Niger

Forced labor and child labor — a continued major distortion in international trade for some products

In recent years, the United States has paid more attention to the trade distortions flowing from forced labor and child labor in other countries, particularly in China. While there has been significant progress in the last twenty years in reducing forced labor and child labor globally according to the International Labor Organization (“ILO”), the COVID-19 pandemic has seen some retrenchment and efforts by China to address minorities in country have created an international backlash and concern.

The ILO webpage on forced labor reflects the global nature of the problem. The webpage states in part,

“Although forced labour is universally condemned, ILO estimates show that 24.9 million people around the world are still subjected toit. Of the total number of victims of forced labour, 20.8 million (83 per cent) are exploited in the private economy, by individuals or enterprises, and the remaining 4.1 million (17 per cent) are in State-imposed forms of forced labour. Among those exploited by private individuals or enterprises, 8 million (29 per cent) are victims of forced sexual exploitation and 12 million (64 per cent) of forced labour exploitation. Forced labour in the private economy generates some US$ 150 billion in illegal profits every year: two thirds of the estimated total (or US$ 99 billion) comes from commercial sexual exploitation, while another US$ 51 billion is a result from forced economic exploitation in domestic work, agriculture and other economic activities (Note 1).

“Vestiges of slavery are still found in some parts of Africa, while forced labour in the form of coercive recruitment is present in many countries of Latin America, in certain areas of the Caribbean and in other parts of the world. In numerous countries, domestic workers are trapped in situations of forced labour, and in many cases they are restrained from leaving the employers’ home through threats or violence. Bonded labour persists in South Asia, where millions of men, women and children are tied to their work through a vicious circle of debt. In Europe and North America, a considerable number of women and children are victims of traffickers, who sell them to networks of forced prostitution or clandestine sweat-shops. Finally, forced labour is still used as a punishment for expressing political views.

“For many governments around the world, the elimination of forced labour remains an important challenge in the 21st century. Not only is forced labour a serious violation of a fundamental human right, it is a leading cause of poverty and a hindrance to economic development. ILO standards on forced labour, associated with well-targeted technical assistance, are the main tools at the international level to combat this scourge.”

ILO, International Labour Standards on Forced labour, https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-standards/forced-labour/lang–en/index.htm. See also ILO and Walk Free, 2017, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery, Forced Labor and Forced Marriage, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_575479.pdf.

Child labor involves more people – an estimated 152 million of which 73 million are involved in hazardous work. See ILO, International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour and Forced Labour (IPEC+), https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/flagships/ipec-plus/lang–en/index.htm.

While the incidence of forced labor and child labor is declining, the COVID-19 pandemic has complicated trends as these populations are most vulnerable. See, e.g., ILO, The International Labour Organization
and the US Department of Labor partnership to eliminate child labour and forced labour, 2019, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@ipec/documents/publication/wcms_710971.pdf (“The ILO’s most recent global estimates of child labour indicate, however, that significant progress is
being made. From 2000 to 2016, there was a net reduction of 94 million children in child labour and
the number of children in hazardous work was halved. In parallel, the ILO Worst Forms of Child
Labour Convention (No. 182) was ratified by 186 countries, reaching almost universal ratification.
The challenges ahead, however, remain formidable: in 2016, 152 million girls and boys were in child
labour and 25 million men, women and children were trapped in forced labour.”); ILO, COVID-19 impact on
child labour and forced labour: The response of the IPEC+ Flagship Programme, 2020, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—ed_norm/—ipec/documents/publication/wcms_745287.pdf (“COVID-19 has plunged the world into a crisis of unprecedented scope and scale. Undoubtedly, restoring global health remains the first priority, but the strict measures required are resulting in massive economic and social shocks. As lockdown, quarantine, physical distancing and other isolation measures to suppress transmission continue, the global economy has plunged into a recession. The harmful effects of this pandemic will not be distributed equally. They are expected to be most damaging in the poorest countries and in the poorest neighbourhoods, and for those in already disadvantaged or vulnerable situations, such as
children in child labour and victims of forced labour and human trafficking, particularly women and girls.
These vulnerable groups are more affected by income shocks due to the lack of access to social protection,
including health insurance and unemployment benefits. * * * Experience from previous crisis situations, such as the 2014 Ebola epidemic, has shown that these factors play a particularly strong role in exacerbating the risk to child labour and forced labour.”).

In China, the government’s efforts to “reeducate” minority populations (e.g., Uyghurs from the western region of Xinjiang) has led to allegations of forced labor on a range of products and actions by the United States to restrict certain imports from China from the region. The Washington International Trade Association is holding a virtual webinar on January 27 looking at the challenges in China and the forced labor problem of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the resulting U.S. ban on cotton and tomato products. See WITA, WITA’s Friday Focus on Trade, Vol. 206, January 22, 2021 (containing various articles on the China forced labor issue and referencing the webinar on January 27, WITA Webinar: The U.S. Moves Against Forced Labor in Xinjiang).

The U.S. Department of Labor in September released its 2020 list of products believed to be produced in foreign countries with forced labor or with child labor. See USDOL, 2020 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, September 2020, https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/child_labor_reports/tda2019/2020_TVPRA_List_Online_Final.pdf. The report provides the following statement of purpose:

“The U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL or the Department) has produced this ninth edition of the List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor in accordance with the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), as amended. The TVPRA requires USDOL’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB or the Bureau) to “develop and make available to the public a list of goods from countries that
[ILAB] has reason to believe are produced by forced labor or child labor in violation of international standards” (TVPRA List or the List; 22 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(2)(C)). It also requires submission of the TVPRA List to the United States Congress not later than December 1, 2014, and every 2 years thereafter (22 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(3)).

“The Frederick Douglass Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection Reauthorization Act of 2018 expanded ILAB’s mandate to require the TVPRA List to include, ‘to the extent practicable, goods that are produced with inputs that are produced with forced labor or child labor’” (22 U.S.C. 7112(b)(2)(C)).

“The TVPRA directs ILAB ‘to work with persons who are involved in the production of goods on the list … to create a standard set of practices that will reduce the likelihood that such persons will produce goods using [child labor or forced labor],’ and ‘to consult with other departments and agencies of the United States Government to reduce forced and child labor internationally and ensure that products made by forced labor and child labor in violation of international standards are not imported into the United States’ (22 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(2)(D)–(E)).” (pages 1 and 3).

