Italy

COVID-19 — US International Trade Commission report on U.S. imports and tariffs on COVID-19 related goods

In a post from April 6th, I reviewed a WTO document on medical goods relevant to COVID-19. https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/04/06/covid-19-wto-report-on-medical-goods-fao-report-on-food-security/. As reviewed in that post, the data compiled by the WTO were useful but both over- and underinclusive. Because tariffs are harmonized for most countries at the 6-digit HS level, comparable data was only available at that level for the WTO’s analysis even though virtually every category included many products that are not relevant to treating COVID-19. The list also doesn’t include input materials as recognized by the WTO. I had suggested that it would be useful to have WTO Members supply information at their most disaggregated level of detail to see if a tighter fit of at least finished products could be identified in terms of trade.

The United States has now provided a report that provides its data at the 10-digit HTS level of detail for imports into the United States. It would be helpful if other major trading nations similarly provided their detail data to the WTO and for public release. Hopefully, the U.S. will provide similar data for its exports in the coming months.

Development of U.S. import data

USTR has been exploring possible elimination of duties on medical goods needed for the U.S. response to COVID-19 and is accepting comments through late June. The U.S. International Trade Commission (“USITC”) was asked by the Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee and the Chairman of U.S. Senate Committee on Finance to conduct “a factfinding investigation to identify imported goods related to the response to COVID-19, their source countries, tariff classifications, and applicable rates of duty.”. The report from the USITC’s Investigation 332-576 was completed in late April and is now available from the USITC webpage. USITC, COVID-19 Related Goods: U.S. Imports and Tariffs, Publication 5047 (April 2020). Updates to the report may be made through June 2020. See https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2020/er0504ll1540.htm

In the report, the USITC compiled data on 112 10-digit HTS categories but noted that many of these categories which are generally more detailed than the 6-digit categories used in the WTO paper still contain large quantities of goods that are not relevant to the COVID-19 response. Thus, the U.S. data, while more refined that the 6-digit data used by the WTO are still overinclusive. To the extent major input data for products needed to address COVID-19 are not included in the USITC investigation, the results are underinclusive as well.

The USITC Executive Summary notes that of the 112 HTS categories:

6 cover COVID-19 test kits/testing instruments,

9 cover disinfectants ad sterilization products,

22 cover medical imagining, diagnostic, oxygen therapy, pulse oximeters, and other equipment,

20 cover medicines (pharmaceuticals),

19 cover non-PPE medical consumables and hospital supplies,

27 cover personal protective equipment, and

9 covered other products.

Looking at what tariffs were applied, the ITC looked both at ordinary customs duties (Column 1 rates) and also whether additional duties on products from China were owed because of the 301 investigation and subsequent actions by the Administration. The USITC indicated that 76 products (68%) were duty-free for ordinary customs purposes and that 36 products (32%) were subject to duties, though one or more countries’ goods entered duty free for each of the 36 products.

For goods from China, 59 categories were not subject to additional 301 duties, 55 products were subject to additional duties (39 products at 25% additional duties; 16 products at 7.5% additional duties) although 28 of the 55 categories were subject to exclusions (total exclusions for 13 product categories; partial exclusions for the remaining 15 categories).

The Commission pulled import data for 2017-2019 (including for several categories which expired before 2020 for completeness of the underlying data). The data show US imports by HTS category and then show the top 5 source countries by HTS and the all other country customs value.

The data from the investigation will be used by USTR and Congress to inform Administration decisions on which products should receive tariff reductions/eliminations.

Using the ITC’s list, the trade data can presently be updated through March 2020 as March 2020 data are now publicly available.. The total for the 112 categories for 2019 was U.S. imports for consumption of $105.3 billion up from $81.3 billion in 2017 and $93.7 billion in 2018. Imports in the first quarter of 2020 were $28.6 billion up from $24.6 billion in the first quarter of 2019.

The top 15 sources of imports into the U.S. in 2019 are the following. Data also show the percentage change in the first quarter of 2020 compared to the first quarter of 2019.

