were honoring contracts with the EU and has led to two temporary regulations (and an extension) giving EU members authority to stop exports outside of the EU (and excluding the shipments to COVAX low-and middle-income countries). See March 5, 2021, COVID-19 vaccines — France supports Italy’s blockage of a shipment to Australia; while Australia has asked the EU to permit the shipment, Australia will have its own production of AstraZeneca product by the end of March, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/05/covid-19-vaccines-france-supports-italys-blockage-of-a-shipment-to-australia-while-australia-has-asked-the-eu-to-permit-the-shipment-australia-will-have-its-own-production-of-astrazeneca-produc/; European Commission, Commission strengthens transparency and authorisation mechanism for exports of COVID-19 vaccines, 24 March 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_1352; European Commission, 24.3.2021 C(2021) 2081 final COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) …/… of 24.3.2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_1352; European Commission, Commission extends transparency and authorisation mechanism for exports of COVID-19 vaccines, 11 March 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_1121. Australia had a shipment stopped by Italy and the EC has been raising concerns in the United Kingdom.

In recent days, Indian producer Serum Institute has notified a number of customers that their orders would be delayed several months. GAVI COVAX has been notified as well, with 40 million doses in April and 50 million in May apparently unlikely to ship. Press articles attribute the delays to the needs within India, though SII has suggested delays are also due to availability issues on certain inputs. The Indian government claims it is simply adjusting schedules in light of internal needs and is not imposing an export ban per se. See, e.g., BBC News, India coronavirus: Why have vaccine exports been suspended?, 25 March 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-55571793; Wall Street Journal, India Suspends Covid-19 Vaccine Exports to Focus on Domestic Immunization, March 25, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/india-suspends-covid-19-vaccine-exports-to-focus-on-domestic-immunization-11616690859#:~:text=An%20Indian%20government%20official%20said,of%20the%20government’s%20vaccine%20program.&text=On%20Tuesday%2C%20the%20government%20said,to%20those%20older%20than%2045; Times of India, India has not banned Covid-19 vaccine exports, 25 March 2021, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-has-not-banned-covid-19-vaccine-exports-sources/articleshow/81693010.cms.

Conclusion

Much of the anticipated ramp up of COVID-19 vaccine production will be happening over the coming months, such that there should be dramatically greater vaccine availability in the coming months. That doesn’t help governments or populations waiting for vaccines. or that are going through a significant ramp up in infections. The pharmaceutical industry and major groups got together earlier this month to explore where the bottlenecks are in ramping up production. See March 12, 2021, The 8-9 March  “Global C19 Vaccine Supply Chain and Manufacturing Summit”, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/12/the-8-9-march-global-c19-vaccine-supply-chain-and-manufacturing-summit-efforts-to-ramp-up-production/ It is unclear the extent to which governments and industry are working together to solve bottlenecks in supply, to facilitate production ramp up, share experiences in reusing safely some critical materials that are in short supply, etc. During these critical months, greater cooperation in solving problems and facilitating expansion of production is needed and hopefully is occurring. Export restrictions have and will occur under various guises, reflecting internal political pressures. In the coming months and certainly by the third quarter of 2021, there should be large volumes of vaccine doses above and beyond what has been contracted by COVAX that will be available for use around the world. Time is obviously of the essence. Cooperation to solve supply chain bottlenecks and speed ramp-ups is the best short term option for speeding getting past the pandemic globally.

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When human rights violations create trade distortions — the case of China’s treatment of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang

Earlier this week, the EU added a series of individuals and companies to its sanctions list including Chinese officials and entities involved in the alleged extreme human rights abuses of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, as well as others in Russia, Libya and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. See European Council, EU imposes further sanctions over serious violations of human rights around the world, 22 March 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/03/22/eu-imposes-further-sanctions-over-serious-violations-of-human-rights-around-the-world/; Official Journal of the European Union, L 99 I, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/478 of 22 March 2021 implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses, Vol. 64, pages 1-12, 22 March 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2021:099I:FULL&from=EN. The Official Journal regulation has as one of the bases of concern for a number of countries where individuals or entities are included on the sanctions list the following, “The Union remains deeply concerned about serious human rights violations and abuses in different parts of the world, such as torture, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances or systematic use of forced labour committed by individuals and entities in China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Libya, Eritrea, South Sudan and Russia.” The regulation includes a page per person/entity being added. Some of the description of why WANG Junzheng has been added to the list is copied below.

“As Party Secretary and Political commissar of the XPCC since 2020, Wang Junzheng is involved in overseeing all policies implemented by the XPCC. In this position, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief, linked, inter alia, to the XPCC’s implementation of a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.

“He is also responsible for the XPCC’s systematic use of Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities as a forced workforce, in particular in cotton fields. As Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the XUAR since 2020, Wang Junzheng is involved in overseeing all the security policies implemented in Xinjiang, including the aforementioned programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. As Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR (February 2019 to September 2020), Wang Junzheng was responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he held a key political position in charge of overseeing and implementing the aforementioned programme.”

On the same day, the United States, United Kingdom and Canada issued a joint statement announcing sanctions on individuals and/or an entity in China involved with the alleged human rights abuses of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. See U.S. Department of State press release, Joint Statement on Xinjiang, March 22, 2021, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-xinjiang/. The body of the joint message is copied below.

“We, the Foreign Ministers of Canada and the United Kingdom, and the United States Secretary of State, are united in our deep and ongoing concern regarding China’s human rights violations and abuses in Xinjiang. The evidence, including from the Chinese Government’s own documents, satellite imagery, and eyewitness testimony is overwhelming. China’s extensive program of repression includes severe restrictions on religious freedoms, the use of forced labour, mass detention in internment camps, forced sterilisations, and the concerted destruction of Uyghur heritage.

“Today, we have taken coordinated action on measures, in parallel to measures by the European Union, that send a clear message about the human rights violations and abuses in Xinjiang. We are united in calling for China to end its repressive practices against Uyghur Muslims and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang, and to release those arbitrarily detained.

“We underline the importance of transparency and accountability and call on China to grant the international community, including independent investigators from the United Nations, journalists, and foreign diplomats, unhindered access to Xinjiang.

“We will continue to stand together to shine a spotlight on China’s human rights violations. We stand united and call for justice for those suffering in Xinjiang.”

Australia and New Zealand, while not imposing sanctions themselves, added their voices of concern over the alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang of the Uyghurs. See Minister of Foreign Affairs Australia, Joint statement on Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang, 23 March 2021, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/joint-statement-human-rights-abuses-xinjiang. The Joint Statement is copied below.

“The Australian and New Zealand Governments today reiterate their grave concerns about the growing number of credible reports of severe human rights abuses against ethnic Uighurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.

“In particular, there is clear evidence of severe human rights abuses that include restrictions on freedom of religion, mass surveillance, large-scale extra-judicial detentions, as well as forced labour and forced birth control, including sterilisation.

“Australia and New Zealand welcome the measures announced overnight by Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. We share these countries’ deep concerns, which are held across the Australian and New Zealand communities.

“Since 2018, when reports began to emerge about the detention camps in Xinjiang, Australia and New Zealand have consistently called on China in the United Nations to respect the human rights of the Uighur people, and other religious and ethnic minorities.

“Today, we underscore the importance of transparency and accountability, and reiterate our call on China to grant meaningful and unfettered access to Xinjiang for United Nations experts, and other independent observers.”

While China argues that their treatment of the Uyghurs is an internal matter, the allegations of serious human rights abuses have raised widespread international condemnation and increasing use of sanctions. The sanctions, however, typically are limited to freezing assets (if any) of individuals or entities in the sanctioning country, banning travel to the country imposing the sanctioning, etc.

Trade Implications

While allegations of human rights violations do not necessarily carry trade distortion implications, the case of the forced labor of Uighurs in Xinjiang clearly does. Xinjiang produces some 80% of the cotton grown in China, much of it produced by forced labor according to reports. As China is a major producer of textile and apparel products and a major exporter of the same, the distortions in trade flows should be obvious. Foreign cotton will have trouble competing in China with cotton produced with forced labor. Garment producers who don’t use the Chinese cotton will face distortions as competing against garments where a significant input has been obtained at artificially low prices. Some countries (e.g., the United States and Canada) have laws which permit them to prevent imports of products made with forced labor, although the breadth of the actions taken to date are typically quite limited.

In prior posts, I looked at the large number of products produced around the world with forced labor or with child labor and also looked specifically at the Chinese treatment of the Uyghurs reviewing a number of publications and reports. See Child labor and forced labor in cotton production — is there a current WTO mandate to identify and quantify the distortive effects?, January 25, 2021, ttps://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/25/child-labor-and-forced-labor-in-cotton-production-is-there-a-current-wto-mandate-to-identify-and-quantify-the-distortive-effects/ ; Forced labor and child labor — a continued major distortion in international trade for some products, January 24, 2021, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/24/forced-labor-and-child-labor-a-continued-major-distortion-in-international-trade-for-some-products/.

To ramp up pressure on China to reform its treatment of the Uyghurs, the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and all other countries concerned about the human rights should coordinate a broad-based denial of imports from China or from other countries where cotton from Xinjiang is part of the product until such time as the treatment of the Uyghurs has been corrected.

Climate change and a border tax — will the U.S. and EU have a unified position at the WTO in 2021?

The European Union has been working on reducing its carbon footprint consistent with the Paris Agreement commitments and its updated 2030 reduction levels. Part of its effort has been to impose costs on carbon content of certain high energy-consuming industries. To avoid carbon leakage, the EU has been looking at the possibility of imposing a carbon border adjustment mechanism. The European Commission’s work program has the EC presenting a draft proposal of such a mechanism in the second quarter of 2021. See EU Green Deal (carbon border adjustment mechanism), https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12228-Carbon-Border-Adjustment-Mechanism. The Inception impact assessment released by the European Commission is embedded below.

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The EU has indicated that whatever action it takes in its carbon border adjustment mechanism will be consistent with WTO obligations.

