Honduras

Forced labor and child labor — a continued major distortion in international trade for some products

In recent years, the United States has paid more attention to the trade distortions flowing from forced labor and child labor in other countries, particularly in China. While there has been significant progress in the last twenty years in reducing forced labor and child labor globally according to the International Labor Organization (“ILO”), the COVID-19 pandemic has seen some retrenchment and efforts by China to address minorities in country have created an international backlash and concern.

The ILO webpage on forced labor reflects the global nature of the problem. The webpage states in part,

“Although forced labour is universally condemned, ILO estimates show that 24.9 million people around the world are still subjected toit. Of the total number of victims of forced labour, 20.8 million (83 per cent) are exploited in the private economy, by individuals or enterprises, and the remaining 4.1 million (17 per cent) are in State-imposed forms of forced labour. Among those exploited by private individuals or enterprises, 8 million (29 per cent) are victims of forced sexual exploitation and 12 million (64 per cent) of forced labour exploitation. Forced labour in the private economy generates some US$ 150 billion in illegal profits every year: two thirds of the estimated total (or US$ 99 billion) comes from commercial sexual exploitation, while another US$ 51 billion is a result from forced economic exploitation in domestic work, agriculture and other economic activities (Note 1).

“Vestiges of slavery are still found in some parts of Africa, while forced labour in the form of coercive recruitment is present in many countries of Latin America, in certain areas of the Caribbean and in other parts of the world. In numerous countries, domestic workers are trapped in situations of forced labour, and in many cases they are restrained from leaving the employers’ home through threats or violence. Bonded labour persists in South Asia, where millions of men, women and children are tied to their work through a vicious circle of debt. In Europe and North America, a considerable number of women and children are victims of traffickers, who sell them to networks of forced prostitution or clandestine sweat-shops. Finally, forced labour is still used as a punishment for expressing political views.

“For many governments around the world, the elimination of forced labour remains an important challenge in the 21st century. Not only is forced labour a serious violation of a fundamental human right, it is a leading cause of poverty and a hindrance to economic development. ILO standards on forced labour, associated with well-targeted technical assistance, are the main tools at the international level to combat this scourge.”

ILO, International Labour Standards on Forced labour, https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-standards/forced-labour/lang–en/index.htm. See also ILO and Walk Free, 2017, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery, Forced Labor and Forced Marriage, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_575479.pdf.

Child labor involves more people – an estimated 152 million of which 73 million are involved in hazardous work. See ILO, International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour and Forced Labour (IPEC+), https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/flagships/ipec-plus/lang–en/index.htm.

While the incidence of forced labor and child labor is declining, the COVID-19 pandemic has complicated trends as these populations are most vulnerable. See, e.g., ILO, The International Labour Organization
and the US Department of Labor partnership to eliminate child labour and forced labour, 2019, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@ipec/documents/publication/wcms_710971.pdf (“The ILO’s most recent global estimates of child labour indicate, however, that significant progress is
being made. From 2000 to 2016, there was a net reduction of 94 million children in child labour and
the number of children in hazardous work was halved. In parallel, the ILO Worst Forms of Child
Labour Convention (No. 182) was ratified by 186 countries, reaching almost universal ratification.
The challenges ahead, however, remain formidable: in 2016, 152 million girls and boys were in child
labour and 25 million men, women and children were trapped in forced labour.”); ILO, COVID-19 impact on
child labour and forced labour: The response of the IPEC+ Flagship Programme, 2020, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—ed_norm/—ipec/documents/publication/wcms_745287.pdf (“COVID-19 has plunged the world into a crisis of unprecedented scope and scale. Undoubtedly, restoring global health remains the first priority, but the strict measures required are resulting in massive economic and social shocks. As lockdown, quarantine, physical distancing and other isolation measures to suppress transmission continue, the global economy has plunged into a recession. The harmful effects of this pandemic will not be distributed equally. They are expected to be most damaging in the poorest countries and in the poorest neighbourhoods, and for those in already disadvantaged or vulnerable situations, such as
children in child labour and victims of forced labour and human trafficking, particularly women and girls.
These vulnerable groups are more affected by income shocks due to the lack of access to social protection,
including health insurance and unemployment benefits. * * * Experience from previous crisis situations, such as the 2014 Ebola epidemic, has shown that these factors play a particularly strong role in exacerbating the risk to child labour and forced labour.”).

In China, the government’s efforts to “reeducate” minority populations (e.g., Uyghurs from the western region of Xinjiang) has led to allegations of forced labor on a range of products and actions by the United States to restrict certain imports from China from the region. The Washington International Trade Association is holding a virtual webinar on January 27 looking at the challenges in China and the forced labor problem of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the resulting U.S. ban on cotton and tomato products. See WITA, WITA’s Friday Focus on Trade, Vol. 206, January 22, 2021 (containing various articles on the China forced labor issue and referencing the webinar on January 27, WITA Webinar: The U.S. Moves Against Forced Labor in Xinjiang).

The U.S. Department of Labor in September released its 2020 list of products believed to be produced in foreign countries with forced labor or with child labor. See USDOL, 2020 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, September 2020, https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/child_labor_reports/tda2019/2020_TVPRA_List_Online_Final.pdf. The report provides the following statement of purpose:

“The U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL or the Department) has produced this ninth edition of the List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor in accordance with the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), as amended. The TVPRA requires USDOL’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB or the Bureau) to “develop and make available to the public a list of goods from countries that
[ILAB] has reason to believe are produced by forced labor or child labor in violation of international standards” (TVPRA List or the List; 22 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(2)(C)). It also requires submission of the TVPRA List to the United States Congress not later than December 1, 2014, and every 2 years thereafter (22 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(3)).

“The Frederick Douglass Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection Reauthorization Act of 2018 expanded ILAB’s mandate to require the TVPRA List to include, ‘to the extent practicable, goods that are produced with inputs that are produced with forced labor or child labor’” (22 U.S.C. 7112(b)(2)(C)).

“The TVPRA directs ILAB ‘to work with persons who are involved in the production of goods on the list … to create a standard set of practices that will reduce the likelihood that such persons will produce goods using [child labor or forced labor],’ and ‘to consult with other departments and agencies of the United States Government to reduce forced and child labor internationally and ensure that products made by forced labor and child labor in violation of international standards are not imported into the United States’ (22 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(2)(D)–(E)).” (pages 1 and 3).

This year’s publication lists 77 countries that have one or more products believed to be produced with child labor, with forced labor or with both child and forced labor. Fourteen countries are listed as having products believed to be produced with forced labor. Thirty-six countries are listed as believed to produce products with child and forced labor. Sixty-four countries produce some products with child labor. The 77 countries are listed below along with whether products are believed produced with child labor, forced labor, or child labor & forced labor.

Afghanistan — child larbor; child labor & forced labor

Angola — child labor & forced labor

Argentina — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Azerbaijan — child labor

Bangladesh – child labor; child labor & forced labor

Belize — child labor

Benin — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Bolivia — child labor; forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Brazil — child labor; forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Burkina Faso — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Burma — child labor; forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Cambodia — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Cameroon — child labor

Central African Republic — child labor

Chad — child labor

China — forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Colombia — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Costa Rica — child labor

Cote d’Ivoire — child labor & forced labor

Democratic Republic of the Congo — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Dominican Republic — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Ecuador — child labor

Egypt — child labor

El Salvador — child labor

Eswatini — child labor

Ethiopia — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Ghana — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Guatemala — child labor

Guinea — child labor

Honduras — child labor

India — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Indonesia — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Iran — child labor

Kazakhstan — child labor & forced labor

Kenya — child labor

Kyrgyz Republic — child labor

Lebanon — child labor

Lesotho — child labor

Liberia — child labor

Madagascar — child labor

Malawi — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Malaysia — forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Mali — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Mauritania — child labor

Mexico — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Mongolia — child labor

Mozambique — child labor

Nepal — child labor & forced labor

Nicaragua — child labor

Niger — child labor; forced labor

Nigeria — child labor; child labor & forced labor

North Korea — forced labor

Pakistan — child labor; forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Panama — child labor

Paraguay — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Peru — child labor; forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Philippines — child labor

Russia — forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Rwanda — child labor

Senegal — child labor

Sierra Leone –child labor; child labor & forced labor

South Sudan — child labor & forced labor

Sudan — child labor

Suriname — child labor

Taiwan — forced labor

Tajikistan — child labor & forced labor

Tanzania — child labor

Thailand — child labor; forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Turkey — child labor

Turkmenistan — child labor & forced labor

Uganda — child labor

Ukraine — child labor

Uzbekistan — forced labor

Venezuela — forced labor

Vietnam — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Yemen — child labor

Zambia — child labor

Zimbabwe — child labor

While the number of products obviously vary by country and category, the report categorized agriculture as having 68 child labor listings and 29 forced labor listings. This compares to manufacturing with 39 child labor and 20 forced labor listings; mining showed 32 child labor and 13 forced labor listings and pornography showed one each.

Looking at specific products for individual countries provides the most information.

As an example, China is shown as having the following products believed to be produced with forced labor — Artificial Flowers, Christmas Decorations, Coal, Fish, Footwear, Garments, Gloves, Hair Products, Nails, Thread/Yarn, and Tomato Products. China is also shown as having the following products believed to be produced with child labor and forced labor — Bricks, Cotton, Electronics, Fireworks, Textiles, and Toys. As a USDOL separate post notes, gloves, hair products, textiles, thread/yarn and tomato products were added in 2020 because of research on the forced labor situation in Xinjiang. See USDOL, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Against Their Will: The Situation in Xinjiang, Forced Labor in Xinjiang, 2020, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/against-their-will-the-situation-in-xinjiang. The document is embedded below.

Against-Their-Will_-The-Situation-in-Xinjiang-_-U.S.-Department-of-Labor

Looking at India, products believed to be produced with child labor include the following — Bidis (hand-rolled
cigarettes), Brassware, Cotton, Fireworks, Footwear, Gems, Glass Bangles, Incense (agarbatti), Leather Goods/
Accessories, Locks, Matches, Mica, Silk Fabric, Silk Thread, Soccer Balls, Sugarcane, Thread/Yarn. Products believed produced with child labor & forced labor include the following — Bricks, Carpets, Cottonseed (hybrid), Embellished Textiles, Garments, Rice, Sandstone, Stones.

While the USDOL reports don’t estimate the portion of exports from any country of individual products that are produced with child and/or forced labor, the trade consequences can be significant as such labor is artificially valued creating distortions in competitiveness and resulting trade flows. For example, the list of products for China are either important export products for China or important inputs into exported products. The same would true for India and for many other of the 77 countries on the list.

Conclusion

The U.S. has in place statutory provisions which permit the exclusion from entry into the United states of products produced with forced labor. The Trump Administration did a somewhat better job enforcing U.S. law on imports of products produced with child or forced labor. Much more can be done and should be done domestically.

Similarly, the ILO is working to eliminate forced labor and child labor consistent with UN Sustainable Development Goals. “The objective of the IPEC+ Global Flagship Programme – in line with Target 8.7 of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, adopted by the United Nations in 2015 – is to provide ILO leadership in global efforts to eradicate all forms of child labour by 2025 and all forms of contemporary slavery and human trafficking by 2030. It also aims to ensure that all people are protected from – and can protect themselves against – these gross human rights violations.” ILO, IPEC+ Global Flagship Programme Implementation, Towards a world free from child labour and forced labour, page 4, 2020, https://respect.international/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/wcms_633435.pdf.

The WTO could play a role in the fight against forced labor and child labor. Such labor practices distort global trade flows in addition to the challenges created for countries engaged in such practices in terms of poverty and human rights abuses. The WTO could gather information from Members on the volume of production and exports of products produced with child and forced labor both as finished products and as inputs into other products. Such an exercise would facilitate an understanding of the extent of global trade represented by such products and help focus attention on trade actions that could be taken to help Members eliminate such harmful practices. While it is unlikely that Members will agree to such a data gathering undertaking, one is surely needed and would add transparency to a source of an important global issue with trade as well as non-trade dimensions.

Informal Heads of Delegation Meeting at WTO confirms Nigerian and Korean candidates advance to third (final) round of consultations in selection of next Director-General

This morning’s 11 a.m. informal heads of delegation meeting in Geneva saw Ambassadors David Walker (New Zealand), Dacio Castillo (Honduras) and Harald Aspelund (Iceland) communicate the results of the second round of consultations with WTO Members to the membership. Pursuant to the procedures adopted in 2002 for the selection of the Director-General, the Chair of the General Council together with the Chairs of the Dispute Settlement Body and Trade Policy Review Body (the “troika”) consult with each Member of the WTO to receive their preferences in successive rounds of consultations. In the second round, each Member was asked to provide two of five remaining candidates as the Member’s preferences.

As leaked yesterday, the two candidates who advance to the third round of consultations are Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala of Nigeria and Minister Yoo Myung-hee of the Republic of Korea. The selection of these two candidates was based “on the depth and breadth of preferences articulated” by Members to the troika. “The result creates an historic precedent for the WTO in that it assures that the 7th Director-General will become the first woman to lead the organization.”

The WTO press release from today (October 8) from which all quotes are taken, “WTO members narrow field of DG candidates,” can be found here, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/dgsel_08oct20_e.htm.

“During the DG selection processes of 2005 and 2013, breadth of support was defined as ‘the distribution of preferences across geographic regions and among the categories of members generally recognized in WTO provisions: that is (least developed countries), developing countries and developed countries.’ The Chair said he and his colleagues were guided by the practices established in these General Council proceedings and he further explained that the decisions made clear that ‘breadth of support means the larger membership’.”

The three candidates not advancing are Amb. Amina C. Mohamed of Kenya, Mr. Mohammed Moziad Al-Tuwaijri of Saudi Arabia and Dr. Liam Fox of the United Kingdom. Amb. Walker (Chair of the General Council) said “On behalf of the entire membership, I would like to express deep gratitude for their participation in this selection process. It was clear that members consider them individuals of outstanding qualifications. I am sure you will all agree with us that in participating in the selection process, the candidates have all made a significant contribution to the standing and image of the WTO.”

The third round of consultations will start October 19 and end on October 27. There will be another informal heads of delegation meeting so that Amb. Walker and his facilitators can present the results of the third round of consultations, probably on Thursday, October 29.

The Chair of the General Council will then call a General Council meeting before November 7 to present their recommendation of the candidate most likely to obtain consensus. If Members agree, that candidate becomes the next Director-General. If there is a lack of consensus, the 2002 procedures provide for the possibility of a vote.