Top sources of imports Customs Value 2019 % change 2019-2020

Ireland $14.173 billion +12.77%

China $12.313 billion -14.13%

Germany $12.228 billion +20.35%

Mexico $ 8.791 billion + 4.44%

Canada $ 6.026 billion +19.57%

Belgium $ 5.952 billion +63.21%

Switzerland $ 5.082 billion +39.80%

Japan $ 4.144 billion +28.38%

United Kingdom $ 3.409 billion +11.42%

India $ 2.816 billion +16.71%

South Korea $ 2.694 billion -30.68%

Netherlands $ 2.545 billion +94.16%

Italy $ 2.177 billion +75.66%

Malaysia $ 2.163 billion + 7.65%

Costa Rica $ 1.693 billion +22.50%

All Other $16.574 billion +15.13%

Total $105.267 billion +16.16%

Different supplying countries focus on different parts of the medical goods needs of the United States. For example, the top four HTS categories imports from Ireland accounted for more than $10 billion of the $14.173 billion from the country in 2019 and all were medicines. In comparison, the top two HTS categories of imports into the U.S. from China were basket categories (other articles of plastic; other made up articles) which are presumably personal protective equipment (“PPE”) products and were $5 billion of the $12.313 billion. While ventilators were also a significant item, most other major items appear to fit within the PPE category.

Conclusion

The purpose of the USITC investigation and report are to provide information to the Congress and Administration to help identify which imported products relevant to the COVID-19 response by the United States are dutiable and which products from China are also subject to additional tariffs from the 301 investigation. The Administration and Congress will use the information as part of the Administration’s review of which imported products should face a reduction or elimination of tariffs at least during the pandemic.

However, the data also provide useful information for broader use in understanding the extent of trade in goods actually relevant to the global response to COVID-19. Hopefully, the U.S. will compile comparable data on the country’s exports and other major trading nations will supply comparable data to the WTO and to the public.

COVID-19 – G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors April 15, 2020 Communique and G20 Action Plan

With the COVID-19 pandemic continuing to expand globally, with confirmed cases roughly 2.2 million on April 17 and with deaths exceeding 150,000, the world’s major economies continue to meet to promote policies and take individual and collective actions to address the health, social and economic impacts from the pandemic.

The G20 finance ministers and central bank governors met virtually earlier this week in an effort to push forward the overall objectives of G20 leaders. The communique that was released at the end of the virtual meeting included an Annex containing a “G20 Action Plan – Supporting the Global Economy through the COVID-19 Pandemic”. Below is a lengthy excerpt from the opening remarks of Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Finance, H.E. Mr. Mohammed bin Abdullah Al-Jadaan. Saudi Arabia holds the presidency of the G20 in 2020.

“We have just concluded our second G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting on the margin of the 2020 spring meetings.

“This pandemic has already taken a great toll on our people and on their economic wellbeing, and we are still faced with extraordinary uncertainty about the depth and duration of this global pandemic.

“G20 Leaders, during the G20 Extraordinary Leaders’ Summit on 26 March 2020, recognized the gravity of the intertwined public health and economic crises. They have therefore committed to a globally coordinated response encompassing all necessary measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.

“More recently, G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors convened two extraordinary meetings to reach a consensus on a roadmap that will implement our G20 Leaders’ commitments in responding to COVID-19.

“Ministers and Governors’ urgent collective priority is to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic and its intertwined health, social and economic impacts. We are determined to spare no effort, both individually and collectively, to protect lives, overcome the pandemic, safeguard people’s jobs and incomes, support the global economy during and after this phase and ensure the resilience of the financial system.

“These are unprecedented times that demand swift, strong and significant global action. G20 members have injected over $7 trillion into the global economy to protect jobs, businesses and economies, billions have been allocated to the hunt for vaccines, research and development, protection of front line health workers and addressing trade issues on vital goods. Our
efforts must continue and be amplified.

“Ministers and Governors are committed to use all available policy tools to support the global economy, boost confidence, maintain financial stability and prevent deep and prolonged economic effects. As mandated by the extraordinary G20 Leaders’ Summit, today Ministers and Governors endorsed a G20 Action Plan in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

“The Plan sets out our commitments to specific actions to drive forward international economic cooperation as we navigate this crisis and look ahead to a robust and sustained global economic recovery.

