United States

WTO Dispute Settlement — How to Handle Allegations That An Appellate Body Member is Affiliated with a Government and Hence Not Properly an Appellate Body Member?

In the first twenty-five years of the World Trade Organization, there have generally been few challenges to Appellate Body members in terms of violations of their obligations under Art. 17.3 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding or of the Rules of Conduct, WTO/DSB/RC/1.

The dispute brought by Canada against a countervailing duty order issued by the United States on supercalendered paper from Canada has resulted in such an issue arising. The WTO summary of the case is contained here, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds505_e.htm. The Appellate Body Report was circulated on February 6, 2020 under the document number WT/DS505/AB/R.

The United States had taken an appeal from certain aspects of the panel report. At the Dispute Settlement Body meeting of February 26, 2020, the U.S. had objected to the DSB considering the Appellate Body report as invalid for various reasons, including the fact that two of the three AB members’ terms had expired and had not received authorization from the DSB to continue to participate in appeals, that the report was issued far beyond the maximum 90 days laid out in the DSU (Art. 17.5 of the DSU). Most importantly, the United States claimed that the third person hearing the appeal was in fact affiliated with a government in contravention of DSU 17.3 and that her participation in the appeal was inappropriate for that reason and the fact that many of the cases relied upon by Canada to establish a practice were cases involving the government of China, the government with which the AB member was allegedly affiliated creating justifiable doubts as to the person’s independence or impartiality (WT/DSB/RC/1, Art. III.1). The U.S. position was that in light of the problems, the only consensus possible would be a positive consensus and that the U.S. would agree to a positive consensus on certain findings by the panel that were not appealed by the U.S.

Canada, the EU, and China all made comments at the DSB meeting in late February. Canada argued that despite the allegations raised by the US which should be looked at but not in the context of a DSB meeting, the DSB would adopt the Appellate Body report absent negative consensus. China agreed and defended the Appellate Body member who was from China. The EU reviewed procedures for raising the types of allegations raised by the US but like Canada and China viewed the DSU as mandating adoption of the AB report where a negative consensus did not exist.

The U.S. did not agree that adoption was permitted or appropriate and continued to oppose. The WTO webpage coverage of the dispute view the AB and panel reports as adopted on 5 March 2020. The minutes of the WTO DSB meeting of February 28 and March 5, 2020 are presented in WT/DSB/M/441 at pages 18-25 (14 May 2020). The document is embedded below and the reader is encouraged to read the discussion on those pages in full to understand the competing positions of the parties and major third parties.

WTDSBM441

While the Rules of Conduct describe a process for presenting information “of a material violation of the obligations of independence, impartiality, or confidentiality or the avoidance of direct or indirect conflicts of interest by covered persons which may impair the integrity, impartiality or confidentiality of the dispute settlement mechanism,” parties are told “at the earliest possible time and on a confidential basis, submit such evidence to the Chair of the DSB, the Director-General or the Standing Appellate Body, as appropriate.” WT/DSB/RC/1 Art. VIII.1. Paragraph 2 of Art. VIII says that the alleged failure to disclose by itself is not a sufficient ground for disqualification “unless there is also evidence of a material violation of the obligations of independence, impartiality, confidentiality or the avoidance of direct or indirect conflicts of interests and that the integrity, impartiality or confidentiality of the dispute settlement mechanism would be impaired thereby.”

Paragraphs 14-17 address how to address alleged violations by a member of the Appellate Body basically calling for the information to be shared with the other party to the dispute and to the Standing Appellate Body.

But the basic premise of the Rules of Conduct is that allegations and resolutions will occur before the panel or Appellate Body process is complete to permit time to substitute a new panelists or Appellate Body member into the dispute before final resolution.

Challenges of the Supercalendered Paper case

After December 10, 2019, there was only one Appellate Body member. The United States communicated with the Director-General of the WTO and the Chair of the Dispute Settlement Body (the other two entities to whom evidence of possible violations could be sent if other than an Appellate Body member) on January 30, 2020 about the alleged violation of the one remaining AB member as she was affiliated with the government of China and the case, while brought by Canada involved mainly cases in which China was involved. While the evidence wasn’t sent to the Standing Appellate Body, that was not a practical option under the circumstances.

It is unclear whether the Director-General or the Chair of the Dispute Settlement Body did anything with the information provided. Certainly, no action was expeditiously undertaken to permit a resolution of the allegation before the time when the DSB would take up the Appellate Body Report and panel report. There is no reference in the minutes of the March 5, 2020 meeting to any action being taken.

The position of Canada and the EU was that the U.S. would have to wait until the Appellate Body was functioning again to have the issue reviewed. Yet such an approach is counter to the need to determine whether a material violation has occurred expeditiously so that corrective action (e.g., replacement of AB member or panelist) could occur if appropriate.

What is clear is that a system which doesn’t permit the timely evaluation of allegations against the propriety of an Appellate Body member, a panelist or other individual involved in the dispute settlement system, serving on a dispute weakens the integrity of the system and the perceived impartiality of the AB members and panelists.

Nor have Canada, the EU, China or others identified what a later review of allegations would permit in terms of correction of the particular dispute if the allegations are deemed to be confirmed. Nor do the Rules of Conduct seem to provide for retroactive correction of earlier disputes where a panelist or Appellate Body with a demonstrated serious violation of obligations served (and hence either there may have been a split decision on certain issues if there was a dissenting view and where you would not have had three proper AB members participate).

One would assume that the U.S. will make addressing these shortcomings in the existing system part of what needs to be addressed before the Appellate Body is reconstituted.

Continuing saga

Despite the fact that Canada agrees that the U.S. has raised serious issues, Canada has sought rights to retaliation and the topic was discussed at Monday’s Dispute Settlement Body meeting (June 29, 2020). The WTO press release on the meeting included this summary of the discussion of supercalendered paper:

“Paper from Canada

“Canada noted its request to suspend concessions against the United States for the US failure to comply with the WTO’s ruling in DS505. Canada said the US has neither informed the DSB of its intentions in regard to complying with the ruling, nor has it proposed a reasonable period of time to ensure compliance. Thus, Canada was pursuing its right to retaliate.

“The United States objects to the premise that the DSB adopted the ruling in this dispute on 5 March. The US position is that there was no valid Appellate Body report, and there was no consensus for the DSB to adopt the ruling. The report was not valid for three reasons: 1) the ruling was issued after the 90-day deadline set under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU); 2)
two of the Appellate Body members were not authorized by the DSB to continue working on the case after their terms as members expired; and 3) the third Appellate Body member — Hong Zhao of China — was disqualified from serving as a member because she currently serves as vice president of an academy which is a public institution under Chinese law and subordinate to China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), and thus she was neither independent nor impartial.

“The US also said Canada was not suffering any trade impact from the measures in question, particularly since the countervailing duties had been removed two years earlier. Nevertheless, the US said it had objected to the Canadian request on 26 June, meaning that the matter is automatically referred to WTO arbitration.

“Canada was joined by China, the EU, Japan, Australia and Mexico in rejecting the notion that the Appellate Body ruling in DS505 was not valid and that the DSB never adopted the ruling. Canada said the minutes of the DSB meeting on 5 March show that the ruling was adopted on the basis of Article 17.14 of the DSU, whereby a ruling can only be rejected if all WTO members present agree to reject it. Canada added that its request is based on a formula to ensure that retaliation can be exercised only if and when the US applies its WTO-inconsistent ongoing conduct to imports from Canada in the future.

“China rejected the accusations that Ms Zhao was not impartial and independent, declaring that the Chinese institute with which she is affiliated is an independent legal entity, and that the US raised no objections to her when she was first appointed to the WTO, nor when she was involved in rulings that were favorable to the United States.

“The US countered that China has not denied US statements regarding Ms Zhao’s affiliation with the institute and its affiliation with, and financial support from, MOFCOM.”

https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/dsb_29jun20_e.htm.

The United States releases its statement to the Dispute Settlement Body meetings on the US Mission Geneva webpage. See Statement of the United States at the Dispute Settlement Body Meeting, Geneva, June 29, 2020, https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Jun29.DSB_.Stmt_.as-deliv.fin_.public13218.pdf The relevant portion (pages 20-24) of the U.S. statement this past Monday is copied below.

“12. UNITED STATES – COUNTERVAILING MEASURES ON SUPERCALENDERED PAPER FROM CANADA

“A. RECOURSE TO ARTICLE 22.2 OF THE DSU BY CANADA (WT/DS505/13)

“ On June 18, 2020, Canada filed a request that the DSB authorize Canada to suspend concessions because it considers that the United States failed to comply with the recommendations of the DSB.

“ The United States objects to the premise of Canada’s request, which is that the DSB adopted recommendations in this dispute on March 5, 2020. As we will explain again, the position of the United States is that no DSB recommendation was or could be adopted because there was no valid Appellate Body report, and there was no consensus for the DSB to adopt the reports.

“ The United States has also repeatedly expressed concern that Canada continues to pursue a dispute that has no real world effect on Canadian exporters – a fact conceded by Canada’s recent request.

“ Canada’s request asks for authorization based on speculation – that is, related to an alleged nullification or impairment that occurs ‘if the ‘ongoing conduct’ continues to exist and [if it] applies to exports from Canada in the future’.

“ Canada is unable to even assert that it suffers from any nullification or impairment today because the alleged conduct is not applied to any Canadian good.

“ Only one determination in this dispute involved Canada – Supercalendered Paper – and that countervailing duty order was revoked two years ago.

“ Therefore, Canada suffers no nullification or impairment from the alleged measure, nor can it say that the alleged measure continues to exist, nor that Canada will suffer nullification or impairment in the future.

“ Nevertheless – and without prejudice to the U.S. position that no recommendations were adopted by the DSB – by letter dated June 26, 2020, the United States also objected to the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations proposed by Canada.

“ Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, the filing of the objection by the United States automatically results in the matter being referred to arbitration. Article 22.6 does not refer to any decision by the DSB, and no decision is therefore required or possible.

“ Consequently, because of the U.S. objection under Article 22.6, the matter already has been referred to arbitration. Although unnecessary, the DSB may take note of that fact and confirm that it may not therefore consider Canada’s request for authorization.

“ The United States recalls that at the March 5, 2020, DSB meeting, we did not join a consensus to adopt the reports put forward. There were multiple reasons why the appellate document was not a valid Appellate Body report under Article 17 of the DSU. First, the DSB had taken no action to permit two ex-AB members to continue to serve after their terms expired; second, the report was not issued within 90 days, as required by Article 17.5; and third, one person serving was affiliated with the Government of China, and therefore was not a valid member of the Appellate Body under Article 17.3.12

“ Indeed, separate from this dispute, on January 31, 2020, the United States informed the WTO Director-General and the DSB Chair by letter of discovered information that disqualified a Chinese national, Ms. Zhao, from the Appellate Body.

“ At the March 5 meeting, the United States detailed for Members the evidence demonstrating that Ms. Zhao is not “unaffiliated with any government.” No information has been presented, before, during, or after the March 5 DSB meeting that contradicts that evidence.

“ Because of Ms. Zhao’s affiliation with the Government of China, the appellate document is not a valid Appellate Body report because it had not been provided and circulated on behalf of three Appellate Body members, as required under DSU Article 17.1.

“ At the March 5 DSB meeting, Canada agreed that the allegations of Ms. Zhao’s lack of independence are serious and stated that they deserve full and impartial consideration. Canada asserted that the Rules of Conduct addressed such situations.

“ The United States agrees with Canada’s apparent concern that Ms. Zhao’s participation in the appeal may also be inconsistent with the Rules of Conduct.

“ The procedures under the Rules of Conduct for the Appellate Body itself to conduct an inquiry are not available in current circumstances. However, this does not mean that no inquiry may be conducted. To the contrary, in general the Rules provide for the DSB Chair or the Director-General to conduct the relevant inquiry.

“ The DSB Chair and Director-General would be natural leaders of such an inquiry given their roles in the WTO dispute settlement system and the trust Members repose in them.

“ The United States notes that the conduct at issue also would have constituted a breach of the obligation in DSU Article 17.3 to avoid a direct or indirect conflict of interest.13 Ms. Zhao was demonstrably connected with the Chinese Government, which had a direct interest in this appeal as the “ongoing conduct” complained of related almost exclusively to China.14 This reinforces the importance of an alternative form of ethical inquiry.

“ Therefore, given Canada’s acknowledgement of serious issues of independence and impartiality, the United States would support an alternative inquiry under the Rules of Conduct.