The Biden Administration, in the President’s 2021 Trade Policy Agenda, has indicated an openness to considering a carbon border adjustment. See 2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program, March 2021, page 3, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2021/2021%20Trade%20Agenda/Online%20PDF%202021%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202020%20Annual%20Report.pdf. The section on “Putting the World on a Sustainable Environment and Climate Path” is copied below (emphasis added).

“The United States and the global community face a profound climate crisis, and the Biden Administration is committed to pursuing action at home and abroad to avoid the increasingly disruptive and potentially catastrophic impact of climate change. The United States will work with other countries, both bilaterally and multilaterally, toward environmental sustainability.

“As part of this whole-of-government effort, the trade agenda will include the negotiation and implementation of strong environmental standards that are also critical to a sustainable climate pathway. These standards will include promoting sustainable stewardship of natural resources, such as sustainable fisheries management, and preventing harmful environmental practices, such as illegal logging and wildlife trafficking. This comprehensive approach may also entail leveraging our strong bilateral and multilateral trade relationships to raise global climate ambition.

“The Biden Administration will work with allies and partners that are committed to fighting climate change. This will include exploring and developing market and regulatory approaches to address greenhouse gas emissions in the global trading system. As appropriate, and consistent with domestic approaches to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, this includes consideration of carbon border adjustments. Additionally, the Biden Administration will work with allies as they develop their own approaches and act against trading partners that fail to meet their environmental obligations under existing trade agreements.

“The trade agenda will support the Biden Administration’s comprehensive vision of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and achieving net-zero global emissions by 2050, or before, by fostering U.S. innovation and production of climate-related technology and promoting resilient renewable energy supply chains.”

President Biden’s Special Envoy on Climate traveled to the United Kingdom and to the European Union the week of March 8. See U.S. Department of State, Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry Engages European Allies on Climate Ambition, March 6, 2021, https://www.state.gov/special-presidential-envoy-for-climate-john-kerry-engages-european-allies-on-climate-ambition/ (traveling to London, Brussels and Paris March 8-10). A Financial Times article indicated that Special Envoy Kerry was pushing the European Commission to hold up any announcement on a carbon border adjustment mechanism until after the November 2021 meeting of parties to the Paris Agreement in Glasgow (COP26) to see if sufficient commitments were made to make such a mechanism unnecessary. The article indicated that a draft proposal was expected from the EC in June. See Financial Times, John Kerry warns EU against carbon border tax, March 12, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/3d00d3c8-202d-4765-b0ae-e2b212bbca98 (“The former secretary of state told the Financial Times he was ‘concerned’ about Brussels’ forthcoming plans for a carbon border adjustment mechanism and urged the EU to wait until after the COP26 climate change conference in Glasgow to move forward.”).

Obviously, Special Envoy Kerry’s comments prioritize diplomacy over development of a mechanism to deal with countries who are slow to address the pressing climate challenges. The EU system, of course, has a process for approving proposals like the carbon border adjustment mechanism which if followed as presently planned presumably would not result in adoption in 2021. It is not clear from the press article if the U.S. concern is with the planned June proposal or with ensuring that no adoption happens until after the Glasgow meeting in November. If the latter, there should be little problem for the EU to ensure no adoption in 2021, and the EC proposal could include language about the COP 26 meeting. If the former, postponing action by the EC would push back adoption by at least six months which may or may not be acceptable to the EU.

With USTR nominee Katherine Tai expected to be confirmed by the U.S. Senate later this week, it is unclear based on the press article of the meeting between the EC and Special Envoy Kerry if USTR would hold up efforts to find common ground with the EU on the trade approach on climate change, including on what a carbon border adjustment mechanism would look like so that there is a united front between the U.S. and the EU whenever the mechanism is presented (or at least adopted).

With China, the largest emitter, having announced that it will continue to increase it emissions until 2030, the efforts of the EU and U.S. to speed up the global reductions in emissions will face insurmountable obstacles if there isn’t greater efforts by all, including China. See Politico, US and EU search for a China climate doctrine that works, The first European trip by US climate envoy John Kerry sparks a joint effort to get China to cut its emissions, March 9, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/u-s-and-eu-search-for-a-china-climate-strategy-after-snub/.

There is little doubt that if all major emitters are not in solidarity on the need to increase the depth of carbon reductions quickly, there will be carbon border adjustment mechanisms put in place by the EU and likely by the U.S. to ensure actions taken in countries working hard toward major reductions in emissions by 2030 are not undermined by less ambitious objectives. A joint effort by the U.S. and EU would be more effective than the EU going it alone. Let’s hope common ground is found on how to proceed.

“No Quick Fixes for WTO Dispute Settlement Reform” — a skeptical view by the former Deputy USTR of the EU’s willingness to address core U.S. concerns

In yesterday’s post, I reviewed a program hosted by Georgetown Law’s Institute for International Economic Law that looked at opportunities for transatlantic cooperation in WTO reform. See March 10, 2021, Today’s webinar hosted by Georgetown Law’s Institute for International Economic Law “Rethinking the WTO:  Opportunity for Transatlantic Cooperation” — many areas for likely cooperation; some important challenges, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/10/todays-webinar-hosted-by-georgetown-laws-institute-for-international-economic-law-rethinking-the-wto-opportunity-for-transatlantic-cooperation-many-areas-for-likely-cooperation-some-impo/. The focus of the program was the mid-February EC Trade Policy Review paper and Annex on WTO Reform. While there was agreement that there were many areas of possible U.S.-EC cooperation in pursuing WTO reform, Thomas Graham, a former Appellate Body Member and Chair, raised a caution about how quickly meaningful reform of the WTO dispute settlement system could be achieved. He referenced a commentary published by CSIS from Amb. Dennis Shea, the former U.S. Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the WTO during the Trump Administration. See Amb. Dennis Shea, No Quick Fixes for WTO Dispute Settlement Reform, March 9, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/no-quick-fixes-wto-dispute-settlement-reform.

Ambassador Shea’s commentary is worth separate review. Amb. Shea starts by sharing his experience in 2018 as the new U.S. ambassador to the WTO in pressing the EU on whether they shared U.S. concerns about overreach and other problems in the Appellate Body’s functioning and being told that the EU shared none of the U.S. concerns. He then contrasts that position with the position staked out in the EC’s Trade Policy Review paper where there is a recognition that the U.S. “has raised ‘a number of valid concerns'”. The point of Amb. Shea’s initial comments is both to show skepticism as to whether the EU change of position is real and to point out comments by the EU which suggests a lack of understanding of the U.S. concerns or which indicate needed reversal by the EU of a number of positions taken in the past. Amb. Shea urges the Biden Administration not to take up negotiations before the U.S. is able to explore with the EU and others “why the Appellate Body felt free to overreach and why the WTO membership allowed it to occur for so long. A shared diagnosis of the problem will help lead to more durable solutions, including a possible rethinking of the dispute settlement system itself.” This is, of course, the position that Amb. Shea,for the Trump Administration, took consistently at the WTO during his tenure there.

There is little doubt that many WTO Members have been looking at very limited modifications to the WTO dispute settlement system as being adequate to address longstanding U.S. concerns — an approach repeatedly rejected by the prior Administration and unlikely to result in forward progress with the Biden Administration.

The Appellate Body was a new concept added at the end of the Uruguay Round. The binding nature of dispute settlement with an Appellate Body was premised on a limited role for the Appellate Body and assumed an ability of WTO Members to correct erroneous decisions through either negotiations or through interpretations adopted by the Ministerial Conference or the General Council. After 25 years, it is clear that the checks on the dispute settlement system that are included in the WTO Agreements have not functioned as intended or functioned at all. Coupled with the collapse of the negotiating function more broadly, the reality has been a dispute settlement system that has often made up rights and obligations on the fly. Why WTO Members have been ok with that usurpation of sovereign states’ right to limit obligations to those negotiated and agreed to is the fundamental question. It is at the heart of Amb. Shea’s commentary.

From some thirty years of traveling to Geneva, I have heard from nearly every major Member using the dispute settlement system that based on how the Appellate Body was operating, the Member believed it could obtain results through disputes that should be the subject of negotiations and that the Member knew had not been agreed by trading partners. Thus, obtaining rights without negotiations is certainly one of the reasons that many Members have accepted the actions of the Appellate Body that have exceeded its limited authority over time. There are undoubtedly other reasons. Understanding the reasons for Member acceptance of a dispute settlement system operating outside of its limited mandate presumably would be relevant to identifying solutions that would put dispute settlement back into its proper role and ensure errors can be addressed in fact, not just in theory.

Amb. Shea presents eight questions for European trade officials that raise some of the concerns the U.S. has and highlight where there have been significant differences in the positions staked out by the EU in prior cases from the statements in the EC Trade Policy Review paper.

The first question goes to the lack of precedent in WTO dispute settlement and whether the EU thus now recognizes that the Appellate Body erred when it mandated that panels follow Appellate Body reports “absent cogent reasons”. He also asks if the EU rejects “the view that the Appellate Body was vested with broad authority to develop ‘a coherent and predictable body of jurisprudence?'” The U.S. position has been that the dispute settlement process is intended to help the Members find a solution to a problem raised, and that the power to establish rights and obligations lies with the Members through negotiations.

The second question goes to the proper role of the Appellate Body — whether the role is limited to questions of law raised on appeal or extends to whether panels made an objective assessment of the facts under DSU Art. 11. The EU has supported the latter position in prior disputes which has often meant a relitigation of cases at the Appellate Body level.

The EU in its Trade Policy Review paper states that the 90-day deadline for Appellate Body reports should be “strictlly respected”. Because this is different than the position the EU exhibited during the first 25 years when the Appellate Body far exceeded 90 days on a regular basis, Amb. Shea in his third question asks “What has changed?” Problems with timeliness of reports exist both for the Appellate Body and for panels. The problem at the Appellate Body has been noteworthy because of early year compliance with the requirements and early outreach to disputants where 90 days couldn’t be met but an evolution of the Appellate Body’s approach to where extensions were taken without consultations with the disputants.