This year’s publication lists 77 countries that have one or more products believed to be produced with child labor, with forced labor or with both child and forced labor. Fourteen countries are listed as having products believed to be produced with forced labor. Thirty-six countries are listed as believed to produce products with child and forced labor. Sixty-four countries produce some products with child labor. The 77 countries are listed below along with whether products are believed produced with child labor, forced labor, or child labor & forced labor.

Afghanistan — child larbor; child labor & forced labor

Angola — child labor & forced labor

Argentina — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Azerbaijan — child labor

Bangladesh – child labor; child labor & forced labor

Belize — child labor

Benin — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Bolivia — child labor; forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Brazil — child labor; forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Burkina Faso — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Burma — child labor; forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Cambodia — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Cameroon — child labor

Central African Republic — child labor

Chad — child labor

China — forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Colombia — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Costa Rica — child labor

Cote d’Ivoire — child labor & forced labor

Democratic Republic of the Congo — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Dominican Republic — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Ecuador — child labor

Egypt — child labor

El Salvador — child labor

Eswatini — child labor

Ethiopia — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Ghana — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Guatemala — child labor

Guinea — child labor

Honduras — child labor

India — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Indonesia — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Iran — child labor

Kazakhstan — child labor & forced labor

Kenya — child labor

Kyrgyz Republic — child labor

Lebanon — child labor

Lesotho — child labor

Liberia — child labor

Madagascar — child labor

Malawi — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Malaysia — forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Mali — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Mauritania — child labor

Mexico — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Mongolia — child labor

Mozambique — child labor

Nepal — child labor & forced labor

Nicaragua — child labor

Niger — child labor; forced labor

Nigeria — child labor; child labor & forced labor

North Korea — forced labor

Pakistan — child labor; forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Panama — child labor

Paraguay — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Peru — child labor; forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Philippines — child labor

Russia — forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Rwanda — child labor

Senegal — child labor

Sierra Leone –child labor; child labor & forced labor

South Sudan — child labor & forced labor

Sudan — child labor

Suriname — child labor

Taiwan — forced labor

Tajikistan — child labor & forced labor

Tanzania — child labor

Thailand — child labor; forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Turkey — child labor

Turkmenistan — child labor & forced labor

Uganda — child labor

Ukraine — child labor

Uzbekistan — forced labor

Venezuela — forced labor

Vietnam — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Yemen — child labor

Zambia — child labor

Zimbabwe — child labor

While the number of products obviously vary by country and category, the report categorized agriculture as having 68 child labor listings and 29 forced labor listings. This compares to manufacturing with 39 child labor and 20 forced labor listings; mining showed 32 child labor and 13 forced labor listings and pornography showed one each.

Looking at specific products for individual countries provides the most information.

As an example, China is shown as having the following products believed to be produced with forced labor — Artificial Flowers, Christmas Decorations, Coal, Fish, Footwear, Garments, Gloves, Hair Products, Nails, Thread/Yarn, and Tomato Products. China is also shown as having the following products believed to be produced with child labor and forced labor — Bricks, Cotton, Electronics, Fireworks, Textiles, and Toys. As a USDOL separate post notes, gloves, hair products, textiles, thread/yarn and tomato products were added in 2020 because of research on the forced labor situation in Xinjiang. See USDOL, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Against Their Will: The Situation in Xinjiang, Forced Labor in Xinjiang, 2020, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/against-their-will-the-situation-in-xinjiang. The document is embedded below.

Against-Their-Will_-The-Situation-in-Xinjiang-_-U.S.-Department-of-Labor

Looking at India, products believed to be produced with child labor include the following — Bidis (hand-rolled
cigarettes), Brassware, Cotton, Fireworks, Footwear, Gems, Glass Bangles, Incense (agarbatti), Leather Goods/
Accessories, Locks, Matches, Mica, Silk Fabric, Silk Thread, Soccer Balls, Sugarcane, Thread/Yarn. Products believed produced with child labor & forced labor include the following — Bricks, Carpets, Cottonseed (hybrid), Embellished Textiles, Garments, Rice, Sandstone, Stones.

While the USDOL reports don’t estimate the portion of exports from any country of individual products that are produced with child and/or forced labor, the trade consequences can be significant as such labor is artificially valued creating distortions in competitiveness and resulting trade flows. For example, the list of products for China are either important export products for China or important inputs into exported products. The same would true for India and for many other of the 77 countries on the list.

Conclusion

The U.S. has in place statutory provisions which permit the exclusion from entry into the United states of products produced with forced labor. The Trump Administration did a somewhat better job enforcing U.S. law on imports of products produced with child or forced labor. Much more can be done and should be done domestically.

Similarly, the ILO is working to eliminate forced labor and child labor consistent with UN Sustainable Development Goals. “The objective of the IPEC+ Global Flagship Programme – in line with Target 8.7 of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, adopted by the United Nations in 2015 – is to provide ILO leadership in global efforts to eradicate all forms of child labour by 2025 and all forms of contemporary slavery and human trafficking by 2030. It also aims to ensure that all people are protected from – and can protect themselves against – these gross human rights violations.” ILO, IPEC+ Global Flagship Programme Implementation, Towards a world free from child labour and forced labour, page 4, 2020, https://respect.international/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/wcms_633435.pdf.

The WTO could play a role in the fight against forced labor and child labor. Such labor practices distort global trade flows in addition to the challenges created for countries engaged in such practices in terms of poverty and human rights abuses. The WTO could gather information from Members on the volume of production and exports of products produced with child and forced labor both as finished products and as inputs into other products. Such an exercise would facilitate an understanding of the extent of global trade represented by such products and help focus attention on trade actions that could be taken to help Members eliminate such harmful practices. While it is unlikely that Members will agree to such a data gathering undertaking, one is surely needed and would add transparency to a source of an important global issue with trade as well as non-trade dimensions.