“ Even aside from the fact that Ms. Zhao was not a valid Appellate Body member under DSU Article 17.3, such an inquiry would confirm her disqualification from serving on the appeal.

“Second Intervention

“ Canada asserts that the appellate report must have been adopted by negative consensus. But it is evident that not any document issued with the title “Report of the Appellate Body” is such a document. For example, if such a document were signed by three members of the Appellate Body Secretariat, no one would seriously argue the report must be adopted by the DSB by negative consensus. That is because the alleged “Report” would not be consistent with DSU Article 17, which requires an appeal to be decided by three Appellate Body members.15

“ In this dispute, the facts are not seriously contested. First, the DSB had taken no action to permit two ex-AB members to continue to serve after their terms expired; this is evident from the fact that no such decision was ever proposed to the DSB.

“ Second, the report was not issued within 90 days, as required by Article 17.5; this too is not contested.

“ Third, one Appellate Body member was affiliated with the Government of China; as the United States has pointed out, the evidence of affiliation brought forward by the United States has not been directly contested. Therefore, this affiliated person was not a valid member of the Appellate Body under Article 17.3.

“ Given that there was no valid Appellate Body report before the DSB, the document could not be adopted by negative consensus under Article 17.14 as that rule did not attach to this document. Therefore, the DSB could only adopt the document by positive consensus. The United States made clear at the DSB meeting that it objected and did not join a consensus on adoption.

“ As there was no consensus for adoption, the DSB did not adopt any reports in this dispute. Accordingly, there was no recommendation for the United States to bring a measure into conformity with a covered agreement.

“ Regarding Canada’s comments concerning application of the Rules of Conduct, we note these rules were agreed by Members in order to help preserve the integrity and impartiality of the WTO dispute settlement system. That does not mean that the Rules are all that is necessary to do so. Rather, first and foremost, it is for WTO Members, and all participants in the system, to take responsibility for safeguarding that system.

“ When Canada says only the Appellate Body may apply the obligations of impartiality and independence to a person serving on an appeal, and therefore the Rules cannot be applied now, Canada would actually use the Rules to undermine the integrity and impartiality of the WTO.

“ If there are valid ethical concerns with the service by a person in an appeal, they should be investigated. It would be thoroughly inconsistent with our experience and close relationship with Canada to see it defend the behavior of the Chinese official in this dispute.

“ And there is no question that Ms. Zhao’s professional connections with the Government of China raise serious ethical concerns. For instance, given Ms. Zhao’s professional connections with the Government of China, her participation in the appeal is not consistent with the obligations to be ‘independent and impartial’ and ‘avoid direct or indirect conflicts of interest,’ provided for in paragraph II:1 of the Rules of Conduct.16

“ We therefore look forward to further conversations with Canada to find a shared approach through which we can maintain the integrity and impartiality of WTO dispute settlement.

“ At the March 5 DSB meeting and again today, China has responded to the evidence explained by the United States. Importantly, and revealingly, China has not denied the following:

“o Ms. Zhao serves as Vice President of MOFCOM-AITEC.

“o Ms. Zhao receives or has received a salary for her position of Vice President.

“o MOFCOM-AITEC is an “affiliated” entity “subordinate” to MOFCOM.

“o MOFCOM-AITEC’s budget is part of MOFCOM’s budget, such that the salary for Ms. Zhao’s Vice President position at MOFCOM-AITEC is funded by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

“ The fact that China did not deny these statements or assert that they are incorrect only confirms that Ms. Zhao is affiliated with the Government of China and is therefore not a valid member of the Appellate Body.

“12 See U.S. Statement at the March 5, 2020, Meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body (Item 8).

“13 See DSU Art. 17.3 (“They [persons serving on the Appellate Body] shall not participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct or indirect conflict of interest.”).

“14 See United States – Countervailing Measures on Supercalendered Paper from Canada (Panel), WT/DS505/R, para. 7.295 and Tables 1-4 (seven of nine proceedings involving China).

“15 DSU Art. 17.1 (“The Appellate Body shall hear appeals from panel cases. It shall be composed of seven persons, three of whom shall serve on any one case.”).

“16 Rules of Conduct, Section II (“Governing Principle”), para. 1 (“Each person covered by these Rules … shall be independent and impartial [and] shall avoid direct or indirect conflicts of interest . . . so that through the observance of such standards of conduct the integrity and impartiality of that mechanism are preserved.”).”

Conclusion

The dispute settlement system at the WTO is facing challenges flowing from long standing concerns about the Appellate Body conforming to the limited role given it by the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the expansive reading of the Appellate Body’s role by AB members over time and the largely ineffective negotiating function of the WTO which has prevented meaningful oversight of the Appellate Body by WTO Members.

Added to the longstanding concerns raised by the United States and others comes a concern that goes to the heart of the dispute settlement system’s legitimacy — the need for impartial decision making and how to ensure prompt resolution of allegations of violations of obligations by AB members or panelists. The allegations against the remaining Appellate Body member raised by the United States in the supercalendered paper dispute have not been addressed by the Director-General of the WTO or by the Chair of the Dispute Settlement Body. Other WTO Members seem to be willing to see challenged reports adopted instead of having allegations pursued. Adopting a report put out by the AB including the challenged member and Canada’s pursuit of retaliation rights make a mockery of a properly functioning system and will do lasting harm to the DSB’s legitimacy. And so the downward spiral at the WTO continues in its dispute settlement function.

WTO Dispute Settlement – With Appellate Body Currently Non-Operational, AB Secretariat Personnel Have Been Shifted to Other Divisions

As of December 11, 2019, there was only one remaining Appellate Body member whose term had not expired. Agreement amongst WTO Members permitted a number of pending appeals (those where hearings had already happened) to be completed even though this would mean completion by individuals whose terms had terminated but who would operate under AB rule 15. The last Appellate Body reports were released on June 9, 2020. AUSTRALIA – CERTAIN MEASURES CONCERNING TRADEMARKS, GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AND OTHER PLAIN PACKAGING REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO TOBACCO PRODUCTS AND PACKAGING, WT/DS435/AB/R and WT/DS441/AB/R (9 June 2020).

The WTO has contractual arrangements with the remaining Appellate Body member and with many of the Appellate Body Secretariat staff. As a result, the WTO Director-General has worked to move the AB Secretariat staff to other Divisions within the WTO in light of the reduced 2020 Appellate Body budget, the reduced workload and now the termination (at least temporarily) of any work by the Appellate Body.

For example, the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration meeting of March 9, 2020 had an appearance by Director-General Azevedo. The write-up on the meeting noted that “Turning to the Appellate Body Secretariat, the Director-General observed that until a political agreement emerges as to the format of the future appeals process, 23 staff members of the Appellate Body Secretariat have been temporarily re-assigned to other Divisions.” Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration, Report of meeting held on 9 March 2020, WT/BFA/185/Rev. 1 at para. 1.10.

Last Friday, June 26, 2020, Director-General Azevedo wrote to all the WTO membership to alert them to the creation of a new Division on July 1 “responsible for Knowledge and Information Management, Academic Outreach and the WTO Chair’s Programme”. The new Division will be headed by Mr. Werner Zdouc who was being reassigned. Mr. Zdouc has since 2006 served as the director of the Appellate Body Secretariat. It is assumed that by July 1st all Appellate Body Secretariat staff have either left the WTO or been reassigned. The June 26 letter is embedded below.

DG-letter-to-PRs-re-New-Division-Zdouc-June-2020

Press accounts from 2019 suggested that Mr. Zdouc was viewed as contributing to the problems at the Appellate Body long complained of by the United States and some others, particularly on the issue of precedent (i.e., whether AB reports were precedential) and on the practical problem of whether the Appellate Body would correct elements of decisions that were viewed as wrongly decided by Members. See Inside U.S. Trade’s World Trade Online, Appellate Body’s future could depend on whether its director keeps his job, December 8, 2019.

Movement of WTO Appellate Body Secretariat staff doesn’t end the conflict on second-tier review

While there has been hope amongst some that WTO Members would continue to pursue in 2020 a path to reform that would permit the reactivating of the Appellate Body, that hope seems to have no short-term prospect for fulfillment.

Parties remain locked in their existing positions. With U.S. elections scheduled for November, some WTO Members may be deciding that they will simply await the outcome of the election before further engaging. Ambassador Lighthizer said at the recent U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means hearing on the President’s 2020 trade agenda that it would be ok if the Appellate Body never comes back.

Without an operational Appellate Body, WTO Members have various options including arbitration under DSU Article 25. However, there are ongoing skirmishes at the WTO pertaining to the coverage of costs by the WTO of arbitration costs for Members pursuing arbitration through the interim arbitration agreement to which the EU, Canada, China and many other countries are signatories. See JOB/DSB/1/Add. 12, 13 and 14.

During the 2020 budget discussions held at the end of 2019, the U.S. had pushed for a clarification for how arbitrators would be paid (same as panelists which was significantly lower than AB member daily charges; no monthly retainer) and for a reduction in the Appellate Body budget in light of the lack of sufficient AB members. See, e.g., Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration, Report of the Meeting Held on 12 and 27 November and 5 December 2019, WT/BFA/183 (6 December 2019).

Recent press accounts have reported that there continue to be challenges by the United States to the interim arbitration agreement on various fronts including payment from the WTO budget. See Inside U.S. Trade’s World Trade Online, June 12, 2020, Shea: U.S. opposes use of WTO budget for interim appellate plan (article includes a link to the June 5 letter from Amb. Shea to DG Azevedo). As stated in Amb. Shea’s June 5th letter to DG Azevedo, the U.S. objects to the interim arbitration agreement that the EU, China and others are party to because it “exacerbates some of the worst aspects of the Appellate Body’s practices.” The U.S. also objected “to the use of WTO budget funds for a process that is clearly far more than a simple Article 25 arbitration.” The letter is embedded below.

June-5-2020-letter-from-Amb.-Shea-to-DG-Azevedo

Conclusion

With a reduced 2020 budget for the Appellate Body and with the conclusion of disputes on which Appellate Body reports will be prepared until such time as the Appellate Body is reactivated, the WTO has reassigned Appellate Body Secretariat staff to other divisions and has started a new division which will be headed by the former Director of the Appellate Body Secretariat.

Unfortunately, shifting personnel to different divisions does nothing to eliminate the deep divisions on how to proceed with dispute settlement after panel reports. Moreover, there is no apparent willingness to move reform of the dispute settlement system forward at the present time. Efforts by the EU and others to create an interim process that mirror many of the problems found in the Appellate Body practices have simply moved the deep divisions among Members over the Appellate Body into what is permissible under DSU Art. 25. So we will have a crisis in the dispute settlement area at least until 2021 and probably beyond.

Candidates for the Next Director-General of the WTO — four and counting, an update

Two weeks after the WTO opened the nomination process for candidates to fill the Director-General post which becomes vacant on September 1, 2020, four countries have put forward candidates — Mexico, Nigeria, Egypt and Moldova. The period for nominations will come to a close on July 8 (COB Geneva time), so there are still sixteen days for additional candidates to be put forward.

There are many rumors and a few facts on possible candidates not yet announced. Press have indicated that Benin, which had had a candidate identified for consideration by the African Union, has withdrawn H.E. Mr. Eloi Laourou (Benin’s current Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the WTO) from consideration and will be supporting Nigeria’s candidate, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. See The Africa Report, Benin drops its WTO candidate in support of Nigeria’s Okonjo-Iweala (15 June 2020), https://www.theafricareport.com/29941/benin-drops-its-wto-candidate-in-support-of-nigerias-okonjo-iweala/.

The other African name floated as a possible candidate has been Kenya’s Amina Mohamed, current sport and culture minister and former Kenyan Ambassador to the WTO who was the first woman to chair the WTO’s General Counsel. She was also a candidate for the Director-General position in 2012-2103 when Roberto Azevedo of Brazil was selected. While mentioned early, there has been little in the press indicating Kenya will be nominating her, but there is obviously still time if Kenya so chooses. See Financial Times, Contenders Set Out Stalls to Succeed Azevedo at Helm of WTO, May 17, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/fc5fda8e-56cb-4866-b477-f4c3af603b5c.

Possible Developed Country Candidate(s)?

It has been rumored that there would be one or more developed country candidates and some WTO Members or their trade ministers, like the EU, have articulated a belief that the next Director-General should be from a developed country, consistent with the recent rotation between developed and developing country having the post of Director-General. Since DG Azevedo is from Brazil, a developing country, developed countries should take the next turn, according to this logic.