On the topic of “overreach” by the Appellate Body, Amb. Shea asks whether the EU agrees with the U.S. on cases other than the Appellate Body’s interpretation of “public body’ and if yes, how would the EU propose correcting these other prior rulings? (Question 4). Questions 5 and 6 address particular areas of concern (additional requirements in safeguard cases; the prohibition created by the Appellate Body on “zeroing” in antidumping duty investigations). As I have raised in prior posts, there will not be a resolution of the impasse on the Appellate Body until the problem of overreach is addressed and correction of past overreach has been achieved. While there has been overreach in areas besides trade defense agreements, the three examples raised in Questions 4-6 deal with major overreach problems in the subsidy/countervailing duty, safeguard and antidumping agreements.

Question 7 asks the EU if it agrees with the problems identified by former Appellate Body member Thomas Graham “including a ‘prevailing ethos’ to act like a court that was unaccountable to WTO members, an unjustified sense of infallibility, and an excessive degree of control exercised by its staff”. Mr. Graham at yesterday’s IIEL program argued for the need for greater accountability and the need for reexamining the structure of the dispute settlement — presumably addressing his prior observations on the problems of the Appellate Body. See March 10, 2021, Today’s webinar hosted by Georgetown Law’s Institute for International Economic Law “Rethinking the WTO:  Opportunity for Transatlantic Cooperation” — many areas for likely cooperation; some important challenges, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/10/todays-webinar-hosted-by-georgetown-laws-institute-for-international-economic-law-rethinking-the-wto-opportunity-for-transatlantic-cooperation-many-areas-for-likely-cooperation-some-impo/. The U.S.’s position has been that the Appellate Body is not a court. Indeed, the EU has agreed that the Appellate Body is not a court. See October 1, 2020:  Thoughts on the Geneva Trade Week session entitled “WTO Dispute Settlement – Where Do We Stand?”, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/10/01/thoughts-on-the-geneva-trade-week-session-entitled-wto-dispute-settlement-where-do-we-stand/ (EU Amb. Machado’s summary (as compiled by me) included that “The EU agrees that panels and the Appellate Body are not courts and that panelists and AB members are not judges. It is the role of WTO Members, not adjudicators, to establish new rules.”). The question in essence goes to how does reform of the dispute settlement system restore the very limited role panels and any second tier review have in helping parties find a solution to a dispute between Members.

Amb. Shea’s last question acknowledges two of the demands of the EU — binding decisions independently reached. But he questions the value of a two-tier system noting that over 25 years it has often been the U.S. view that panels reached the correct result and the Appellate Body the incorrect result. “Shouldn’t the focus be on reforming the WTO dispute settlement system (perhaps with an updated appellate review mechanism) rather than ‘reconstituting’ the Appellate Body?” Amb. Shea’s question seems to stress the institutional problems that the Appellate Body has developed over 25 years and the potential challenges to actually reforming the Appellate Body. But Amb. Shea doesn’t say a second-tier couldn’t work, just that Members should not be locked into restoring the Appellate Body as such.

Conclusions

USTR under the Trump Administration did an exceptional job of laying out U.S. concerns with the WTO Appellate Body over a 2-3 year period. Amb. Shea’s commentary reflects the fact that during the Trump Administration (and before), the EU’s positions on a host of issues important to the proper functioning of the dispute settlement system differed from those of the United States.

The EC’s Trade Policy Review paper and Annex on WTO Reform is an important document, including by showing movement by the EU on some issues of concern to the U.S. in the dispute settlement arena. Amb. Shea’s commentary highlights some of the issues that need to be resolved if there is to be a meeting of the minds between the U.S. and EU on Appellate Body reform, including addressing overreach including on past Appellate Body reports. As Mr. Graham reviewed yesterday and as Amb. Shea reviews in his question 7, reform includes the need for greater accountability of those involved. It also involves a significant contraction in the role any second-tier review handles.

While the approach advocated by Amb. Shea certainly has merit (gain an understanding of “why” the Appellate Body exceeded its authority and Members accepted such action before starting negotiations), it also is possible for the U.S. to start laying out reform needs realizing that some such reforms may go beyond the DSU and operating procedures of the Appellate Body to ensure meaningful checks and balances through the Members (currently hypothetically through Ministerial Conferences or the General Council) or through creating a different appeal mechanism for legal questions. But as Mr. Graham indicated yesterday, dispute settlement will not happen quickly and will be challenging based on the depth of the problems and the need for structural changes and changes in operating procedures as well as addressing the substantive needs.

While there seemed to be different views within the Trump Administration on whether dispute settlement should be binding, that is not the view of Amb. Shea in his commentary nor is it historically the view of the U.S. Congress (as long as Members have the authority to not implement an adverse decision and rather pay compensation or suffer retaliation) or prior Administrations (including the Trump Administration in its handling of disputes). While it is not known as yet the position of the Biden Administration, it is likely that a system that is binding and independent should be acceptable if properly limited and with meaningful crosschecks. I don’t know that there will be objections to a two-tier process, although the reforms needed may make the resulting second-tier look very different from the Appellate Body.

Reform of the dispute settlement system and restoration of a two-tier review is important to most WTO Members. Having focused Members attention on the importance of reform, the Trump Administration has handed off dispute settlement reform to the Biden Administration with WTO Members finally understanding that the longstanding concerns of the United States need to be addressed. The EC Trade Policy Review paper and Annex on WTO Reform shows movement by the EU on some issues of importance to the U.S. While the road forward is likely to be complicated and long, hopefully the Biden Administration will help the process move forward by identifying the array of changes that are needed in the coming months.

Today’s webinar hosted by Georgetown Law’s Institute for International Economic Law “Rethinking the WTO: Opportunity for Transatlantic Cooperation” — many areas for likely cooperation; some important challenges

On March 10, 2021 Georgetown Law’s Institute for International Economic Law (IIEL) held the second in a series of events on “Rethinking the WTO”, this time on “Opportunity for Transatlantic Cooperation”. See Georgetown Law, Rethinking the WTO: Opportunity for Transatlantic Cooperation, March 8, 2021, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/rethinking-the-wto-opportunities-for-transatlantic-cooperation/. The program was introduced by David Kleimann, Senior Visiting Research Fellow, IIEL. The program was moderated by Joost Pauwelyn, Murase Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown Law and also a professor at the Graduate Institute of Geneva. The four panelists included Sabine Weyand, Director General, Directorate General for External Trade, European Commission; Jennifer Hillman, Professor from Practice, Georgetown Law, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations and a former member of the WTO Appellate Body; Thomas Graham, partner at Cassidy Levy Kent and former member and Chair of the WTO Appellate Body; and Henry Gao, Associate Professor of Law, Singapore Management University, Dongfang Scholar Chair Professor, Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade and Advisory Board Member of the WTO Chairs Program.

Ms. Weyand provided an overview of the European Commission’s revised trade policy paper, focusing on the Annex dealing with WTO reform. I had reviewed the revised policy paper in a prior post. See February 18, 2021, The European Commission’s 18 February 2021 Trade Policy Review paper and Annex — WTO reform and much more proposed, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/02/18/the-european-commissions-18-february-2021-trade-policy-review-paper-wto-reform-and-much-more-proposed/. Ms. Weyand’s comments expressed hope that early statements by the Biden Administration meant that there were many areas for possible cooperation, although she started with reviving the Appellate Body — an area where cooperation is more challenging. She articulated that the EU was looking for an early commitment by the Biden team that the U.S. supported a two-tiered, binding, independent dispute settlement system — that which was promised in the Dispute Settlement Understanding. She acknowledged that the U.S. had valid concerns including on overreach on some cases.

Ms. Weyand reviewed areas where collaboration had occurred during the Trump Administration — the joint consultations on subsidies, SOEs, forced technology transfer — and opined that the process should be taken back up. She also mentioned new areas where rules were needed, including Joint Statement Initiatives (electronic commerce where the U.S. is active and others where the U.S. is not) where there should be opportunities for collaboration. She viewed that open plurilaterals were the likely necessary option for reform with benefits limited to those participating. She acknowledged that WTO Members need to address how to make folding plurilaterals into the WTO easier to do. The EU supports the U.S. view that the Special and Differential Treatment provisions and approach don’t make sense in 2021 though the revised policy.

Jennifer Hillman, after the disclaimer that she is not part of the Biden Administration and hence doesn’t speak for them, agreed that the early pronouncements by the Biden team showed significant areas of likely cooperation on WTO reform between the U.S. and the EU based on its revised trade policy paper. She believed that the period of time for getting collaboration started and showing early results was short and that many of the topics for collaboration would require time, hence raising concerns about the ability to actually see forward movement. During her direct comments, Ms. Hillman focused on areas other than dispute settlement. She noted that the concept of sustainable development appeared to have different meanings depending on whom one was talking to. For Europe, it seemed to focus on environment whereas for the Biden Administration there is a heavier focus on labor rights whereas for many WTO Members (developing and least developed countries), the focus would be development. She viewed it as important for the EU to realize focus on labor by U.S. in seeking and obtaining collaboration on sustainable development. She agreed on areas of cooperation on gender equality and empowerment of women and girls, on having the WTO contribute to addressing climate change, including on border taxes that are WTO consistent, on plurilaterals and the need for change to how Special and Differential Treatment is addressed, and on the need for new (e-commerce) or revised rules (industrial subsidies).