Food security and COVID-19 — how World Trade Organization Members could fill a pressing need

In 2020 as the world has been dealing with the health and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, the World Trade Organization has focused attention on keeping markets open by urging Members to provide notifications of trade restrictive and trade liberalizing measures taken not just on medical goods but also on agricultural products. The G20 countries and various groups of WTO Members have made commitments to impose restrictions only under limited circumstances and only temporarily, consistent with WTO obligations. Some Members have urged countries to agree not to impose export restraints on agricultural goods to limit worsening challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic. On agricultural export restrictions, a number of countries have applied some restrictions despite information that global food supplies are sufficient which should make restrictions unnecessary. The attention paid to the issue by the WTO and its Members have limited the number of countries engaged in agricultural export restraints which is a positive development.

With the steps many countries have taken to limit the spread of the COVID-19, there has been enormous economic pain incurred by most countires, with tens of millions of people in countries temporarily unemployed, schools closed, food distribution disrupted with the closure of restaurants which constitute a large part of food shipped from processing plants and farms.

The UN, World Bank and others have projected huge increases in the number of people pushed into extreme poverty because of the effects flowing from the pandemic. Extreme poverty brings with it food security issues as people suffering extreme poverty don’t have the means to procure basic food needs.

The United Nation’s World Food Programme (WFP) has long been involved in helping address food security needs around the world. In the COVID-19 pandemic, the WFP is mobilizing to provide assistance to some 138 million people in 83 countries. With most countries occupied with dealing with the needs of their own populations, countries and private citizens have been slow to respond to the humanitarian challenges facing so many around the world. The WFP has appealed for US$4.9 billion to let them perform their stepped up function during COVID-19 through the end of 2020. As of August 6, they had received only 9 percent of what they need, $US440 million.

The WFP during the pandemic has been involved in facilitating services by many NGOs and international organizations. For example, “Over 16,500 health and humanitarian personnel from 288 organizations have now been transported to destinations throughout Africa, Asia, the Middle East and the Commonwealth of Independent States countries by WFP’s air passenger service since its launch on 1 May. 53 destinations are now being served, with approximately 2,500 passengers using WFP’s service per week.” WFP, COVID-19, Level 3 Emergency, External Situation Report #12 (6 August 2020)(emphasis in original). The latest situation report is embedded below and reviews the wide array of services provided as well a review of some of the countries with acute needs. It also provides a link to contribute to the WFP.

WFP-0000118265

The External Situation Report indicates that there are 27 countries (based on an FAO-WFP hotspot analysis) which “are at risk of significant food security deterioration in the next six months”. (page 2). Countries at risk are Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Haiti, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Burkina Faso, Mali, the Niger, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Sudan, South Sudan, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Yemen, Ethiopia, Iraq, Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan and Bangladesh (total is 31, though Peru, Ecuador, Colombia appear to be at a lower level of risk based on coloration used on page 2). FAO – WFP early warning analsyis of acute food insecurity hotspots, https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000117706/download/.

Where is the food aid?

For many countries, agricultural production has remained reasonably strong but large volumes of agricultural products have been destroyed based on lack of domestic markets, typically flowing from the collapse of the restaurant trade and the challenges in redirecting product, packaging and labeling into retail channels. See, e.g., New York Times, April 11, 2020, Dumped Milk, Smashed Eggs, Plowed Vegetables: Food Waste of the Pandemic, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/business/coronavirus-destroying-food.html.

At the same time, there have been huge increases in internal-country demand for help from food banks in some countries. See, e.g., for the United States: Feeding America, The first months of the food bank response to COVID, by the numbers, https://www.feedingamerica.org/hunger-blog/first-months-food-bank-response-covid-numbers.

It would seem that coordinated action by major agricultural goods producers in the WTO with the WFP and other groups should be able to provide large quantities of agricultural goods to those in need globally in the remaining months of 2020, goods which might otherwise simply be destroyed.

Similarly, while all countries are financially stretched during the pandemic, helping WFP obtain the needed financial resources to provide a coordinated pledging event should be of interest to WTO Members and many of the multilateral organizations working on COVID responses, as well as the business community and the general public.

While the WTO has grappled with limiting/eliminating export subsidies for agricultural goods, the WTO has always recognized the need to maintain the flow of humanitarian need particularly in agricultural goods. Consider these paragraphs from the 2015 Nairobi Ministerial Conference Decision on Export Competition (WT/MIN(15)45, WT/L/980 (21 Dec. 2015) at 6-7):

“International Food Aid

“22. Members reaffirm their commitment to maintain an adequate level of international food aid, to take account of the interests of food aid recipients and to ensure that the disciplines contained hereafter do not unintentionally impede the delivery of food aid provided to deal with emergency situations. To meet the objective of preventing or minimizing commercial displacement, Members shall ensure that international food aid
is provided in full conformity with the disciplines specified in paragraphs 23 to 32, thereby contributing to the objective of preventing commercial displacement.

“23. Members shall ensure that all international food aid is:

“a. needs-driven;

“b. in fully grant form;

“c. not tied directly or indirectly to commercial exports of agricultural products or other goods and services;

“d. not linked to the market development objectives of donor Members;
and that

“e. agricultural products provided as international food aid shall not be re-exported in any form, except where the agricultural products were not permitted entry into the recipient country, the agricultural products were determined inappropriate or no longer needed for the purpose for which they were received in the recipient country, or re-exportation is necessary for logistical reasons to expedite the provision of food aid for another country in an emergency situation. Any reexportation in accordance with this subparagraph shall be conducted in a manner that does not unduly impact established, functioning commercial markets of agricultural commodities in the countries to which the food aid is re-exported.

“24. The provision of food aid shall take into account local market conditions of the same or substitute products. Members shall refrain from providing in-kind international food aid in situations where this would be reasonably foreseen to cause an adverse effect on local13 or regional production of the same or substitute products. In addition, Members shall ensure that international food aid does not unduly impact established, functioning commercial markets of agricultural commodities.

“25. Where Members provide exclusively cash-based food aid, they are encouraged to continue to do so. Other Members are encouraged to provide cash-based or in-kind international food aid in emergency situations, protracted crises (as defined by the FAO14), or non-emergency development/capacity building food assistance environments where recipient countries or recognized international humanitarian/food entities, such as the United Nations, have requested food assistance.

“26. Members are also encouraged to seek to increasingly procure international food aid from local or regional sources to the extent possible, provided that the availability and prices of basic foodstuffs in these markets are not unduly compromised.