An article in the New York Times indicates that the European Trade Commissioner, Phil Hogan (Ireland) has confirmed he is considering a bid. See New York Times, Who’s Bidding to Be Next World Trade Organization Chief?, June 22, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/06/22/business/22reuters-trade-wto-factbox.html.

Spain’s Foreign Minister Arancha Gonzalez Laya has also been repeatedly identified as a potential candidate. She was chef de cabinet for Director-General Pascal Lamy who served from 2005-2013.

Other developed countries could decide to nominate one or more candidates, though press accounts indicate that Australia is not planning on submitting a candidate (at least not at present) and the U.S. has historically not put forward a candidate from the U.S. See Financial Review, No Australian candidate for WTO boss, Birmingham says, June 22, 2020, https://www.afr.com/world/europe/no-australian-candidate-for-wto-boss-birmingham-says-20200619-p554gf

Rumors have suggested that the Republic of Korea may submit a candidate. Japan has been very active in recent years through their ambassadors to the WTO but is not believed to be likely to put forward a candidate.

New Zealand had a Director-General two decades ago, Michael Moore, and its Trade Minister and former Ambassador to the WTO, Tim Groser, ran in 2012-2013. It is unclear whether New Zealand will put forward a candidate, whether former Minister Groser or someone else.

There is a rumor in Geneva that more nominations are likely and that at least one more may materialize later this week. If such an event materializes, I would suspect someone from an EU country or from Korea will become the fifth candidate.

Outreach by existing candidates and legal wrangling between African countries

The advantage of being an early announced candidate in the current process is that candidates can get their views out through the media ahead of the General Council meeting, and there is more time for their governments to court support from other WTO Members. Particularly when there is interest in expediting the selection process because of the near-term departure of existing Director-General Azevedo, such opportunities for pre-General Council wooing of other Members and media outreach will be more limited for candidates joining closer to the end of the nominating time period. The General Council meeting to meet and hear from the candidates is understood to likely be sometime in the week of July 12. If there is actually an effort to expedite the selection process after July 8, time will be very limited for candidates after the General Council meeting.

It is clear that at least the first three candidates are taking advantage of media to articulate their vision for the WTO and their role if selected as the next DG. Nominating governments are also doing outreach to trading partners seeking to build up support for their candidate.

For example, Jesus Seade Kuri, the Mexican candidate, provided an interview to the South China Morning Post which was published on June 18, 2020, Mexico’s nominee for top WTO job, Jesus Seade, vows to ‘bring US and China back to the table’, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3089452/mexicos-nominee-top-wto-job-jesus-seade-vows-bring-us-and.

Similarly, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala had her views on the WTO DG job published in various publications including the Pulse, ‘I’m a strong negotiator, reformer,’ Okonjo-Iweala makes her case for ‘challenging’ WTO job, June 17, 2020, https://www.pulse.ng/business/okonjo-iweala-former-minister-makes-case-for-wto-job/y123dsb.

Outreach has also been made by Egypt’s Abdel Hamid Mamdouh as he laid out what he considered to be important aspects of his candidacy in an article that appeared in The Africa Report on June 11. See Egypt’s Abdel Hamid Mamdouh bid for the WTO – Five things to know, June 11, 2020, https://www.theafricareport.com/29730/egypts-abdel-hamid-mamdouh-bid-for-the-wto-five-things-to-know/.

All candidates have recognized the challenges with the tensions between the United States and China, the need to be an honest broker, how their background gives them strengths needed to address the role of Director-General amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and need for reform at the WTO.

While Mexico is working on shoring up support for Mr. Seade amongst WTO Members in the Americas (and elsewhere), the two African candidates are working to gain support from their African colleagues (and others). Little has been in the press as yet as to what actions Moldova or its candidate are taking in the early days after Tudor Ulianovschi’s nomination.

Egypt has attempted to have Nigeria’s candidate disqualified on the grounds that Nigeria had another proposed candidate submitted to the African Union but withdrew that candidate and put forward Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala past the deadline for such nominations. The African Union’s counsel concurred but that position has been challenged by Nigeria. In any event, WTO procedures limit who may nominate candidates to WTO Members. Nigeria is a member while the African Union is not. Therefore, whatever is relevant for African Union member consideration, it is not relevant to whether Nigeria or any other AU member can propose a candidate to the WTO by July 8. See The Cable, Okonjo-Iweala still eligible to run for office of DG, says, WTO, June 20, 2020, https://www.thecable.ng/exclusive-okonjo-iweala-still-eligible-to-run-for-office-of-dg-says-wto. This type of public discord will not be helpful to obtaining solidarity around a single African candidate which has been the presumed purpose of the African Union’s process.

Conclusion

With roughly half of the nomination time period having run, it is clear that there will be a significant number of candidates. It is unclear how many developed country candidates will end up running and to what extent members will focus more on geographical area, development status, or gender of the candidates in their considerations.

With the U.S., the EU and China having very different views of what needs to be done to return the WTO to relevance and with the recent USTR statement that any candidate to receive U.S. backing must “understand the need for reform and the problems of free economies in dealing with China” (New York Times, U.S. Wants WTO Head Who Understands Problems Dealing with China: Lighthizer, June 17, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/06/17/world/asia/17reuters-usa-trade-wto.html), the road ahead will be challenging for all candidates with no guarantee that the process will succeed in either an expedited or normal time period.

Hopefully, the Chairman of the General Council (Amb. David Walker) and the WTO Secretariat have the four Deputy Directors-General warming up in case one of them is needed to serve as the Acting Director-General beginning September 1st.

COVID-19 — the global rate of increase of confirmed cases is surging

By the close of business on June 22, there will be more than 9 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 with the rate of growth exploding more than six months after the first cases were reported in China, with deaths approaching a half million. For the two weeks ending June 21, the number of new cases approached 2 million (1,932,024), up 24.0% from the two weeks ending June 7 (1,557,983) which in turn were up 21.5% from the two weeks ending May 24 (1,281,916). Thus, the last six weeks have seen the rate of new cases grow by 50.7%. Indeed, the last six weeks account for 54.25% of total cases since the end of 2019 (roughly 25 weeks).

As the worst of the pandemic has passed (at least the first wave) for most of the developed world (other than the United States and countries in the Middle East), the sharp growth in cases is mostly due to the spread of the virus in the developing world where healthcare infrastructure and ability to handle the challenges of the pandemic are likely less than for the developed world.

Central and South America, parts of Asia and the Middle East are the current hot spots of infections with growth in a number of African countries as well. The United States which peaked during the two week period ending April 26, has by the far the largest number of total cases (more than 2.2 million) and is seeing the number of cases rise again in the most recent two weeks.

Afghanistan, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Arab Republic all have significant numbers of cases and all but Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE are still growing rapidly in terms of new cases where peaks have not been reached. Thus, the likelihood of even greater number of new cases is a near certainty for the coming weeks.

Some recent developments

Most of western Europe has been engaged in reopening in recent weeks as the rates of infection are dramatically lower than in the March-April period. Indeed, travel within the EU and some neighboring countries is opening up in time for the July-August vacation season. Time will tell if the steps being taken to test, trace and quarantine any cases found going forward will minimize any upward movement in cases.

China and parts of Asia with low rates of infections where economic interruption has been less (e.g., Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Japan), are seeing low numbers of new cases. China has taken strong measures to address a new outbreak in Beijing (numbers are a few hundred cases).

Australia and New Zealand have few if any new cases and the numbers for Canada are also way down with reopening occurring as would be expected.

The U.S. and Canada and the U.S. and Mexico are maintaining travel restrictions between themselves (though excluding movement of goods and services).

In the United States, the story on the control of the pandemic is very mixed as individual states have been engaged in reopening at different rates in part reflecting different infection rates and growth rates. However, reopening in some states is occurring despite conditions in the state not being consistent with the Administration’s guidelines from the Center for Disease Control ad Prevention (“CDC”) on when reopening should occur. Thus, there are states seeing large increases in recent days and weeks while many other states are seeing significant declines or at least stable rates of infection. It is unclear how the infection rate in the U.S. will progress in the coming weeks and months.

Trade Considerations

As my post from last week on the Ottawa Group communication reviewed, there are lots of proposals that have been teed up by WTO Members to keep trade flowing during the pandemic and to potentially reduce the likelihood of such trade disruptions as are being experienced at present in future pandemics.

But large numbers of export restraints remain in place, transparency is better than it was in the first quarter but still not what is needed. However, import liberalization/expedition is occurring in many countries to facilitate obtaining medical goods needed at the lowest price.

The toll flowing from the pandemic and the closing of economies to control the pandemic is enormous despite efforts of governments to provide funding to reduce the damage. This has led the WTO to project 2020 trade flows to decline between 13 and 32% from 2019 levels. As data are available for the March-June period, the severity of the decline for various markets is being fleshed out and resulting in lower global GDP growth projections.

Because the COVID-19 pandemic hit many developed countries hard before spreading to most of the developing world, developing countries have seen economic effects from the pandemic preceding the health effects in their countries. Reduced export opportunities, declining commodity prices (many developing countries are dependent on one or a few commodities for foreign exchange), reduced foreign investment (and some capital flight), higher import prices for critical goods due to scarcity (medical goods) and logistics complications flowing from countries efforts to address the spread of the pandemic are a few examples of the economic harm occurring to many developing countries.

The needs of developing countries for debt forgiveness/postponement appears much larger than projected although multilateral organizations, regional development banks and the G20 have all been working to provide at least some significant assistance to many individual countries. Trade financing will continue to be a major challenge for many developing countries during the pandemic. Harm to small businesses is staggering and will set many countries back years if not decades in their development efforts when the pandemic is past.

As can be seen in developed countries, sectors like travel and tourism (including airlines, hotels, restaurants, entertainment venues) are extraordinarily hard hit and may not recover for the foreseeable future. The need for social distancing makes many business models (e.g., most restaurants, movie theaters, bars, etc.) unworkable and will result in the loss of large portions of small businesses in those sectors in the coming months. For many developing countries, travel and tourism are a major source of employment and income. Losses in employment will likely be in the tens of millions of jobs, many of which may not return for years if at all.

Role of WTO during Pandemic

The WTO views itself as performing the useful functions of (1) gathering through notifications information from Members on their actions responding to the pandemic and getting that information out to Members and the public, (2) providing forecasts of the trade flows during the pandemic, and (3) providing a forum for Members to bring forward proposals on what action the WTO as a whole should consider. Obviously the success of all three functions depends on the openness and engagement of the Members.

WTO agreements don’t really have comprehensive rules for addressing pandemics or for the policy space governments are likely to need to respond to the economic tsunami that may unfold (and will unfold with different intensities for different Members). Some recent proposals would try to address some of the potential needs for the trading system to better respond to pandemics. However, most proposals seem to suggest narrowing the policy space. Last week’s Committee on Agriculture was reported to have had many Members challenging other Members actions in the agriculture space responding to the extraordinary challenges flowing from the pandemic. While Committee activity is designed to permit Members the opportunity to better understand the policies of trading partners, a process in Committee which focuses simply on conformance to existing rules without consideration of what, if any, flexibilities are needed in extraordinary circumstances seems certain to result in less relevance of the WTO going forward.

Most countries have recognized that the depth of the economic collapse being cased by the global efforts to respond to COVID-19 will require Members to take extraordinary steps to keep economies from collapsing. Looking at the huge stimulus programs put in place and efforts to prevent entire sectors of economies from collapsing, efforts to date by major developed countries are some $10 trillion. Concerns expressed by the EU and others have generally not been the need for such programs, but rather have been on ensuring any departures from WTO norms are minimized in time and permit a return to the functioning of market economies as quickly as possible.

Members have not to date proposed, but should agree, that the WTO undertake an evaluation of programs pursued by Members and how existing rules do or do not address the needs of Members in these extraordinary times.

WTO possible actions to facilitate recovery from COVID-19, the Ottawa Group’s June 16 Communication

A number of WTO Members have submitted proposals for action by the WTO Membership to address the global trade challenges flowing from the COVID-19 pandemic including speeding recovery and minimizing future disruptions from later health challenges. Most proposals address what to do about export restrictions, simplifying import procedures and/or reducing import duties, and improved transparency of actions taken.

The Ottawa Group June 2020 Statement: Focusing Action on COVID-19

The latest contribution comes from the “Ottawa Group” and was submitted on June 16, 2020. June 2020 Statement of the Ottawa Group: Focusing Action on COVID-19, WT/GC/217. The Ottawa Group is a group of WTO Members who describe themselves as “champions of WTO reform”. The group consists of the following WTO Members — Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, European Union, Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore and Switzerland.