Thomas Graham, as a former Appelate Body who had left after eight years at the end of 2019 (his and a colleague’s departure reduced the number of Appellate Body Member below the number needed to hear an appeal), believed that the problems with the dispute settlement system could not be easily addressed and would take significant time to resolve in a way that would address the underlying problems. He urged greater accountability by Appellate Body members. He noted in particular the tension between the second and third sentences of DSU 3.2 (as referenced as well in 19.2) where the bar to creating rights and obligations (important to the U.S.) was neutered by actions of the Appellate Body in clarifying existing provisions (historically the focus of the EU). Mr. Graham did not see an easy resolution to this problem without changing the language itself. He also reviewed the Appellate Body’s elimination in effect of Art. 17.6(ii) of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Antidumping Agreement or ADA), a provision intended to grant discretion to administering authorities in interpreting provisions of the Agreement which were capable of more than one interpretation. Mr. Graham noted that members of the Appellate Body viewed there being either no or very few situations where the Antidumping Agreement provisions would be capable of more than one interpretation. He also raised the question of how Members would deal with past decisions made by and principles adopted by the Appellate Body. He referenced a commentary by Amb. Dennis Shea (the Trump Administration Deputy U.S. Trade Representative in Geneva) posted on the CSIS website on March 9, 2021, “No Quick Fixes for WTO Dispute Settlement Reform” and indicated the questions raised in the paper needed to be addressed. See Center for Strategic & International Studies, No Quick Fixes for WTO Dispute Settlement Reform, March 9, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/no-quick-fixes-wto-dispute-settlement-reform (article includes eight questions Amb. Shea believes the EU needs to answer as it thinks about WTO Dispute Settlement reform).

Mr. Gao provided his perspective on how the types of reform issues identified in the EC revised trade policy paper would be viewed by China, among others. Mr. Gao indicated that China has been unwilling to consider reforms which it views as discriminating against China. Thus, initiatives like the EU’s to start a plurilateral on competitive neutrality (SOEs, heavy subsidization, etc.) is viewed by China as aimed at them and hence will never be supported by China. China’s response has been to assert that there should be ownership neutrality (no special rules for SOEs or for differences in economic systems). China has participated in Joint Statement Initiatives where it does not view itself as targeted including e-commerce, domestic services regulation, investment for development, SMSEs, etc. China is supportive of restoration of the Appellate Body. On S&DT, China does not agree to a change in classification of Members but has agreed to take on responsibilities that it views as consistent with its level of development.

Observations

The above review is undoubtedly incomplete and doesn’t include the discussion during the question and answer portion., but hopefully provides enough of a summary to show large areas of agreement and some of caution between the U.S. and the EU. Both the EU and the US (under the Biden Administration) are putting a lot of focus on recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and both are interested in supporting global distribution of vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics through COVAX, though there are short term issues in terms of supplies for national needs for both the U.S. and EU.

In general, the two U.S. panelists agreed with Ms. Weyand that there are areas where cooperation between the U.S. and the EU is possible and viewed the revised EC trade policy paper as helpful, particularly in terms of perceived movement by the EU on dispute settlement. Mr. Gao’s comments show that any reform will not likely be easy or quick because of the large differences in views of existing Members and the challenges posed by China’s economic system to global commerce since consensus decision making permits China to effectively derail multilateral solutions and it can opt not to participate in plurilaterals that it views as not in its interests.

While the U.S. and EU have each articulated the need to have unilateral response capabilities if solutions can’t be found through the WTO or bilaterally, the EU position (and likely Biden Administration position) is that cooperation should be sought between the U.S., EU and possibly others before unilateral actions are taken to permit coordination.

Much of the forward movement at the WTO on new rules is likely to be through plurilateral deals. The JSIs are generating most of the energy at the moment. India and South Africa have submitted a paper arguing that such plurilaterals area not proper under the WTO or require consensus (which doesn’t exist) to be included within the WTO. See February 20, 2021, Will India and South Africa (and others) prevent future relevance of the WTO?, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/02/20/will-india-and-south-africa-and-others-prevent-future-relevance-of-the-wto/. Ms. Weyand’s position was that the WTO will need to find ways to incorporate the plurilaterals into the WTO or action will happen outside of the WTO which cannot be beneficial to the WTO. In a post in recent days, I have argued that the U.S. should joint the JSIs that it is not a party to. See March 9, 2021, The Biden Administration should join the Joint Statement Initiatives that it is not presently party to, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/09/biden-administration-should-join-the-joint-statement-initiatives-that-it-is-not-presently-part-to/. The new Director-General has also put significant emphasis for obtaining forward movement in the JSIs. So despite the current importance of the JSIs, there are challenges to how much the U.S. and EU can achieve through plurilaterals within the WTO without changes to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, and Members will be divided on having WTO plurilaterals where benefits are limited to the parties vs. all Members (i.e., non-MFN, but open for later membership of non-participants).

On Dispute Settlement, the EU has stated that it understands the long-standing U.S. concerns that are bipartisan and reflected both in the Biden Administration and in Congress. While Ms. Weyand’s view is that the U.S. must signal that it accepts a two-tier, binding, independent dispute settlement system early for negotiations to move forward, the comments of Thomas Graham and the paper by Amb. Shea suggest that such an early commitment may be inappropriate. This would be true if the underlying problems laid out over the last years by the U.S. cannot be rectified satisfactorily under such a system — currently unknown as negotiations haven’t taken place.

Since the problems for the U.S. and others with the Appellate Body flow in part from an ineffective mechanism for Members to correct Appellate Body errors (i.e., the negotiating a clarification and/or Ministerial Conference/General Council adoption of an interpretation (Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO Art. IX:2)), reform of the dispute settlement will likely exceed review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding and procedures.

Ms. Hillman has suggested and Mr. Graham has supported Ms. Hillman’s proposal for a separate process for trade remedy or trade defense cases in light of the large number of cases in the area where there has been longstanding disagreement on Appellate Body decisions and because of the failure of the Appellate Body to respect Art. 17.6(ii) of the Antidumping Agreement.

In earlier posts, I had suggested some modifications to Amb. Walker’s 2019 draft General Council Decision that (1) would interpret both DSU Art. 3.2 and 19.2 and possibly deal with the tension Mr. Graham reviewed in his comment and that have led to much of the overreach problem; (2) would address ADA Art. 17.6(ii); and (3) would deal with past erroneous decisions. See July 12, 2020, WTO Appellate Body reform – revisiting thoughts on how to address U.S. concerns, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/07/12/wtos-appellate-body-reform-revisiting-thoughts-on-how-to-address-u-s-concerns/ (relevant section copied below; modifications are in bold and underlined).

‘Overreach’

As provided in Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU, findings and recommendations of Panels and the Appellate Body and recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.   In a large number of Panel and Appellate Body reports, one or more parties and/or third parties have raised concerns about the Panel or Appellate Body adding to or diminishing the rights and obligations contrary to Articles 3.2 or 19.2 of the DSU.

To clarify situations where rights and obligations are being added to or diminished, Panels and the Appellate Body will not fill gaps in agreements, construe silence to indicate obligations or construe ambiguities in language of existing agreements to require a particular construction.  Any such actions by a Panel or by the Appellate Body is inconsistent with Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU.

Any party to an Appellate Body report that raised at the DSB meeting considering adoption of the Appellate Body report concerns about the creation of rights or obligations inconsistent with Articles 3.2 or 19.2, will have 90 days from the adoption of this General Council decision to request a review of the Appellate Body decision.  Such request will be for the limited purpose of having the Appellate Body determine whether on the specific issues raised where the party complained of creating rights or obligations the clarification of meaning provided in this General Council decision would result in a changed decision on the particular issue.  The Appellate Body will render decisions on all such requests within 90 days and will accept no additional briefing or argument from parties.  Where the report would have been different on one or more particular issues, it is sufficient for the Appellate Body to so indicate.  Where the same decision on an issue would have been made, the Appellate Body shall provide a detailed explanation.      

Panels and the Appellate Body shall interpret provisions of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“antidumping agreement”) in accordance with Article 17.6(ii) of that Agreement.  Any party to an Appellate Body report that raised at the DSB meeting considering adoption of the Appellate Body report that Article 17.6(ii) was not applied in interpreting the antidumping agreement, will have 90 days from the adoption of this General Council decision to request a review of the Appellate Body decision.  Such a request will be for the limited purpose of having the Appellate Body determine whether a different outcome on one or more issues would have resulted had the Appellate Body applied Article 17.6(ii)  of the antidumping agreement.  The Appellate Body will render decisions on all such requests within 90 days and will accept no additional briefing or argument from parties.  Where the report would have been different on one or more particular issues, it is sufficient for the Appellate Body to so indicate.  Where the same decision on an issue would have been made, the Appellate Body shall provide a detailed explanation.       

There presumably are many other ways (and perhaps better ways) to deal with these issues, but the above suggests that solutions could be found that would support a two-tiered system. Perhaps, the EU proposal for what it needs from the U.S. early should be supplemented by an understanding that any such commitment assumes ability to address U.S. concerns meaningfully with a two-tier, binding, independent dispute settlement system.

Conclusion

Ms. Weyand’s statement was that cooperation between the U.S. and the EU was a necessary but not sufficient condition to a successful effort at WTO reform. The European Commission in its revised trade policy paper demonstrated some movement from prior positions that had made resolution of matters such as the impasse on the Appellate Body unlikely. Similarly, the Biden Administration has been indicating on a range of issues including environmental sustainability movement that makes a united front between the U.S. and EU more likely. Actions reported in the press in recent weeks show movement by both the U.S. and the EU to improve bilateral relations in the trade sphere. All are very promising signals.

But the path forward is complicated by a lack of common objectives with many third countries, including China. Hence, the correctness of the observation that U.S.-EU cooperation is necessary but not sufficient.

Programs like today’s IIEL program provide a useful opportunity for large numbers of members of the public to gain a better understanding of the possible road forward and challenges to be faced. All of the panelists (and moderator) did an excellent job. It will be interesting to see how the WTO responds in the coming months if the U.S. and EU can in fact mount a united front on reform.

WTO Director-General Okonjo-Iweala’s statement on International Women’s Day, a broader read on gender equality; U.S., EU and New Zealand actions and statements

In my post yesterday, I pulled some information from a short video put together by the WTO, UNCTAD and ITC that dealt with the issue of priorities for the three organizations in terms of recovering from the pandemic. I also reviewed some actions President Biden was taking in the United States. See March 8, 2011, March 8, 2021, International Women’s Day — statements of UN Women Executive Director,  heads of WTO, UNCTAD and International Trade Centre, and U.S. Executive Orders and Statement by President Biden, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/08/march-8-2021-international-womens-day-statements-of-un-women-executive-director-heads-of-wto-unctad-and-international-trade-centre-and-u-s-executive-orders-and-statement-by-president-biden/.

WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala

Yesterday the WTO hosted a virtual event entitled “Women in leadership: Achieving an equal future in a COVID-19 world,” Director-General Okonjo-Iweala gave an opening statement which chronicles both the disproportionate harm women have encountered during the COVID-19 pandemic but also some of the actions some governments are taking to address the challenges facing women. See WTO, International Women’s Day: Focus on women for a stronger recovery, March 8, 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/women_08mar21_e.htm. While the two priorities of the Director-General (DG) reviewed in yesterday’s post are also present in her statement at yesterday’s event (equitable and affordable access to vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics; eliminating or phasing out export restraints), there is a lot more ground covered in the statement. The women and trade agenda at the WTO is relatively limited at the present time. Having a woman as Director-General can lead to changes in the organization and structure of the Secretariat — which is identified as a topic DG Okonjo-Iweala will be addressing — and can help ensure that women are at the table for all negotiations so that trade policy and negotiations include an understanding of the implications for gender equality and empowerment of women and girls. DG Okonjo-Iweala reviews the reasons women have been disproportionately affected — including being overrepresented in sectors heavily impacted by the pandemic (textile and apparel manufacturing, tourism), being heavily concentrated in the informal economy of countries with limited or no safety net if jobs are lost, for entrepreneurs, being in small businesses with limited financial resources making surviving a pandemic more challenging, shouldering heavy loads at home in terms of child care, and facing great health care risks because of the concentration in medical and essential services jobs, The text of DG Okonjo-Iweala’s statement, which ls linked to the press release is copied below. See Speeches — DG Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, 2021 WTO International Women’s Day: “Women in Leadership: Achieving an Equal Future in a COVID-19 World”, March 8, 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spno_e/spno2_e.htm.

“Ladies and gentlemen,

“Today is my first International Woman’s Day as the WTO Director-General. Given the particular challenges the pandemic has brought to women globally, I wish to focus my opening remarks today on what the WTO can do to help address these challenges. But I am keenly aware that achieving gender equality is also one of the top priorities for the Secretariat itself, and we will find an occasion soon to have a focused discussion on gender issues for the Secretariat.

“The COVID-19 pandemic has deepened inequalities of every kind. Between countries with money to spend on vaccines and economic relief, and those that cannot. Between workers who must risk their health every day, and those who can safely work from home. Between big firms and small businesses.

“But perhaps no divide has deepened more than that between men and women.

“In both paid and unpaid work, women bore the brunt of the pandemic’s social and economic impact.

“Globally, 5% of women lost jobs in 2020.  The employment loss of men was 3.8%. Women have also been much more likely than men to drop out of the labour market and become inactive.

“In low-income countries without the means to offer economic support during lockdowns, many women lost their only source of income. As family incomes fell, many girls stayed home when schools reopened, or went to work.

“Why has the recession caused by the pandemic had such a disproportionate impact on women?

“First, women are overrepresented in sectors that have been more negatively affected than others.

“This includes jobs requiring in-person contact, such as food service and retail — sectors that either shut down or became much riskier. Women also account for a large share of workers in services such as tourism — sectors directly affected by travel restrictions.

“Women also outnumber men in the manufacturing sectors hardest hit by the pandemic, such as textiles and apparel, where factories shut down early in the pandemic in response to plummeting export demand. In Bangladesh, for example, female employees represent 80 per cent of the workforce in ready-made garment production. Industry orders declined by 45.8 per cent over the first quarter of 2020 — by 81 per cent in April 2020 alone.

Second, more women work in informal sectors than men. Women make up 58% of employment in informal sectors, and the numbers are higher in developing and least-developed economies. In Africa, for example, almost 90% of employed women work in the informal sector.​ These women workers are hurt the most because they are likely to have lost their only source of income and been left with no social and legal protection. 

“Third, many women entrepreneurs own or manage small businesses that already struggle with limited financial resources and borrowing capacity. The pandemic worsened these pressures.

“And within families, women continue to shoulder a heavier burden than men. Temporary school closures made fathers step up a little, but mothers stepped up much more. Working mothers changed work schedules, reduced hours or took unpaid leave far more frequently than working fathers. In Germany, 6% of fathers but 62% of mothers indicate they have taken on the primary responsibility for their children during school closures.

“Finally, women face greater health risks as they work more in areas such as health and social care, sales of food and other necessary goods. In many countries, women comprise over 75% of the healthcare workforce. In certain countries (Italy, Spain, and the US), a higher proportion of women healthcare workers (69%, 75.5%, and 73% respectively) were found infected with COVID-19: although work is still ongoing to understand the reasons for this, one possible reason is that personal protection equipment has been designed to fit for men and even the smallest size is too big for some women.

“Even before COVID-19, progress towards gender parity had been too slow, too uneven. Now, unless we act quickly, the pandemic’s disproportionate impact on women could last for decades. This would be a moral failure — and an economic disaster.

“The biggest thing the WTO can do right now is to work with Members to keep trade open.

“As the economic data shows, trade has proven crucial in the global fight against the pandemic.

“While too many export restrictions remain in place, trade helped improve access to key medical products over the past year. In the first half of 2020, while global trade contracted by 14% compared to the year before, total imports of personal protective equipment and other COVID-related products rose by 29%. The value of trade in textile face masks grew six-fold. PPE trade grew by 50%. Trade thus enhanced supply resilience, particularly for those countries without manufacturing capacity.

“The pandemic has also highlighted how the temporary movement of healthcare workers, of whom many are women, has particularly helped the most affected countries to deal with the crisis. Open trade will continue to be key to building faster and more inclusive growth.

“Second, WTO Members must minimize or remove existing export restrictions that are impeding access to essential medical supplies and disrupting supply chains. Transparency on any export trade restrictions should also be improved through prompt notifications.

“In all these efforts, our priority should be to contribute to making vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics available and affordable in all countries. Until we have successfully tackled health challenges for everyone, we cannot tackle economic ones.

“Third, trade can be a source of more and better jobs, and increased purchasing power for women. Overall, countries that are more open to trade, as measured by the ratio of trade to gross domestic product, have higher levels of gender equality.

“For one, women are more likely to be in formal jobs if they work in trade-integrated sectors with higher levels of exports, thereby giving them opportunities for benefits, training, and job security. A recent World Bank survey shows that, for women, the probability of being informal declines from 20% in sectors with low levels of exports to 13% in sectors with high levels of exports. 

“Digital technologies can also help women overcome gender-based barriers to trade, reach broader markets, and weather the impact of crises better. Women facemasks producers in Kenya, for example, found ways to develop and even expand their businesses during lockdowns using growing e-commerce opportunities. Rwandan women coffee producers were able to export their products directly to China. Let’s close the existing gender digital divide and help all women benefit from the opportunities created by digital technologies.

“Finally, all these efforts must be supported by targeted support measures for women.

“Women could be left behind in the recovery unless adequate measures are put in place to address the uneven impact of the pandemic on them. Let me give you one example of how targeted intervention can make a difference: in Zambia, the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) and the International Trade Centre (ITC) helped women-owned businesses selling textiles, leather, and honey to attend trade fairs and other B2B activities. The result: they were able to break into 10 new international markets, and generate hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of new sales. They also expanded their supplier networks, and many of those new suppliers were also run by women.

“Governments need to prioritize women in the labour force and in the home through financial, legal, and educational measures. Fiscal support for women will be particularly crucial. Yet currently less than 40 per cent of all measures taken globally for the recovery are gender sensitive, with only 7 per cent containing measures supporting women’s economic security.

“This is a crude reminder for all of us that women must be at all decision-making tables equally as men. As Dame Graça Machel once said, “…socio-economic transformation will only be realized once we aggressively address gender-specific challenges, prioritize gender equality and women’s participation, and firmly entrench women in leadership positions at all levels in society.”

“The cost of gender inequality is enormous. A few years ago McKinsey estimated that if women played a fully equal role to men in the labour market, global economic output could increase by as much as $28 trillion per year. To put it in perspective, this pandemic reduced global output last year by between $3 and 4 trillion.

“The COVID-19 pandemic is setting women back in all domains of society.

“At the same time, it has reminded everyone of the enormous value of care and other kinds of work traditionally associated with women. And it has highlighted the power and effectiveness of women’s leadership. Although no analytical study has been conducted yet, anecdotal examples show that economies led by woman leaders (e.g. New Zealand, Denmark, Chinese Taipei, Iceland, Finland, and Norway) have outperformed their peers in terms of management of this pandemic.

“We cannot expect to make good policy for all members of society if half of the population is not properly and equally represented at the table.

“Gender equality is a fundamental human rights issue and also an economic empowerment issue. We should all work harder in our respective roles to achieve complete gender equality.

“I wish you all a happy International Women’s Day!”