As reviewed in my post yesterday, the two candidates who are advancing have significantly different backgrounds presenting Members with an interesting choice. See October 7, 2020, Nigerian and Korean candidates advance to final round of consultations to become next WTO Director-General, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/10/07/nigerian-and-korean-candidates-advance-to-final-round-of-consultations-to-become-next-wto-director-general/.

While politics obviously has a role in the selection process, both candidates bring high-level government experience and an ability to work with various levels of government officials from many countries. Minister Yoo touted the fact that Korea has gone through significant economic development during her lifetime and so she has seen the needs of her country at various stages of economic development which would help her understand the needs of all WTO Members. She has also engaged in negotiations with many of the major WTO Members, including the U.S. and China. Dr. Okonjo-Iweala is a development economist and has expressed an interest in various issues where working with other international organizations would be important to ensure participation by all WTO members in WTO issues (e.g., addressing the digital divide which prevents many developing and least developed countries from engaging on e-commerce; ensuring access by all Members to vaccines and therapeutics to address the COVID-19 pandemic).

While the process of selecting a new Director-General is cumbersome, it was developed after the challenges in 1999 when no consensus was reached on a single candidate to give a greater likelihood of Members reaching a consensus on candidates put forward. The procedures worked in 2005 and in 2013 and appear to be working this year.

Thoughts on the Geneva Trade Week session entitled “WTO Dispute Settlement – Where Do We Stand?”

The Graduate Institute of Geneva and other groups have organized an ambitious week of programs that started on September 28 and carries on through October 2 with both various plenary sessions and with breakout sessions where multiple events are happening during the same time period.

On Monday, September 28, after an opening plenary on rethinking trade at 1 p.m., there were three ninety minute breakout sessions at 3:00 p.m., including a session on WTO Dispute Settlement – Where Do We Stand? The dispute settlement session was organized by Gabrielle Marceau of the WTO Secretariat and the University of Geneva. The current Chair of the Dispute Settlement Body, H.E. Dacio Castillo of Honduras served as moderator of a panel that included five other Ambassadors/Permanent Representatives to the WTO and two highly respected international trade professionals. Specifically, the panel consisted of EU Ambassador Joao Aguiar Machado, Canadian Ambassador Stephen de Boer, U.S. Ambassador Dennis Shea, Mexican Ambassador Angel Villalobos Rodriguez and Chinese Ambassador Zhang Xiangchen. Ms. Claudia Orozco who had been part of the Colombia Mission, the most frequently selected panelists in WTO disputes and now an arbitrator in the MPIA (Multi-Party Interim Arbitration Arrangement to which 24 WTO Members have signed up pending the resolution of the WTO impasse) was a sixth panelist. Mr. Jorge Miranda, a Senior International Trade Adviser for Cassidy Levy Kent LLP in Washington, D.C., a past Rules Division official and a frequent writer and speaker on WTO dispute settlement was the seventh panelist.

It was an impressive panel with certain understandable limitations. WTO Members at a public event like this will provide a good overview of their existing positions on the topic but are not going to provide clarity of where solutions may be if different from what has been presented previously by their government. Not surprisingly, none of the Ambassadors deviated from that expected framework of comments. Similarly, the observations of panelists who are not speaking for WTO Members can be helpful in identifying possible paths forward but obviously only if Members opt to proceed in one or more of the suggested routes.

I start this post by looking at the positions stated by each panelist in their opening statement, their comments about other statements and their answers to questions. I then present some observations about the positions taken and whether Members are merely talking past each other or testing their priorities against the practical realities that surround the WTO dispute settlement system.

Opening Statements

H.E. Stephen de Boer, Canada

The first panelist to speak was Ambassador de Boer of Canada. He identified three themes to his comments: (1) the key role played by the dispute settlement system in the WTO; (2) the importance of the Appellate Body (AB) in that system; and (3) the role of the Multi Party Interim Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) at the current time.

Amb. de Boer reviewed the elements of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) adopted as part of the Uruguay Round package that came into force in 1995 when the WTO commenced. The DSU provided for binding dispute settlement absent a negative consensus. This was a major improvement over the GATT dispute settlement approach where the losing party could block adoption of a panel decision. Canada is a very strong supporter of the rule of law. Amb. de Boer commented that it is not surprising that panels may err. The two-tier dispute settlement process is designed to address possible erroneous panel interpretations by appeal to the Appellate Body.

At the present time, the lack of a functioning Appellate Body makes the WTO system more uncertain. First, a party or parties unhappy with a panel decision can file an appeal which, with the AB not having three members, means the appeal is into a void where no outcome is possible until the restoration of the AB. If one is left with just panel decisions, there is a higher risk of erroneous decisions which in turn makes the system more uncertain for business. In Canada’s view, the fact that a Member may disagree with specific decisions is not a reason to undermine the dispute settlement system. As the saying goes, justice delayed is justice denied. Hence timeliness of the dispute settlement system is important.

On timeliness, Canada would note that much more of the delay in disputes is at the panel stage. Delays flow from increased complexity of case. Canada believes that dispute settlement reform needs to include a review of timeliness of both panels and the AB.

Canada’s priority is to find multilateral solutions to the dispute settlement system which would of course include the United States.

Canada was pleased to participate in the creation of the MPIA, which now has 24 Member participants.

H.E. Joao Aguiar Machado, European Union

Amb. Machado started by noting that the WTO’s dispute settlement system is not in a good place and is essentially paralyzed. While all Members do not agree on how we got here, we need to agree on where we go from here.

The top priority for the EU is to find a solution to the impasse. The EU supported the Walker proposal (Amb. David Walker, NZ, serving as a facilitator to the General Council in 2019). It proved not to be sufficient. The EU is open to meaningful reform. However, Members need to move forward not backwards in terms of the type of reform considered.

It is important that agreed rules of the WTO are enforceable. This is critical for predictability and certainty in the system.

For the EU, any reformed dispute settlement system must be binding, two-tiered, and guarantee impartiality of adjudicators.

The EU agrees that panels and the Appellate Body are not courts and that panelists and AB members are not judges. It is the role of WTO Members, not adjudicators, to establish new rules.

On the MPIA, it is the intent of the 24 Members participating to establish an interim mechanism to preserve a second-tier dispute settlement step while the AB is inoperable. The MPIA is open to the participation of all Members, is temporary in nature and is not an attempt at reform of the WTO AB which would require involvement of all Members. However, there are enhancements including the use of a pool of arbitrators.

H.E. Dennis Shea, United States

Amb. Shea reviewed that there is little doubt where the United States stands on the dispute settlement system. Over three years in Dispute Settlement Body meetings, the U.S. has reviewed how the Appellate Body has violated the DSU both procedurally and substantively. Then USTR in February of this year put out a 174 page report on the Appellate Body of the WTO [https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Report_on_the_Appellate_Body_of_the_World_Trade_Organization.pdf] which pulled the U.S. concerns together in a single document.

The U.S. was very active in the Walker process in 2019. Unfortunately, very little of what the U.S. offered in comments on the draft proposal was taken on board in what was presented to the General Council. The U.S. has raised questions about the utility of the proposals since much of the language put forward was simply a repetition of what is already in the DSU which has been disregarded by the AB. We don’t have answers to why the AB disregarded the specific DSU language limiting the role of the AB or why it felt free to disregard the limits on its authority.

The AB is not an international court, and AB members are not judges. Role of the AB is not to create a body of jurisprudence but rather simply to make recommendations to help the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) resolve a given dispute. The AB’s role is limited.

Unfortunately, some Members see the AB as an independent international court and the AB members as judges who have the ability to create jurisprudence.

On the MPIA entered into by Canada, the EU, China and others, they have incorporated into an arbitration process some of the worst aspects of the AB practices including awards that are precedential, arbitrators engaging in fact finding and more.

The U.S. fundamentally differs on the role of the Appellate Body from that approach and from the approach of those viewing the AB as a type of court.

In a recent Wall Street Journal piece by USTR Robert Lighthizer, he proposed a single-stage dispute process similar to commercial arbitration with a process to put aside erroneous decisions. What do other panelists think of that approach?

In the meantime, the WTO dispute settlement system continues to function. There have been eight panel requests made in the last five DSB meetings. Parties are considering how to handle panel reports, such as by agreeing not to appeal panel reports. The central objective of the dispute settlement system remains the same — to resolve a dispute between Members.

H.E. Angel Villalobos Rodriguez, Mexico

Amb. Villalobos’s comments were short and quite dispirited. He indicated that he was not optimistic for the future of the WTO dispute settlement system based on Amb. Shea’s comments. Amb. Villalobos feels that the dispute settlement system has become a “zombie”.

In talking about efforts in 2019 to address U.S. concerns with the Appellate Body, Amb. Villalobos noted that a large number of Members had come forward with proposals to deal with various aspects of U.S. concerns and that had resulted in the Walker proposal in late 2019 to the General Council which the U.S. had prevented from being adopted to address a range of U.S. concerns.

The impasse on the Appellate Body has led many countries including Mexico to come together in the MPIA. But the MPIA is intended to be temporary only.

Amb. Villalobos believes the WTO will have a more difficult road in the future to restore the two-tiered dispute settlement system.

While the dispute settlement system has been viewed by many as the crown jewel of the WTO, the present situation may be the beginning of the end for the crown jewel.

H.E. Zhang Xiangchen, China

Amb. Zhang views the Appellate Body and the WTO’s dispute settlement system as being on shaky ground. He is not optimistic that Members can reach agreement on substantive issues. However, that doesn’t mean that Members can’t work at improving the system.

When he looks at some of the concerns raised, such as issuing reports/decisions in 90 days, the problem is not entirely the fault of the Appellate Body. There have been a large number of appeals, many more than was envisioned when the WTO was created. Appeals are much more complicated. Thus, Members share some of the “blame”.

Is overreach a problem? Yes for many countries including China. Amb. Zhang cited the cases involving export duties where the Appellate Body viewed China did not have the right to put forward Art. XX defenses. In his view, Amb. Zhang believes that all negotiators know that there are ambiguous provisions in many agreements. These ambiguities have to be addressed in appeals and obviously are problems for the AB.

No matter how serious problems may be with the Appellate Body, the AB has solved many problems for parties which have improved certainty and predictability.

Going back to the system as it was in the 1990s would be problematic as rules will have no enforcement teeth. This lack of enforceability will hurt negotiations going forward.

Ms. Claudia Orozco, International Trade Law Advisor and Arbitrator for MPIA

Ms. Orozco believes that there is a serious crisis, not of the Appellate Body only, but of the dispute settlement system at the WTO and therefore of the rule of law.

The WTO dispute settlement system is intended to ensure that commitments under WTO Agreements are binding on all parties and that disputes are resolved by third party adjudicators.

The current challenges around the Appellate Body are a serious risk to the dispute settlement system and is leading to reduced use of the dispute settlment system.

A second consequence is likely to be erosion of the monitoring function within the WTO if Members can’t resolve the Appellate Body issues. The purpose of monitoring is to understand actions of trading partners. Greater information on actions can result in disputes if problems can’t otherwise be resolved. Where there is no binding dispute settlement system, Members will likely be less focused on notifications.

The third consequence of the AB impasse will be the erosion of the negotiating function, as there will less interest in new rules if they cannot be enforced.

In short, the impasse if not resolved, will affect the credibility and relevance of the WTO.

Are there solutions? Ms. Orozco believes Members need to look at the history of the WTO over the last twenty-five years. In her view, the AB’s role needs to be narrowed down as 25 years of history show that panels typically don’t make major errors of interpretation which was the intended function of the AB. Thus, questions for Members should include:

— how to narrow the focus of the AB;

— what changes are needed to permit the AB to meet the 90 day deadline;

— based on problems in the first 25 years, what type of experience should AB members have (e.g., experience with disputes in the WTO; experience in implementation of agreements);

–should more than three members of the AB participate in appeals where issues are of first impression;

–what is the role of the AB Secretariat vs. the role of AB members (e.g., should there be rotation of AB Secretariat staff).

The WTO dispute settlement system is critical to commercial players where predictability and certainty are key. Lack of predictability and certainty harm willingness to invest and to trade.

Mr. Jorge Miranda, Senior International Trade Adviser, Cassidy Levy Kent LLP

Mr. Miranda stated that the Appellate Body has made some outstanding achievements but has made major errors in the trade remedy area. The errors coupled with the AB refusal to reconsider legal issues. Without a change in approach, it is hard to see progress.

Mr. Miranda’s comments reflect his views as a co-author in a paper [Jorge Mirand and Manuel Sanchez-Miranda, “How the WTO Appellate Body Drove Itself Into a Corner,” https:ssrn.com/abstract=3596217].

Mr. Miranda reviewed two of the five cases reviewed in the paper showing the serious errors by the Appellate. The first was the fasteners case [European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R, adopted 28 July 2011] where the AB addressed an issue that was not part of the terms of reference and had not been briefed by the parties. This was a major problem as the issue addressed would potentially be subject to a dispute at the WTO.

A second case was a subsidy case and involved the interpretation of the term “public body” [United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 25 March 2011]. Mr. Miranda’s comments focused on the fact that most public bodies in the context of countervailing duty investigations are commercial enterprises. The AB’s decision requires the existence of governmental powers to regulate, control or supervise, but ignored the entrepreneurial functions mentioned in the Subsidies and Countervailing Measure Agreement (Art. 1.1(a)(1)) where no other authority is required.

While Mr. Miranda recognizes the fact that all adjudicators can err, the problem with the WTO AB is its inflexibility and refusal to reconsider interpretations in later cases regardless of arguments put forward.

Mr. Miranda reviews the U.S. system of stare decisis and ability of court’s to reconsider prior decisions in certain circumstances. He also reviews the Mexican system where there need to be multiple decisions on the same issue before there is precedent.

By contrast, the Appellate Body views its interpretation as cast in stone at the first decision. He believes the AB needs to be more flexible in how it views prior decisions/interpretations.

Reactions to Opening Statements of Other Panelists

H.E. Joao Aguiar Machado, European Union

Amb. Machado reiterated the EU view that the AB is not a court. The EU view is that it is in the interest of the WTO membership that rulings are of high quality and that the rulings have consequences. Thus, to the EU, it is important to have a two-tier dispute settlement system so parties can address legal errors in any panel report. The EU is open to discuss how best to get a two-tier system back.