The Ottawa Group statement provides the following introduction followed by six areas for potential WTO action:

“The world continues to grapple with the profound human health and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to these challenges, thinking has begun on trade policy actions that would support an inclusive, sustainable, and resilient recovery as well as what trade rules should be adapted or developed to guide collaborative policy responses to future global crises. In this context, the WTO must play an important role in helping ensure coordination and coherence between actions its members take. This will require initiative and engagement by WTO Members in order to be successful.

“In this environment, there is an opportunity for the Ottawa Group to provide leadership, critical thinking and analysis, as well as ideas and proposals on potential actions that the broader WTO membership could take. In order to make best use of resources, this paper sets out six areas where concrete actions could be taken.” Page 1

The six action items are identified with a discussion of why the area is important and what steps the Group views as important to take. The Ottawa Group recommendations are summarized at the end of the communication (pages 4-5):

Summary:

Action Item 1: Transparency and Withdrawal of Trade-Restrictive Measures

Action Point: Ministers instruct officials to: 1) ensure any measures introduced in response to COVID-19 are promptly notified in accordance with relevant WTO requirements; 2) support efforts by the WTO Secretariat to collect and share information and best practices on trade-related measures taken in response to COVID-19 5/; 3) discuss the principle of ‘targeted, proportionate, transparent, temporary and consistent with WTO rules’; and 4) lead by example and withdraw or end any trade restrictive measures introduced in response to COVID-19 as quickly as possible.

“5/ Including by: (a) returning to the quarterly cycle of trade monitoring reports as during the financial crisis; and (b) including trade-related economic support measures in the trade monitoring reports and (c) and to the extent possible, making a technical assessment of members’ trade-related economic support measures in reaction to COVID-19.

Action Item 2: Keeping Open and Predictable Trade in Agricultural and Agri-Food Products

Action Point: Ministers instruct officials to: 1) engage in ongoing discussions on the fulfilment of joint declarations on maintaining predictable and open agriculture trade; 2) lead by example, and withdraw or end any emergency measures introduced in response to COVID-19 that may adversely affect trade in agriculture as quickly as possible; and 3) advance analysis and consideration on what steps WTO Members could take to continue improving agriculture trade based on the lessons learned from COVID-19 to ensure that future crises will not undermine trade, food security, and the stability of agricultural markets in the long-term.

Action Item 3: E-commerce

Action Point: Ministers instruct officials to prioritize and accelerate work on the Joint Statement Initiative on E-commerce, including through informal and virtual discussions, ahead of the rescheduled MC12 in 2021, including by the development of a consolidated negotiating text by the end of 2020 at the latest. In this regard, we will support the efforts of the co-convenors.

Action Item 4: Trade Facilitation – Use of Information Technology and Streamlined Procedures

Action Point: Ministers instruct officials to identify ways to take full advantage of the opportunities for trade facilitation in the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and to promote best practices for the implementation of the TFA. This includes how the adoption of digital solutions can support the movement of essential goods across borders as smoothly as possible.

Action Item 5: Initiative on Medical Supplies

Action Point: Ministers instruct officials to advance analysis and consideration in order to identify what steps WTO Members could take to facilitate trade in medical supplies to help ensure that the world is better positioned to deal with future health emergencies and to help ensure that versatile, diversified and resilient supply chains exist that allow all members access to vital medical supplies. This work should include analysis of the objectives and effects of policies affecting trade of medical supplies in response to the current pandemic and support for international organizations, including the WTO, in analyzing the potential impacts and outcomes of measures and recommending policies.

Action Item 6: Deepen Engagement with Stakeholders

Action Point: Ministers instruct officials to explore how best to pursue intensified engagement with stakeholders in order to better inform policymaking.”

The Ottawa Group proposals include topics not addressed in other proposals, such as the importance of prioritizing conclusion of the e-commerce joint statement initiative. During the pandemic, the critical importance of e-commerce to and expanded use by many businesses and consumers has reduced the damage to economies and to global trade. All Ottawa Group members are participating in the ongoing e-commerce talks, talks involving 84 countries or territories.

On issues like export restraints, the Ottawa Group has some positive ideas while reflecting the reality that some Ottawa Group members have used export restraints on medical goods during the pandemic. The idea of giving definition to the terms “targeted, proportionate, transparent, temporary and consistent with WTO rules” could be useful for administrations to be able to evaluate intended actions. However, the spread of a pandemic such as COVID-19 and internal political pressures to help one’s own population will render any such clarifications of marginal actual assistance if the underlying challenge of global supply/demand imbalance is not addressed on an ongoing basis.

As has been seen in agricultural goods, increasing information on global supplies both reduces the likelihood of countries imposing export restraints and gives trading partners greater leverage in pushing for roll backs of export restraints imposed by individual countries where there is no actual shortage. The Ottawa Group’s recommendations on agricultural goods reflects that the ability to disarm restrictions where shortages do not in fact exist.

The Ottawa Group submission from June 16 is embedded below.

WTGC217

EU’s June 11, 2020 Concept Paper, Trade in Healthcare Products

Some WTO Members, including Ottawa Group member countries, have taken unilateral action to liberalize trade in medical goods by reducing tariffs (at least temporarily) and by streamlining entry of medical goods needed for handling the pandemic. Some members, like the EU, have suggested creating an expanded medical goods duty-free agreement to go beyond the 1995 pharmaceutical agreement. For example, in a concept paper of 11 June 2020 entitled Trade in Healthcare Products, the EU, inter alia, provides in the Annex (pages 9-14) a list of goods that WTO Members could consider for total duty elimination. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/june/tradoc_158776.pdf The EU notes in a footnote that its concept paper “is meant to contribute to an exploratory discussion on a possible initiative to facilitate trade in healthcare products and is without prejudice to the EU’s position in potential negotiations.” Page 1 footnote 1.

The EU concept paper covers a number of other areas besides tariff eliminations, but for purposes of this note, the discussion will be limited to the product coverage for possible duty elimination. The EU provides a list of 152 6-digit HS categories in its Annex. At the six-digit level, import categories may cover many products not relevant to a particular pandemic, but the six-digit HS level is the most fragmented level of harmonization provided by the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Systems. Interestingly the EU Annex does not cover all products identified by the World Customs Organization and World Health Organization as relevant to fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, there are thirty products (with accompanying HS numbers that are in the WCO list that are not in the EU proposed Annex. See World Customs Organization Prepared jointly with the World Health Organization, HS classification reference for Covid-19 medical supplies, 2.1 Edition, http://www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/nomenclature/covid_19/hs-classification-reference_2_1-24_4_20_en.pdf?la=en.

Specifically, under the WCO’s Section II dealing with face and eye protection, there are two face and eye protection products which are not part of the EU list (HS 9004.90 and 3926.90); four of five glove categories are not in the EU list (HS 3926.20, 4015.19, 6116.10, 6216.00); and eight of nine of the other products are not in the EU list (HS 6505.00, 3926.20, 4015.90 and 4818.50, 6210.40, 6210.40, 6210.50, 6210.50).

Similarly, in Section III, disinfectants and sterilisation products, two products in the WCO list are not covered by the EU (HS 2207.10, 2208.90).

In Section IV, oxygen therapy equipment and pulse oximeters, there is one product in the WCO list not covered by the EU Annex (HS 9026.80).

In Section V, other medical devices and equipment, the EU Annex doesn’t cover three products covered by the WCO list (HS 8413.19, 9028.20, 7324.90).

In Section VI, other medical consumables, there are four products shown in the WCO list that are not part of the EU Annex (HS 2804.40, 3923.29, 3926.90, 3926.90).

Section VII of the WCO list covers vehicles; with the exception of wheelchairs (which are covered by the EU Annex), the other three WCO products are not covered — ambulances, mobile clinic vehicles, mobile radiological vehicles (HS 8703, 8705.90, 8705.90).

Finally, in the WCO’s Section VIII, other products, three of four products in the WCO list are not covered by the EU Annex (HS 8421.39, 7311.00, 7613.00).

Because the WCO/WHO list reflects items needed by countries dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic, it is unclear what the logic is of not including such items in a proposed duty-free list compiled by the EU. Many of the items not included in the EU Annex (e.g., gloves, face shields, etc.) would be needed in addressing the current as well as future pandemics. If there is an effort to seek a duty-free agreement on medical goods, presumably the list will change from that put forward by the EU to be more comprehensive.

While the United States under the Trump Administration is not likely to enter into an agreement to eliminate tariffs on medical goods while the pandemic is afoot (as indicated by Amb. Lighthizer), the reality is that nearly all of the goods in the EU Annex are already duty free in the United States. Specifcally, 135 of the 152 6-digit HS items are duty free (Column 1 rate) in the U.S. in 2020. That is 88.8% of the HS categories. On a dollar value basis, 98.4% of imports into the U.S. during 2019 of products in the EU Annex are under HS numbers that are duty free. Of the remaining 1.6% of imports, a large part of the imports would be duty free under an FTA or GSP or other preferential program. Imports from China, some of which may be subject to supplemental duties flowing from the Section 301 investigation and resulting additional tariffs on Chinese goods, are 6.2% of total imports and some of those goods, if covered by additional duties, are subject to existing or potential exclusions.

Stated differently, should there be an effort to do a sectoral duty free agreement, in considering whether there is a critical mass, sponsors should be evaluating the existing tariff structures of non-participants.

The EU Concept Paper and the WCO list are embedded below.

tradoc_158776

hs-classification-reference_2_1-24_4_20_en-1

Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff’s Jun 17 speech, Pandemic underlines need to improve trading system’s relevance and resilience

This past week, Deputy Director-General Wolff spoke at a Think20 virtual panel on Policy Recommendations for a Post-COVID 19 World. DDG Wolff reviewed both actions that the WTO has taken (transparency on actions taken by Members; developing a trade forecast; providing a forum for members to share proposals and consider collective action) and proposals that had been put forward by Members. See https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/ddgaw_18jun20_e.htm.

DDG Wolff identified two imperatives — “where the current rules are least prescriptive, they should be strengthened”; “where collective action would be helpful it should occur.” He then reviews WTO Members who have put forward proposals (Korea, Canada, Singapore, New Zealand, Switzerland, the Ottawa Group, the Cairns Group) and provided his summary of some of the suggestions made:

“Some specific suggestions that have been made include the following:

” A major effort can be undertaken to increase transparency. Member notifications can be supplemented by enhanced monitoring and reporting of measures by the Secretariat.

“There is little guidance in the WTO rules as to the appropriate use of export controls where it is felt that there exists short supply. Further guidance could be crafted. Sometimes the existence of extensive policy space is contrary to the common interests of all.

“Government interventions to procure needed supplies reduce the scope for market forces to determine competitive outcomes. A number of the practices witnessed in the last three months in response to the pandemic are not explicitly regulated by the current WTO rules. Included under this heading would be subsidization conditioned on supplying the domestic market, and pre-emptive government purchasing and investment. Additional disciplines could be considered.

“Leaving the allocation of scarce necessities solely to market forces may also not be a completely satisfactory alternative if the poorest countries are priced out of participation.

“Consideration can be given to agreeing, as in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, to require that a country planning to impose an export restriction consider the effect on others of applying the measure.

“Additional provisions could provide for prior notice before export restrictions are put into place and a commitment to engage in timely consultations.

“Consideration can be given to including in any restrictions a sunset clause and providing for a roll-back of current trade restrictions.

“Multilaterally-agreed guidance could be given for the sharing of scarce medical supplies, including vaccines.

“Concerted efforts could be made to have relevant tariff liberalization, not just for medical goods, equipment and pharmaceuticals, but more broadly.

“Consideration can be given to creating, a Members’ Emergency Task Force or other mechanism to flesh out options for consideration by Members.

“Where options are devised by groups of Members, an effort and process are needed to gain broader Member support for their recommendations and to assure implementation of concrete steps forward.

“A Long-Range Policy Planning Network for the Multilateral Trading System could be created. There is insufficient attention paid to assessing the future needs of the multilateral trading system, in part due to the daily need to deal with current challenges.

“For the recovery, there are at least three immediately identifiable ways
in which the multilateral trading system can contribute. Consideration
can be given to:

“Lowering the costs of trade by lowering tariffs and other impediments to trade broadly;

“Engaging in a collective effort to accelerate the implementation of
the Trade Facilitation Agreement, and

“Working with international financial institutions and banks to
foster the restoration of trade finance.”