“Our aim, with the action plan, is to support the necessary health response and measures to increase our collective health resilience for the future, preventing a liquidity crisis turning into a solvency crisis, and a global recession becoming a global depression.

“Ministers and Governors have worked as well to deliver international financial assistance to the developing countries.

“Our actions today include a G20 initiative to suspend debt service payments for the poorest countries. All bilateral official creditors will participate in this initiative, which is an important milestone for the G20. The multilateral development banks are also expected to further explore the options for their participation in this initiative. And through this platform, I also call on private creditors, working through the Institute of International Finance, to participate in this initiative on comparable terms.
In addition, our collective actions today resulted in a comprehensive IMF financial support package and implementing urgently the support proposed by the WBG and the Multilateral Development Banks, amounting to USD 200 billion. Ministers and Governors have also taken exceptional measures to develop bilateral swap lines and repo facilities by central banks.”

The Communique and its Annexes can be found here, http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2020/2020-g20-finance-0415.html, and the document is embedded below.

Communiqué_-G20-Finance-Ministers-and-Central-Bank-Governors-April-15-2020

The action plan provides a number of useful agreed actions to address the three broad needs for governmental action to respond to the pandemic – the health response (saving lives), pages 3-4; the economic and financial response (supporting the vulnerable and maintaining conditions for a strong recovery), pages 4-6; and returning to strong, sustainable balanced and inclusive growth once containment measures are lifted, pages 6-7. The action plan also reviews what is being done to provide international support to countries in need, pages 7-8, and actions needed to learn from the current pandemic, pages 8-9. Actions through multilateral organizations like the World Bank and IMF and additional actions through regional development banks provide hope for many least developed countries and many developing countries that assistance is forthcoming for each area of primary need. How successful the assistance will be will depend in part on private sector participation in debt payment deferrals and whether G20 governments increase the level of funding made available to the World Bank and IMF.

Not surprisingly, few of the actions outlined in the G20 action plan are trade specific. Most deal with the types of actions needed to help countries and territories get through the pandemic without the collapse of their economies. The focus is on financial needs. However, there is one trade specific action listed in each of the three areas reviewed.

For health – “We agree that emergency trade measures designed to tackle COVID-19, if deemed necessary, must be targeted, proportionate, transparent and temporary, and that they do not create unnecessary barriers to trade or disruption to global supply chains, and are consistent with WTO rules. We are actively working to ensure the continued flow of vital medical supplies and equipment.” Page 4.

For economic and financial response – “As agreed by Trade and Investment Ministers, we will continue to work together to deliver a free, fair, non-discriminatory, transparent, predictable and stable trade and investment environment, and to keep our markets open.” Page 5.

For returning to strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth — “We look forward to work by the G20 Trade and Investment Working Group to identify, among other things, longer term actions that should be taken to support the multilateral trading system and expedite economic recovery.” Page 6.

As reviewed in prior posts, the lack of greater specificity on trade actions the G20 can agree on reflects in part the existing flexibilities within the WTO permitting governments to take trade restricting actions for certain purposes, including protecting human health. It is also the case that a number of the G20 countries (e.g., China, EU countries, India and the US) have used export restraints already as part of their response to COVID-19. In such a situation, language other than that calling for trade restrictive measures taken to be “targeted, proportionate, transparent and temporary” was unlikely to win agreement from the G20 countries as a whole.

The G20 action plan released by the finance ministers and central bank governors constitutes important ongoing steps by the G20 to provide some coordinated leadership to addressing at least certain global needs flowing from the pandemic.

IMF, OECD and FSB policy tracking tools for government actions to address COVID-19

Attachment I to the G20 Action Plan are links to policy tracking sites on the IMF and the OECD websites. The Attactment also reviews information that is available from the Financial Stability Board. Pages 11-12 describes the policy tracking sites as follows:

“The International Monetary Fund: This policy tracker summarizes the key economic responses governments are taking to limit the human and economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic as of end-March 2020. The tracker includes 193 economies. Available here: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19.

“The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development: This series brings together policy responses spanning a large range of topics, from health to education and taxes. It is updated daily. Available here:
http://oecd.org/coronavirus/en/#country-policy-tracker.