Additional actions by President Biden

In yesterday’s post, I also reviewed actions President Biden was taking in the form of two Executive Orders (one Executive Order on Establishment of the White House Gender Policy Council, a second Executive Order on Guaranteeing an Educational Environment Free from Discrimination on the Basis of Sex, Including Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity). But President Biden on March 8th reviewed additional actions he has taken including nominating two women to hold command positions in the U.S. Military and putting forward to Congress the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2021. See Statement by President Biden on the Introduction of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2021 and Remarks by President Biden on International Women’s Day (“On Friday, I submitted to the Senate for confirmation my first slate of nominations for four-star command positions in our Armed Forces — among them, two outstanding and eminently qualified warriors and patriots.  General Jacqueline Van Ovost in the United States Air Force is currently the only female four-star officer serving in our military.  I nominated her as Commander of the United States Transportation Command.  And when confirmed, the Lieutenant General Laura Richardson, of the United States Army, will be promoted in rank and join General Van Ovost as the only four-star — as another four-star general.  I nominated her as Commander in the United States Southern Command.  And, when confirmed, they will become the second and third women in the history of the United States Armed Forces to lead combatant commands.”). The Biden Administration also had a press briefing with the two co-chairs of the Gender Policy Council. See Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, Co-Chair of the Gender Policy Council and Chief of Staff to the First Lady Julissa Reynoso, and Co-Chair and Executive Director of the Gender Policy Council Jennifer Klein, March 8, 2021. And Vice President Kamala Harris reported participated in a discussion with an EU Parliamentary Committee. See eudebates.tv, We are all in this together! Jacinda Ardern on International Women’s Day, March 8, 2021, https://www.eudebates.tv/debates/world-debates/australia/we-are-all-in-this-together-jacinda-ardern-on-international-womens-day/ (“.During the plenary session of the European Parliament in Brussels, Jacinda Ardern, Prime Minister of New Zealand joined MEPs to celebrate the International Women’s Day during a debate. Prime Minister Jacinda was one of a number of high-profile guests, including US Vice President Kamala Harris, to address the European Union Parliament for International Women’s Day.”)..

So the Biden Administration has been taking actions to bring women into positions of power in a unprecedented manner in the United States and to embark on reviews to ensure problems to achieving gender equality are identified and addressed.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen

The EU has had relatively strong programs promoting gender equality over time. Like the United States, the EU is looking to do more. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made a statement yesterday at the EP FEMM Interparliamentary Committee meeting reviewing the important contributions of women to the development of COVID-19 vaccines and the actions the EU will be taking to improve gender equality. Like President Biden’s cabinet, EC President von der Leyen has much greater balance in the Commission composition in terms gender representation. See Opening speech by President von der Leyen at the EP FEMM Interparliamentary Committee meeting, on the occasion of the International Women’s Day 2021, March 8, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_21_1017. Her speech is copied below.

“Thank you very much Evelyn Regner,

“Presidents and Honourable Members,

“It is an honour to be with you today, in the company of so many amazing women. And allow me to begin by mentioning three women who are not with us today. Doctor Özlem Türeci. Professor Sarah Gilbert. Doctor Kizzmekia Corbett. Some of you may have never heard their names before. But we owe them a lot. They are three scientists from Germany, the UK and the U.S. And these three extraordinary women lead the teams that developed the first three vaccines against coronavirus. BioNTech, Moderna and AstraZeneca.

“And I am sure that they, like many of us, have fought against all sorts of stereotypes. But this is how women respond to stereotypes: By going their way, showing leadership and excelling in their field. And today the whole world can see that we are all better off when women get the opportunities they deserve. Of course, women are made for science. Of course, women are fit to lead. Of course, career and motherhood can go together. It is obvious, but unfortunately it still needs to be said.

“This year’s International Women’s Day is for women like these three scientists. This Women’s Day is for women on the front-line, and for women in the back-office. It is for the health workers, who have been our guardian angels, and it is for our sales assistants, who have kept our supermarkets open. And indeed, let us never forget that almost 80% of them are women.

“Women’s Day is also for all the mothers who have taken care of their children during the lockdowns, while also working from home. But this Women’s Day is also for the women who lost their job during the crisis. And Women’s Day is for those who no longer want to settle for discriminations, insecurity and unfairness. As a female leader, I would like 2021 to bring good news to all of them, to all European women. And this is what we are working on: Putting women at the centre of all our policies.

“And let me start with the basics. Later this year we will propose new legislation to fight violence against women. This has become even more urgent because of the lockdowns. Living free from fear and violence is a basic human right. And we must ensure adequate protection for all women, in all European countries, online and offline, and especially at home.

“Second, women must be at the centre of the recovery. This is a clear requirement for all national recovery plans. NextGenerationEU will finance good jobs for women and men alike. It will invest in quality education for girls and women, including scientific education. NextGenerationEU will be for all Europeans, women and men.

“Third, today indeed we are presenting our new Action Plan to implement the European Pillar of Social Rights. We have set ambitious targets on jobs, skills, and poverty reduction. These are clear and measurable goals to drive our work.

“And let me take one of them: By 2030, at least 78% of European adults should be employed. And this can only be achieved by having more women in the labour market. But to do this we need to make progress on work-life balance. Ensuring parental leave for mothers and fathers. Investing in childcare and good schools. And indeed creating a child guarantee, so that all parents, from all social backgrounds, can send their kids to childcare and school. And this is what empowerment means. Freedom to be a mother and to have a career, for all women.

“And this adds up to the fourth point, today we are also proposing a Directive for pay transparency. It builds on a very simple idea: Equal work deserves equal pay. And for equal pay, you need transparency. Women must know whether their employers treat them fairly. And when this is not the case, they must have the power to fight back and get what they deserve.

“And finally, women should always be able to reach for the top, including in private companies. I fought for this when I was a Minister in Germany. And I will not stop pushing for gender quotas on boards until we get a fair system for all European countries. We simply cannot exclude half of our talents from leadership positions.

“Having women in leadership position should become the norm, not the exception. And slowly but steadily, Europe is changing. Five EU governments are now led by women. For the first time, an EU country, Estonia, is led by two women, as President and Prime Minister. And you, President Sakellaropoulou, are the first woman to be elected as Greek President.

“For the first time in our history, not only the European Commission is led by a woman, but we have also achieved gender-balance in the College of Commissioners. As you know, this is something I promised on my nomination. I asked every European country to present a man and a woman as candidates for each post. It was not always easy. But we made it. And it shows that everything can change, with tireless perseverance.

“All of this matters. It matters to the quality of our decision-making. And it matters to our daughters. It tells them that they can reach for the top. It tells them that hard work pays off. That they will be judged on their ideas, their dedication and their talent, not for their chromosomes. A gender-balanced Europe is a better Europe. Not just for women, but for all of us.

“And in this spirit: Long live Europe, and happy Women’s Day!”

New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Arden

New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda Arden also spoke to the European Parliament yesterday. Her speech can be found here. eudebates.tv, We are all in this together! Jacinda Ardern on International Women’s Day, March 8, 2021, https://www.eudebates.tv/debates/world-debates/australia/we-are-all-in-this-together-jacinda-ardern-on-international-womens-day/. New Zealand has done a lot to promote gender equality and has leadership in government that is roughly in number equal between women and men. But challenges remain as the Prime Minister notes in her speech including women being “overrepresented in job loss and low paid work and domestic violence statistics.” The Prime Minister’s speech is copied below (headers are from the webpage).

“Jacinda Ardern European Parliament speech on International Women’s Day 

“I’m honoured to see this kind invitation to speak with you and I bring warm greetings from New Zealand. President Sassoli, thank you for convening this session and for the focus on women’s empowerment and leadership during the covid crisis. To say this is a challenging time would be, of course, a monumental understatement. The world is reeling from the effects of the covid-19 pandemic.

“It has had far reaching consequences that have affected every one of us. This is a critical time for us as leaders and representatives to come together, even if it is by video in these constrained times. Covid-19 highlights how truly interdependent we all are, how reliant we are on cooperation, communication and compassion to successfully combat the virus.

“Jacinda Ardern puts people at the centre

“It highlights how important it is that we work together for a sustainable recovery that delivers for our economies and our planet. But it also puts people at the centre of our decision making. In New Zealand our approach in battling covid-19 has been one of inclusivity. The idea that everyone needs to do their bit to protect one another, especially our most vulnerable.

“I want to talk about our population as the team of five million, and we may be a small team, but one that nonetheless has proven the power and importance of the collective. And now that’s exactly what we need from the world. It’s a haunting legacy if the virus drags on around the globe. It has become clear no country is safe until every country is safe. As we move to a phase of vaccination we are not a team of five million, but we are a team of seven point eight billion

“The success of individual countries or regions means little unless we are all successful. In New Zealand‘s indigenous language Te Reo Maori, we say “we are all in this together”. But some have felt the effects of covid-19 even more acutely than others. Covid-19 has ravaged our health systems, our economies, our livelihoods. But it is also exacerbated structural inequalities that disproportionately impact women and girls.

“Women are at the forefront

“Women are at the forefront of fighting the covid crisis. Amongst the doctors, nurses, scientists, communicators, caregivers and frontline and essential workers who face the devastations and challenges of this virus every day. Along with being directly affected by the virus itself and its immediate impacts on our livelihoods, we’re also the subjects of intensified domestic violence.

“Now this is being reported as the shadow pandemic in all corners of the world. Not only by fully and meaningfully including women and girls in leadership and decision making at all levels can we ensure that our responses to the pandemic meet the needs of everyone. As prime minister of a small country on the far side of the world, I’m proud of what our team of five million in New Zealand has been able to achieve over the last year.

“We have a proud history of championing gender rights since we became the first country in the world to give all women the right to vote in 1893. I’m part of the most diverse and inclusive parliament New Zealanders have ever elected, with women making up forty eight per cent of our parliament and fifty five per cent of my party in government.

“Women hold top positions

“Women also hold the post of Governor-General, Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition and Chief Justice, and increasingly holding senior roles in our public service and business sector. And now, for the first time and long overdue, I might add, New Zealand‘s Minister of Foreign Affairs is a woman. She is a skilled, values driven indigenous woman with a contemporary worldview.

“And yet for all of that, we have so much more to do because it doesn’t matter how many women are in leadership, so long as we have women overrepresented in job loss and low paid work and domestic violence statistics. In my mind, that is the true measure of whether we have made progress and whether we have equality.

“As we look towards the year ahead we all know it will be tough. There will be big challenges and demands made of all of us as leaders. We will be tested. We must all do more to support women lead business, including small enterprises, to be part of the covid-19 economic recovery so they can more readily experience the benefits of trade.

“The European Union and New Zealand. We are Like-Minded Partners with so many values and interests in common, we both desire the stability and freedom afforded us all by global rules and institutions, free and open markets and a world where human rights are valued and prioritised.

“As we all turn towards creating a sustainable global economic recovery, my message to you is simple. We need to stick together because we are all in this together. I wish your Parliament and all our people the very best for the challenges that lie ahead. Stay safe. Stay well.”