Amb. Machado believes that it is unfair to claim that the MPIA incorporates the worst elements of the AB. The MPIA results in arbitration decisions. The MPIA is not an attempt to create AB reform. Since the MPIA is an interim arbitration process while awaiting the return of the AB, it is understandable that the parties to the MPIA drew on the AB, which is the only second-tier system that has existed over the last 25 years. While the MPIA parties have introduced efficiencies in how MPIA operates, this is not an attempt to reform the AB as any reform would need all Members.

At end of the day, the EU needs a system that is efficient, binding, independent and of the highest quality.

H.E. Angel Villalobos Rodriguez, Mexico

Amb. Villalobos sees fragmentation of approach facing the WTO dispute settlement system — the MPIA for some; other approaches for others. The fragmentation may last a long time. If so, such fragmentation will weaken the appetite to negotiate, and the increased uncertainty and unpredictability will weaken investment and trade.

Amb. Villalobos noted that a large percentage of disputes are resolved at the consultation stage and that a sizeable portion of cases that do go forward to the panel stage are resolved without appeal.

There are typically not good alternatives for Members to WTO dispute settlement. Regional trade agreements often don’t have dispute settlement on trade remedies (though USMCA between the U.S., Mexico and Canada does) and typically don’t have strong Secretariats.

H.E. Zhang Xiangchen, China

Amb. Zhang noted that the paralysis of the AB is a major challenge to the trading system. Binding rulings from impartial adjudicators are important for predictability and certainty. Regional free trade agreements and any dispute settlement contained therein cannot replace the WTO.

In looking at the path forward, the accountability of the AB can be addressed through peer review and oversight by the WTO Members.

Mr. Jorge Miranda, Senior International Trade Adviser, Cassidy Levy Kent LLP

Regional agreements can’t compete with the WTO dispute settlement system. None have an Appellate Body.

The fact that there are problems with the WTO dispute settlement system, in Mr. Miranda’s opinion, is not a major issue.

On the issue of oversight, there should be a way to address without affecting the independence and impartiality of the AB.

H.E. Stephen de Boer, Canada

It is important to go back to first principles. Members placed great importance on certainty. Fact that any Member believes it didn’t get the right result in a given dispute is not a basis to abandon the system. In a November 2016 statement by then Chairman of the Appellate Body, Thomas Graham, he noted that overreach is in the eye of the beholder. [Thomas Graham, 22 November 2016, Speaking Up: The State of the Appellate Body, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/ab_22nov16_e.pdf%5D. The dispute settlement system is different than individual disputes or cases.

The fact that there continue to be some disputes filed is not a sign that the system is well. The impasse will have an effect on negotiations.

Canada is willing to talk about change but needs an effective and enforceable system.

Ms. Claida Orzco, International Trade Law Advisor and MPIA Arbitrator

There is agreement that the crisis is very problematic. We must remember that everything the WTO does is for the private sector which needs certainty and predictability.

It is important to solve the problem. That includes looking at how to achieve decisions within 90 days, limiting the role of the AB to focus on issues relevant to a dispute’s resolution, identifying the relevant the credentials for AB Members.

As the AB was created to correct manifest errors in legal interpretations, history over the last 25 years shows that is not a significant problem. This implies, Members can reduce the role of the AB.

H.E. Dennis Shea, United States

The WTO membership needs to understand that there is a problem with the operation of the dispute settlement system. Efforts of the U.S. over the last three years has finally gotten a recognition by many that there are problems. So that is some progress.

Some Members view the role of the AB as that of a court with the ability to establish rules. The U.S. does not view the AB as a court and views rule making as the sole responsibility of the WTO Members.

While Canada has talked about the need for certainty, the U.S. views certainty as the AB completing its work in 90 days, not investigating facts, and not creating obligations.

While some view the current situation as undermining the ability to negotiate, the United States has viewed the operation of the Appellate Body as leading Members to litigate rather than negotiate.

On the issue of precedent, in 1996, the AB indicated its decisions were not precedential. Twelve years later in 2008, it viewed its decisions as precedential absent cogent reasons.

The U.S. disagrees that the AB is a higher source in dispute settlement. The AB has a limited role only.

In 2020, Thomas Graham gave his farewell speech as an Appellate Body member at Georgetown and listed areas where in his experience the Appellate Body was acting like a court. [see https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wto.org%2Fenglish%2Ftratop_e%2Fdispu_e%2Ffarwellspeechtgaham_e.htm&data=02%7C01%7C%7C892aebd466894f3d774908d86571205c%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C637370883824924668&sdata=QPkC0ep1OHLIwTtUPpDgTAWV9cfx%2FoDB812iMg%2FrTKk%3D&reserved=0]

Answers to Questions

H.E. Joao Aguiar Machado, European Union

In responding to a question about why a two-tier system of dispute settlement is necessary since other organizations make due with a single tier, Amb. Machado stated that a two-tier system of dispute settlement is important in the WTO since disputes are often dealing with national legislation. The second level of review is needed to review potential errors of law, so Members can go back to their legislatures for domestic changes to bring themselves into compliance with WTO obligations.

In looking at the length of time to resolve disputes, Amb. Machado noted that disputes have become very complex which has contributed to the delays. Members need to take some responsibility to reduce the number of issues in appeals versus the historic approach.

While the EU will discuss reforms, the EU will not agree to have the dispute settlement go back to the GATT system.

H.E. Angel Villalobos Rodriguez, Mexico

Amb. Villalobos responded to a question on likely effect of the current impasse by stating that with no Appellate Body, the appetite of Members for new rules will be reduced.

H.E. Stephen de Boer, Canada

Amb. de Boer indicated that Canada doesn’t view the AB as a court or members as judges.

Canada believes any reforms to the dispute settlement system can only look forward; specifically, reforms of the dispute settlement system can’t look at past decisions.

Amb. de Boer reiterated his opening statement point that delay in the dispute settlement system is not limited to the AB process and so reform should look at the entire dispute settlement system to ensure timely reports and decisions.

Looking at USTR Liighthizer’s Wall Street Journal article, Amb. de Boer stated that it appears to be the first expression of what U.S. wants. Going back to the GATT system seems to be Amb. Lighthizer’s objective.

H.E. Zhang Xiangchen, China

Amb. Zhang stated that a two-tiered system of dispute settlement was adopted in the Uruguay Round as a response to problems with the GATT system of resolving disputes. Amb. Zhang indicated that 90% of Members believe the WTO needs a two-tier system for disputes.

On the question of the recent panel decision on U.S. tariffs imposed on China pursuant to a section 301 investigation, China agrees with the panel report that the U.S. actions violated MFN obligations. China urges the U.S. to bring its actions into conformance with its obligations.

H.E. Dennis Shea, United States

In response to an inquiry about why Members would negotiate new rules where enforcement is not guaranteed, Amb. Shea noted that the U.S. (and many other Members) are actively engaged in negotiations, whether multilateral (fisheries subsidies) or plurilateral (e-commerce). Thus, it is possible for negotiations for new rules to proceed in the current circumstances.

Ms. Claudia Orozco, International Trade Law Advisor and MPIA Arbitrator

Ms. Orozco noted that the concern if rules are not enforceable is that there would be less interest in negotiating new rules. Her hope was that that concern would not materialize.

On a question about the Secretariat, Ms. Orozco noted that some reforms, like rotation of personnel at senior position, time limits for Secretariat personnel might be useful as in the past the head of the AB Secretariat had served longer than any AB member. The WTO also needs oversight of the AB by Members and some form of response where a problem arises and repeats itself (e.g. repeated failure to complete reports in 90 days).

Mr. Jorge Miranda, Senior International Trade Adviser, Cassidy Levy Kent LLP

Mr. Miranda took the view that any type of adjudicatory system would have the adjudicators looking back at what they had done previously. Key, in his view, is to have more flexibility than the AB has shown as to relevance of prior decisions.

Observations

As an outside observer, I provide some comments for what they are worth.

  1. While stating that they don’t view the AB as a court or AB members as judges, the EU and Canada do not identify how that point of agreement with the United States translates into a view of AB reports. If not a court, presumably the AB is not to create law or rules. Yet that is what the AB has repeatedly done. Should the prior reports of the AB have any value? Any value other than their pursuasiveness would seem inappropriate.

2. Wouldn’t the issue of overreach be addressed in part by clarifying what is meant by creating rights or obligations? For example, many of the overreach issues of concern to the U.S. (and possibly others) flow from gap filling, construing silence or adopting a single interpretation on ambiguous language. Clarifying the language in DSU 3.2 and 19.2 to indicate that examples of creating rights or obligations would include gap filling, construing silence or providing a single interpretation of ambiguous language would thus increase certainty and predictability and leave rulemaking to the WTO Members as intended.

3. Ms. Orozco stated that the AB role should be reduced as typically panels have not made manifest errors in legal interpretation based on a review of the first twenty-five years of decision. The AB was done at the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations and was largely a safeguard against wildly erroneous decisions by a panel if adoption of reports was to be automatic. Does the experience of the first 25 years reduce the need for a two-tier system? Reasons for wanting a two-tier system going forward include automaticity of adoption, independence of adjudicator, opportunity to correct errors from a panel report. But automaticity need not be tied to having a two-tier system. Particularly where purpose of dispute settlement is to help find a resolution to the dispute between parties versus an effort to create law through “clarifying” agreements, a single level could be made automatic. There is nothing about a single level of dispute settlement that doesn’t permit independence (whether panels are staffed as they are now or through a different approach as has been suggested by some). Even the opportunities to correct errors could be addressable in a single-tier if there were a process (such as suggested by USTR Lighthizer) for addressing erroneous decisions.

4. Both Canada and the European Union talk about any reform process as being forward looking only and not addressing the harm caused by the long history of AB deviation from obligations. Since the entire purpose of the dispute settlement system is to resolve disputes to permit a restoration of rights and obligations of Members, the notion that a system which has changed the rights and obligations of Members over 25 years cannot be addressed as part of reform is at least bizarre. There is no question that it is easier to simply adopt changes to the DSU and move forward but that basically legitimizes a wide range of erroneous decisions which have significantly changed the balance of rights and obligations for many Members. While the challenge of finding a path to address the past as part of the reform is real, there are undoubtedly ways to do so. I had suggested one approach in a prior post. See July 12, 2020, WTO Appellate Body reform – revisiting thoughts on how to address U.S. concerns, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/07/12/wtos-appellate-body-reform-revisiting-thoughts-on-how-to-address-u-s-concerns/.

5. The concern about wrongly decided Appellate Body reports is real and not really addressed by most of the panelists. Amb. Lighthizer in his Wall Street Journal piece has a proposal which would change the system to one-tier resembling commercial arbitration and with an ability of Members to correct erroneous decisions. This proposal may reflect U.S. concerns that other WTO Members haven’t meaningfully addressed the problem of erroneous AB decisions (whether overreach or faulty legal analysis). See August 24, 2020:  USTR Lighthizer’s Op Ed in the Wall Street Journal – How to Set World Trade Straight, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/08/24/ustr-lighthizers-op-ed-in-the-wall-street-journal-how-to-set-world-trade-straight/. If one looks at Mr. Miranda’s paper, there is little doubt that there are decisions from the AB that are pretty clearly wrongly decided. Efforts in the AB reform process to confirm that there are no precedents doesn’t move the ball very far where prior decisions remain as a body for review without means to get the AB to recognize its mistakes in subsequent cases, for the WTO Membership to correct the AB or through other means.

6. The concept that the current situation will adversely affect willingness of Members to negotiate is interesting particularly when juxtaposed with the last twenty-five years of very limited success in negotiations at the WTO. So while there may be some merit in the concern (which is a supposition at this point), it is hard to imagine a less productive negotiating function than what has existed with a functioning dispute settlement system over the last 25 years. The U.S. view that the current system and willingness of the AB to create rights that can’t be found in the agreements is factually the more compelling. I have travelled to Geneva over the last thirty years and have been told in private by virtually every major WTO Member that they know there are issues that before the WTO they would have teed up for negotiations, but because of the activity of the AB, they chose to see if they could get through dispute settlement even though knowing their trading partners had never agreed to what was being sought. So in my mind, there is no doubt that a major contributor to the dysfunction of the negotiating function at the WTO has been the willingness of the Appellate Body to create rights and obligations that cannot be found in the Agreements that sovereign states agreed to.

7. On the MPIA, while there is understanding by all Members that the MPIA is intended to be temporary, there is little doubt that the MPIA includes aspects of the AB that the U.S. has viewed as very problematic. While the EU professes that there is no effort at reform in the MPIA, the MPIA includes aspects that the EU may want as reforms to the dispute settlement system. Finally, other Members have found other approaches to handle disputes in an era when the AB is not functioning. While that is not true for all disputes, the Members choosing to appeal into a void include the EU, a participant of MPIA, on a panel decision adverse to its interests brought by the Russian Federation. See August 29, 2020,  WTO Dispute Settlement Body meeting of August 28, 2020 – how disputes are being handled in the absence of reform of the Appellate Body, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/08/29/wto-dispute-settlement-body-meeting-of-july-28-2020-how-disputes-are-being-handled-in-the-absence-of-reform-of-the-appellate-body/.

Conclusion

The program on WTO Dispute Settlement – where do we stand? was an interesting update from a number of the major WTO Members, the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body and two well respected private sector advisers.

While all seem to recognize that the United States has serious concerns that it has articulated for decades but has spelled out in detail in the last three years, there has been little movement on the substantive issues during the last fifteen months. The gap between having a binding system that resolves disputes between parties but doesn’t create jurisprudence and a binding system that creates jurisprudence is wide. While many talk the talk that the Appellate Body is not a court and its members are not judges, there hasn’t been an apparent active effort to translate that into a framework to compare with the U.S. view of the role of the system.

Without a willingness to actually have the Appellate Body serve the very limited role for which it was created, the future for the WTO dispute settlement system will likely look like the hodgepodge of approaches that are presently in play.

Food security and COVID-19 — how World Trade Organization Members could fill a pressing need

In 2020 as the world has been dealing with the health and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, the World Trade Organization has focused attention on keeping markets open by urging Members to provide notifications of trade restrictive and trade liberalizing measures taken not just on medical goods but also on agricultural products. The G20 countries and various groups of WTO Members have made commitments to impose restrictions only under limited circumstances and only temporarily, consistent with WTO obligations. Some Members have urged countries to agree not to impose export restraints on agricultural goods to limit worsening challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic. On agricultural export restrictions, a number of countries have applied some restrictions despite information that global food supplies are sufficient which should make restrictions unnecessary. The attention paid to the issue by the WTO and its Members have limited the number of countries engaged in agricultural export restraints which is a positive development.