“The Financial Stability Board: Compilation of regulatory, supervisory and other financial policy measures in response to COVID-19. Circulated to FSB members.” See, e.g., FSB, COVID-19 pandemic: Financial stability implications and policy measures taken, https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P150420.pdf

Below is an excerpt from the IMF tracker for China:

“China, People’s Republic of

“China has been hit hard by the outbreak with over 81,865 confirmed COVID-19 cases and 3,335 deaths as of April 9, 2020 (mainland). The government imposed strict containment measures, including the extension of the national Lunar New Year holiday (ending on Feb 2 extended from Jan 30), the lockdown of Hubei province, large-scale mobility restrictions at the national level, social distancing, and a 14-day quarantine period for returning migrant workers. The domestic transmission of the virus has slowed significantly, and mobility restrictions have been largely removed. while policy has tightened to contain the virus transmission of asymptomatic cases.

“Key Policy Responses as of April 9, 2020

“FISCAL

“An estimated RMB 2.6 trillion (or 2.5 percent of GDP) of fiscal measures or
financing plans have been announced, of which 1.2 percent of GDP are
already being implemented. Key measures include: (i) Increased spending on epidemic prevention and control. (ii) Production of medical equipment. (iii) Accelerated disbursement of unemployment insurance. (iv) Tax relief and waived social security contributions. The overall fiscal expansion is expected to be significantly higher, reflecting the effect of already announced additional measures such as an increase in the ceiling for special local government bonds of 1.3 percent of GDP, improvements of the national public health emergency management system, and automatic stabilizers.

“MONETARY AND MACRO-FINANCIAL

“The PBC provided monetary policy support and acted to safeguard financial market stability. Key measures include: (i) liquidity injection into the banking system via open market operations, including RMB 3 trillion in the first half of February and 170 billion in late-March, (ii) expansion of re-lending and rediscounting facilities by RMB 1.8 trillion to support manufacturers of medical supplies and daily necessities micro-, small- and medium-sized firms and the agricultural sector at low interest rates, (iii) reduction of the 7-day and 14-day reverse repo rates by 30 and 10 bps, respectively, as well as the 1-year medium-term lending facility rate by 10 bps, (iv) targeted RRR cuts by 50-100 bps for large- and medium-sized banks that meet inclusive financing criteria which benefit smaller firms, an additional 100 bps for eligible joint-stock banks, and 100 bps for small- and medium-sized banks in April and May to support SMEs, (v) reduction of the interest on excess reserves from 72 to 35 bps, and (vi) policy banks’ credit extension to micro- and small enterprises (RMB 350 billion).

“The government has also taken multiple steps to limit tightening in financial conditions, including measured forbearance to provide financial relief to affected households, corporates, and regions facing repayment difficulties. Key measures include (i) delay of loan payments and other credit support measures for eligible SMEs and households, (ii) tolerance for higher NPLs for loans by epidemic-hit sectors and SMEs, (iii) support bond issuance by financial institutions to finance SME lending, (iv) additional financing support for corporates via increased bond issuance by corporates, (v) increased fiscal support for credit guarantees, (vi) flexibility in the implementation of the asset management reform, and (vii) easing of housing policies by local governments.

“EXCHANGE RATE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

“The exchange rate has been allowed to adjust flexibly. A ceiling on crossborder financing under the macroprudential assessment framework was raised by 25 percent for banks, non-banks and enterprises.”

As noted, the IMF tracks the same type of information for 193 economies. The IMF data do not include trade-related actions by governments.

More surprising is that the OECD policy tracker doesn’t review trade-related actions since the OECD does review trade policy issues within its overall activities. In an earlier post, I had noted that the OECD indicates that it shares trade information with the WTO, but neither the WTO nor the OECD present information is as detailed and comprehensive a way as the tracking done by the IMF or done by the OECD on matters they do cover. Below is the OECD tracking information for Italy as an example of the depth of information provided for each country monitored:

“Italy Beta Updated on 17-Apr-2020

Containment measures/Quarantine/Confinement


“On April 10, the government extended the lockdown to 3 May. People can only leave the home for prescribed, essential purposes. Movement out of the municipality of residence remains prohibited.

“On March 23, movements restrictions reinforced, with fewer exceptions and a limited range of industrial and commercial activities permitted to continue operating.