A broad array of suggestions have been made at the WTO as can be seen. The challenge, of course, is in generating momentum for group action. If the major players are not pulling in the same direction, it is hard to see how that momentum will be generated. Typically times of crisis create opportunities for bold action. Is today’s crisis such an opportunity considering the significantly different perspectives of China, the EU and the U.S.?

Many developing countries (and those who claim developing status at the WTO) typically have the highest tariffs and can be motivated for short-term tariff action on specific goods (as this pandemic has demonstrated), but have not shown a willingness to lead on tariff liberalization when developed countries typically have very low tariff levels already. Is the pandemic a reason for such countries to rethink their contribution to the global trading system?

A number of the proposals go to the functioning of the WTO and its governance. Considering the desire by many for broader reform but with significant differences in what type of reforms are appropriate, can the proposals identified generate consensus support in the coming months?

With the economic damage to the world’s economies much larger than originally projected, certainly there has never been a greater need for collective action to minimize human health and economic costs from the pandemic and to speed economic recovery. The coming months will show whether the great divides among the majors can be bridged for the good of all.

U.S. approach to trade – USTR Lighthizer’s Foreign Affairs article and Congressional testimony on June 17

Every year, the U.S. House of Representative’s Committee on Ways and Means and the U.S. Senate Finance Committee hold hearings to understand the Administration’s trade agenda for the year. This year both Committees held hearings on June 17 where the sole Administration witness was U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer.

Ambassador Lighthizer had separately prepared an article for Foreign Affairs entitled “How to Make Trade Work for Workers, Charting a Path Between Protectionism and Globalism” which had been reviewed by many of the Committee members prior to the hearings. The article is available here and presents the Trump Administration’s approach to trade policy. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-make-trade-work-workers.

The Foreign Affairs article

Ambassador Lighthizer uses the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic to state that it is time for discussions to reach a new consensus on “the future of U.S. trade policy.” Amb. Lighthizer’s summary of the approach of the current Administration are repeated below:

“That debate should start with a fundamental question: What should the objective of trade policy be? Some view trade through the lens of foreign policy, arguing that tariffs should be lowered or raised in order to achieve geopolitical goals. Others view trade strictly through the lens of economic efficiency, contending that the sole objective of trade policy should be to maximize overall output. But what most Americans want is something else: a trade policy that supports the kind of society they want to live in. To that end, the right policy is one that makes it possible for most citizens, including those without college educations, to access the middle class through stable, wellpaying jobs.

“That is precisely the approach the Trump administration is taking. It has broken with the orthodoxies of free-trade religion at times, but contrary to what critics have charged, it has not embraced protectionism and autarky. Instead, it has sought to balance the benefits of trade liberalization
with policies that prioritize the dignity of work.”

The paper reviews the history of trade liberalization, what the Administration views as its limits, their perception that many trade advocates have extolled the benefits of liberalization while discounting or ignoring the economic costs of liberalization. Unlike other areas of government policy, trade liberalization was viewed as an absolute good and not weighed against the costs of the policy in fact.

The section of the article entitled “The dark side of free trade” reviews the steep economic and human costs for the United States over the period 2000-2016 noting the loss of manufacturing jobs, stagnation of median household incomes, and the devastation to the populations left behind in manufacturing locations. While outsourcing reduces costs, it increases vulnerabilities and reduces the nation’s ability to respond to certain situations, such as the pandemic.

Amb. Lighthizer opines that “A sensible trade policy strikes a balance among economic security, economic efficiency, and the needs of working people.” He reviews how he believes the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (“USMCA”) achieves that balance looking at specific improvements from NAFTA.

The article then goes on to look at “two of the most significant trade challenges [the U.S.] will face in the coming years: market-distorting state capitalism in China and a dysfunctional WTO.”

The Trump Administration changed the approach of trying to deal with China’s trade policy issues pursued by prior Administration (e.g., through bilateral talks and through the WTO dispute settlement system) by going after some of the larger issues through the section 301 investigation with resulting tariffs on imports from China which led to the creation of the Phase 1 Agreement and, depending on success of Phase 1, a potential Phase 2.

On the WTO, the article focuses on the WTO’s Appellate Body and its deviation from its original purpose.

“The challenges in the WTO are also vexing. Like many international organizations, the WTO has strayed from its original mission. Designed as a forum for negotiating trade rules, it has become chiefly a litigation society. Until recently, the organization’s dispute-resolution process was led by its seven-member Appellate Body, which had come to see itself as the promulgator of a new common law of free trade, one that was largely untethered from the actual rules agreed to by the WTO’s members. The Appellate Body routinely issued rulings that made it harder for states to combat unfair trade practices and safeguard jobs. This was one of the reasons why the Trump administration refused to consent to new appointments to it, and on December 11, 2019, the Appellate Body ceased functioning when its membership dipped below the number needed to hear a case.

“The United States should not agree to any mechanism that would revive or replace the Appellate Body until it is clear that the WTO’s dispute-resolution process can ensure members’ flexibility to pursue a balanced, worker-focused trade policy. Until then, the United States is better off resolving disputes with trading partners through negotiations—as it did from 1947, when the General Agreement on Tarifs and Trade was signed, until 1994, when the WTO was created—rather than under a made-up jurisprudence that undermines U.S. sovereignty and threatens American jobs.”

Congressional Hearings

The Congressional hearings provide the opportunity for the Administration to present its record of accomplishments as well as identifying pressing issues being pursued and for members of Congress to inquire about specific issues of importance to their constituents, to challenge the narrative of the Administration (typically by the opposition party), to press for commitments on actions deemed of importance and otherwise to gain clarification of matters of interest to Congressional members.

Yesterday’s hearings had all of the above. Amb. Lighthizer’s opening statement to both Committees stressed what the Administration viewed itself as having achieved and the benefits to working Americans with a focus on China (and the US-China Phase 1 Agreement), USMCA, the US-Japan Phase 1, disputes at the WTO and WTO reform proposals as well as the Administration’s game plan for the WTO, for pending negotiations with the U.K. and Kenya and for WTO reform, and enforcement of existing agreements. His opening statement to the U.S. Senate Finance Committee is embedded below but mirrors his prepared statement to the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee.

17JUN2020LIGHTHIZERSTMNT1

Senate Finance Committee Ranking Member Wyden (D-OR) in his opening statement painted a different picture of the first three years of the Trump Administration’s trade agenda and whether successes had been achieved. His statement is embedded below.

061720-Wyden-Trade-Agenda-Hearing-Opener1

There were many questions in both chambers on the USMCA agreement, with particular focus on enforcement of labor, environment and other issues. With the final revised USMCA receiving strong bipartisan support in both houses of Congress and with the agreement taking effect on July 1st, many of the questions flagged areas where one of the countries was viewed as not in compliance with obligations in the Agreement (e.g., energy practices in Mexico) and commitments by Amb. Lighthizer to pursue matters where compliance wasn’t in place.

On the issue of Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum products from Canada and Mexico, some members inquired whether examining imposition of such tariffs would be consistent with U.S. agreement with the two countries which had excluded them from the additional tariffs. Amb. Lighthizer reviewed that the agreement excluded Canada and Mexico where volumes remained at historic levels. If the U.S. found surges and decided to impose the tariffs, any retaliation by Canada or Mexico would be limited to the same sectors (i.e., could not retaliate against agricultural products). Amb. Lighthizer indicated that the U.S. was considering whether tariffs should be imposed in light of surges that had been occurring.

There were also many questions about the U.S.-China Agreement with a focus on whether China was likely to meet its obligations on the purchase of goods (with most questions focused on agricultural purchases). Ranking Member Wyden (D-OR) cited a Peterson Institute paper claiming poor compliance with purchase commitments. See https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-phase-one-tracker-chinas-purchases-us-goods Amb. Lighthizer on a number of occasions reviewed what were described as inadequacies in the Peterson data and reviewed strong growth in orders from China on agricultural goods to the present time (vs. exports through April shown in the Peterson graphs which look at January-April, even though the agreement didn’t take effect until February 14, 2020).

There were many questions about reshoring manufacturing of medical goods, particularly personal protective equipment (“PPE”), challenges to such reshoring because of the failure of the Administration to enter into long-term contracts to permit manufacturing to start up, whether broader tariff exclusions should be provided to imports of such products while there were inadequate supplies, concerns about existing supplies of PPEs amidst the ongoing pandemic. The issue featured prominently in Senate Finance Committee Chairman Grassley’s (R-IA) opening statement and in the questions of a number of Senators and House Representatives in the two sessions. Amb. Lighthizer discussed use of tariffs as a longer term issue to support reshoring and contested arguments that the Administration had not done enough to secure supplies during the pandemic. Chairman Grassley’s opening statement is embedded below.

Grassley-at-Hearing-on-the-President

There was also interest in both Houses of the ongoing or soon to be initiated FTA negotiations with the United Kingdom (ongoing, two rounds completed) and with Kenya (to start after July 4). There were questions or statements of support for the U.S.-Japan Phase 1 Agreement particularly by members with agricultural export interests to Japan.

On U.S.-EU trade relations, there were a few questions raised dealing either with the perceived abuse of geographical indications on food products by the EU and its push to get other countries to accept EU indications or with changing EU SPS provisions that appear to members of Congress and USTR as not science based. Amb. Lighthizer characterized both as protectionist trends from our friends in the EU. He also indicated that USTR is considering whether the U.S. should initiate a 301 investigation on the non-science based SPS measures.

On digital services taxes, questions arose about yesterday’s announced U.S. withdrawal from the OECD negotiations. Amb. Lighthizer reviewed USTR’s role in conducting 301 investigations first on France and now on a host of other countries where taxes are being imposed or considered on digital services on a discriminatory basis and on companies with no physical presence in countries imposing the taxes. The OECD effort was started to achieve a global agreement that could be accepted by all. The U.S. withdrew from the talks based on its view that the talks were building in discrimination against U.S. companies. If there is not a solution in the OECD, Amb. Lighthizer made it clear that results from the 301 investigations would permit the U.S. to take appropriate action against countries who proceed without a global agreement.

While Amb. Lighthizer’s opening statement had reviewed various WTO issues relevant to reform efforts — addressing Appellate Body; putting teeth into WTO notification requirements; clarifying which Members are eligible for special and differential treatment, and the concern about bound tariffs which have proven not to reflect current economic realities between countries, there were few questions about WTO reform during the two hearings. Amb. Lighthizer did go through the challenge of a WTO system where tariffs are bound, where the U.S. over 70 years has removed the vast majority of its tariffs and many other countries have maintained very high bound and even applied tariffs with little likelihood that those tariffs would be reduced regardless of the economic advances made by countries with high bindings. India and Indonesia were two of the countries used as examples of where bound tariffs today of such countries were not reflective of their economic advances and hence were unfair to the U.S.

There were also questions that arose from press reports about statements President Trump allegedly made to President Xi in Japan seeking China’s help in his reelection effort and to reports about two USTR professional staff members who had set up a webpage and been contacting automotive companies about helping them with USMCA compliance at a time when they were still USTR employees. Amb. Lighthizer was in a meeting with the U.S. and Chinese Presidents in Osaka, Japan in 2019 and denied that any request for assistance was made by President Trump at that meeting. On the latter issue, Amb. Lighthizer indicated that political appointees clearly could not do what was done by professional staff and that the professional staff had reportedly sought and obtained clearance from the USTR ethics office.

Conclusion

It has long been obvious that the Trump Administration was adopting a significantly different approach to trade policy than had been pursued by prior Administrations over recent decades. Ambassador Lighthizer’s Foreign Affairs article provides an articulation of the underlying concerns that have driven the Administration to the current policy approach. While there are many who remain skeptical about the benefits vs. costs flowing from the modified approach being pursued by the Trump Administration, there is little question that the change in approach has gotten attention of trading partners and at least some important modifications in agreements.

The USMCA has many novel elements, many of which are interconnected in terms of achieving stated objectives. Changes in rules of origin coupled with a high level of labor needing to make a minimum level of hourly wages and labor enforcement provisions are intended to address longstanding concerns of labor and is consistent with Amb. Lighthizer’s articulated objective of making trade work for workers. The willingness to work with the Democrats to achieve the labor and environment provisions contained in the revised agreement objectives permitted broad bipartisan support when implementing legislation was considered in the United States. Similarly, the USMCA provision of a sixteen year sunset of the agreement, extendable every six years should permit Canada, Mexico and the United States to update the agreement on a regular basis preventing the loss of relevance or coverage that normal FTAs have experienced with the passage of time.