With the steps many countries have taken to limit the spread of the COVID-19, there has been enormous economic pain incurred by most countires, with tens of millions of people in countries temporarily unemployed, schools closed, food distribution disrupted with the closure of restaurants which constitute a large part of food shipped from processing plants and farms.

The UN, World Bank and others have projected huge increases in the number of people pushed into extreme poverty because of the effects flowing from the pandemic. Extreme poverty brings with it food security issues as people suffering extreme poverty don’t have the means to procure basic food needs.

The United Nation’s World Food Programme (WFP) has long been involved in helping address food security needs around the world. In the COVID-19 pandemic, the WFP is mobilizing to provide assistance to some 138 million people in 83 countries. With most countries occupied with dealing with the needs of their own populations, countries and private citizens have been slow to respond to the humanitarian challenges facing so many around the world. The WFP has appealed for US$4.9 billion to let them perform their stepped up function during COVID-19 through the end of 2020. As of August 6, they had received only 9 percent of what they need, $US440 million.

The WFP during the pandemic has been involved in facilitating services by many NGOs and international organizations. For example, “Over 16,500 health and humanitarian personnel from 288 organizations have now been transported to destinations throughout Africa, Asia, the Middle East and the Commonwealth of Independent States countries by WFP’s air passenger service since its launch on 1 May. 53 destinations are now being served, with approximately 2,500 passengers using WFP’s service per week.” WFP, COVID-19, Level 3 Emergency, External Situation Report #12 (6 August 2020)(emphasis in original). The latest situation report is embedded below and reviews the wide array of services provided as well a review of some of the countries with acute needs. It also provides a link to contribute to the WFP.

WFP-0000118265

The External Situation Report indicates that there are 27 countries (based on an FAO-WFP hotspot analysis) which “are at risk of significant food security deterioration in the next six months”. (page 2). Countries at risk are Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Haiti, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Burkina Faso, Mali, the Niger, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Sudan, South Sudan, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Yemen, Ethiopia, Iraq, Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan and Bangladesh (total is 31, though Peru, Ecuador, Colombia appear to be at a lower level of risk based on coloration used on page 2). FAO – WFP early warning analsyis of acute food insecurity hotspots, https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000117706/download/.

Where is the food aid?

For many countries, agricultural production has remained reasonably strong but large volumes of agricultural products have been destroyed based on lack of domestic markets, typically flowing from the collapse of the restaurant trade and the challenges in redirecting product, packaging and labeling into retail channels. See, e.g., New York Times, April 11, 2020, Dumped Milk, Smashed Eggs, Plowed Vegetables: Food Waste of the Pandemic, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/business/coronavirus-destroying-food.html.

At the same time, there have been huge increases in internal-country demand for help from food banks in some countries. See, e.g., for the United States: Feeding America, The first months of the food bank response to COVID, by the numbers, https://www.feedingamerica.org/hunger-blog/first-months-food-bank-response-covid-numbers.

It would seem that coordinated action by major agricultural goods producers in the WTO with the WFP and other groups should be able to provide large quantities of agricultural goods to those in need globally in the remaining months of 2020, goods which might otherwise simply be destroyed.

Similarly, while all countries are financially stretched during the pandemic, helping WFP obtain the needed financial resources to provide a coordinated pledging event should be of interest to WTO Members and many of the multilateral organizations working on COVID responses, as well as the business community and the general public.

While the WTO has grappled with limiting/eliminating export subsidies for agricultural goods, the WTO has always recognized the need to maintain the flow of humanitarian need particularly in agricultural goods. Consider these paragraphs from the 2015 Nairobi Ministerial Conference Decision on Export Competition (WT/MIN(15)45, WT/L/980 (21 Dec. 2015) at 6-7):

“International Food Aid

“22. Members reaffirm their commitment to maintain an adequate level of international food aid, to take account of the interests of food aid recipients and to ensure that the disciplines contained hereafter do not unintentionally impede the delivery of food aid provided to deal with emergency situations. To meet the objective of preventing or minimizing commercial displacement, Members shall ensure that international food aid
is provided in full conformity with the disciplines specified in paragraphs 23 to 32, thereby contributing to the objective of preventing commercial displacement.

“23. Members shall ensure that all international food aid is:

“a. needs-driven;

“b. in fully grant form;

“c. not tied directly or indirectly to commercial exports of agricultural products or other goods and services;

“d. not linked to the market development objectives of donor Members;
and that

“e. agricultural products provided as international food aid shall not be re-exported in any form, except where the agricultural products were not permitted entry into the recipient country, the agricultural products were determined inappropriate or no longer needed for the purpose for which they were received in the recipient country, or re-exportation is necessary for logistical reasons to expedite the provision of food aid for another country in an emergency situation. Any reexportation in accordance with this subparagraph shall be conducted in a manner that does not unduly impact established, functioning commercial markets of agricultural commodities in the countries to which the food aid is re-exported.

“24. The provision of food aid shall take into account local market conditions of the same or substitute products. Members shall refrain from providing in-kind international food aid in situations where this would be reasonably foreseen to cause an adverse effect on local13 or regional production of the same or substitute products. In addition, Members shall ensure that international food aid does not unduly impact established, functioning commercial markets of agricultural commodities.

“25. Where Members provide exclusively cash-based food aid, they are encouraged to continue to do so. Other Members are encouraged to provide cash-based or in-kind international food aid in emergency situations, protracted crises (as defined by the FAO14), or non-emergency development/capacity building food assistance environments where recipient countries or recognized international humanitarian/food entities, such as the United Nations, have requested food assistance.

“26. Members are also encouraged to seek to increasingly procure international food aid from local or regional sources to the extent possible, provided that the availability and prices of basic foodstuffs in these markets are not unduly compromised.

“27. Members shall monetize international food aid only where there is a demonstrable need for monetization for the purpose of transport and delivery of the food assistance, or the monetization of international food aid is used to redress short and/or long term food deficit requirements or insufficient agricultural production situations which give rise to chronic hunger and malnutrition in least-developed and net food-importing developing countries.15

“28. Local or regional market analysis shall be completed before monetization occurs for all monetized international food aid, including consideration of the recipient country’s nutritional needs, local United Nations Agencies’ market data and normal import and consumption levels of the commodity to be monetized, and consistent with Food Assistance Convention reporting. Independent third party commercial or non-profit
entities will be employed to monetize in-kind international food aid to ensure open market competition for the sale of in-kind international food aid.

“29. In employing these independent third party commercial or non-profit entities for the purposes of the preceding paragraph, Members shall ensure that such entities minimize or eliminate disruptions to the local or regional markets, which may include impacts on production, when international food aid is monetized. They shall ensure that the sale of commodities for food assistance purposes is conducted in a transparent, competitive and open process and through a public tender.16

“30. Members commit to allowing maximum flexibility to provide for all types of international food aid in order to maintain needed levels while making efforts to move toward more untied cash-based international food aid in accordance with the Food Assistance Convention.

“31. Members recognize the role of government in decision-making on international food aid in their jurisdictions. Members recognize that the government of a recipient country of international food aid can opt out of the usage of monetized international food aid.

“32. Members agree to review the provisions on international food aid contained in the preceding paragraphs within the regular Committee on Agriculture monitoring of the implementation of the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision of April 1994 on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-developed and net food-importing developing countries.

“13 The term ‘local’ may be understood to mean at the national or subnational level.

“14 FAO defines protracted crises as follows: ‘Protracted crises refer to situations in which a significant portion of a population is facing a heightened risk of death, disease, and breakdown of their livelihoods.’

“15 Belize, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Ecuador, Fiji, Guatemala, Guyana, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea and Suriname shall also have access to this provision.

“16 In the instance where it is not feasible to complete a sale through a public tender, a negotiated sale can be used.”

It is believed that the current WTO provisions on food aid should not pose hurdles to countries providing in kind aid where there are needed food products that can be exported during the pandemic. If that is not the case, then the WTO Members should agree to a temporary waiver of relevant restrictions to permit food aid during the pandemic.

There has been much discussion within the G20, WTO, WHO and other groups that collective action on the medical front is critical to see that medical goods, vaccines, are therapeutics are available equitably and at affordable prices. What one hasn’t seen is the same focus on ensuring that the world’ populations have access to food equitably and at affordable prices. During the pandemic, WTO Members have the opportunity to work together to see that food is not wasted and that food aid is supplemented to the extent possible to alleviate the unique challenges to food security presented by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Review of the COVID-19 pandemic — continued overall growth in cases and deaths, resurgence in some countries where COVID-19 had receded

This past week saw the release of information on GDP contraction in the U.S. in the second quarter of 2020 (9.5% (annualized at 32.9%)) and in the European Union (11.9%). See U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, News Release BEA 20-37, Gross Domestic Product, Second Quarter 2020 (Advance Estimate) and Annual Update, https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/gdp2q20_adv_0.pdf; Eurostat newsrelease 121/2020 – 31 July 2020, Preliminary flash estimate for the second quarter of 2020, GD down by 12.1% in the euro area and by 11.9% in the EU, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/11156775/2-31072020-BP-EN.pdf/cbe7522c-ebfa-ef08-be60-b1c9d1bd385b#:~:text=The%20next%20estimates%20for%20the,released%20on%2014%20August%202020.&text=Compared%20with%20the%20same%20quarter,respectively%20in%20the%20previous%20quarter. Japan has similarly suffered substantial contraction in its GDP through the second quarter. See https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Japan-GDP-to-shrink-22-in-Q2-in-biggest-postwar-drop-forecast.

These sharp contractions in U.S. and EU GDP reflect the effects of the actions by governments in the U.S. and in the EU to shut down parts of their economies in an effort to control the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. The sharp contractions would have been far worse but for government efforts to provide emergency funding to support companies, workers and local governments. While the COVID-19 pandemic has been far less severe in terms of cases and deaths in Japan and in other countries in Asia, contraction in GDP reflects both declining consumer spending and global effects of trade contraction that are occurring.

China, where COVID-19 infections were first discovered, saw a decline in GDP in the 1st quarter of 2020 with a rebound in the second quarter to a 3.2% increase. See CNBC, China says its economy grew 3.2% in the second quarter this year, rebounding from coronavirus, July 15, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/16/china-economy-beijing-reports-q2-2020-gdp.html.

The sharp contractions in GDP from much of the developed world is consistent with projections by the IMF from June 2020. A summary table from the World Economic Outlook Update is copied below.

The hope was that after a sharp contraction in the second quarter, the world would experience a v-shaped recovery once the pandemic was brought under control in much of the world.

As we start August 2020, expectations are turning to a longer and shallower rebound in the third and fourth quarters of 2020 which will negatively affect billions of people. The world has not yet crested in terms of new COVID-19 cases and countries that had gotten the virus seemingly under control are seeing various levels of resurgence. The United States which never got the virus under control has seen a second surge that has reached levels at least twice as high as earlier levels of new cases and has seen a resurgence in hospitalizations and deaths.

There are a few bright spots. Some countries have managed to drastically reduce the spread of the virus and have been reopening in phases with limited recurrence. Moreover, a number of pharmaceutical companies have entered phase three trials of vaccines, and governments have fronted billions of dollars to build capacity for vaccines should they prove safe and effective. While major countries like the U.S. and the EU block have secured access to potentially hundreds of millions of doses from various companies should vaccines in trial receive approval for distribution, at least a number of these pharmaceutical companies (or consortia) have arrangements for massive production around the world including billions of doses for developing and least developed countries which should enable a more equitable and affordable distribution than may have been true in the past.

COVID-19, the number of new cases in the last fourteen days

Looking at the daily reports put out by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, the world saw an additional 3,568,162 cases in the fourteen days ending August 2nd. This was an increase of some 550,000 from the previous fourteen days ending July 19 where new cases were 3,018,993. The July 19 two week figures were again up close to 550,000 from the period ending July 5 when there were 2,469,859 cases. The period ending June 21 has 1,932,024 new cases; the period ending June 7 had seen an additional 1,567,983 new cases. Thus, in less than two months the global number of new cases in a fourteen-day time period increased by 127.56 percent. The COVID-19 situation update worldwide, as of 2 August 2020 is embedded below.

COVID-19-situation-update-worldwide-as-of-2-August-2020

Fourteen of the forty-two countries or customs territories that I have been tracking who account for more than 90% of total cases and total deaths from the pandemic continue to not have peaked in terms of two week number of new cases. See July 21, 2020, COVID-19 – the United States continues to spin out of control with increasing shortages of medical goods; sharp increases in developing countries in the Americas and parts of Asia, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/07/21/covid-19-the-united-states-continues-to-spin-out-of-control-with-increasing-shortages-of-medical-goods-sharp-increases-in-developing-countries-in-the-americas-and-parts-of-asia/. Japan, which had peaked a number of months ago, has a resurgence of cases, so much so that the last two weeks (11,439 new cases) exceed any other two week period for the country. Other countries which have not peaked include the United States (908,980 new cases), India (673,105 new cases) Brazil (633,017 new cases), Colombia (115,481 new cases), Mexico (95,280 new cases), Argentina (72,001 new cases) and these additional countries — Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, and the Philippines). South Africa peaked in the prior two week period but still had an additional 152,411 new cases (93.56% of its peak).

Many developed countries have seen sharp increases in the last two weeks, albeit from much lower levels than in the spring. These include Spain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Australia and Japan.

Many developing and least-developed countries in Central and South America, Africa and parts of Asia are seeing growing numbers of cases. While some of these countries have seen a peak in the number of new cases, for others that is not true. India and Brazil are continuing to struggle to contain the spread as are the Latin and Asian countries reviewed above.

In the last two weeks, the United States had more new cases per 100,000 population than all of the other 41 countries being monitored other than Brazil and Panama. The U.S. number of new cases per 100,000 population was 5.88 times the number for all countries (including the U.S) and 4-50 times as high as major EU countries. And on deaths in the last fourteen days, the U.S. has more deaths per 100,000 population than all of the other 41 countries other than Brazil, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, Chile, Bolivia, Colombia and Panama. The U.S. death rate in the last fourteen days is 3.95 times the rate/100,000 population for the entire world and 25-87 times the rate for major EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain).