“Industrial and commercial activity prohibited apart from those assessed as ‘essential’, with a list that includes about 30% of private employment and activity.

Travel bans/restrictions

“Strict travel restrictions nation-wide, reinforced from March 23 and, on April 10, were extended to May 2. These prohibit movements out of the municipality where individuals reside. Non-nationals or residents cannot enter Italy except for limited, prescribed reasons.

Closure of schools/universities

“Closure of schools and universities from March 4 until April 3, extended to at least April 14.

Cancellation of public events / Closure of public places

“- Bars and restaurants along with many other retail trade activities (e.g. shopping centres; indoor and outdoor markets) closed from March 10 until at least 14 April, and all sporting competitions suspended over the same period along with other public gatherings.

“- All but prescribed essential production activities suspended from March 23, with the list of permitted activities further limited from March 26.

“- On March 30, closures extended from April 3 to 30 April for sports, bars and similar activities.

Support measures – Health

“EUR 3.2 billion for the national health service and to support civil protection. Within this package:

“- EUR 1.4 bn to raise funding for the health care system for 2020, including EUR 845 m to recruit 20 000 more health workers.

“- Ease burden of hospitals: dedicate entire facilities to patients infected with Covid-19, while redirected non-infected patients for other facilities.

“- Increased cleaning of public transportation facilities, such as metro transit, buses, boats.

“- Measures to increase purchases and production of medical materials (masks, ventilation machines).

“- Repurposing of medical equipment and buildings (e.g. hotels) for the medical emergency.

“- The production of face masks is incentivised

“- Retired medical personnel are encouraged to come back to work

“- Smart working has been extensively favoured, both in the private and in the public sector.

Fiscal measures – overall

“EUR 25 billion of measures, including EUR 20 billion of net debt measures. 1) EUR 3.2 bn for health care and civil protection; 2) EUR 10.3 bn for employment and incomes; 3) EUR 5.1 bn support to raise liquidity for businesses and households; 4) EUR 1.6 bn tax payment support. EUR 540 m for 60% tax credit on commercial rents.

Fiscal measures – people specific

“Over EUR 10 bn allocated:

“- EUR 5.0 bn to strengthen the wage supplementation scheme for furloughed employees, and increase to a last-resort fund for workers not qualifying for these measures. This includes about EUR 1.3 bn for ordinary wage supplementation schemes, EUR 300 m for wage supplementation schemes to firms that already participate in the ‘cassa integrazione guadagni straordinaria’ supplementation scheme, and EUR 3.3 bn for firms already that already participate in of the ‘cassa integrazione in deroga’. A Last Resort scheme is established for workers not qualifying (EUR 300 m).

“- EUR 2.3 bn for one-off EUR 600 payment to various categories of self-employed and seasonal workers. A Last Resort scheme has been established for those not qualifying.

“- EUR 400 m for one-year suspension in the repayment of real estate mortgages by workers having lost their job.

“- Allowance of EUR 500 per month for up to 3 months for self-employed workers in the municipalities most affected.

“- EUR 1.3 bn to strengthen childcare support for children up to 12 years old (15 extra days at a 50% wage replacement rate, compared with 0% or 30% of the ordinary leave) or, alternatively, a EUR 600 transfer to pay childcare services.

“- EUR 30 m for EUR 1000 childcare payment to employees in the healthcare and law enforcement sectors.

“- EUR 0.5 bn to raise by 12 days the paid leave for disabled workers and workers caring for a disabled relative.

“- EUR 130 m to extend sick leave to cover days spent in quarantine.

“- EUR 900 m for a EUR 100 one-off bonus to workers who continued to work at their workplace.

“- Moratorium on debt payments, including mortgages.

“- EUR 400 m for one-year suspension in the repayment of real estate mortgages by workers having lost their job.

“- Moratorium on debt payments, including mortgages.

Fiscal measures – company specific

“- EUR 540 m for 60% tax credit on commercial rents.

“- EUR 50 m for incentives to firms to sanitise workplaces.

“- Suspension for 2 months of tax and social security payments in the municipalities most affected.

“- For firms with an annual turnover below EUR 2 m, suspension of all the tax and social security payments coming due in March (valued at EUR 10 bn in deferred payments).