“27. Members shall monetize international food aid only where there is a demonstrable need for monetization for the purpose of transport and delivery of the food assistance, or the monetization of international food aid is used to redress short and/or long term food deficit requirements or insufficient agricultural production situations which give rise to chronic hunger and malnutrition in least-developed and net food-importing developing countries.15

“28. Local or regional market analysis shall be completed before monetization occurs for all monetized international food aid, including consideration of the recipient country’s nutritional needs, local United Nations Agencies’ market data and normal import and consumption levels of the commodity to be monetized, and consistent with Food Assistance Convention reporting. Independent third party commercial or non-profit
entities will be employed to monetize in-kind international food aid to ensure open market competition for the sale of in-kind international food aid.

“29. In employing these independent third party commercial or non-profit entities for the purposes of the preceding paragraph, Members shall ensure that such entities minimize or eliminate disruptions to the local or regional markets, which may include impacts on production, when international food aid is monetized. They shall ensure that the sale of commodities for food assistance purposes is conducted in a transparent, competitive and open process and through a public tender.16

“30. Members commit to allowing maximum flexibility to provide for all types of international food aid in order to maintain needed levels while making efforts to move toward more untied cash-based international food aid in accordance with the Food Assistance Convention.

“31. Members recognize the role of government in decision-making on international food aid in their jurisdictions. Members recognize that the government of a recipient country of international food aid can opt out of the usage of monetized international food aid.

“32. Members agree to review the provisions on international food aid contained in the preceding paragraphs within the regular Committee on Agriculture monitoring of the implementation of the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision of April 1994 on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-developed and net food-importing developing countries.

“13 The term ‘local’ may be understood to mean at the national or subnational level.

“14 FAO defines protracted crises as follows: ‘Protracted crises refer to situations in which a significant portion of a population is facing a heightened risk of death, disease, and breakdown of their livelihoods.’

“15 Belize, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Ecuador, Fiji, Guatemala, Guyana, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea and Suriname shall also have access to this provision.

“16 In the instance where it is not feasible to complete a sale through a public tender, a negotiated sale can be used.”

It is believed that the current WTO provisions on food aid should not pose hurdles to countries providing in kind aid where there are needed food products that can be exported during the pandemic. If that is not the case, then the WTO Members should agree to a temporary waiver of relevant restrictions to permit food aid during the pandemic.

There has been much discussion within the G20, WTO, WHO and other groups that collective action on the medical front is critical to see that medical goods, vaccines, are therapeutics are available equitably and at affordable prices. What one hasn’t seen is the same focus on ensuring that the world’ populations have access to food equitably and at affordable prices. During the pandemic, WTO Members have the opportunity to work together to see that food is not wasted and that food aid is supplemented to the extent possible to alleviate the unique challenges to food security presented by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The race to become the next WTO Director-General — where candidates are on important issues: eligibility for Special and Differential Treatment/self-selection as a developing country

[Updated August 27 to incorporate comments by Amb. Tudor Ulianovschi of Moldova at a WITA webinar held on August 26]

During the years of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, countries engaged in a series of rounds of tariff liberalization. The basic principle of Most Favored Nation ensured that any participating country or customs territory would receive the benefits of trade liberalization of others whether or not the individual country made tariff liberalization commitments of its own.

Moreover, the GATT and now the WTO have recognized that countries at different levels of economic development will be able to make different contributions and some may need special and differential treatment to better participate.

Historically, there has been a distinction between developed countries and developing countries, with special and differential (S&D) treatment reserved for the latter. Typically, S&D treatment would permit, inter alia, lesser trade liberalization commitments and longer phase-ins for liberalization undertaken.

During the Uruguay Round, least-developed countries, as defined by the United Nations, were broken out from developing countries to receive lesser obligations than other developing countries. But the categorization as a developing country has always been a matter of self-selection within the GATT and now within the WTO.

Some three quarters of WTO’s current 164 Members have self-declared themselves to be developing countries or are least-developed countries under UN criteria. Thus, only one fourth of WTO Members shoulder full obligations under the current system.

While the Uruguay Round negotiations attempted to deal with “free riders” by requiring all countries and customs territories to bind all or nearly all tariff lines, the results at the creation of the World Trade Organization was a system where the vast majority of Members had relatively high tariff rates in their bindings while developed countries typically have very low tariff rates bound.

After twenty-five years of operation and dramatic economic development by many Members and limited trade liberalization through WTO multilateral negotiations, questions have been raised by the United States and others as to whether the concept of self-selection by countries of developing country status has contributed to the inability of the WTO to achieve further liberalization through negotiations. The U.S. has put forward a definition of who would eligible for developing country status based upon a country not qualifying under any of four criteria. See December 28, 2019, WTO Reform – Will Limits on Who Enjoys Special and Differential Treatment Be Achieved? https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2019/12/28/wto-reform-will-limits-on-who-enjoys-special-and-differential-treatment-be-achieved/. Countries who would not qualify under the U.S. proposal include:

Member of the OECD or in the accession process:

Chile, South Korea, Mexico, Turkey, Colombia, Costa Rica.

Member of the G-20:

India, South Africa, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, China, Indonesia, South Korea.

Classified by World Banks as “high income” for 2016-2018 (includes):

Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Hong Kong, South Korea, Kuwait, Macao, Panama, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, St. Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay.

0.5% of Merchandise Trade (includes):

China, South Korea, Hong Kong, Mexico, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, South Africa.

For many countries who have self-declared as developing countries, the concept of changing their status, regardless of economic development, is untenable and has been actively opposed at the WTO (including by China, India and South Africa).

Four WTO Members who had self-declared as developing countries — Korea, Singapore, Brazil and Costa Rica — have indicated to the WTO that they will not seek special and differential treatment in ongoing or future negotiations (but maintain such rights for existing agreements). Other countries who are self-declared developing countries have blocked an Ambassador from one of the four who have agreed to accept greater obligations from assuming the Chair post for one of the WTO Committees.