WTO Members have the opportunity to adopt rules to minimize trade disruptions and expedite economic recovery

Many Members of the WTO have submitted proposals for action by the Membership to minimize the harm to global economies and trade flows from addressing trade restrictions, trade liberalization possibilities and other matters within the WTO’s wheelhouse.

In a previous post, I reviewed the July 25 APEC trade ministers joint statement and annex which in my view could provide the platform for WTO Members coming together to adopt a group of principles that have been endorsed not only by the APEC countries but also by G-20 members (in various G-20 releases). See July 28, 2020, APEC trade ministers’ virtual meeting on July 25 – Declaration on Facilitating the Movement of Essential Goods during COVID-19, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/07/28/apec-trade-ministers-virtual-meeting-on-july-25-declaration-on-facilitating-the-movement-of-essential-goods-during-covid-19/.

The WTO, being a member-driven organization, requires the WTO Members to come together for the common good if progress is to be made. While recent actions on seemingly non-substantive issues, like selecting an acting Director-General (largely an administrative function pending selection of a new Director-General), lay bare the lack of trust and widely divergent views among WTO Members, adopting basic principles for getting through the pandemic should be a win-win for all Members.

Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic is continuing to wreak havoc across the globe with new cases and new deaths continuing to mount. The health consequences are severe and are increasingly shifting to developing and least-developed countries. However, some developed countries, like the U.S., have not gotten the virus under control. Moreover, a number of countries who have had success controlling the spread of COVID-19 are seeing a resurgence as reopening of economies continues. This has led some countries to slow or even reverse some of the reopening steps.

As the sharp economic contractions in major developed economies attest, there are huge economic costs to dealing with the pandemic. The economic rebound is unlikely to be as strong or as quick as many have hoped. While much of what is needed is focus by each country and its citizenry to follow the science and get the pandemic under control, there is also an important role for multilateral organizations to play in keeping markets open, providing financing for those in need and more. The WTO has a potentially important role on the trade front. It is unclear that WTO Members will embrace the opportunities presented, but if Members would it would reduce the depth of the trade contraction and help speed economic recovery.

COVID-19 — the United States continues to spin out of control, with increasing shortages of medical goods; sharp increases in developing countries in the Americas and parts of Asia

The last two weeks have seen the case count of new COVID-19 cases in the United States surge out of control across much of the country with a staggering number of new cases reaching 871,922 cases between July 6 and July 19, up from 584,423 cases in the prior two-week period — an increase in new cases of 287,499 or 49.2% in just two weeks. The U.S. accounted for more than half of the global spike in new cases from the last two week period examined (June 22-July 5) from less than 2.5 million new cases for the world to 3,018,993 through July 19. Growth in new cases is occurring in many developing countries as well, but no developed country other than the United States has been unable to cap the level of new cases and, in most instances, bring the number down sharply over time (Russia’s number of new cases has declined but not sharply like other developed countries).

The consequences for the U.S. and the world of the continued rapid growth in new cases are significant. The U.S. is finding many states needing to slow down or reverse the reopening of the economy which will hurt the economic recovery in the United States, result in a continuation of exceptionally high unemployment, threaten hundreds of thousands of businesses with survival, put in jeopardy the ability of schools at all levels to open safely and put downward pressure on global trade based on reduced U.S. demand, restrictions on various major service sectors and production of goods at below optimal levels. Moreover, there are many states facing sharp increases in hospitalizations putting stress on the health care system in many parts of the country and returning states and local communities to scramble for medical goods, including personal protective equipment. There are news articles of some hospital systems facing the same types of shortages that were harming care in the March-April period. Congress is facing the need in the coming days and weeks to provide substantial additional support to the unemployed, to health care systems, to state and local governments, to certain sectors of the economy particularly hard hit. Thus, the U.S. drag on the global economy will likely continue while the U.S. will be chasing medical supplies at a time of growing demand in the developing world, likely making access to many medical goods more expensive and harder to find.

While the Administration has focused on reopening the U.S. economy regardless of the actual situation and has dismissed the increase in new cases as simply the result of increased testing and has claimed that the U.S. has the lowest mortality rate, the facts on the ground indicate the crisis will continue for some time. The United States has just 4.3% of the world’s population but has had 26% of the world’s cases and 23.3% of the world’s deaths from COVID-19. So the bottom line is that the U.S. has a massive and growing health crisis that is far from being under control.

On the question of the death rate and how the U.S. compares to other countries, the table below presents some data which are self-explanatory. Using the daily data from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, I reviewed 42 countries and territories who collectively have accounted for 90.88% of all cases since December 31 and 91.93% of all deaths recorded as due to COVID-19. Through July 19, the U.S. had the sixth highest mortality rate looking at deaths per hundred thousand population (France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and Chile had worse rates ). If one looks at the period since April 11 (three months and eight days, roughly half of the total period), the U.S. had the forth worst mortality rate (deaths per hundred thousand population; Peru, the United Kingdom, and Chile had worse rates). The U.S. death rate is worse than our neighbors, Canada and Mexico. It is worse than that of most European countries, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. And much worse than China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, South Africa and many other countries. The U. S. rate of deaths/cases has remained unchanged at 3.78% over the total period and for the period since April 11th. It has been in the more recent period that U.S. testing has expanded significantly, but without any change in rate of death.

While the U.S. ranking of deaths as a percent of total confirmed cases of COVID-19 is better than its ranking based on the number of deaths per 100,000 population, the death rate/100,000 provides the best measure of the relative cost in deaths to each country/territory. Thus, the U.S. death rate is 3.9 times higher than the rate in Germany, 1.8 times the rate in Canada, 54.5 times the rate in Japan, 5 times the rate in Russia, 73.4 times the rate in South Korea, 133.1 times the rate in China, 1419.3 times the rate in Taiwan and 4.5 times the rate of the total of the 42 countries/territories (including the U.S.).

Countrydeaths/100,000 pop.
Dec. 31 – July 19
deaths/100,000 pop.
Aprill 11 – July 19
United Kingdom67.9354.49
Spain60.5526.80
Italy58.0626.82
France44.9925.30
Chile44.0443.70
United States42.5836.87
Peru39.9839.46
Brazil37.3236.82
Mexico30.4830.30
Ecuador30.4028.69
Panama25.2225.08
Canada23.6322.11
Bolivia18.2918.12
Iran16.8611.76
Colombia12.9412.79
Germany10.947.88
Kuwait9.679.65
Iraq9.399.21
Honduras9.148.90
Dominican Republic9.047.87
Russia8.468.40
South Africa8.458.41
Guatemala8.248.22
Saudi Arabia7.187.00
Turkey6.685.45
Oman6.196.13
Qatar5.445.23
Argentina4.924.74
Egypt4.234.10
United Arab Emirates3.463.30
Afghanistan3.063.02
Pakistan2.582.55
India1.961.95
Philippines1.641.45
Bangladesh1.581.57
Indonesia1.481.37
Japan0.780.71
South Korea0.580.17
Singapore0.470.36
Nigeria0.390.38
China0.320.08
Taiwan0.030.01
Total of 42 countries9.517.95

Growth in new cases among developing countries

With the world total confirmed cases of COVID-19 standing at 14.267 million on Sunday, July 19, there were large numbers of new cases over the last two weeks from a large number of countries. Brazil had another 497,856 cases; India had 404,453 new cases; South Africa an additional 162,902 cases; Russia 97,031 new cases; Mexico an additional 86748 cases; Colombia an additional 77,311 cases; Peru 50,420 new cases; Argentina 46,515 new cases; Saudi Arabia an additional 42,487 cases; Bangladesh 42,387 new cases; ten countries each had between 20,000 and 40,000 new cases (Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kazakhstan, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Bolivia, Chile); seven countries had between 10,000 and 19,999 new cases (Panama, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Guatemala, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Egypt) with all other countries/territories having less that 10,000 new cases each.

Of the forty-two countries/territories that account for more than 90% of cases and deaths, besides the U.S., there were fourteen where the last two weeks were new highs for the country/territory, that is where the virus is continuing to expand: India, Mexico, South Africa, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Indonesia, Iraq, Oman and the Philippines.

In the last two weeks, the forty-two countries listed in the table above increased their rate of new cases by 22.66%. All other countries increased by 17.46% while the total for all countries increased by 22.22%.

So just as was true in prior posts on the COVID-19 pandemic, the pandemic continues to grow rapidly and is affecting an increasing number of developing and least developed countries. This puts increased pressure on the global supply of medical goods including personal protective equipment. As noted in previous posts and as reviewed on the WTO website, many countries have introduced export restraints particularly for medical goods, but also for some agricultural products. Many have also introduced liberalizing measures to reduce the cost of imports of needed medical goods and to streamline the importing process for such goods.

Vaccines and therapeutics – developments and challenges for access

As reviewed in a prior post, “There have been extraordinary efforts to ramp up research and development around the world to address COVID-19. Through the WHO and other efforts, there have been greater efforts at coordination of R&D and at the identification of gaps in knowledge and research. Large sums are being committed by some countries and NGOs to help ensure that all countries will have access to vaccines and therapeutics that get developed and that such access will be at affordable prices.” July 5, 2020, COVID-19 – the sharp expansion of new cases will put increased pressure on finding vaccines and therapeutics and complicate global economic recovery, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/07/05/covid-19-the-sharp-expansion-of-new-cases-will-put-increased-pressure-on-finding-vaccines-and-therapeutics-and-complicate-global-economic-recovery/.

A number of vaccines are moving into the stage 3 testing of large numbers of humans in the coming weeks/months. There is hope that one or more products in tests will result in vaccines that get approved for distribution by the end of the year or early in 2021. This week’s Bloomberg Businessweek has a cover article on the University of Oxford COVID-19 vaccine that, if approved, will be distributed by AstraZeneca who has arranged global manufacturing of what could be more than two billion doses. See July 20, 2020, Bloomberg Businessweek, The Front-Runner, pages 42-47. While the University of Oxford has led in the development and testing of the hoped-for vaccine, AstraZeneca has made arrangements with a number of companies around the world to produce the vaccine if approved and has agreements with the United Kingdome for 100 million doses, with the U.S. for 300 million doses and an arrangement with an Indian company to produce 1 billion doses for developing and middle income countries. Id at 46. There are other developmental vaccines that are also making progress through testing stages though their timing for eventual approval (if found efficacious) may be a few months behind the University of Oxford program. The good news, if vaccines get developed quickly which are efficacious, is that the major producers in the west are putting in place plans to provide global production which should go a long way to ensuring equitable access for all at affordable prices. Hopefuly, the University of Oxford/AstraZeneca model will be followed by all. China also has vaccines in test mode, although it is less clear what their approach would be to production and distribution if products are approved.

While the world has seen a very large collective scientific effort to find vaccines and therapeutics, in the last week there have also been claims by three governments (the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States) of cybersecurity attacks from Russia on COVID-19 research programs. See, e.g., CNN, UK, US and Canada alleged Russian cyberattacks on COVID-19 research centers, July 17, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/16/politics/russia-cyberattack-covid-vaccine-research/index.html. The link to the UK advisory is here. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/advisory-apt29-targets-covid-19-vaccine-development.

Conclusion

Nearly seven months into the pandemic, the continued growth in the number of new COVID-19 cases is continuing to put pressure on health care systems in many parts of the world and dampen prospects for the global economy’s rapid recovery.

The United States has been unable to get the pandemic under control within its borders and has been leading the growth in new cases. The rapid rate of growth of new cases across much of the United States has led to backtracking by many U.S. states on opening measures taken in the last two months. With the growing challenges in the United States, the U.S. will be a drag on global economic recovery.

While there is more global production of many of the medical goods needed to address COVID-19 ahead of the development of vaccines and therapeutics, the enormous growth in the number of cases and the continued spread in developing and least developing countries along with the United States will continue to test the balance between demand and supply. While the WTO is monitoring developments on export restraints and liberalization measures based on country notifications, large numbers of export restraints on medical goods continue and will likely remain in place for months to come complicating the ability to maximize utilization of scarce supplies.

It has been known that the ultimate return to normal conditions for the world would have to await the development and distribution of vaccines and therapeutics that are efficacious to all peoples on an equitable and affordable basis. But the new “normal” of living with COVID-19 while we await vaccine developments is being frustrated in some countries, like the United States, by an inability to communicate the challenges with a single voice, by the politicizing of basic disease prevention steps like mask wearing and social distancing, by the failure to ramp up testing and tracing sufficiently based on the level of COVID-19 spread and by the lack of support from the body politic (which flows both from the lack of a single message from federal, state and local leaders and from lockdown fatigue). Thus, for the United States and perhaps others, we are seemingly unable to slow the spread through steps many other countries have adopted and that have been known by medical experts for decades if not centuries.

Fortunately, there is positive news coming from the research and development efforts of many companies, universities and research institutes. Let us hope that vaccines and cures are found quickly. The drag on the global economy and the enormous toll on populations will likely continue until then.

COVID-19 — the sharp expansion of new cases will put increased pressure on finding vaccines and therapeutics and complicate global economic recovery

The last two weeks have seen an extraordinary explosion of new cases of COVID-19 in the United States, the rest of the Americas, and in many developing and least developed countries in Asia and Africa. Total infections globally now exceed 11.2 million up close to 2.5 million in the last two weeks (from 8.767 million) and up close to 100% from the two week period ending May 24. All figures are taken from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control daily reports.

The top five countries in the world with most cases account for 53.94% of global cases through July 5 and are:

United States 2,839, 542

Brazil 1,577,004

Russia 674,515

India 673,165

Peru 299,080

Three of these countries (the United States, Brazil and India) have not yet reached a peak and had the three largest number of new cases in the last two weeks — 584,423 for the U.S.; 509,425 for Brazil; 262,704 for India. While Russia and Peru appear to have peaked (last two weeks are 28.89% and 37.18% below their respective peak periods), the number of new cases in the last two weeks was the fourth and eight largest of any country (97,563 for Russia; 47,742 for Peru). The top five countries for cases to date also accounted for 60.81% of new cases during the last two weeks.

The U.S. which had seemingly peaked in the two weeks end April 26 at 409,102 and seen declines to 297,391 for the two weeks ending June 7, has seen a resurgence since then (335,058 for two weeks ending June 21) with a staggering growth in the last two weeks to 584,423 new cases. Thus, the U.S. has seen a dramatic growth in cases — up 96.52% from the June 7th two weeks; up 74.42% from the prior two weeks ending June 21; and up 42.86% since the prior peak for the two weeks ending April 26.