“- Non-application of withholding tax for professionals without employees, with revenues below EUR 400 000 until 31 May 2020.

“- Suspension of collection of tax collection files (valued at EUR 0.6 bn).

“- EUR 50 m allocation for one-year suspension in repayment of loans to Invitalia to support SMEs in the most affected municipalities.

“- Suspension of 2 months (until end of April) in the payment of the electricity, gas, water and waste bills in the most affected municipalities.

“- Increase to EUR 1.7 bn for the Fund to provide fee-free guarantee for SMEs loans. Eligibility has been enlarged, admission fees and costs reduced. Private individuals can contribute to the SMEs Fund’s financing. Maximum guarantees raised from EUR 2.5 m to EUR 5 m.

“- Further guarantees for firms most affected by the virus. Facilitate guarantees for self-employed workers, freelancers and individual entrepreneurs.

“- Suspension of 6 months (until end of September) of loan repayment by SMEs.

“- State guarantee for up to EUR 10 bn in new loans for medium-large firms.

“- EUR 500 m to support exporting firms.

“- Incentive to sell impaired loans (NPLs) by converting deferred tax assets (DTA) into tax credits for financial and industrial companies.

“- Establishment of a Fund to support the cultural sector. Increase in advances from the 2014-2020 Development and Cohesion Fund.

“- Increase to EUR 1.7 bn for the Fund to provide fee-free guarantee for SMEs loans. Eligibility has been enlarged, admission fees and costs reduced. Private individuals can contribute to the SMEs Fund’s financing. Maximum guarantees raised from EUR 2.5 m to EUR 5 m.

“- Further guarantees for firms most affected by the virus. Facilitate guarantees for self-employed workers, freelancers and individual entrepreneurs.

– Suspension of 6 months (until end of September) of loan repayment by SMEs.

“- State guarantee for up to EUR 10 bn in new loans for medium-large firms.
Information not available.

“- Increase to EUR 1.7 bn for the Fund to provide fee-free guarantee for SMEs loans. Eligibility has been enlarged, admission fees and costs reduced. Private individuals can contribute to the SMEs Fund’s financing. Maximum guarantees raised from EUR 2.5 m to EUR 5 m.

“- Further guarantees for firms most affected by the virus. Facilitate guarantees for self-employed workers, freelancers and individual entrepreneurs.

“- Suspension of 6 months (until end of September) of loan repayment by SMEs.

“- State guarantee for up to EUR 10 bn in new loans for medium-large firms.
Information not available.

Monetary policy / Macro-prudential regulation

“Information not available

“Less significant banks and non-bank intermediaries are allowed to operate temporarily below the level of the Pillar 2 Guidance, the capital conservation buffer and the liquidity coverage ratio. Their deadline to submit their revised NPL reduction plans is postponed to 30 June. Other reporting and inspection deadlines are delayed.”

World Customs Organization Tracks Certain Trade-Related Actions Related to COVID-19

In an earlier post, I had reviewed transparency concerns in tracking trade actions related to COVID-19. As the above information shows, other international organizations (IMF and OECD) provide pretty detailed information on certain aspects of government actions related to COVID-19. While the WTO has a page dedicated to COVID-19 and has compiled a list of notifications from Members of trade actions taken (both trade restricting and trade liberalizing), the data on the WTO website are limited. The limitation flows in large part from the failure of Members to provide full notifications. As mentioned, the OECD should be able to supplement what it puts out to include information on trade actions it has access to from OECD member governments.

Similarly, the World Customs Organization compiles customs related actions taken by governments on its website. The information on India is linked to below and then embedded. http://www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/facilitation/activities-and-programmes/natural-disaster/covid_19/best-practices_india_en.pdf?la=en.

best-practices_india_en

The International Trade Centre in Geneva has a “dashboard” that is updated daily showing COVID-19 temporary trade actions taken by governments. https://www.macmap.org/en/covid19.

It would useful if there was a compilation of trade-related actions from either the WTO or a consortium of international organizations so that there is much greater transparency on efforts (both trade restricting and trade liberalizing).