The United States has also raised questions about the imbalance of tariff bindings which have flowed from economic development of some countries without additional liberalization of tariffs by those countries and the lack of progress on negotiations. Thus, for the United States there is also the question of whether tariff bindings should be reexamined in light of economic developments over the last twenty-five years. From the WTO’s World Tariff Profiles 2020 the following simple bound tariff rates for all goods are identified for a number of countries. See https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff_profiles20_e.pdf. While for developing countries, bound rates are often much higher than applied rates, the bound rates give those countries the ability to raise applied tariffs without challenge:

“Developed Countries”

United States: 3.4%

European Union: 5.1%

Japan: 4.7%

Canada: 6.4%

“Developing Countries”

China: 10.0%

Brazil: 31.4%

Chile: 25.2%

Costa Rica: 43.1%

Republic of Korea: 16.5%

India: 50.8%

Indonesia: 37.1%

Singapore: 9.5%

South Africa: 19.2%

Thus, for the eight candidates competing for the position of Director-General of the World Trade Organization, a challenging topic within the WTO for possible reform is whether the issue of Special and Differential treatment needs review to ensure that its provisions apply to those who actually have a need and not to three quarters of the Members simply because they self-selected. While not necessarily encompassed by the S&D question, for the United States, the issue also subsumes whether WTO reform needs to permit a rebalancing of tariff bindings based on changing economic development for WTO Members.

What follows is a review of the prepared statements to the General Council made by each candidate during July 15-17, my notes on candidates’ responses to questions during the press conference immediately following each candidate’s meeting with the General Council, and my notes on candidates’ responses to questions during webinars hosted by the Washington International Trade Association (WITA) and Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) (as of August 13, seven of the eight candidates have participated in such webinars; the webinar with the Moldovan candidate is being scheduled).

Dr. Jesus Seade Kuri (Mexico)

Dr. Seade did not take up the question of special and differential treatment directly as part of his prepared statement. One can read part of his statement to indicate that part of the challenges facing the WTO flow from the lack of success of the negotiating function on traditional issues (which would include further tariff liberalization). Also one could construe the need to modernize the organization as including the need to better reflect the need for all Members to carry the extent of liberalization that their stage of economic development permits.

“In the medium and long term, and in order to prevent the Organization from becoming obsolete and obsolete, it is important that mechanisms be
adopted to modernize it. I will seek to establish an informal dialogue on the
weaknesses and challenges of the Organization in the current context, through annual forums or specialized conferences.

“But thinking about long-term expectations, I am convinced that they have been affected by the lack of significant results in the negotiations since the
creation of the WTO. Thus, as results are achieved on 21st century issues, it will be very important to also energetically take up the traditional priority issues on the sustainable development agenda.” (Google translation from French)

During the press conference, Dr. Seade was asked a question on the issue of developed versus developing country designation. My notes on his response are as follows:

On the question of developed vs. developing country, Dr. Seade looks at it from the perspective of special and differential treatment. On the one hand the world keeps changing, so it’s reasonable to ask what a Member can do. The idea of changing classification of countries from developing to developed will take a very long time and so is probably the wrong approach. The question should be what contribution can a particular member make, which may be different in different industries.

WITA had a webinar with Dr. Seade on July 7. https://www.wita.org/event-videos/conversation-with-wto-dg-candidate-seade/. Dr. Seade was asked about the issue of self-selection of developing country status and how he would try to get Members to address. My notes on his response follow:

Dr. Seade had this to say:  he believes countries are looking at the issue the wrong way.  Special and differential treatment is like a discount card which you can use at a store.  Some customers have the discount card; some don’t.  The reality in the WTO is that everything is negotiated.  When you negotiate, you can talk to every Member.  If Members make whether and what type of special and differential treatment a Member needs part of negotiations, the outcome can be tailored so that Members are contributing what they can while still accommodating Members where there is a real need. While seeking to define who is a developing country may be an approach that can be taken, Dr. Seade believes that actually getting Members to agree to changing status is an impossible issue.  In his view, status is “theological” for many Members. 

One can look at the trade facilitation agreement for an example of where Members were asked to take on obligations to the extent they could; there were negotiations if more was felt possible from a Member.  The same type of approach can be taken in ongoing and new negotiations.  He believes this is the way to go.  The key question is not who is eligible, but for what does a Member need S&D.  This will be true at a country level (e.g., in Dr. Seade’s view Mexico and Brazil don’t need the same flexibilities as Angola).  But the need for differentiation in a given country may also differ by sector.  In fact the need for special and differential treatment can vary by product. Dr. Seade mentioned Mexico’s agriculture sector, where corn production is not efficient or modern and hence S&D may be necessary but where that is not the case for fruits and vegetable production.  Thus, Dr. Seade believes that going about it on a more practical way is the right way to make progress in the WTO.  Negotiate by agreement by country, etc.

Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (Nigeria)

Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala’s prepared statement directly notes the differing positions on the issue of special and differential treatment and also mentions concerns of Members in terms of imbalances in rights and obligations and distribution of gains (which presumably includes the U.S. concern about high bound tariff rates of many countries who have gone through significant ecoonomic growth in the last 25 years).

“Members’ views differ on a number of fundamental issues, such as special and differential treatment or the need for the WTO to tackle new issues and develop new or enhanced rules to deal with SOEs and agricultural subsidies, for example.”

“While a key objective of the WTO is the liberalization of trade for the mutual benefit of its Members, it appears that this very concept is now a divisive issue as a result of the perceived imbalances in the rights and obligations of Members and the perceived uneven distribution of the gains from trade. I would constantly remind Members about the value of the MTS and help energize them to work harder to overcome the challenges that have paralyzed the WTO over the years.”

During the press conference on July 15th, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala was not a question on S&D treatment, classification of developing countries or on tariff bindings.

WITA had a webinar with Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala on July 21. https://www.wita.org/event-videos/conversation-with-wto-dg-candidate-dr-ngozi-okonjo-iweala/. Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala in her opening comments identified the issue of special and differential treatment as an issue that could be considered as part of WTO reform, although it wasn’t in her list of topics for tackling by the next WTO Ministerial Conference. She was asked a question about how to restore trust among Members and used that question to review her thoughts on special and differential treatment and the question of self-selection by Members as developing countries. Below is my summary of Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala’s discussion of the issue.