The United States has been in the process of opening up over the last two months after lockdowns in most states and has seen dramatic growth in cases in large parts of the country (south, southwest, west coast), with some substantial contraction in areas hardest hit back in March and April (Middle Atlantic states including New York and New Jersey). While other countries that have been opening up have had some resurgence as well (e.g., France, Germany, South Korea, Japan), the growth has been from very low numbers and has typically been relatively small absolute increases.

The United States is the only developed country to be having the challenges it is having getting the COVID-19 pandemic under control. Indeed, no other developed country has not peaked in the number of new cases. All other developed countries have generally seen very large decreases in the number of new cases from their peaks back in March or April. Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases in the U.S., has warned that the United States could reach infection rates of 100,000 cases per day without increased adherence to the straightforward but challenging control criteria of social distancing, wearing masks, handwashing, testing, tracing and isolation.

With mixed messages from government leaders at the federal, state and local levels, with COVID-19 fatigue among many U.S. residents, and with lower rates of infection and generally less severe infections for younger people (leading many to be less concerned about the pandemic), the path forward in the U.S. is unclear particularly prior to the development of effective vaccines and therapeutics.

So large are the increases in new cases from the U.S., Brazil and India in the last two weeks that the U.S. and Brazil’s two week totals exceed the total cases since December 31 for all other countries except Russia and India; India’s new cases over the last two weeks exceed every country’s total number of COVID-19 cases since December 31 except the U.S., Brazil, Russia, Peru, Chile, and the United Kingdom).

The alarming rate of growth in the United States is masking the focus on the rapid growth of the pandemic in many developing and least developed countries. For countries with the largest number of confirmed cases, Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, Nigeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iraq, and the Philippines are seeing cases grow in number with no peak as yet. This is also true among many countries in the Middle East where World Bank listings would not have them as lower income countries – Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. For the developing and least developed countries who are not among the forty-two countries who account for 90.62% of total cases through July 5, the rate of growth of new cases in the last two weeks is roughly 50% greater than for the 42 countries — 39.59% increase versus 26.87% increase (47.34% greater).

So the pandemic continues to grow rapidly and is affecting an increasing number of developing and least developed countries. The WHO has repeatedly reviewed the steps any country needs to take to bring the COVID-19 pandemic under control. See WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 – 1 July 2020, https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19—1-july-2020. The world is not adhering to the required steps, at least for many countries including the United States.

Trade implications

Prior posts have reviewed the array of health and economic challenges for governments that are going through increasing cases during the pandemic. The WTO and others have cataloged the number of export restraints on medical goods imposed by certain countries during the pandemic. Because of the huge increase in demand that occurs for many medical goods when the pandemic spreads in a country, the world has been faced with challenges of adequacy of supplies, openness of markets, and ability to ramp up production as needed. While some restraints have been lifted, many continue. There have also been some export restraints on agricultural goods introduced by countries concerned about access to food supplies during the pandemic despite no actual global food shortage for major crops.

There also have been many efforts at liberalization by countries as they attempt to lower the cost of imported medical goods, streamline customs procedures to expedite delivery of goods, maintain open markets and for other reasons.

Groups of countries at the WTO, in the G20 and through other entities have put forward a range of proposals and action steps to ensure that trade plays its part in minimizing the downside to countries from the pandemic both in terms of health consequences and in terms of economic activity.

With rapidly growing numbers of new COVID-19 cases, one can predict that pressures will continue on export restraints and on needed efforts to ramp up production and inventories of key medical goods. As the number of tests, number of hospitalizations and other medical activities increase, governments will be struggling to find supplies. The United States has had significant problems in the past and will likely experience medical goods shortages again if the number of new cases in the U.S. is not brought under control.

For many developing and least developed countries, there are joint efforts by countries through the Supply Chain Task Force (chaired by the World Health Organization and World Food Programme) to identify medical equipment needs and to work to develop contracts to secure needed supplies and get them to the countries in need. See COVID-19 supply chain system, requesting and receiving supplies, https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/covid-19-supply-chain-system-requesting-and-receiving-supplies. The write-up explaining how it operates is embedded below and reflects the global commitment to see that both medical goods and any eventual vaccines and therapeutics and improved diagnostics are equitably available at affordable prices.

covid-19-supply-chain-system-requesting-and-receiving-supplies-2

While the joint efforts of various UN and other organizations are providing assistance to some 130 countries, challenges exist both as to funding and to access to adequate supplies as demand grows. Below are notes for the record from the Supply Chain Task Force meeting of 23 June 2020 followed by the catalogue of products being covered by the Emergency Global Supply Chain System.

supply-chain-taskforce-nfrs-20200623

20200207233119365

Availability of medical goods should improve as many countries who have gone through the worst of the pandemic (at least phase 1) who produce medical goods are increasingly in a position to increase exports. The challenges will be with overall global capacity and whether certain countries tie up global supplies to safeguard against growing demand in the current phase or to develop inventories should there be a second phase.

Vaccines and therapeutics – developments and challenges for access

There have been extraordinary efforts to ramp up research and development around the world to address COVID-19. Through the WHO and other efforts, there have been greater efforts at coordination of R&D and at the identification of gaps in knowledge and research. Large sums are being committed by some countries and NGOs to help ensure that all countries will have access to vaccines and therapeutics that get developed and that such access will be at affordable prices.

On July 1-2, the WHO held a two day virtual conference both to track progress on COVID-19 research and development efforts and to identify new research priorities. See https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/global-scientific-community-unites-to-track-progress-on-covid-19-r-d-identifies-new-research-priorities-and-critical-gaps.

The WHO has a summary table that shows where different vaccine development projects are. The document is embedded below.

novel-coronavirus-landscape-covid-19-1

However, a major challenge for equitable and affordable access to both vaccines and therapeutics involves the needs of major governments to lock- up capacity for potential vaccines and early therapeutics to take care of their own populations regardless of global giving events or commitments of individual countries to the principles of equitable and affordable access for all.

Prior posts have reviewed efforts of the United States, the European Union and others to lock up large quantities of vaccines from particular manufacturers of vaccines in trials should the trials prove successful. Most countries don’t have the financial capabilities to copy that approach. In addition, many vaccine trials are in China by Chinese pharmaceutical companies raising questions as to how vaccines developed by those companies (in which the Chinese government has investments for some or all of the companies) will be handled and made available to other countries with needs.

Developments in the last week show the challenge will apply equally with therapeutics that are viewed as effective in treating COVID-19. For example, there is one treatment which to date has been shown to shorten the recovery time in patients who have COVID-19. The product is remdesivir produced by U.S. company Gilead. A preliminary report on the results of testing of remdesivir was published in May 2020. See The New England Journal of Medicine, Remdesivir for the Treatment of COVID-19 — Preliminary Report, May 22, 2020.

In a July 4 article in The Guardian, entitled, “Trump is scooping up the world’s remdesivir. It’s a sign of things to come,” the author states “Trump boasted this week that the US had bought the world’s entire supply of remdesivir, the antiviral drug produced by the U.S. biotechnology company Gilead. Though low- and middle-income countries can still produce their own generic versions of the drug, European and other high-income countries are not able to buy remdesivir or produce it for three months. Fortunately the UK and Germany have stockpiled enough of the drug to treat all the patients who need it.” https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jul/04/trump-remdesivir-covid-19-drug.

A Reuters article from July 3rd reviews remdesivir getting conditional EU clearance. See Reuters, Gilead’s COVID-19 antiviral remdesivir gets conditional EU clearance, July 3, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-eu-remdesivir/gileads-covid-19-antiviral-remdesivir-gets-conditional-eu-clearance-idUSKBN2441GK. “”The EU’s green light broadens the use of remdesivir around the world – the United States has cleaered it for emergency use and it is also approved as a COVID-19 therapy in Japan, Taiwan, India, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates, Gilead said on Friday.”

It is fair to say that with the huge growth in the number of confirmed cases in the U.S. and with the U.S.’s control of supply for the next three months, remdesivir is likely the poster child of the challenges the global community will face in ensuring equitable and affordable access to vaccines and therapeutics going forward.

Conclusion

More than six months into the COVID-19 pandemic, the world continues on a sharp upward trajectory of new cases with a major shift from developed countries to developing and least developed countries as nearly all developed countries (excluding the United States) have managed to get the pandemic under control. With the United States apparently unable to get its house in order, there will be increased stress on medical goods supplies as demand from the U.S. will certainly continue to grow. Global efforts to arrange supplies for developing and least developed countries are showing some positive results. However, such efforts will become more challenging in the coming months as the number of cases in those countries continue to surge and those countries and buying groups compete with the U.S. for supplies.

It has long been known that the world would not be safe from COVID-19 until there were vaccines and therapeutics equitably available to all. For that to be the case, the vaccines and therapeutics need to be affordable for all.

There has historically been the perceived need for countries with the means to secure supplies for their populations during pandemics before making supplies available to all on an equitable basis and at affordable prices. With the COVID-19 seemingly out of control in the United States, there is little doubt that the United States will be doing its best to lock up supplies of vaccines and therapeutics as it has done and as it apparently will need to do to get to the other side of the pandemic.

Activities by the U.S., the EU and others on arranging commitments for promising vaccines and therapeutics will make the global objective of equitable and affordable access harder to achieve.

The reasons for optimism that a better approach will be followed during this pandemic include commitments made by many countries to ensure equitable access at affordable prices, the existence of multilateral organizations working to get getting vaccines to those in need, and the global footprint of at least some of the major companies and consortia developing vaccines and therapeutics which should provide regional production capabilities better able to service global demand.

Look for a challenging rest of 2020 and first half of 2021.

COVID-19 — the global rate of increase of confirmed cases is surging

By the close of business on June 22, there will be more than 9 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 with the rate of growth exploding more than six months after the first cases were reported in China, with deaths approaching a half million. For the two weeks ending June 21, the number of new cases approached 2 million (1,932,024), up 24.0% from the two weeks ending June 7 (1,557,983) which in turn were up 21.5% from the two weeks ending May 24 (1,281,916). Thus, the last six weeks have seen the rate of new cases grow by 50.7%. Indeed, the last six weeks account for 54.25% of total cases since the end of 2019 (roughly 25 weeks).

As the worst of the pandemic has passed (at least the first wave) for most of the developed world (other than the United States and countries in the Middle East), the sharp growth in cases is mostly due to the spread of the virus in the developing world where healthcare infrastructure and ability to handle the challenges of the pandemic are likely less than for the developed world.

Central and South America, parts of Asia and the Middle East are the current hot spots of infections with growth in a number of African countries as well. The United States which peaked during the two week period ending April 26, has by the far the largest number of total cases (more than 2.2 million) and is seeing the number of cases rise again in the most recent two weeks.

Afghanistan, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Arab Republic all have significant numbers of cases and all but Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE are still growing rapidly in terms of new cases where peaks have not been reached. Thus, the likelihood of even greater number of new cases is a near certainty for the coming weeks.

Some recent developments

Most of western Europe has been engaged in reopening in recent weeks as the rates of infection are dramatically lower than in the March-April period. Indeed, travel within the EU and some neighboring countries is opening up in time for the July-August vacation season. Time will tell if the steps being taken to test, trace and quarantine any cases found going forward will minimize any upward movement in cases.

China and parts of Asia with low rates of infections where economic interruption has been less (e.g., Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Japan), are seeing low numbers of new cases. China has taken strong measures to address a new outbreak in Beijing (numbers are a few hundred cases).

Australia and New Zealand have few if any new cases and the numbers for Canada are also way down with reopening occurring as would be expected.

The U.S. and Canada and the U.S. and Mexico are maintaining travel restrictions between themselves (though excluding movement of goods and services).

In the United States, the story on the control of the pandemic is very mixed as individual states have been engaged in reopening at different rates in part reflecting different infection rates and growth rates. However, reopening in some states is occurring despite conditions in the state not being consistent with the Administration’s guidelines from the Center for Disease Control ad Prevention (“CDC”) on when reopening should occur. Thus, there are states seeing large increases in recent days and weeks while many other states are seeing significant declines or at least stable rates of infection. It is unclear how the infection rate in the U.S. will progress in the coming weeks and months.

Trade Considerations

As my post from last week on the Ottawa Group communication reviewed, there are lots of proposals that have been teed up by WTO Members to keep trade flowing during the pandemic and to potentially reduce the likelihood of such trade disruptions as are being experienced at present in future pandemics.

But large numbers of export restraints remain in place, transparency is better than it was in the first quarter but still not what is needed. However, import liberalization/expedition is occurring in many countries to facilitate obtaining medical goods needed at the lowest price.

The toll flowing from the pandemic and the closing of economies to control the pandemic is enormous despite efforts of governments to provide funding to reduce the damage. This has led the WTO to project 2020 trade flows to decline between 13 and 32% from 2019 levels. As data are available for the March-June period, the severity of the decline for various markets is being fleshed out and resulting in lower global GDP growth projections.

Because the COVID-19 pandemic hit many developed countries hard before spreading to most of the developing world, developing countries have seen economic effects from the pandemic preceding the health effects in their countries. Reduced export opportunities, declining commodity prices (many developing countries are dependent on one or a few commodities for foreign exchange), reduced foreign investment (and some capital flight), higher import prices for critical goods due to scarcity (medical goods) and logistics complications flowing from countries efforts to address the spread of the pandemic are a few examples of the economic harm occurring to many developing countries.

The needs of developing countries for debt forgiveness/postponement appears much larger than projected although multilateral organizations, regional development banks and the G20 have all been working to provide at least some significant assistance to many individual countries. Trade financing will continue to be a major challenge for many developing countries during the pandemic. Harm to small businesses is staggering and will set many countries back years if not decades in their development efforts when the pandemic is past.

As can be seen in developed countries, sectors like travel and tourism (including airlines, hotels, restaurants, entertainment venues) are extraordinarily hard hit and may not recover for the foreseeable future. The need for social distancing makes many business models (e.g., most restaurants, movie theaters, bars, etc.) unworkable and will result in the loss of large portions of small businesses in those sectors in the coming months. For many developing countries, travel and tourism are a major source of employment and income. Losses in employment will likely be in the tens of millions of jobs, many of which may not return for years if at all.

Role of WTO during Pandemic

The WTO views itself as performing the useful functions of (1) gathering through notifications information from Members on their actions responding to the pandemic and getting that information out to Members and the public, (2) providing forecasts of the trade flows during the pandemic, and (3) providing a forum for Members to bring forward proposals on what action the WTO as a whole should consider. Obviously the success of all three functions depends on the openness and engagement of the Members.