Conclusion

Gender equality is an issue that needs a permanent place on agendas of organizations and governments to ensure progress is made for half the world’s people. Progress has been too slow in too much of the world and discrimination or unequal treatment can be found in various forms in nearly all countries. It is unimaginable that the world has not progressed more. We can and must do better.

Biden Administration should join the Joint Statement Initiatives that it is not presently party to

President Biden has made it clear that his Administration will work within multilateral organizations to the extent possible to move the U.S. agenda forward. During the Trump Administration, the U.S. participated actively in the World Trade Organization but was active in only one of the Joint Statement Initiatives that were initiated at the end of the Buenos Aires Ministerial Conference in late 2017.

Thus, the United States is an active participant in the ongoing negotiations following the Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce (WT/MIN(17)/60, 13 December 2017), but is not a party to the other Joint Statement Initiatives. See Joint Ministerial Statement on Services Domestic Regulation (WT/MIN(17)/61, 13 December 2017); Joint Ministerial Statement on Investment Facilitation for Development (WT/MIN(17)/59, 13 December 2017); Joint Ministerial Statement, Declaration on the Establishment of a WTO Informal Work Programme for MSMEs (WT/MIN(17)/58, 13 December 2017); Joint Declaration on Trade and Women’s Economic Empowerment on the Occasion of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires in December 2017.

While India and South Africa have challenged the legitimacy of the Joint Statement Initiatives (JSIs), a great deal of the energy in the WTO in the last several years has been put into the JSIs. See, e.g., February 20, 2021, Will India and South Africa (and others) prevent future relevance of the WTO?, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/02/20/will-india-and-south-africa-and-others-prevent-future-relevance-of-the-wto/; WTO, Coordinators of joint initiatives cite substantial progress in discussions, 18 December 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/jsec_18dec20_e.htm. The WTO press release is copied below.

“The coordinators of the joint initiatives on e-commerce, investment facilitation, services domestic regulation and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) said on 18 December that substantial progress has been achieved in their respective discussions and that they are on track to deliver concrete results or additional progress at the WTO’s 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) scheduled for next year.

“In their communication, the coordinators noted that they have delivered summary statements to WTO members outlining how far the four initiatives have advanced since they were launched three years ago, where they stand today, and what their next steps in the discussions will be.

“’What these statements clearly show is the substantial progress [of the initiatives] in a short period of time, that they are on track to delivering concrete results or progress at MC12, and that they are contributing to building a more responsive, relevant and modern WTO — which will be critical to restoring global trade and economic growth in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis.’

“’These initiatives have grown into an increasingly important part of the agenda of the WTO, with an expanding number of participants from both the developed and developing worlds that account for a significant part of the WTO’s membership, and based on the principles of openness, transparency and inclusiveness,’ the coordinators added.

“The new joint initiatives were launched at the WTO’s 11th Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires in December 2017 with the aim of commencing negotiations or discussions on issues of increasing relevance to the world trading system.

“The joint initiative coordinators are Ambassador José Luis Cancela Gómez (Uruguay) for the Informal Working Group on MSMEs; Ambassadors George Mina (Australia), Yamazaki Kazuyuki (Japan) and Tan Hung Seng (Singapore) for the Joint Statement Initiative on E-Commerce; Deputy Permanent Representative Jaime Coghi Arias (Costa Rica) for the Joint Statement Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation; and Ambassador-designate Mathias Francke (Chile) for the Structured Discussions on Investment Facilitation for Development.

“The coordinators noted that the consolidated negotiating text on e-commerce will provide a foundation for intensified negotiations in 2021. They highlighted that the negotiations on services domestic regulation are at a ‘mature stage’, with a genuine potential for an outcome by MC12.

“The coordinators also said that substantive provisions of an investment facilitation agreement are being negotiated by the participating members in this initiative. In addition, they noted the recent announcement by the Informal Working Group on MSMEs of a package of declarations and recommendations to help small business trade internationally.

“The coordinators underscored that the shared and ultimate goal of these initiatives is to strengthen and reinforce the multilateral trading system, that they are open to all WTO members, and that they seek the participation of as many members as possible.

“The coordinators stated: ‘The initiatives on e-commerce, investment facilitation, services domestic regulation, and MSMEs clearly demonstrate that the WTO can respond to new economic and technological challenges in a flexible, pragmatic, and timely way. These initiatives — and their innovative approach to cooperation and negotiation — can provide a valuable illustration of WTO reform in action.’”

While the Joint Declaration Trade and Women’s Economic Empowerment on the Occasion of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires in December 2017 is not treated as a JSI, it does have many Members supporting the Declaration and engaging in the informal work programme.

Some of the other countries participating in all of the JSIs and Joint Declaration

While the number of WTO Members participating in the JSIs and supporting the Joint Declaration vary, the following is a partial list of Members who are signatories to all of the JSIs and the Joint Declaration. Other than the Electronic Commerce initiative, the U.S. is presently not a signatory or participant in any of the other JSIs or Joint Declaration.

Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, European Union, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Switzerland are participants in all of the JSIs and supportive of the Joint Declaration. Dozens of other Members are participating in some or many of the JSI’s that the U.S. is not presently supporting or active in.

Conclusion

While the United States has a large agenda of issues it wishes to address at the WTO (including trade and the environment, WTO reform, industrial subsidies), it makes no sense that the United States would not actively participate in work programs where most of the major economies are active and where new rules will be relevant to areas of significance for the United States as well as for trading partners. While the work program on women and trade is in an informal working group, President Biden has made empowerment of women an important priority for his Administration as a range of actions during International Women’s Day made clear. See, e.g., March 8, 2011, March 8, 2021, International Women’s Day — statements of UN Women Executive Director,  heads of WTO, UNCTAD and International Trade Centre, and U.S. Executive Orders and Statement by President Biden, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/08/march-8-2021-international-womens-day-statements-of-un-women-executive-director-heads-of-wto-unctad-and-international-trade-centre-and-u-s-executive-orders-and-statement-by-president-biden/. Similarly, MSMEs are an important part of the U.S. economy and a major driver of economic growth. The U.S. has a very strong services sector which has an interest in domestic regulatory issues both in the U.S. and as addressed overseas. Finally, the U.S. is both a major investor in foreign countries and a recipient of large amounts of foreign investment and has a significant interest in helping the global community address issues involved in investment in developing and least developed countries on a more predictable basis.

Hopefully, the Biden Administration when its USTR nominee is confirmed in the coming days, will opt to engage in all of the JSIs. It is time.

U.S. and EU issue joint statement suspending for four months retaliatory tariffs from large civil aircraft WTO disputes (Airbus-Boeing)

Yesterday, the U.S. and United Kingdom announced a four month suspension of retaliatory tariffs from the Airbus-Boeing WTO disputes to provide time to seek a negotiated solution. As noted in my post on the development, it was expected that a similar agreement would be reached with the EU. See March 4, 2021, First step in resolving the Airbus-Boeing WTO dispute — U.K. and U.S. announce four month suspension of retaliatory tariffs effective March 4, 2021, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/04/first-step-in-resolving-the-airbus-boeing-wto-dispute-u-k-and-u-s-announce-four-month-suspension-of-retaliatory-tariffs-effective-march-4-2021/

Today a joint statement was released by the U.S. and the European Union on a similar four-month suspension of retaliatory tariffs. See USTR, Joint Statement of the European Union and the United States on the Large Civil Aircraft WTO Disputes, March 5, 2021, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/march/joint-statement-european-union-and-united-states-large-civil-aircraft-wto-disputes. The text of the joint statement is copied below.

“’The European Union and the United States today agreed on the mutual suspension for four months of the tariffs related to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Aircraft disputes. The suspension will cover all tariffs both on aircraft as well as on non-aircraft products, and will become effective as soon as the internal procedures on both sides are completed. 

“’This will allow the EU and the US to ease the burden on their industries and workers and focus efforts towards resolving these long running disputes at the WTO.

“’The EU and the US are committed to reach a comprehensive and durable negotiated solution to the Aircraft disputes. Key elements of a negotiated solution will include disciplines on future support in this sector, outstanding support measures, monitoring and enforcement, and addressing the trade distortive practices of and challenges posed by new entrants to the sector from non-market economies, such as China.

“’These steps signal the determination of both sides to embark on a fresh start in the relationship.’”

The agreement to suspend the retaliatory tariffs for four months was the result of a phone call between President Biden and EC President von der Leyen.

The White House has the following readout of the phone call:

Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen

“MARCH 05, 2021 • STATEMENTS AND RELEASES

“President Joseph R. Biden spoke today with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. He underscored his support for the European Union and his commitment to repair and revitalize the U.S.-EU partnership. Noting our shared values and the world’s largest trade and investment relationship, the leaders agreed to suspend the tariffs related to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Aircraft disputes for four months and to work toward resolving these long running disputes at the WTO.  They discussed the importance of close U.S.-EU cooperation to contain the COVID-19 pandemic and enhance global health security, pursue a sustainable global economic recovery, tackle the climate crisis, and strengthen democracy.  The leaders also agreed to coordinate on issues of shared interest, including China, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and the Western Balkans.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/05/readout-of-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-call-with-european-commission-president-ursula-von-der-leyen/.

The European Commission President von der Leyen issued a press release after her conversation with President Biden. See European Commission, Statement by President von der Leyen following her phone call with President of the United States Joe Biden, March 5, 2021, The press release is embedded below but the relevant paragraphs on the suspension of tariffs are copied below before the full press release.

“As a symbol of this fresh start, President Biden and I agreed to suspend all our tariffs imposed in the context of the Airbus-Boeing disputes, both on aircraft and non-aircraft products, for an initial period of 4 months. We both committed to focus on resolving our aircraft disputes, based on the work our respective trade representatives. This is excellent news for businesses and industries on both sides of the Atlantic, and a very positive signal for our economic cooperation in the years to come.”