One issue being pushed by the United States and others that is very divisive is the issue of special and differential treatment and self-selection of developing country status.  The concern of those wanting a change is that self-selection and the automatic entitlement to S&D treatment shifts the balance of rights and obligations to advanced developing countries.  There is no disagreement that least-developed countries need special and differential treatment. In her view, the real question is whether other countries that view themselves as developing should get special and differential treatment automatically.  Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala believes the WTO needs a creative approach to resolve the issue.  For example, Members should address the need of individual Members for special and differential treatment on a negotiation by negotiation basis.  Members should, as part of each negotiation, consider what other Members believe their needs are based on level of development.  She references the Trade Facilitation Agreement as an example where Members took on obligations based on their level of development vs. a one size fits all approach.  Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala believes that if the Members can reach a resolution on this issue, the resolution would help build trust among Members and hence help the WTO move forward.

Mr. Abdel-Hamid Mamdouh (Egypt)

Mr. Mamdouh’s prepared statement did not directly deal with the topic of special and differential treatment or the changing economic competitiveness of Members. There is one statement towards the end of his statement which recognizes the evolving nature of the Membership.

“Since then, global trade has transformed, and trading powers have evolved. The circumstances and dynamics have changed. But the skillset we require of the leadership: imaginative thinking, and the ability to come up with legally sound and enforceable solutions – remain the same.”

During his press conference on July 15, Mr. Mamdouh was not asked a question on S&D treatment or the criteria for being a developing country.

WITA had a webinar with Mr. Mamdouh on June 23. https://www.wita.org/event-videos/conversation-candidate-hamid-mamdouh/. Mr. Mamdough was asked a question during the webinar on whether the large number of WTO Members who have self-declared as developing countries and hence are eligible for special and differential treatment doesn’t undermine the credibility of the organization and what he would do about it if he was Director-General. Below is my summary of Mr. Mamdouh’s response.

Mr. Mamdouh believes that the issue should be addressed in a pragmatic maner. He referred back to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) negotiated during the Uruguay Round and noted that the GATS contains no special and differential treatment provisions.  Thus, in the GATS, Members moved away from a system of country classifications.  In Mr. Mamdouh’s view, obligations should be customized based on a Member’s needs/abilities through negotiations.  Flexibilities to address particular Member needs can be determined individually.  While this was the approach in GATS, Members can do that on goods on any area that can be scheduled but also rule making areas.  In Mr. Mamdouh’s view for any substantive obligations, there is room to customize obligations through negotiations.  He believes that big developing countries wouldn’t oppose different countries taking on different obligations.  He doesn’t believe that a solution will be in negotiating a different categorization system.  The solution for the WTO is to take a pragmatic approach and customize the outcome based on negotiations.  Mr. Mamdouh referenced fisheries subsidies as an example where that could occur.  He believes customizing obligations based on individual Member needs will be increasingly necessary, citing the 164 current Members.  But he cautions that no “one size fits all”.  Every solution would need to be tailored on the basis of the area being negotiated.

Amb. Tudor Ulianovschi (Moldova)

Amb. Ulianovschi’s prepared statement to the General Council on July 16 covers a wide range of issues that need to be addressed going forward, but, does not mention the issue of special and differential treatment or which Members should not be eligible to be developing countries based on economic developments. Amb. Ulianovschi does have one sentence in his prepared statement which talks generally about addressing global inequalities.

“The WTO is one of the most complex organizations in the world today, and it’s one of the most needed as to ensure open, predictable, inclusive, rule based multilateral trading system, as well as – to address global inequalities and bridge the gap between the least developed, developing and developed countries.”

At the press conference on July 16, Amb. Ulianovschi was asked many questions but none of the developing country/special and differential treatment issue.

WITA held a webinar with Amb. Tudor Ulianovschi on August 26, 2020. https://www.wita.org/event-videos/conversation-with-tudor-ulianovschi/. During the webinar, Amb. Ulianovschi mentioned special and differential treatment both in his opening statement and in answer to a question. My notes on Amb. Ulianovschi’s comments are provided below.

From his opening statement, Amb. Ulianovschi noted that as a member driven organization, the WTO needs Members to negotiate to move forward.  He believes that a diplomatically active Director-General can help the WTO move forward, and he can help address lack of trust which he believes is largely psychological primarily based on unfinished business but also dispute settlement, special and differential treatment and other issues.

Q:  How important is it to have a reform agenda, and how can you convince major Members to agree on a common agenda? A:    Amb. Ulianovschi stated that reform is absolutely necessary.  In his view, cosmetic reform is not sufficient, a fact made clear by major Members.  Amb. Ulianovschi believes that political experience and dialogue by the Director-General will be key to get those who have put forward proposals to get into a discussion that is inclusive and transparent.  There are a large number of issues that are affecting the environment at the WTO.  For example, the WTO needs to address the horizontal issue of Special and Differential Treatment (S&D).  The S&D principle is at the core of the organization, but it is how you apply the principle which determines commitments of Members.  From that point of view, Amb. Ulianovschi sees it as a positive signal that major players are putting forward proposals on this topic.  The proposals should be the starting point for discussions.  Amb. Ulianovschi would invite those who have put forward proposals to start discussions with other Members.  Negotiations need political will to succeed, and Members need to agree on how to proceed.  He believes that if he is Director-General, he can get Members to that point.

H.E. Yoo Myung-hee (Republic of Korea)

Minister Yoo’s prepared statement covers many issues but does not address the issue of special and differential treatment/developing country classification.

In her press conference on July 17 after meeting with the General Council, Minister Yoo was asked a question on developing vs. developed country status. My notes on her response follow:

A question was asked how Minister Yoo viewed the question of the status of Members as developed or developing countries particularly in light of Korea viewing itself as a developing country in the WTO although Korea has indicated it will not seek additional special and differential treatment under future WTO Agreements. Minister Yoo started her response by noting that the Marrakesh Agreement requires that the WTO work to help developing and least developed countries secure their fair share of trade. There are competing issues at the WTO. Should the WTO make special and differential treatment provisions more operational in existing Agreements is one issue. Should the WTO change the classification status of some countries based on economic development is the other issue. For Korea, the. world has changed, and countries have changed in terms of their stage of economic development. Korea decided to take on more responsibility based on its changing level of economic development. But many countries continue to need special and differential treatment. It would be ideal for developing countries to take on more responsibilities as they are able. But this is a sensitive issue on which there is no consensus as yet.