WTO agreements don’t really have comprehensive rules for addressing pandemics or for the policy space governments are likely to need to respond to the economic tsunami that may unfold (and will unfold with different intensities for different Members). Some recent proposals would try to address some of the potential needs for the trading system to better respond to pandemics. However, most proposals seem to suggest narrowing the policy space. Last week’s Committee on Agriculture was reported to have had many Members challenging other Members actions in the agriculture space responding to the extraordinary challenges flowing from the pandemic. While Committee activity is designed to permit Members the opportunity to better understand the policies of trading partners, a process in Committee which focuses simply on conformance to existing rules without consideration of what, if any, flexibilities are needed in extraordinary circumstances seems certain to result in less relevance of the WTO going forward.

Most countries have recognized that the depth of the economic collapse being cased by the global efforts to respond to COVID-19 will require Members to take extraordinary steps to keep economies from collapsing. Looking at the huge stimulus programs put in place and efforts to prevent entire sectors of economies from collapsing, efforts to date by major developed countries are some $10 trillion. Concerns expressed by the EU and others have generally not been the need for such programs, but rather have been on ensuring any departures from WTO norms are minimized in time and permit a return to the functioning of market economies as quickly as possible.

Members have not to date proposed, but should agree, that the WTO undertake an evaluation of programs pursued by Members and how existing rules do or do not address the needs of Members in these extraordinary times.

WTO Appellate Body Reports on Australia’s Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products — Separate Views of One Division Member Merit Close Review

In a post from yesterday, I reviewed the Appellate Body (“AB”) reports released on June 9 in the appeals by Honduras and the Dominican Republic on the panel reports on Australia’s plain packaging regime on tobacco products. As noted, the AB upheld the panel reports that Australia’s regime did not violate any WTO Agreements as alleged by the Appellants. See WTO Appellate Issues Reports on Australia’s Plain Packaging Requirements on Tobacco Products – Last Reports Until WTO Appellate Body Reform Occurs, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/06/09/wto-appellate-body-issues-reports-on-australias-plain-packaging-requirements-on-tobacco-products-last-reports-until-wto-appellate-body-reform-occurs/

There are important “separate views” contained in the AB reports that while agreeing with the final conclusion that there was no violation disagree with the searching review of the underlying record on the claim that the panels had not made an objective assessment of the facts pursuant to DSU Art. 11. The separate views also disagreed with the finding of the other two Division members that appellants’ due process rights were violated based on use of information in the interim panel reports that had not previously been available to the parties.

As WTO disputes have become ever more litigious, lawyers used by Members to handle appeals have increased the frequency of seeking a review of the factual record on the claim that panels have not made an objective assessment of the record. Instead of parties limiting appeals of such claims to extraordinary situations, increasing numbers of appeals have focused on these appeal issues. The result has been greatly complicated appeals, much longer AB reports and an inability for AB Divisions to render decisions in 60-90 days of the filing of an appeal.

The Australia plain packaging appeals were filed by Honduras on 17 July 2018 and by the Dominican Republic on 23 August 2018. Thus, the AB reports released on 9 June 2020 were 693 days and 656 days after the appeals were filed. While certainly part of the delay flows from the inability to fill the AB member vacancies since 2018, a significant part flows from the failure of the AB Divisions to limit review of claims under DSU Art. 11 to situations that plausibly create the extraordinary circumstances required for its invocation.

The AB reports in these appeals are 232 pages in length. The concept that a Division of the AB will draft reports in 60-90 days that are 232 pages in length is obviously implausiible. Eliminating the DSU Art. 11 claims would have reduced the length of the reports by roughly 100 pages and would have permitted the AB to focus on the legal issues and legal interpretations of the panel appealed by the parties. As clear from the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the AB isn’t to review factual issues. Rather DSU Art. 17.6 limits the AB to reviewing legal issues and legal interpretations of the panel.

The proper role of the AB and the need to clarify the limited circumstances when a challenge to facts found by the panel by claims of panel bias or failure to make an objective evaluation of the record (DSU Art. 11) have been some of the ongoing concerns of the United States in looking at the functioning of the AB. The latest AB reports demonstrate the importance of addressing the U.S. concerns. The separate views included in the report are important in articulating how the DSU Art. 11 claims in these appeals should have been handled.

The separate views are copied below and eloquently lay out the correct approach in these appeals. WT/DS435/AB/R at 179 – 183 and WT/DS441/AB/R at 179 – 183

6.2 Separate opinion of one Division Member regarding Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement

6.2.1 Introduction

“6.523. It is well settled that not every error by a panel rises to the level of a breach of Article 11 of the DSU. Under the DSU, panels enjoy considerable discretion with respect to fact-finding and the evaluation of facts. This is underscored by the language of Article 11 that ‘a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case’, read in conjunction with Article 17.6 of the DSU, which says that ‘[a]n appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.’ In other words, Article 11 claims on appeal should be reserved – and entertained – only for rare instances of ‘egregious’ errors by panels, which call into question the good faith of the panel.1433

“6.524. With respect to the appellants’ claims regarding the Panel’s analysis under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, I concur with the majority’s ultimate findings and conclusions. However, I disagree on two points: (i) that it was necessary to examine in detail the appellants’ claims that the Panel erred in determining the degree of contribution of the TPP measures to Australia’s objective; and (ii) that the Panel’s treatment of and reliance on multicollinearity and non-stationarity constituted an error under Article 11 of the DSU.

6.2.2 Addressing the appellants’ claims regarding the contribution of the TPP measures was not necessary to resolve the dispute

“6.525. The complainants’ main argument before the Panel was that the TPP measures are more trade-restrictive than necessary because: (i) they are trade-restrictive; and (ii) they are not apt to, and do not, contribute to Australia’s legitimate public health objective.1434 In the alternative, the complainants argued that, even assuming that the TPP measures contribute to Australia’s legitimate public health objective, they are still ‘more trade-restrictive than necessary’ because there are alternative measures that are reasonably available to Australia and that would be less trade-restrictive while making an equivalent contribution to the objective.1435

“6.526. The Panel rejected those arguments by the complainants, while noting that the TPP measures are necessarily trade-restrictive because all tobacco products are imported into Australia, and that the TPP measures contribute to Australia’s public health objective by reducing consumption of tobacco products. The appellants challenge the Panel’s rejection of their arguments. My discussion of that challenge centres on the two sentences in paragraph 7.1025 of the Panel Report.

“6.527. In the first of these sentences, the Panel found that the complainants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures ‘are not apt to make a contribution to Australia’s objective’.1436 In the second sentence, the Panel found that, ‘[r]ather, … the evidence … , taken in its totality, supports the view that the TPP measures … are apt to, and do in fact, contribute to Australia’s objective.’1437

“6.528. The appellants’ appeals were silent regarding the first sentence. They addressed only the second sentence. In doing that, the appellants have not explained how any errors undermining the Panel’s finding in the second sentence of paragraph 7.1025 would suffice to demonstrate that the Panel erred in forming the conclusion in the first sentence of that paragraph.

“6.529. In response to questioning at the second hearing, the appellants stated that it was unnecessary to raise any independent appeal or challenge of the Panel’s finding in the first sentence, because the Panel’s finding in that sentence is integrally linked to the Panel’s finding in the second sentence. The appellants underscored that the Panel conducted an integrated analysis of the degree of contribution based on the evidence as a whole.1438

“6.530. I read these two sentences as saying different things. The first sentence says that the appellants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures are not apt to make a contribution; the second sentence says that the totality of evidence supports the view that the TPP measures are apt to, and do in fact, make a contribution.

“6.531. Even assuming, arguendo, that the appellants are correct that the Panel relied on the totality of the evidence in forming both conclusions in these two sentences of paragraph 7.1025, I do not see how the errors alleged by the appellants pertaining to the Panel’s second-sentence finding would vitiate the Panel’s finding in the first sentence. The mere fact that the Panel may have relied on the same evidence for both findings does not mean that any errors in the Panel’s second determination – that the evidence supports the view that the TPP measures ‘are apt to, and do in fact’ make a contribution – also would undermine the Panel’s conclusion that the complainants failed to substantiate their burden of demonstrating that the TPP measures are not apt to contribute. Those are two different conclusions.

“6.532. Consequently, in order for us to overturn the Panel’s conclusion that the complainants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures are not apt to contribute to Australia’s objective – expressed in the first sentence of paragraph 7.1025 – the appellants were required to demonstrate that the Panel’s errors in its examination of the evidence vitiated that conclusion, and did so in a manner so egregious as to constitute a violation of Article 11 of the DSU.

“6.533. As noted, the appellants did not appeal the Panel’s finding in the first sentence of paragraph 7.1025. They also did not otherwise address the question of whether any errors in the Panel’s evaluation of the second sentence in that paragraph would vitiate the first sentence, except to argue that the two sentences ‘are linked’ and that the Panel’s evaluation of them was based on the same evidence.

“6.534. As a result, I consider that the Panel’s determination that the complainants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures are not apt to contribute to Australia’s objective is undisturbed on appeal. Since measures are presumed to be WTO-consistent until shown otherwise, it follows that the TPP measures are presumed to be at least capable of making a contribution to Australia’s objective1439, whether or not the Panel might have erred in determining that the totality of evidence supports the view that the TPP measures are apt to, and do in fact, make a contribution to Australia’s objective.

“6.535. It follows that the Panel’s finding, in the first sentence of paragraph 7.1025 of the Panel Report, stands. Since the TPP measures are therefore presumed to be capable of contributing to Australia’s objective, it further follows that: (i) the appellants have failed to demonstrate that the Panel erred in rejecting their principal argument; and (ii) with respect to their alternative argument, whether or not the proposed alternatives make an equivalent contribution to the TPP measures, the appellants did not present an alternative that is less trade-restrictive than the TPP measures1440, and consequently there is no basis for us to overturn the Panel’s overall conclusion that the appellants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures are inconsistent with Article 2.2.

“6.536. Thus, I believe it was unnecessary, for purposes of resolving these disputes, for the majority to consider in detail the appellants’ claims regarding the Panel’s assessment of the TPP measures’ contribution to Australia’s objective. For that reason, I also believe that it was inadvisable for the majority to consider in detail the appellants’ contribution claims. This could have been a much shorter report, I believe, based on the findings that the first sentence of paragraph 7.1025, regarding aptness, stands, that the appellants’ proposed alternatives would not be less trade-restrictive than the TPP measures, and therefore that the appellants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures are inconsistent with Article 2.2.

6.2.3 Due process and Article 11 of the DSU

“6.537. I disagree with the majority’s intermediate finding that, by introducing in its Interim Report econometric analyses that had not been tested with the parties, the Panel failed to observe due process in a way that constitutes a violation of Article 11 of the DSU.

“6.538. In my view, the Panel’s reliance on multicollinearity and non-stationarity to test the robustness of the parties’ evidence was part of the Panel’s reasoning, with respect to which a panel enjoys considerable discretion. The parties to this case submitted to the Panel a large amount of econometric evidence. It was appropriate for the Panel to assess the probative value of that evidence. The Panel tested the robustness of the econometric studies submitted by the parties by taking into account, inter alia, whether the models suffered from multicollinearity and non-stationarity. The mere fact that these two so-called ‘criteria’ were not specifically mentioned by the parties is not sufficient to warrant a different scrutiny of the Panel’s reliance on them, as compared to the Panel’s reliance on other econometric concepts (e.g. overfitting and endogeneity) that the parties had identified. I therefore consider that the Panel acted within the bounds of its discretion as a trier of facts by not only examining the parameters used by each party, but also by going further in its evaluation and testing the robustness of the parties’ econometric evidence for multicollinearity and non-stationarity.

“6.539. With regard to the issue of due process, Australia argues that the complainants could have used the interim review stage to request the Panel to review the relevant parts of the Panel Report pursuant to Article 15 of the DSU but chose not to do so.1441 The appellants submit that interim review would not have provided them with a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to comment on the Panel’s concerns regarding multicollinearity and non-stationarity.1442

“6.540. Article 15.2 of the DSU says, in relevant part, that: Within a period of time set by the panel, a party may submit a written request for the panel to review precise aspects of the interim report prior to circulation of the final report to the Members. At the request of a party, the panel shall hold a further meeting with the parties on the issues identified in the written comments. If no comments are received from any party within the comment period, the interim report shall be considered the final panel report and circulated promptly to the Members.

“6.541. The complainants became aware of the Panel’s analysis of multicollinearity and non-stationarity when they received the Panel’s Interim Report on 2 May 2017. However, the complainants did not raise any substantive concerns with respect to these aspects of the Panel’s analysis in their comments on the Interim Report, nor did they request an interim review meeting. It is reasonable to read Article 15.2 as placing responsibility on the complainants to have raised the Panel’s reliance on multicollinearity and non-stationarity at the interim review stage, especially given the importance that the appellants attribute to these issues on appeal. In my view, the complainants’ failure to raise these issues at the interim review stage undermines the appellants’ claim regarding due process.

“6.542. Thus, since the complainants had an opportunity to raise these issues and did not do so, I do not agree with their claim that the Panel denied them due process by not ‘giving the parties any opportunity whatsoever to comment’.1443 Since the complainants did not attempt to raise their concerns regarding the Panel’s reliance on multicollinearity and non-stationarity at the interim review stage, it is unnecessary to speculate about whether the alleged limited nature of the interim review process, which I do not find to be expressed in the text of Article 15.2, would have been sufficient. Consequently, I disagree with the majority’s interim conclusion on this point.

“6.543. In light of the above, I consider that the appellants have not demonstrated that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the facts of the case as required under Article 11 of the DSU by denying the parties an opportunity to comment on the Panel’s reliance on multicollinearity and non-stationarity.

“1428 Panel Report, paras. 7.1025 and 7.1043.

“1429 Panel Report, para. 7.1255.

“1430 Panel Report, paras. 7.1464 and 7.1531.

“1431 Panel Report, paras. 7.1417 and 7.1495.

“1432 See also Panel Report (DS435), para. 8.1.a; Panel Report (DS441), para. 8.1.b.i.

“1433 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 133. See also Appellate Body Reports, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 141; Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, para. 164; EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), para. 177.

“1434 See Panel Report, paras. 7.426, 7.437, 7.485 and 7.520; Honduras’ and the Dominican Republic’s responses to questioning at the second hearing.