Conclusion

The COVID-19 data on confirmed cases show that the vast majority of the cases to date have been in Europe, the U.S., China and a few other countries although nearly all countries have some cases. With an unprecedented (at least in the last 100 years) pandemic, the breadth and complexity of the needs of G20 countries and the rest of the world are breathtaking. While some have criticized the G20 for the lack of specific commitments in the trade area of COVID-19 responses, the G20 Action Plan released earlier this week is an important step by the world’s major economies to address not only the health needs of the global community but also the interrelated economic survival of economies both within the G20 and around the world. While more undoubtedly needs to be done, the Action Plan is a start and will hopefully be updated and expanded in the coming weeks and months.

U.S. Additional Tariffs on Imports of Steel and Aluminum “Derivative” Products — Presidential Proclamation 9980

The United States conducted two investigations under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as modified, in 2017 with findings that imports of steel and aluminum products were a threat to U.S. national security. Import relief (25% on covered steel products and 10% on covered aluminum products) was imposed by mid-2018. Retaliation by many trading partners followed without resort to WTO dispute settlement. Dispute settlement cases were also filed by a number of countries. The U.S. also filed disputes against those countries who had retaliated without obtaining final reports or decisions from the WTO panels or Appellate Body and authorization if the U.S. did not comply with any loss that might have happened. All the disputes that are ongoing are at the panel stage at the WTO.

A number of countries agreed to other arrangements with the U.S. or were excluded from coverage. These included Argentina, Australia, Canada and Mexico for aluminum products and those countries plus Brazil and South Korea for steel products.

On January 24, 2020, President Trump issued a Presidential Proclamation “on Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Derivative Steel Articles into the United States”. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-adjusting-imports-derivative-aluminum-articles-derivative-steel-articles-united-states/. The Proclamation (No. 9980) will be published in the Federal Register on January 29, 2020 and will apply to imports from subject countries beginning on February 8 (25% on steel derivative products and 10% on aluminum derivative products listed in Annexes II and I respectively). The inspection version of the Federal Register for January 29 is available today and the document is attached below. In the Proclamation, the President lays out the history of the 232 investigations and actions previously taken as well as the President’s intention to have Commerce monitor developments in case other actions were warranted. The action laid out in Proclamation 9980 is responsive to information reportedly provided by Commerce of possible evasion/circumvention of the duties. Countries who are excluded or who have arrangements with the U.S. on the original 232 actions are also excluded subject to certain conditions being present suggesting a need to address imports from those countries as well.

1-29-2020-FR-of-presidential-proclamation-on-steel-and-aluminum-derivatives

The purpose of this note is not to review the legal basis for the U.S. action (there have been a number of judicial actions in the United States challenging various aspects of the steel and aluminum national security case), but rather to examine the U.S. trade data to understand the breadth of the term “derivatives” and which countries appear to be the main targets of the additional duties.

Prior Proclamations Sought Review by Commerce and Others of Developments in Case Additional Action Was Deemed Necessary

The President in Proclamation 9980 references the fact that the Secretary of Commerce was directed to monitor imports of aluminum and steel and identify any circumstances which might warrant additional action. For example, paragraph 5(b) of the Steel Proclamation (No. 9705) of March 8, 2018 contained the following language:

“(b)  The Secretary shall continue to monitor imports of steel articles and shall, from time to time, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the USTR, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and such other senior Executive Branch officials as the Secretary deems appropriate, review the status of such imports with respect to the national security.  The Secretary shall inform the President of any circumstances that in the Secretary’s opinion might indicate the need for further action by the President under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended.  The Secretary shall also inform the President of any circumstance that in the Secretary’s opinion might indicate that the increase in duty rate provided for in this proclamation is no longer necessary.”

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-proclamation-adjusting-imports-steel-united-states/.

Similar language was in the aluminum proclamation.

How Broad is the Term Derivative Aluminum or Derivative Steel Product?

The aim of the Proclamation is to deal with products that undermine the purpose of the earlier proclamations. Proclamation 9980 reviews (paragraph 6) how the term “derivative” is used for purposes of the proclamation:

“For purposes of this proclamation, the Secretary determined that an article is ‘derivative’ of an aluminum article or steel article if all of the following conditions are present: (a) the aluminum article or steel article represents,
on average, two-thirds or more of the total cost of materials of the derivative article; (b) import volumes of such derivative article increased year-to-year since June 1, 2018, following the imposition of the tariffs in Proclamation 9704 and Proclamation 9705, as amended by Proclamation 9739 and Proclamation 9740, respectively, in comparison to import volumes of such derivative article during the 2 preceding years; and (c) import volumes of such derivative article following the imposition of the tariffs
exceeded the 4 percent average increase in the total volume of goods imported into the United States during the same period since June 1, 2018.”