WITA had a webinar with Minister Yoo on August 11.  https://www.wita.org/event-videos/candidate-h-e-yoo-myung-hee/. Below is my summary of the question asked on the issue of special and differential treatment and self-selection of developing country status, and Minister Yoo’s response:

Korea has informed the WTO that Korea will not seek S&D treatment in ongoing or future negotiations.  Many Members thinks the self-selection of developing country status is undermining the system.  How do you evaluate the issue and how important is it to resolve?

Minister Yoo indicated that this is an important issue to resolve to make progress in ongoing and future negotiations.  She believes it is important to reflect on a core principle of the WTO to ensure that developing countries and least-developed countries secure their fair share of global trade.  The question for the WTO is how to effectuate this embedded principle.

Over half of WTO Members are developing countries and 36 others are least developed countries. In total roughly three fourths of all Members get special and differential treatment.  If so many are eligible for special and differential treatment, it likely means that the countries with the greatest needs are not receiving the assistance actually needed to help their development and greater participation in international trade.

In Minister Yoo’s view, the WTO has very divergent views among Members about changing the classification process for Members from self-selection to a set of factual criteria.  US has put forward a proposal to categorize members as developed based on different factual criteria.  However, there is no consensus at the WTO at the moment which means that changing the classification process will not happen until there is consensus.  In light of the lack of consensus, a pragmatic approach may be to have countries who can take on more responsibilities to do so voluntarily.  This will permit those who need assistance to get it.

Looking at the Trade Facilitation Agreement, while the Agreement is not necessarily representative of other areas under negotiation, it shows one way to handle the issue of special and differential treatment in a pragmatic way.  Some developing countries take on more responsibility than others without S&D treatment and without a transition period.  This is an example of how through negotiations, Members can customize obligations to individual Member capabilities.  Such an approach is practical and pragmatic.

In Korea’s case, Korea indicated that they would not seek S&D treatment in ongoing and future negotiations based on Korea’s state of economic development.  It was not an easy decision and required extensive internal consultations.  Korea wants to promote the WTO system.  She believes it is useful for each country to step up and take on more responsibility if they are capable of doing so.  The U.S. proposal has been important in raising the issue.  While no consensus exists at the moment, the U.S. action has gotten Members discussing the matter.  If Minister Yoo is selected to be the next Director-General, she would continue to raise the issue with Members to achieve a good outcome for all. She believes resolution of the issue can help unlock progress in ongoing and future negotiations.

H.E. Amina C. Mohamed (Kenya)

Minister Mohamed’s prepared statement contains a number of statements which recognize the need of Members to contribute according to their ability, although she does not address the classification of developing countries or the need for special and differential treatment specifically.

“Renewal has to start with facing up to the defects that have weakened the system in recent years: the inability to update rules to reflect the changing realities of how trade is conducted; the sterility of ideological standoffs; the retreat into defensiveness; and the sense of the benefits of trade not being equitably shared.”

“All Members should contribute to trade opening and facilitation efforts, especially those most in a position to do so.”

“We need a WTO that is fair and equitable, taking into account the level of economic development of each member. All WTO Members must be prepared to contribute to improving and strengthening the organization, so that it can facilitate trade for the benefit of all, and contribute to economic recovery from the effects of the pandemic.”

During Minister Mohamed’s press conference on July 16, no questions were asked about developing country status or on special and differential treatment.

WITA had a webinar with H.E. Mohamed on August 6. https://www.wita.org/event-videos/ambassador-amina-mohamed/. During the webinar, Minister Mohamed both made several comments on special and differential treatment and self-selection of developing country status, but also answered a question. My notes on her comments and the question asked are summarized below:

One of issues needing to be addressed by the WTO are the current “divisions over developing country status”.

We need a WTO that is fair and equitable considering the level of economic development of each Member.  The WTO should give effect to its development objectives in a practical and enabling way that takes into account needs and results.  All WTO Members must be prepared to contribute to strengthening and improving the WTO system.

Q: The U.S. has raised the issue of self-declaration of developing country status.  How would you handle the issue if you become Director-General?

Minister Mohamed noted that special and differential treatment is an integral part of existing agreements.  However, going forward, the journey to modify the approach to S&D has already begun. ” The train has already left the station.” Minister Mohamed noted that in the Trade Facilitation Agreement, any special treatment was based on the need of the individual Member. Countries assumed obligations they were able to, so different developing countries assumed different levels of obligations with or without transition periods.

Second, self-declaration by certain countries that they would no longer seek special and differential treatment has already occurred (Korea, Brazil, Singapore and Costa Rica).  Minister Mohamed believes the WTO will see more of this going forward by other countries.  If Minister Mohamed is selected to be the next Director-General, she would continue discussions among the Members and have candid discussions with some of the Members.  But she believes moving forward, special and differential treatment will be increasingly based on actual need.

H.E. Mohammed Maziad Al-Tuwaijri (Saudi Arabia)

Minister Al-Tuwaijri in his prepared statement to the General Council on July 17 addressed briefly the proposal from the U.S. on special and differential treatment (classification of developing countries):

“Concerning Special and Differential Treatment, the bottom line is, without negotiations that include incentives for everyone to participate actively, I do not think it will be possible for Members to address the issue of SDT. This is one of the main reasons that the negotiating function needs to start working. Members have various capacities to implement and take advantage of new rules and commitments, so it is clear that each Member must decide for itself what is in its own interest.”

At his press conference on July 17, Minister Al-Tuwaijri was not asked a question on special and differential treatment or of classification of developing countries.

WITA did a webinar with Minister Al-Tuwaijri on August 5. https://www.wita.org/event-videos/director-general-candidate-he-mohammed-al-tuwaijri/. During the webinar Minister Al-Tuwaijri was not asked a question on self-selection of developing country status or on special and differential treatment.

The Rt Hon Dr. Liam Fox MP

Dr. Fox’s prepared statement to the General Council on July 17 did not include any references to special and differential treatment or to the classification of developing countries.

During his press conference on July 17, Dr. Fox was not asked a question dealing with special and differential treatment or the classification of developing countries.

WITA had a webinar with Dr. Fox on July 30, 2020. https://www.wita.org/event-videos/conversation-with-dr-liam-fox/. Dr. Fox was asked about the concerns expressed by the U.S. and others that the process of self-selection of developing country status had resulted in too many Members having special and differential treatment. There was a need to see that S&D is limited to those who actually need help. How would Dr. Fox address this issue if he were selected as the Director-General? What follows reflects my notes on Dr. Fox’s response.