Statement_by_President_von_der_Leyen_following_her_phone_call_with_President_of_the_United_States_Joe_Biden

EC Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis in a tweet indicated the suspension had been agreed and stated that “This is a major breakthrough that provides a welcome boost to EU exporters & it gives both sides time & space to resolve this long-running dispute.” https://twitter.com/VDombrovskis/status/1367888145505783810. See also Financial Times, EU and US agree to suspend tariffs in Airbus-Boeing dispute, March 5, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/3da1759f-894e-4c1d-813f-5012d96bf52b.

While the development was not unexpected in light of yesterday’s announcement, it is a further sign of the major effort of the Biden Administration to work with our allies such as the European Union and is another manifestation of the Biden Administration’s embrace of multilateral solutions and working with allies.

First step in resolving the Airbus-Boeing WTO dispute — U.K. and U.S. announce four month suspension of retaliatory tariffs effective March 4, 2021

For the U.S., EU and U.K., finding a path to resolving the long-running dispute on civil aircraft subsidies is a major priority. Both the U.S. and the EU have been authorized to retaliate by the WTO in recent years. Some efforts at finding a resolution were pursued during the Trump Administration. The Biden Administration has made it clear that it wants to find ways to work with our allies and resolving the underlying civil aircraft dispute has been a topic covered by President Biden’s USTR nominee Katherine Tai in her confirmation hearing. See March 2, 2021, Katherine Tai, USTR designate, on addressing WTO reform including dispute settlement if confirmed; the USTR 2021 Trade Policy Agenda, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/02/katherine-tai-ustr-designate-on-addressing-wto-reform-including-dispute-settlement-if-confirmed-the-ustr-2021-trade-policy-agenda/.

Today the U.S. and the United Kingdom released a joint statement following agreement to suspend retaliatory tariffs for four months from March 4, 2021 to provide space for seeking a negotiated solution. The U.K. had suspended retaliatory tariffs since January 1st. See USTR, Joint US-UK Statement on Suspension of Large Civilian Aircraft Tariffs, March 4, 2021, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/march/joint-us-uk-statement-suspension-large-civilian-aircraft-tariffs. The joint statement is embedded below.

US-UK-4-month-tariff-suspension-to-ease-the-burden-on-industry-while-seek-resolution-of-Airbus-Boeing-disputes

The announcement does not include the EU as a party, but it is expected that the EU will join such action since they are the major European party and face the largest amount of retaliation. In early December 2020, during the last months of the Trump Administration, EC Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis had indicated the EU would suspend retaliatory tariffs if the U.S. did as well. See Bloomberg, EU Says Boeing-Airbus Dispute Can Be Settled Under Trump, December 3, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-03/eu-says-boeing-airbus-dispute-can-be-settled-under-trump (“EU Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis said ‘it’s possible’ that both sides will reach an agreement by Jan. 20 governing aid to Boeing Co. and Airbus SE. He reiterated an offer to remove EU retaliatory tariffs on $4 billion of American goods if the U.S. does the same for its duties on $7.5 billion of European products. ‘The solution which would be preferred by the EU would be that both sides withdraw or at least suspend their tariffs and we reach agreement on future disciplines in the area of civil aviation,’ Dombrovskis said in an interview with Bloomberg TV on Thursday. ‘We are still intensively engaged with the current U.S. administration.'”).

The U.S. goal is certainly to find a solution that works for the Boeing Company and that permits the U.S., EU and U.K. to turn their attention to the challenges in the civil aircraft industry by major new entrants like China. Today’s action with the U.K. is the first step in the Biden Administration’s efforts to get this dispute resolved.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION: MAKING MSMES COMPETITIVE IN GREEN TECH

Climate change is a major global concern. Indeed, the UN has indicated there is less than a year for countries to get serious about saving the planet by getting their updated national climate action plans (NDCs) submitted. See Time, ‘If This Task Was Urgent Before, It’s Crucial Now.’ U.N. Says World Has 10 Months to Get Serious on Climate Goals, February 26, 2021,https://time.com/5942546/un-emissions-targets-climate-change/; UN Climate Change, Greater Climate Ambition Urged as Initial NDC Synthesis Report Is Published, 26 February 2021, https://unfccc.int/news/greater-climate-ambition-urged-as-initial-ndc-synthesis-report-is-published (“’2021 is a make or break year to confront the global climate emergency. The science is clear, to limit global temperature rise to 1.5C, we must cut global emissions by 45% by 2030 from 2010 levels.  Today’s interim report from the UNFCCC is a red alert for our planet. It shows governments are nowhere close to the level of ambition needed to limit climate change to 1.5 degrees and meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. The major emitters must step up with much more ambitious emissions reductions targets for 2030 in their Nationally Determined Contributions well before the November UN Climate Conference in Glasgow,’ said UN Secretary-General António Guterres.”).

While the largest polluters — China and the United States — haven’t submitted updated NDCs, the Biden Administration is planning on hosting a climate summit in the summer and plans on having more ambitious plans for the U.S. prepared by that time. See Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership, February 23, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/23/roadmap-for-a-renewed-u-s-canada-partnership/ (“The Prime Minister and the President expressed their commitment to have their two countries work together on cooperative action ahead of the US-hosted Leaders’ Climate Summit that will allow both countries to increase their climate ambition. The President, in addition to acknowledging Canada’s new strengthened national climate plan and its globally ambitious price on pollution, reiterated his aim to have ready the US nationally determined contribution (NDC) in advance of the Summit and welcomed the Prime Minister’s aim to announce the enhanced 2030 emissions target for its NDC by the Summit as well.”).

At the World Trade Organization, many countries are anxious to explore ways that trade can facilitate addressing the challenges from climate change. Because of the large share of employment around the world by micro-, small- and medium’sized businesses (MSMEs), such businesses are playing and will have to play a critical role in adopting technologies to permit reduction of pollutions threatening the planet.

On February 25, 2021 a group of WTO Members (largely developed countries) submitted a communication to the WTO membership outlining ways that MSMEs can use intellectual property to green their businesses. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION: MAKING MSMES COMPETITIVE IN GREEN TECH, COMMUNICATION FROM AUSTRALIA, CANADA, CHILE, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, SINGAPORE, SWITZERLAND, THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES, IP/C/W/675 (26 February 2021). The paper lays out the purpose of the communication in its introduction copied below.

“1. Some of today’s critical global challenges include climate change, biodiversity loss, environmental degradation and food security. As an example, climate change matters to our health and increases the risk of infections and pandemics.1

“2. Several international efforts such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Convention on Biological Diversity, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement are designed to address these challenges. In this context, the role of Green Technology2 is important to provide new alternatives to address these challenges and create opportunities that have economic, social, and environmental benefits, as underscored by the framework of the SDGs. Of these, several underline the importance of Environmentally Sound Technologies (ESTs) for the accomplishment of the above objectives.

“3. Micro-, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (MSMEs) can play a pivotal role in this change towards more sustainability. As they provide for more than 50 percent of employment (G20/OECD, 2015), they can constitute core engines of innovation and growth. MSMEs working in the green tech sector represent key economic actors in the effort towards finding solutions to address the abovementioned global challenges. The role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) to enhance the competitiveness of MSMEs should be looked at closely. IPRs enhance the dissemination and protection of innovations – which is key for MSMEs, including those in the green tech sector (Friesike, Jamali, Bader et al, 2009). This submission presents IPR approaches for making MSMEs more competitive in green tech.

“1 Harvard T.H Chan School of Public Health: https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/cchange/subtopics/coronavirus-and-climate-change/ (last consulted: 09.01.2021).”

The communication then provides information on international and national approaches to helping SMSEs obtain IP protection and/or obtain through license or otherwise existing IP technologies to address greening their businesses. For example, on international approaches, the communication reviews the role WIPO and WTO play in providing easy access to lots of information on intellectual property systems of many countries. WIPO has set up support through WIPO Green to facilitate collaboration on environmentally sound technologies (ESTs) including what technologies are available for licensing, etc.

“5. One important initiative to accelerate the development and dissemination of ESTs is WIPO GREEN, a marketplace designed to connect providers and seekers of ESTs. All technologies listed in the online database of WIPO GREEN are available for license, collaboration, joint ventures, and sale. In addition to establishing a network of various partners, WIPO GREEN contains a database of IP experts, supports acceleration projects in different countries and produces briefs and seminars for various green tech areas. It is thus particularly valuable for MSMEs, given that it facilitates the diffusion of their technologies and provides information to technology providers and seekers in all countries.”

The communication from the WTO Members also includes information on the Technology Mechanism provided by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and provides information on classification of green technology patents by WIPO, the European Patent Office (EPO) and US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).

On national approaches Members can take, the communication focuses on actions the national patent office can take.

“12. There are several ways for IP offices to assist MSMEs in making the best use of IPRs.

“• IP offices can provide basic guidance and assistance on various IPR aspects. By preparing reader-friendly IP material, including patent and trademark basics, examination overviews, information on patent searching and resources on legal assistance that could be used by inventors and businesses in the green tech sector, individual questions and needs may be met.

“• IP offices may provide support in the form of assisting applicants with patent searches, landscape analyses and also facilitate free legal assistance.

“• Specifically with a view to promoting ESTs, IP offices could consider accelerated patent examination procedures for such green tech patent applications. This process shortens the time between application and grant, enabling MSMEs to attain financial support more quickly.

“• Customized workshops, seminars, or awards for the best green tech inventions may also help to make MSMEs that are involved in the green tech sector more aware of the benefits that the IP system may hold for them.”

The complete communication is embedded below.

W675-1

Conclusion

While there are presently limited environmental negotiations going on at the WTO (fisheries subsidies), the global race to address a warming world requires greater focus by WTO Members on the role trade can play to improve the global response. Restarting the environmental goods negotiations is one obvious area for negotiations. Addressing carbon leakage through national laws and international negotiations is another. Encouraging collaboration to spread green technology requires no negotiations but is a potentially important component in the global response. Hence the February 25 communication is a valuable contribution to increasing the global focus on how to address the challenges of a warming planet.