What is the Volume of Imports Covered and Which are the Major Exporting Countries?

When one looks at the products that are covered by the two Annexes, one will see relatively few tariff categories covered by the new Proclamation. There are two HS categories that contain products that may be either steel or aluminum – bumper stampings and body stampings. There are significant imports of bumper stampings (though the data are not broken between steel, aluminum and other material). Imports from all counttries of bumper stampings in the first eleven months of 2019 were $394.3 million (of which $199.6 million are from countries not excluded for aluminum; $198.4 million if steel). Body stamps were significantly smaller, $5.2 million from all countries in Jan.-Nov. 2019 ($2.4 million covered if all are aluminum; $2.3 million covered if all are steel). The 8708 categories may have met the Commerce criteria but show a decline in 2019 vs. 2018 of 8.63% for the covered products/countries.

The other aluminum products identified — stranded wire, cables, plaited bands and the like (HS 7614.10.50, 7614.90.20, 7614.90.40, 7614.90.50) are relatively small in value – $43 million for all countries in 2019 (11 months)($26.9 million for countries subject to the additional 10% duties). The products/countries covered increased over the first 11 months of 2018 by 41.45%.

The other steel products identified – nails, tacks (other than thumb tacks), drawing pins, corrugated nails, staples and similar articles (HTS 7317.00.30.00, 7317.00.5503, 7317.005505, 7317.00.5507, 7317.00.5560, 7317.00.5580, 7317.00.6560) were $331.8 million in the first eleven months of 2019 for all countries ($276.9 million for countries covered by the new 25% duty). However, the rate of increase for covered products/countries was only 7.03% in 2019 versus 2018 (but had large increases vs. 2016 and 2017).

Countries with large exports in 2019 of the aluminum products (other than bumpers and body stampings) include Turkey at $7.4 million, India at $7 million, China at $5.0 million, Indonesia at $1.6 million, Italy at $1.35 million.

Countries with large exports in 2019 of the steel derivative products (other than bumpers and body stampings) include Oman at $59.5 million, Taiwan at $31 million, Turkey at $28.4 million, Thailand at $26.0 million, India at $25.3 million, Sri Lanka at $22.2 million, China at $20.4 million, Liechtenstein at $13.0 million, Malaysia at $12.5 million, Austria at $9.9 million and Saudi Arabia at $9.4 million.

On bumpers and body stampings, a number of the excluded countries are major suppliers — imports from Canada were $151.9 million in the first eleven months of 2019. Imports from Mexico were $44.6 million. For countries facing higher tariffs of 10% or 25% depending on whether the exported bumper stamping or body stamping is steel or aluminum, some of the large suppliers in 2019 were Taiwan at $87.4 million, Japan at $41.4 million, China at $39.4 million, Germany at $12.1 million, South Africa at $4.5 million, Italy at $3.8 million and Thailand at $3.6 million.

Conclusion

While any import measure by the President should be periodically reviewed for effectiveness and the need to maintain, the current action by the President in essence is a minor tweak with only $504 million of imports covered by the modified coverage of the Section 232 Proclamations — likely less than 1% of imports of steel and aluminum covered by the original proclamations.

It is true that the domestic steel and aluminum industries are not operating at the levels viewed as optimal and the problem of massive excess capacity in China and other countries is little changed in fact. But if a revision were needed, the level of ambition reflected in the Proclamation seems inadequate to the task.

So perhaps the way to read the proclamation is a recognition by the Administration that the existing relief hasn’t achieved the full measure of relief intended and to give trading partners warning that more is possible if the underlying problems aren’t addressed.

The Proclamation will certainly engender more disputes and increased tension with many of our trading partners. It is hard to understand the calculus (divorced from 2020 election posturing) of taking such a modest step, but time will tell if this is simply a prelude to a larger action in the coming months.