On the importance of the U.S. relationship with China, the current Administration has come to the conclusion that China is not interested in converting to a market economy in fact. Reciprocity is unlikely under WTO Agreements since the WTO is premised on market economy Members, and the WTO agreements do not address many of the distortions flowing from the Chinese-style economy. Thus, the Administration has pursued a different approach to achieve a different outcome and greater reciprocity. The importance of the U.S.-China Phase 1 is best understood in that context. While the jury is out on how successful the Phase 1 Agreement will be, Amb. Lighthizer’s review of USTR information on growing orders from China in agriculture and China’s implementation of many of the specific commitments in the SPS area and other areas is encouraging.

On the WTO, the U.S. is looking for fundamental reform to achieve an organization that has rules for all and that reflects the changing capabilities of Members. With the differences in views of the purpose of the Appellate Body between the U.S. and the EU (and others), there is no likelihood of rapid restoration of the Appellate Body. With the EU moving towards taking unilateral action against Members who don’t engage in a second stage review of disputes with them, we are likely facing a period of heightened trade tensions between the U.S. and the EU.

Other U.S. proposals that have already been made at the WTO (notification requirements; eligibility for special and differential treatment; WTO being an organization for market economies ) or are working on jointly with others (e.g., EU and Japan on industrial subsidies and state-owned enterprises), have different challenges in terms of reaching consensus to adopt. The issue not yet formally raised on revisiting tariff bindings and/or how the system addresses changes in economic might over time with existing bindings would seem to require a further major shock to the operation of the WTO to have any chance of being considered.

As trading partners struggle to find new sources of revenue, particularly following the economic challenges flowing from the COVID-19 pandemic, many have looked to tax foreign companies in the digital services space. As the U.S. has many of the major players, there are looming major confrontations over EU and other country efforts to impose discriminatory taxes. The U.S. will defend its interests if an OECD agreed approach cannot be found. Based on yesterday’s withdrawal of the U.S. from the OECD process, major disputes are likely by the end of 2020.

The Trump Administration will continue to utilize all legal tools available to it under U.S. law and pursuant to various Agreements to achieve a rebalancing of the U.S. trade relationship with our major trading partners and with all nations. The Foreign Affairs article provides the Administration’s logic for the approach being pursued.

Qatar’s WTO dispute with Saudi Arabia — panel report released on June 16, 2020

A panel report in the dispute between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia – Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS567/R, was released to the public today, June 16th.

Saudi Arabia and a number of other countries in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region had severed all relations with Qatar on June 5, 2017. Report, Section 2.2.2. “The June 2017 severance of relations and events leading up to it”. A Qatari company with exclusive rights of broadcasting in the MENA region (including Saudi Arabia) a range of sports for various leagues around the world found its materials used by a Saudi company without authorization. The Qatari company was unable to hire Saudi counsel to pursue enforcement actions in Saudi Arabia and criminal actions were not pursued by the Saudi government.

The dispute was one of several by Qatar against Members who cut off all relations for alleged violations of WTO Agreements. In the challenge of Saudi Arabia, various violations of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement were alleged by Qatar. While Saudi Arabia participated in the panel process, its main argument was that the matter was not properly the subject of dispute settlement or was justified by TRIPS Article 73.

Because the question of whether actions by countries pursuant to their national security concerns are properly the subject of WTO dispute settlement is important to many Members and in a number of ongoing disputes, there were many third parties (13 in total) to the dispute, including the United States, the European Union, China, Canada, Japan and others.

Panel findings

The panel did not find that the issues presented could not be decided by the panel. Based on the facts that were before the panel, the panel report had little trouble finding violations of various TRIPS Articles, with the key issue being whether security interests of the defending Member permitted an override of the other obligations. On this latter issue, the panel had different views on the two main violations, finding one (Art. 41.1 and 42) covered by the security exceptions and the other (Art. 61) not. More specifically, the panel found that the inability of the Qatari company to obtain local counsel in Saudi Arabia flowed directly from Saudi Arabia’s actions considered “necessary for the protection of its essential security interests” and which were “taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.” TRIPS Art. 73(b) and (b)(iii). The panel did not find that the claim surrounding the non-application of criminal procedures and penalties to the Saudi company was factually related to the worsened relationship between Saudi Arabia and Qatar and hence did not find Art. 73 overrode the violation of TRIPS Art. 61.

The conclusion to the panel report is embedded below.

567r_conc_e

The earlier case that looked at security interests under the GATT, Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WT/DS512/R (adopted 26 April 2019; panel report was not appealed), was an object of interest for a number of the third parties who filed comments. While the U.S. supported the Saudi position that security interests are a matter of self-determination and are not subject to dispute settlement, that view was not supported by most other Members including Canada, China, the EU or Japan. WT/DS567/R/Add.1 at Annex C-4 (Canada), C-5 (China), C-6 (European Union), C-7 (Japan), C-13 (United States). With many countries (but not Japan) having challenges to the United States Section 232 national security action on steel and aluminum pending before panels, the third party positions mirror arguments being presented in those other disputes.

Next Steps

It is not clear that either Qatar or Saudi Arabia will pursue arbitration under DSU Art. 25 or some other approach to reach a final resolution of the dispute. While Saudi Arabia lost the overarching issue at the panel stage, having cut off all relations with Qatar, it is unclear why it would pursue next steps. For Qatar, having obtained a legal victory on some issues at the panel stage and with relations severed with Saudi Arabia, it is unclear what additional benefit they get from pursuing arbitration. They could decide to leave the issue for later appeal by agreeing with Saudi Arabia that they reserve the right to appeal at such time as the Appellate Body is functioning again. As neither Qatar nor Saudi Arabia are parties to the interim arbitration agreement that the EU and 20 other WTO Members are party to (JOB/DSB/1/Add.12, 13 and 14), any decision to pursue arbitration would have to be negotiated between the two countries including procedures, etc.

Conclusion

The panel report released today is important both in terms of providing some interpretation of TRIPS provisions but also for its interpretation of TRIPS Art. 73, which mirrors the language in GATT Art. XXI.

Bigger panel decisions are due out later this year in the large number of challenges to U.S. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, and the actions taken on steel and aluminum products. The U.S. now has two panel reports that don’t agree with the U.S. basic premise that determination of national security interests and appropriate actions to take to defend are matters for Members to determine on their own without review by the dispute settlement system.

Assuming that the upcoming panel decisions go against the United States on that core principle, how the U.S. responds will depend on whether the panel report otherwise upholds the U.S. action as permissible in fact. If the U.S. loses the cases in toto, look for the U.S. to not accept the panel results, and to either negotiate with trading partners individually or take no action. The many countries who took unilateral retaliatory action without WTO disputes will likely continue to do so and may increase the level of retaliation based on the specifics of the decision.

At the same time, the United States has filed a series of challenges to the unilateral imposition of retaliation duties by many trading partners who treated Section 232 relief as being safeguard relief or without any WTO justification. Assuming that the U.S. wins all of these cases at the panel stage, the net outcome for the U.S. and each individual WTO member who has challenged Section 232 relief will depend on the combination of results and presumably bilateral consultations. It is unlikely that the United States will engage in arbitration with any of the disputants.

WTO Appellate Body Reports on Australia’s Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products — Separate Views of One Division Member Merit Close Review

In a post from yesterday, I reviewed the Appellate Body (“AB”) reports released on June 9 in the appeals by Honduras and the Dominican Republic on the panel reports on Australia’s plain packaging regime on tobacco products. As noted, the AB upheld the panel reports that Australia’s regime did not violate any WTO Agreements as alleged by the Appellants. See WTO Appellate Issues Reports on Australia’s Plain Packaging Requirements on Tobacco Products – Last Reports Until WTO Appellate Body Reform Occurs, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/06/09/wto-appellate-body-issues-reports-on-australias-plain-packaging-requirements-on-tobacco-products-last-reports-until-wto-appellate-body-reform-occurs/

There are important “separate views” contained in the AB reports that while agreeing with the final conclusion that there was no violation disagree with the searching review of the underlying record on the claim that the panels had not made an objective assessment of the facts pursuant to DSU Art. 11. The separate views also disagreed with the finding of the other two Division members that appellants’ due process rights were violated based on use of information in the interim panel reports that had not previously been available to the parties.

As WTO disputes have become ever more litigious, lawyers used by Members to handle appeals have increased the frequency of seeking a review of the factual record on the claim that panels have not made an objective assessment of the record. Instead of parties limiting appeals of such claims to extraordinary situations, increasing numbers of appeals have focused on these appeal issues. The result has been greatly complicated appeals, much longer AB reports and an inability for AB Divisions to render decisions in 60-90 days of the filing of an appeal.

The Australia plain packaging appeals were filed by Honduras on 17 July 2018 and by the Dominican Republic on 23 August 2018. Thus, the AB reports released on 9 June 2020 were 693 days and 656 days after the appeals were filed. While certainly part of the delay flows from the inability to fill the AB member vacancies since 2018, a significant part flows from the failure of the AB Divisions to limit review of claims under DSU Art. 11 to situations that plausibly create the extraordinary circumstances required for its invocation.

The AB reports in these appeals are 232 pages in length. The concept that a Division of the AB will draft reports in 60-90 days that are 232 pages in length is obviously implausiible. Eliminating the DSU Art. 11 claims would have reduced the length of the reports by roughly 100 pages and would have permitted the AB to focus on the legal issues and legal interpretations of the panel appealed by the parties. As clear from the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the AB isn’t to review factual issues. Rather DSU Art. 17.6 limits the AB to reviewing legal issues and legal interpretations of the panel.

The proper role of the AB and the need to clarify the limited circumstances when a challenge to facts found by the panel by claims of panel bias or failure to make an objective evaluation of the record (DSU Art. 11) have been some of the ongoing concerns of the United States in looking at the functioning of the AB. The latest AB reports demonstrate the importance of addressing the U.S. concerns. The separate views included in the report are important in articulating how the DSU Art. 11 claims in these appeals should have been handled.

The separate views are copied below and eloquently lay out the correct approach in these appeals. WT/DS435/AB/R at 179 – 183 and WT/DS441/AB/R at 179 – 183

6.2 Separate opinion of one Division Member regarding Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement

6.2.1 Introduction

“6.523. It is well settled that not every error by a panel rises to the level of a breach of Article 11 of the DSU. Under the DSU, panels enjoy considerable discretion with respect to fact-finding and the evaluation of facts. This is underscored by the language of Article 11 that ‘a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case’, read in conjunction with Article 17.6 of the DSU, which says that ‘[a]n appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.’ In other words, Article 11 claims on appeal should be reserved – and entertained – only for rare instances of ‘egregious’ errors by panels, which call into question the good faith of the panel.1433

“6.524. With respect to the appellants’ claims regarding the Panel’s analysis under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, I concur with the majority’s ultimate findings and conclusions. However, I disagree on two points: (i) that it was necessary to examine in detail the appellants’ claims that the Panel erred in determining the degree of contribution of the TPP measures to Australia’s objective; and (ii) that the Panel’s treatment of and reliance on multicollinearity and non-stationarity constituted an error under Article 11 of the DSU.

6.2.2 Addressing the appellants’ claims regarding the contribution of the TPP measures was not necessary to resolve the dispute

“6.525. The complainants’ main argument before the Panel was that the TPP measures are more trade-restrictive than necessary because: (i) they are trade-restrictive; and (ii) they are not apt to, and do not, contribute to Australia’s legitimate public health objective.1434 In the alternative, the complainants argued that, even assuming that the TPP measures contribute to Australia’s legitimate public health objective, they are still ‘more trade-restrictive than necessary’ because there are alternative measures that are reasonably available to Australia and that would be less trade-restrictive while making an equivalent contribution to the objective.1435

“6.526. The Panel rejected those arguments by the complainants, while noting that the TPP measures are necessarily trade-restrictive because all tobacco products are imported into Australia, and that the TPP measures contribute to Australia’s public health objective by reducing consumption of tobacco products. The appellants challenge the Panel’s rejection of their arguments. My discussion of that challenge centres on the two sentences in paragraph 7.1025 of the Panel Report.

“6.527. In the first of these sentences, the Panel found that the complainants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures ‘are not apt to make a contribution to Australia’s objective’.1436 In the second sentence, the Panel found that, ‘[r]ather, … the evidence … , taken in its totality, supports the view that the TPP measures … are apt to, and do in fact, contribute to Australia’s objective.’1437

“6.528. The appellants’ appeals were silent regarding the first sentence. They addressed only the second sentence. In doing that, the appellants have not explained how any errors undermining the Panel’s finding in the second sentence of paragraph 7.1025 would suffice to demonstrate that the Panel erred in forming the conclusion in the first sentence of that paragraph.