Dr. Fox stated that first, the WTO must reassess that we are all aiming at the same goal.  As the WTO has expanded membership, Members knew that the organization would have countries with vast differences in capabilities and that it would take different countries different amounts of time to get to full implementation.  Thus, special and differential treatment is available. However, Dr. Fox understands that there are some WTO Members who want to be perpetually exempted from undertaking full obligations regardless of the level of economic development they have achieved. Dr. Fox views this approach as unacceptable. Membership in an organization envisions equal rights and obligations, though it may take some members longer to get there.

On the topic of special and differential treatment, Dr. Fox believes that it is important to accelerate the rate of development for countries that are developing or least-developed, so that their improved level of economic development means they don’t need special and differential treatment.  One of the reasons some Members gave Dr. Fox for not wanting to be moved into a different category, was the concern over loss of trade preferences.  Dr. Fox used as an example, small coastal economies who can experience wide swings in per capita GDP based on external events (hurricanes, etc.) which can move them from high income to low income and back in short order.  Dr. Fox believes WTO Members must think creatively on how to address concerns of Members that giving up developing country status will put them in difficulties. On his example, he suggested using multiple year averages.

Conclusion

As the WTO has become a much more universal organization, membership has widely expanded beyond the historical developed country proponents of the GATT. At the same time, in recent decades there has been tremendous economic development by many countries which should mean that the ability of Members to handle full or increased obligations of the WTO has increased for many countries.

Yet, the current system does not provide a means for modifying obligations of Members who joined as developing country members regardless of the level of development achieved after joining. The view of some Members is that this disconnect between actual economic development and level of commitments undertaken has contributed to the inability to conclude negotiations. The issues raised by the United States have resulted in a few countries indicating that they will not seek special and differential treatment in ongoing or future negotiations. In at least one recent agreement, the Trade Facilitation Agreement, countries have assumed obligations based on their perceived need and not as a general right with the result of countries who may have self-selected developing country status taking on more obligations with lower or no delay in implementation than other developing countries.

For the incoming Director-General, finding a solution to this issue acceptable to all Members could be critical to unlocking progress on other negotiations.

Presidential Proclamation 9974 of December 26, 2019 – contains changes to countries eligible for aspects of Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, implements U.S. duty reduction commitments from U.S.-Japan trade agreement and other matters

On December 30, 2019, Presidential Proclamation 9974 was published in the U.S. Federal Register. 84 Fed. Reg. 72,187-72,211. The proclamation addresses a number of trade issues, including:

(1) removing Cameron from beneficial tariff treatment under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (“AGOA”), 19 U.S.C. 2466a, effective January 1, 2020 [see 84 FR 72,187, paragraphs 1-4];

(2) finding that Niger, the Central African Republic, and The Gambia are not eligible for certain preferential access on textiles and apparel under 19 U.S.C. 3721(a) for failure to establish “effective visa systems and related customs procedures” to minimize shipment of nonqualified goods, although Niger and Guinea-Biseau were found to qualify under 19 U.S.C. 3721(c) as lesser developed sub-Suharan countries [see 84 FR 72,187, paragraphs 4-6];

(3) extends through the close of December 31 2020, duty-free access of specified quantities of certain agricultural products (list of products is contained in Annex I to the Proclamation) [see 84 FR 72,187-72,188, paragraphs 7-14 and 84 FR 72, 192, Annex I];

(4) takes actions to implement U.S. obligations undertaken with Japan in the U.S.-Japan trade agreement [see 84 FR 72,188-72,189, paragraphs 15-18 and 84 FR 72,193-72,208, Annexes II and III];

(5) modifications to the tariff schedules in connection with the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement [see 84 FR 72,189-72,190, paragraphs 19-15 and 84 FR 72,209-72,211, Annex IV].

After reviewing the issues and bases for designated actions, the Presidential Proclamation then lays out the actions being implemented by proclamation. 84 FR 72,190-72,211 (including Annexes). Proclamation 9974 is attached below.

12-26-2019-Presidential-Proclamation-to-take-Certain-Actions-under-the-AGOA-and-for-Other-Purposes

The significant trade issue for the United States is obviously implementing the U.S.-Japan trade agreement on tariff reductions and Japan’s participation in the TRQ on beef. As reviewed in prior posts (December 10 and October 26, 2019), the U.S.-Japan trade agreements affect a relatively small amount of U.S. trade with Japan and Japanese trade with the U.S., appear to be largely based on the U.S. desire to obtain parity for U.S. agricultural producers with CPTPP members following the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP agreement and establishing a strong agreement on digital trade with a trading partner with similar high standards as existing U.S. standards. The big question for U.S.companies and workers and their Japanese counterparts is whether either country has the current political bandwidth to put in place an FTA vs. the small market liberalization agreement and digital trade agreement achieved to date.

Turning to the actions on individual Sub-Saharan countries, the importance is almost certainly greater for the African countries than for the U.S. Specifically, for the individual African countries who are losing certain AGOA benefits or finding themselves now entitled, trade flows are relatively minor from a U.S. perspective; from the African country perspecitive, the importance may be significantly greater. For example, the United States in 2018 had imported $63 million of merchandise from Cameroon duty free under AGOA. This was out of total US imports from Cameroon of $212 million ($72 million were otherwise duty-free). U.S. imports from the other Sub-Saharan countries in 2018-2019 have been significantly smaller. Nonetheless, duty-free access remains important for all of these countries going forward.

The extension of the market access for Israeli agricultural products for another year has been occurring annually since the original agreement’s term expired. With all that is on the table for the Trump Administration, it is not clear if the 2004 agreement will be renegotiated in 2020 or simply rolled over for another year at the end of 2020.

Finally, the modifications to the tariff schedule for the US-Chile FTA seem to be largely technical in nature.

With the U.S.-China Phase 1 Agreement to be signed on January 15 (and expected to go into effect 30 days later) and with the USMCA awaiting Senate passage of implementing legislation, 2020 could see some significant reduction of barriers with China and the implementation of USMCA (assuming Canadian passage). But the Presidential Proclamation 9974 helped start 2020 with a modest trade liberalization agreement with Japan and the tweaking of a number of smaller agreements or country participation in parts of AGOA.