“1435 See Honduras’ first written submission to the Panel, paras. 853 and 911; Dominican Republic’s first written submission to the Panel, paras. 737-739, 980, and 1019.

“1436 Panel Report, para. 7.1025.

“1437 Panel Report, para. 7.1025.

“1438 Honduras’ and the Dominican Republic’s responses to questioning at the second hearing (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.495-7.497).

“1439 Where a panel finds that the parties’ evidence reveals that a measure is capable of contributing, or the evidence is unclear or mixed as to whether the measure is capable of contributing, a panel should find that the complainant has failed to demonstrate that the measure is incapable of contributing to the objective. This would at the same time mean that, to the extent that the complainant also argues that the measure is inconsistent with Article 2.2 on the basis that there are reasonably available less trade-restrictive alternative measures capable of making an equivalent contribution, the presumption of WTO-consistency requires that a panel presume that the measure is at least capable of making some contribution to the legitimate objective and, on that basis, proceed to examine the remaining factors for determining ‘necessity’, such as the degree of the measure’s trade restrictiveness and the availability of less trade-restrictive alternative measures.

“1440 For the reasons set forth in sections 6.1.3-6.1.4 we have upheld the Panel’s findings that the alternative measures proposed by the complainants would not be less trade-restrictive than the TPP measures.

“1441 Australia’s appellee’s submission, para. 464.

“1442 Honduras’ responses to questioning at the second hearing. In addition, the Dominican Republic noted that, at the interim review stage, it could pose only ‘rhetorical questions’ to the Panel. (Dominican Republic’s responses to questioning at the second hearing).

“1443 Dominican Republic’s appellant’s submission, para. 42. (emphasis omitted).”

WTO Appellate Body Issues Reports on Australia’s Plain Packaging Requirements on Tobacco Products — Last Reports Until WTO Appellate Body Reform Occurs

On June 9th, the long awaited WTO Appellate Body (“AB”) reports on the two challenges to Australia’s plain packaging requirements on tobacco products were released. AUSTRALIA – CERTAIN MEASURES CONCERNING TRADEMARKS, GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AND OTHER PLAIN PACKAGING REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO TOBACCO PRODUCTS AND PACKAGING, WT/DS435/AB/R and WT/DS441/AB/R (9 June 2020). The appellants were Honduras and the Dominican Republic. The Appellate Body essentially upheld the panel reports not finding violations of WTO Agreements by Australia’s actions. The decisions are important for governments and citizens concerned with the need to limit the reach of health harmful products like cigarettes. With plain packaging laws now prevalent in a number of countries, one can expect today’s AB decision to encourage more countries to emulate the approach taken by Australia (in part or in whole).

The WTO Secretariat prepares summaries of findings on cases. Below is the link to the summary followed by the summary of findings from the AB decisions provided on the WTO webpage, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds435_e.htm#bkmk435abr:

“Honduras (DS435) and the Dominican Republic (DS441) (together referred to as the appellants) requested the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel’s conclusions under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, and Articles 16.1 and 20 of the TRIPS Agreement.

  • “1. With respect to Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement:
    • With respect to the contribution of the TPP measures to Australia’s objective, the Appellate Body found that Honduras had not substantiated its claim that the Panel erred in its application of Article 2.2 to the facts of the case. Ultimately, the Appellate Body found that the appellants had not demonstrated that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the facts under Article 11 of the DSU. In particular, the Appellate Body found that, although the Panel erred by disregarding certain evidence adduced by the Dominican Republic, and acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU by compromising the complainants’ due process rights with respect to the Panel’s reliance on multicollinearity and non‑stationarity when reviewing the parties’ econometric evidence, such errors were not sufficiently material to vitiate the Panel’s findings regarding the contribution of the TPP measures to Australia’s objective, namely improving public health by reducing the use of, and exposure to, tobacco products.
    • The Appellate Body found that the appellants had not demonstrated that the Panel erred in its intermediate conclusions pertaining to the trade restrictiveness of the TPP measures. In particular, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding that the impact of the TPP measures on reducing the opportunity for producers to differentiate between different products on the basis of brands did not in itself necessarily amount to a limiting effect on international trade. The Appellate Body also upheld the Panel’s finding that the complainants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures would necessarily lead to a decline in the value of imported tobacco products as a consequence of consumers shifting from premium to non-premium products in response to the TPP measures (downtrading).
    • With respect to the alternative measures, the Appellate Body found that the Panel erred in finding that the complainants had failed to demonstrate that each of the two alternative measures (the increase in the MLPA and an increase in taxation) would be apt to make a contribution equivalent to that of the TPP measures. However, the Appellate Body found that the Panel did not err in finding that the complainants had failed to demonstrate that these two alternative measures are less trade restrictive than the TPP measures. Consequently, the Panel’s finding that the complainants had not demonstrated that the increase in the MLPA and the increase in taxation would each “be a less trade restrictive alternative to the TPP measures that would make an equivalent contribution to Australia’s objective”, stands.
    • Consequently, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s conclusion that the complainants had not demonstrated that the TPP measures are more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, within the meaning of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
  • “2. With respect to Article 16.1 of the TRIPS Agreement:
    • The Appellate Body found that the Panel did not err in its interpretation of Article 16.1. The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that Article 16.1 of the TRIPS Agreement grants a trademark owner the exclusive right to preclude unauthorized use of the trademark by third parties. However, Article 16.1 does not confer upon a trademark owner a positive right to use its trademark or a right to protect the distinctiveness of that trademark through use.
    • Having found no error in the Panel’s interpretation, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that there was no need to examine further the complainants’ factual allegation that the TPP measures’ prohibition on the use of certain tobacco related trademarks would in fact reduce the distinctiveness of such trademarks, and lead to a situation where a “likelihood of confusion” with respect to these trademarks is less likely to arise in the market.
    • Consequently, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s conclusion that the complainants have not demonstrated that the TPP measures are inconsistent with Article 16.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.
  • “3. With respect to Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement
    • The Appellate Body found that the Panel did not err in its interpretation and application of Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement. In particular, the Appellate Body considered that the Panel did not err in its interpretation of the term ‘unjustifiably’ in Article 20 and in its application of this interpretation to the facts of the case. The Appellate Body thus agreed with the Panel that the complainants had not demonstrated that trademark-related requirements of the TPP measures unjustifiably encumbered the use of trademarks in the course of trade within the meaning of Article 20.
    • Consequently, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s conclusion that the complainants had not demonstrated that the TPP measures are inconsistent with Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement.

“The Appellate Body recalled that, having rejected all of the complainants’ claims, the Panel had declined Honduras’ and the Dominican Republic’s requests that the Panel recommend, in accordance with Article 19.1 of the DSU, that the DSB request Australia to bring the measures at issue into conformity with the TRIPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement.

“Having upheld the Panel’s findings under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement and Articles 16.1 and 20 of the TRIPS Agreement, it followed that the Appellate Body also agreed with the Panel that Honduras and the Dominican Republic had not succeeded in establishing that Australia’s TPP measures are inconsistent with the provisions of the covered agreements at issue. Accordingly, the Appellate Body made no recommendation to the DSB, pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU.”

While the Reports are Not Surprising in Outcome, They Show Many of the Concerns that U.S. has Raised about the AB Over Time

These are the last reports of the Appellate Body until the impasse on the appointment of new Appellate Body members is solved, which will require the United States achieving reforms in the operation of the Appellate Body and the AB’s actual adherence to the Dispute Settlement Understanding as negotiated.

Many of the concerns that the U.S. has long raised are present in the current decisions. For example, the reports were not prepared in 90 days from the date of appeal, nor were the delays in completion of the appeals specifically authorized by the parties. The decisions were prepared by non-current members of the Appellate Body (although Members had agreed to permit conclusion of appeals where hearings had already occurred). The vast majority of the issues in the appeals were challenges to findings of fact by the panels under the guise of DSU Article 11 challenges that the panels failed to make an objective assessment of the facts. While the Appellate Body decisions attempt to limit what the AB should be reviewing where DSU Art. 11 is the basis for the claim, the bulk of the decisions still involve discussions of at least some of the DSU Art. 11 claims made by the appellants. See WT/DS435/AB/R at 38-135 and WT/DS441/AB/R at 38-135.

The United States was a third party to the cases but limited its written comments to a few issues, the most important of which was the need for the Appellate Body not to permit Art. 11 to be used for a review of factual findings, which by DSU are issues for the panel. See WT/DS435/AB/R/Add.1, Annex C-16 at 92-93; WT/DS441/AB/R/Add.1, Annex C-16 at 92-93:

“III. COMPLAINANTS’ CLAIMS OF ERROR UNDER THE DSU

“7. Honduras and the Dominican Republic both appeal dozens of factual findings under DSU Article 11. Both appeals by Honduras and the Dominican Republic to the Appellate Body make numerous claims under Article 11 of the DSU of what clearly are alleged factual errors by the Panel. By agreement of all WTO Members, the DSU expressly limits the scope of an appeal to alleged legal errors by a panel, not factual errors.6 The United States disagrees with these attempts to re-litigate dozens of unfavorable factual determinations by the Panel through claims of breach of Article 11 of the DSU.

“8. The Appellate Body has an opportunity in this appeal to reconsider how its originally limited approach to review the “objective assessment” of a panel has been seized by appellants to cover practically all factual determinations by a panel. Given the lack of textual basis in the DSU for
appellate review of panel fact-finding, the Appellate Body could instead reassert that the proper issues for appeal are issues of law and legal interpretations covered by a panel report.7

“6 See DSU Article 17.6.

“7 Id. (“An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.”).”

Conclusion

The plain packaging decisions by the Appellate Body are the last AB decisions until the impasse over AB member selection is resolved which means that the U.S. concerns of the operation of the AB must be resolved.

While the decisions are important in themselves, they also demonstrate the types of problems which have made Appellate Body decisions untimely and problematic to the United States and other Members.

While some Members are now proceeding with arbitration type actions to maintain a second-level review of disputes, the need for collective action to return the Appellate Body to its proper and limited role continues. With the COVID-19 pandemic and now the Director-General selection process taking up much of the trade oxygen for many WTO Members, the need for Appellate Body reform is likely to slip to 2021 or later before being focused on again.

The WTO Budget — Will There Be a Resolution in December?

November 2019 proved to be a challenging time for the WTO in terms of getting agreement on the budget for the organization for 2020. Normally, the budget is approved for a two year time period. At the November 12 Budget, Finance and Administration Committee [“BFA Committee”] meeting, the United States had questions on a number of topics including funding for the Appellate Body and its Secretariat with the result that the Director-General’s draft budget was not approved at that meeting. The Committee added another meeting to the agenda for November 27 in the hope of achieving resolution and agreement at the Committee level on the budget for 2020-2021.

Virtually none of the documents that are submitted to or generated by the BFA Committee are made public, nor is there a summary of meetings that is made available to the public. Thus, relatively little is public about events following the November 12 BFA Committee meeting. The Director-General is reported to have revised the budget proposal after consultations with the United States which appeared to leave the total budget for the WTO in tact but to have modified what could be used for the Appellate Body based on the reality of the number of Appellate Body [“AB”} members being reduced to 1 after December 10 which prevents the AB from handling new appeals after that date.

Press accounts suggest that the U.S. agreed to having just a few of the 13 pending appeals concluded with AB funds — specifically the two plain packaging of cigarette cases against Australia brought by Costa Rica and Honduras (DS435 and DS 441). In an earlier note, I had reviewed the likely challenges for the 13 pending appeals in light of when notices of appeal were filed and the possibility of one of the two AB members whose term expires on December 10 apparently not having expressed a willingness to continue to hear appeals past the end of his second term.

Reportedly, the U.S. has also insisted on funding for any arbitration under DSU Article 25 to be handled from the WTO Secretariat and be at the level and amount for panelists vs. Appellate Body members.

Finally, the U.S. has only agreed to funding for 2020 with 2021 to be dealt with next year.

At the meeting on November 27, press reports indicate that objections to the modified budget were raised by the EU, China, India and Turkey. on various grounds (e.g., different treatment for different pending disputes; contractual commitments to the remaining AB member for the remainder of the member’s term; view that it is not the role of the BFA Committee to resolve how pending appeals are handled) with no consensus at the end of the November 27 meeting. See, e.g., Washington Trade Daily, November 28, 2019 at 1-2.

No additional BFA Committee meeting has been added to the WTO list of remaining meetings in 2019. There are two informal heads of delegation meetings ahead of the December 9-11 General Council meeting. One was held on November 29 (informal General Council – heads of deletation) but has no report of what was discussed or whether the budget was being handled in ongoing negotiations with those raising concerns. The next informal heads of delegation meeting is scheduled for Friday, December 6 (TNC – heads of delegation) followed by the three day General Council meeting.

The General Council’s agenda is likely lengthy and will include annual reports from various committees and other entities but has not been made public at this point. However, some documents for review at the General Council are available publicly including the draft General Council Decision prepared by Amb. Walker of New Zealand which is an attempt to find a solution to problems with the dispute settlement system raised by the United States. As the U.S. has already indicated that the draft General Council Decision does not adequately address its concerns, it is not expected that the draft Decision will be adopted by the General Council after it has been presented and discussed.

December 18 is the last regularly scheduled Dispute Settlement Body meeting of the year, and will occur eight days after the last day the Appellate Body has a minimum of three Appellate Body members (assuming no resolution with the United States). Thus, no new appeals filed after December 10 can be heard by the Appellate Body until new members are agreed to.

Amb. Walker, who in addition to being the facilitator for the General Council’s consideration of the issue is the current Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body, is understood to be working with Members to see if there is an approach to the pending appeals that can be approved. For the reasons reviewed in the Nov. 24 post, it is unlikely that most of the current appeals will be in a position to proceed if all three of the existing Appellate Body members don’t agree to continue to serve under Rule 15 of the AB’s procedures despite the terms for two of the three expiring on December 10. Amb. Walker will be hoping to have an agreed solution ahead of the December 18 DSB meeting. But the resolution on how pending appeals will be handled, if found, is presumably relevant to what the Members agree to for the 2020 budget. The December 18 DSB meeting is the last listed meeting of any WTO group for 2019. Indeed, December 23 – 31 are shown as non-working days for the WTO.

While it is hard to imagine that WTO Members won’t approve a modified budget for 2020 in the coming few weeks, it is likely to be a tense end to 2019 at the WTO with formal or informal additional meetings possible and with some Members having to consider how to handle pending appeals and all ongoing and future disputes.