“6.529. In response to questioning at the second hearing, the appellants stated that it was unnecessary to raise any independent appeal or challenge of the Panel’s finding in the first sentence, because the Panel’s finding in that sentence is integrally linked to the Panel’s finding in the second sentence. The appellants underscored that the Panel conducted an integrated analysis of the degree of contribution based on the evidence as a whole.1438

“6.530. I read these two sentences as saying different things. The first sentence says that the appellants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures are not apt to make a contribution; the second sentence says that the totality of evidence supports the view that the TPP measures are apt to, and do in fact, make a contribution.

“6.531. Even assuming, arguendo, that the appellants are correct that the Panel relied on the totality of the evidence in forming both conclusions in these two sentences of paragraph 7.1025, I do not see how the errors alleged by the appellants pertaining to the Panel’s second-sentence finding would vitiate the Panel’s finding in the first sentence. The mere fact that the Panel may have relied on the same evidence for both findings does not mean that any errors in the Panel’s second determination – that the evidence supports the view that the TPP measures ‘are apt to, and do in fact’ make a contribution – also would undermine the Panel’s conclusion that the complainants failed to substantiate their burden of demonstrating that the TPP measures are not apt to contribute. Those are two different conclusions.

“6.532. Consequently, in order for us to overturn the Panel’s conclusion that the complainants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures are not apt to contribute to Australia’s objective – expressed in the first sentence of paragraph 7.1025 – the appellants were required to demonstrate that the Panel’s errors in its examination of the evidence vitiated that conclusion, and did so in a manner so egregious as to constitute a violation of Article 11 of the DSU.

“6.533. As noted, the appellants did not appeal the Panel’s finding in the first sentence of paragraph 7.1025. They also did not otherwise address the question of whether any errors in the Panel’s evaluation of the second sentence in that paragraph would vitiate the first sentence, except to argue that the two sentences ‘are linked’ and that the Panel’s evaluation of them was based on the same evidence.

“6.534. As a result, I consider that the Panel’s determination that the complainants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures are not apt to contribute to Australia’s objective is undisturbed on appeal. Since measures are presumed to be WTO-consistent until shown otherwise, it follows that the TPP measures are presumed to be at least capable of making a contribution to Australia’s objective1439, whether or not the Panel might have erred in determining that the totality of evidence supports the view that the TPP measures are apt to, and do in fact, make a contribution to Australia’s objective.

“6.535. It follows that the Panel’s finding, in the first sentence of paragraph 7.1025 of the Panel Report, stands. Since the TPP measures are therefore presumed to be capable of contributing to Australia’s objective, it further follows that: (i) the appellants have failed to demonstrate that the Panel erred in rejecting their principal argument; and (ii) with respect to their alternative argument, whether or not the proposed alternatives make an equivalent contribution to the TPP measures, the appellants did not present an alternative that is less trade-restrictive than the TPP measures1440, and consequently there is no basis for us to overturn the Panel’s overall conclusion that the appellants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures are inconsistent with Article 2.2.

“6.536. Thus, I believe it was unnecessary, for purposes of resolving these disputes, for the majority to consider in detail the appellants’ claims regarding the Panel’s assessment of the TPP measures’ contribution to Australia’s objective. For that reason, I also believe that it was inadvisable for the majority to consider in detail the appellants’ contribution claims. This could have been a much shorter report, I believe, based on the findings that the first sentence of paragraph 7.1025, regarding aptness, stands, that the appellants’ proposed alternatives would not be less trade-restrictive than the TPP measures, and therefore that the appellants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures are inconsistent with Article 2.2.

6.2.3 Due process and Article 11 of the DSU

“6.537. I disagree with the majority’s intermediate finding that, by introducing in its Interim Report econometric analyses that had not been tested with the parties, the Panel failed to observe due process in a way that constitutes a violation of Article 11 of the DSU.

“6.538. In my view, the Panel’s reliance on multicollinearity and non-stationarity to test the robustness of the parties’ evidence was part of the Panel’s reasoning, with respect to which a panel enjoys considerable discretion. The parties to this case submitted to the Panel a large amount of econometric evidence. It was appropriate for the Panel to assess the probative value of that evidence. The Panel tested the robustness of the econometric studies submitted by the parties by taking into account, inter alia, whether the models suffered from multicollinearity and non-stationarity. The mere fact that these two so-called ‘criteria’ were not specifically mentioned by the parties is not sufficient to warrant a different scrutiny of the Panel’s reliance on them, as compared to the Panel’s reliance on other econometric concepts (e.g. overfitting and endogeneity) that the parties had identified. I therefore consider that the Panel acted within the bounds of its discretion as a trier of facts by not only examining the parameters used by each party, but also by going further in its evaluation and testing the robustness of the parties’ econometric evidence for multicollinearity and non-stationarity.

“6.539. With regard to the issue of due process, Australia argues that the complainants could have used the interim review stage to request the Panel to review the relevant parts of the Panel Report pursuant to Article 15 of the DSU but chose not to do so.1441 The appellants submit that interim review would not have provided them with a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to comment on the Panel’s concerns regarding multicollinearity and non-stationarity.1442

“6.540. Article 15.2 of the DSU says, in relevant part, that: Within a period of time set by the panel, a party may submit a written request for the panel to review precise aspects of the interim report prior to circulation of the final report to the Members. At the request of a party, the panel shall hold a further meeting with the parties on the issues identified in the written comments. If no comments are received from any party within the comment period, the interim report shall be considered the final panel report and circulated promptly to the Members.

“6.541. The complainants became aware of the Panel’s analysis of multicollinearity and non-stationarity when they received the Panel’s Interim Report on 2 May 2017. However, the complainants did not raise any substantive concerns with respect to these aspects of the Panel’s analysis in their comments on the Interim Report, nor did they request an interim review meeting. It is reasonable to read Article 15.2 as placing responsibility on the complainants to have raised the Panel’s reliance on multicollinearity and non-stationarity at the interim review stage, especially given the importance that the appellants attribute to these issues on appeal. In my view, the complainants’ failure to raise these issues at the interim review stage undermines the appellants’ claim regarding due process.

“6.542. Thus, since the complainants had an opportunity to raise these issues and did not do so, I do not agree with their claim that the Panel denied them due process by not ‘giving the parties any opportunity whatsoever to comment’.1443 Since the complainants did not attempt to raise their concerns regarding the Panel’s reliance on multicollinearity and non-stationarity at the interim review stage, it is unnecessary to speculate about whether the alleged limited nature of the interim review process, which I do not find to be expressed in the text of Article 15.2, would have been sufficient. Consequently, I disagree with the majority’s interim conclusion on this point.

“6.543. In light of the above, I consider that the appellants have not demonstrated that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the facts of the case as required under Article 11 of the DSU by denying the parties an opportunity to comment on the Panel’s reliance on multicollinearity and non-stationarity.

“1428 Panel Report, paras. 7.1025 and 7.1043.

“1429 Panel Report, para. 7.1255.

“1430 Panel Report, paras. 7.1464 and 7.1531.

“1431 Panel Report, paras. 7.1417 and 7.1495.

“1432 See also Panel Report (DS435), para. 8.1.a; Panel Report (DS441), para. 8.1.b.i.

“1433 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 133. See also Appellate Body Reports, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 141; Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, para. 164; EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), para. 177.

“1434 See Panel Report, paras. 7.426, 7.437, 7.485 and 7.520; Honduras’ and the Dominican Republic’s responses to questioning at the second hearing.

“1435 See Honduras’ first written submission to the Panel, paras. 853 and 911; Dominican Republic’s first written submission to the Panel, paras. 737-739, 980, and 1019.

“1436 Panel Report, para. 7.1025.

“1437 Panel Report, para. 7.1025.

“1438 Honduras’ and the Dominican Republic’s responses to questioning at the second hearing (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.495-7.497).

“1439 Where a panel finds that the parties’ evidence reveals that a measure is capable of contributing, or the evidence is unclear or mixed as to whether the measure is capable of contributing, a panel should find that the complainant has failed to demonstrate that the measure is incapable of contributing to the objective. This would at the same time mean that, to the extent that the complainant also argues that the measure is inconsistent with Article 2.2 on the basis that there are reasonably available less trade-restrictive alternative measures capable of making an equivalent contribution, the presumption of WTO-consistency requires that a panel presume that the measure is at least capable of making some contribution to the legitimate objective and, on that basis, proceed to examine the remaining factors for determining ‘necessity’, such as the degree of the measure’s trade restrictiveness and the availability of less trade-restrictive alternative measures.

“1440 For the reasons set forth in sections 6.1.3-6.1.4 we have upheld the Panel’s findings that the alternative measures proposed by the complainants would not be less trade-restrictive than the TPP measures.

“1441 Australia’s appellee’s submission, para. 464.

“1442 Honduras’ responses to questioning at the second hearing. In addition, the Dominican Republic noted that, at the interim review stage, it could pose only ‘rhetorical questions’ to the Panel. (Dominican Republic’s responses to questioning at the second hearing).

“1443 Dominican Republic’s appellant’s submission, para. 42. (emphasis omitted).”

WTO Appellate Body Issues Reports on Australia’s Plain Packaging Requirements on Tobacco Products — Last Reports Until WTO Appellate Body Reform Occurs

On June 9th, the long awaited WTO Appellate Body (“AB”) reports on the two challenges to Australia’s plain packaging requirements on tobacco products were released. AUSTRALIA – CERTAIN MEASURES CONCERNING TRADEMARKS, GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AND OTHER PLAIN PACKAGING REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO TOBACCO PRODUCTS AND PACKAGING, WT/DS435/AB/R and WT/DS441/AB/R (9 June 2020). The appellants were Honduras and the Dominican Republic. The Appellate Body essentially upheld the panel reports not finding violations of WTO Agreements by Australia’s actions. The decisions are important for governments and citizens concerned with the need to limit the reach of health harmful products like cigarettes. With plain packaging laws now prevalent in a number of countries, one can expect today’s AB decision to encourage more countries to emulate the approach taken by Australia (in part or in whole).

The WTO Secretariat prepares summaries of findings on cases. Below is the link to the summary followed by the summary of findings from the AB decisions provided on the WTO webpage, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds435_e.htm#bkmk435abr:

“Honduras (DS435) and the Dominican Republic (DS441) (together referred to as the appellants) requested the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel’s conclusions under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, and Articles 16.1 and 20 of the TRIPS Agreement.

  • “1. With respect to Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement:
    • With respect to the contribution of the TPP measures to Australia’s objective, the Appellate Body found that Honduras had not substantiated its claim that the Panel erred in its application of Article 2.2 to the facts of the case. Ultimately, the Appellate Body found that the appellants had not demonstrated that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the facts under Article 11 of the DSU. In particular, the Appellate Body found that, although the Panel erred by disregarding certain evidence adduced by the Dominican Republic, and acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU by compromising the complainants’ due process rights with respect to the Panel’s reliance on multicollinearity and non‑stationarity when reviewing the parties’ econometric evidence, such errors were not sufficiently material to vitiate the Panel’s findings regarding the contribution of the TPP measures to Australia’s objective, namely improving public health by reducing the use of, and exposure to, tobacco products.
    • The Appellate Body found that the appellants had not demonstrated that the Panel erred in its intermediate conclusions pertaining to the trade restrictiveness of the TPP measures. In particular, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding that the impact of the TPP measures on reducing the opportunity for producers to differentiate between different products on the basis of brands did not in itself necessarily amount to a limiting effect on international trade. The Appellate Body also upheld the Panel’s finding that the complainants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures would necessarily lead to a decline in the value of imported tobacco products as a consequence of consumers shifting from premium to non-premium products in response to the TPP measures (downtrading).
    • With respect to the alternative measures, the Appellate Body found that the Panel erred in finding that the complainants had failed to demonstrate that each of the two alternative measures (the increase in the MLPA and an increase in taxation) would be apt to make a contribution equivalent to that of the TPP measures. However, the Appellate Body found that the Panel did not err in finding that the complainants had failed to demonstrate that these two alternative measures are less trade restrictive than the TPP measures. Consequently, the Panel’s finding that the complainants had not demonstrated that the increase in the MLPA and the increase in taxation would each “be a less trade restrictive alternative to the TPP measures that would make an equivalent contribution to Australia’s objective”, stands.
    • Consequently, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s conclusion that the complainants had not demonstrated that the TPP measures are more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, within the meaning of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
  • “2. With respect to Article 16.1 of the TRIPS Agreement:
    • The Appellate Body found that the Panel did not err in its interpretation of Article 16.1. The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that Article 16.1 of the TRIPS Agreement grants a trademark owner the exclusive right to preclude unauthorized use of the trademark by third parties. However, Article 16.1 does not confer upon a trademark owner a positive right to use its trademark or a right to protect the distinctiveness of that trademark through use.
    • Having found no error in the Panel’s interpretation, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that there was no need to examine further the complainants’ factual allegation that the TPP measures’ prohibition on the use of certain tobacco related trademarks would in fact reduce the distinctiveness of such trademarks, and lead to a situation where a “likelihood of confusion” with respect to these trademarks is less likely to arise in the market.
    • Consequently, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s conclusion that the complainants have not demonstrated that the TPP measures are inconsistent with Article 16.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.
  • “3. With respect to Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement
    • The Appellate Body found that the Panel did not err in its interpretation and application of Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement. In particular, the Appellate Body considered that the Panel did not err in its interpretation of the term ‘unjustifiably’ in Article 20 and in its application of this interpretation to the facts of the case. The Appellate Body thus agreed with the Panel that the complainants had not demonstrated that trademark-related requirements of the TPP measures unjustifiably encumbered the use of trademarks in the course of trade within the meaning of Article 20.
    • Consequently, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s conclusion that the complainants had not demonstrated that the TPP measures are inconsistent with Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement.

“The Appellate Body recalled that, having rejected all of the complainants’ claims, the Panel had declined Honduras’ and the Dominican Republic’s requests that the Panel recommend, in accordance with Article 19.1 of the DSU, that the DSB request Australia to bring the measures at issue into conformity with the TRIPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement.

“Having upheld the Panel’s findings under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement and Articles 16.1 and 20 of the TRIPS Agreement, it followed that the Appellate Body also agreed with the Panel that Honduras and the Dominican Republic had not succeeded in establishing that Australia’s TPP measures are inconsistent with the provisions of the covered agreements at issue. Accordingly, the Appellate Body made no recommendation to the DSB, pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU.”

While the Reports are Not Surprising in Outcome, They Show Many of the Concerns that U.S. has Raised about the AB Over Time

These are the last reports of the Appellate Body until the impasse on the appointment of new Appellate Body members is solved, which will require the United States achieving reforms in the operation of the Appellate Body and the AB’s actual adherence to the Dispute Settlement Understanding as negotiated.

Many of the concerns that the U.S. has long raised are present in the current decisions. For example, the reports were not prepared in 90 days from the date of appeal, nor were the delays in completion of the appeals specifically authorized by the parties. The decisions were prepared by non-current members of the Appellate Body (although Members had agreed to permit conclusion of appeals where hearings had already occurred). The vast majority of the issues in the appeals were challenges to findings of fact by the panels under the guise of DSU Article 11 challenges that the panels failed to make an objective assessment of the facts. While the Appellate Body decisions attempt to limit what the AB should be reviewing where DSU Art. 11 is the basis for the claim, the bulk of the decisions still involve discussions of at least some of the DSU Art. 11 claims made by the appellants. See WT/DS435/AB/R at 38-135 and WT/DS441/AB/R at 38-135.

The United States was a third party to the cases but limited its written comments to a few issues, the most important of which was the need for the Appellate Body not to permit Art. 11 to be used for a review of factual findings, which by DSU are issues for the panel. See WT/DS435/AB/R/Add.1, Annex C-16 at 92-93; WT/DS441/AB/R/Add.1, Annex C-16 at 92-93:

“III. COMPLAINANTS’ CLAIMS OF ERROR UNDER THE DSU

“7. Honduras and the Dominican Republic both appeal dozens of factual findings under DSU Article 11. Both appeals by Honduras and the Dominican Republic to the Appellate Body make numerous claims under Article 11 of the DSU of what clearly are alleged factual errors by the Panel. By agreement of all WTO Members, the DSU expressly limits the scope of an appeal to alleged legal errors by a panel, not factual errors.6 The United States disagrees with these attempts to re-litigate dozens of unfavorable factual determinations by the Panel through claims of breach of Article 11 of the DSU.

“8. The Appellate Body has an opportunity in this appeal to reconsider how its originally limited approach to review the “objective assessment” of a panel has been seized by appellants to cover practically all factual determinations by a panel. Given the lack of textual basis in the DSU for
appellate review of panel fact-finding, the Appellate Body could instead reassert that the proper issues for appeal are issues of law and legal interpretations covered by a panel report.7

“6 See DSU Article 17.6.

“7 Id. (“An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.”).”

Conclusion

The plain packaging decisions by the Appellate Body are the last AB decisions until the impasse over AB member selection is resolved which means that the U.S. concerns of the operation of the AB must be resolved.

While the decisions are important in themselves, they also demonstrate the types of problems which have made Appellate Body decisions untimely and problematic to the United States and other Members.

While some Members are now proceeding with arbitration type actions to maintain a second-level review of disputes, the need for collective action to return the Appellate Body to its proper and limited role continues. With the COVID-19 pandemic and now the Director-General selection process taking up much of the trade oxygen for many WTO Members, the need for Appellate Body reform is likely to slip to 2021 or later before being focused on again.

COVID-19 – continued global growth of cases; shift continues to Latin America, parts of Asia and the Middle East

Four months after COVID-19 peaked in China, where the virus started, the world continues to stagger under an expanding case load of confirmed COVID-19 cases. Indeed, in the last two weeks new cases around the world have increased by 1.567 million to reach a current global total since the end of December of 6.835 million as of June 7. These number compare to less than 55,000 global cases (nearly all in China) in early February. During the last two weeks, new confirmed cases increased 22.32% from the prior two weeks and continue a chain of unbroken increases since the beginning of March.

As much of the developed world has seen a peak in the number of cases, the continued growth in new cases reflects shifting centers or hot spots generally to developing countries. In looking at 25 countries that have accounted for more than 80% of all cases through June 7, ten of these countries have not yet reached a peak — Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, South Africa — while the other fifteen have peaked and seen declines from peak of between 10% and 99%. These fifteen countries are Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. Still these 25 countries saw a combined increase in total new cases of 18.7% in the last fourteen days. All other countries saw a much larger increase in new cases, 39.61% from 220,812 cases the previous 14 days to 308,293. Some countries of note in this “all other” grouping include Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Nepal, Oman, Qatar, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. See https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases. June 7th report embedded below.

COVID-19-situation-update-worldwide-as-of-7-June-2020

The shifting focus of cases to developing and least developed countries raises increased concerns about access to medical goods, including personal protective equipment, ventilators, and other goods. The WTO’s list of measures applied by Members dealing with COVID-19 either to restrict exports of medical goods or food products or to improve market access , shows dozens of countries applying export restraints on various medical goods (masks, gloves, etc.) including countries where new cases are well past peak (indeed where new cases may be 90% below peak). The WTO information is current as of May 29, 2020. There are also a large number of countries reducing tariffs or streamlining importation of medical goods. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_goods_measure_e.htm.

Moreover, health care infrastructure is often weaker in many of these countries facing growing COVID-19 cases, and the structure of their economies may complicate the ability of governments to address the pandemic even if medical goods are available. A recent article reviews the challenges in Latin America. See https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/americas/latin-america-coronavirus-intl/index.html.

Some major players like the United States, the European Union and its member states, and China are both investing large amounts in research and development and also securing early access to any vaccines developed through early commitments and other actions. https://www.biospace.com/article/eu-using-2-7-million-emergency-fund-to-buy-promising-covid-19-vaccines/. With the number of R&D projects ongoing around the world and the efforts of companies and governments to get manufacturing geared up early on promising products, the likelihood of earlier availability of large quantities of vaccines should there be breakthroughs has improved.

The question of equitable and affordable availability for all peoples is certainly there for a global pandemic where major players are funding research and have the resources to get early commitments for supplies. But greater manufacturing capacity earlier should improve global availability. So too the efforts of many countries, organizations and businesses to ensure both availability of vaccines and the distribution of such products to those in need is a major factor in ensuring greater access at affordable prices. As the news from the June 4 GAVI conference in London demonstrates, many are uniting to ensure that small children who have been unable to receive various immunizations against other diseases are able to do so yet this year as well as meet the needs of the pandemic for many developing and least developed countries. See https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/world-leaders-make-historic-commitments-provide-equal-access-vaccines-all.

Conclusion

The pandemic is continuing to worsen on a global basis even as parts of Asia, Western Europe, Oceania, Canada and the United States are post-peak and starting a process of reopening. The tremendous growth in the number of cases is in developing and least developed countries, those least prepared to handle the health and economic fall out.

The trade news is mixed. Many countries are liberalizing imports of medical goods during the pandemic which is obviously a positive. However, dozens of countries have introduced export restrictions in an environment in which global supply has lagged global demand, and countries have scrambled to protect access to what supplies they can. Many of these restrictions should be removed at this point, at least by countries that are well past peak demand situations.

Ramp up in global production of many medical goods has occurred, though it is unclear if demand/supply balance has been achieved or how/if the world will build the necessary national and regional inventories to handle a second wave or future pandemics. Moreover, without knowing how much larger the number of new cases will become before there is a global peak, it is hard to know if expansion of production of medical goods will be adequate to meet demand in the coming months. Efforts by the G-20 in the trade and investment area are a start but limited in terms of likely actual effect.

Factually, there have substantial declines in global trade flowing from the lock down situation in large parts of the world over the last few months. Trade flows should increase in those parts of the world where reopening is occurring but will likely further decrease in countries where the pandemic is picking up its infection rate. The economic toll on many countries who have come through the worst of the pandemic has been unprecedented and will present challenges to their ability to rebound quickly and to their willingness to increase financial assistance to others.

While success in finding vaccines or therapeutics is never guaranteed (indeed no vaccine for HIV has been found despite efforts for 40 years), there has never been the global focus on R&D and the willingness to risk large amounts of capital to be ready to produce large volumes of doses for any products demonstrating effectiveness. While the global community is not unified in its support of the WHO or in cooperating to achieve equitable and affordable access for all, there has been important support for both which should improve achieving a global solution if vaccines are developed that are effective.

Finally, it is hard to imagine significant forward movement at the WTO on its current negotiations or on WTO reform (including of the dispute settlement system) while Members are struggling to address the fallout from the pandemic. And, of course, with the WTO turning its attention to the selection of a new Director-General in light of DG Azevedo’s departure at the end of August, achieving focus on the normal work of the WTO will be that much harder until a new DG has been selected.

Bottom line – a continued difficult 2020 in the second half of the year.

U.S.-China Phase I Deal is Failing Expanded U.S. Exports Even Before Recent Efforts by China to Limit Certain U.S. Agriculture Exports as Retaliation for U.S. Position on Hong Kong

The U.S.-China Phase I trade agreement went into effect in mid-February just as the COVID-19 pandemic was rapidly spreading globally.  In the United States, the U.S. Trade Representative and U.S. Secretary of Agriculture have released a series of statements indicating that China has been making a number of the substantive changes that were contained in the agreement, with the U.S. being pleased with the progress.  See, e.g. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/may/usda-and-ustr-announce-continued-progress-implementation-us-china-phase-one-agreement

The COVID-19 pandemic has seriously reduced economic activity in the United States and in many other countries.  Despite such reduced economic activity in recent months, the U.S. Administration has remained optimistic about China’s meeting the agreement’s terms and the agreement being “a success,” including the significant increase in exports to China from the United States over two years (2020-2021).  https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/may/usda-and-ustr-announce-continued-progress-implementation-us-china-phase-one-agreement.  An important measure of the success will be the extent to which there are significant increases in U.S. exports.

As reviewed in a recent post, the United States has announced it will be terminating special status of Hong Kong in light of Chinese security actions taken vis-a-vis Hong Kong.  U.S. Withdrawal from the World Health Organization and Decision to Revoke Preferential Treatment for Hong Kong – Reduced Cooperation as COVID-19 Pandemic Rages On, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/05/30/u-s-withdrawal-from-the-world-health-organization-and-decision-to-revoke-preferential-treatment-for-hong-kong-reduced-cooperation-as-covid-19-pandemic-rages-on/.  U.S. action did not call for the termination of the US-China Phase I Agreement.  In recent days, the press have reported that China has ordered state-owned entities to stop purchasing from the United States various agriculture products, including soybeans, pork, corn and cotton.  https://thehill.com/policy/finance/trade/500464-china-halts-state-purchases-of-us-soybeans-pork-report.  There have been some statements in the U.S. press suggesting that China continues to buy U.S. agricultural products including soybeans despite the earlier reports to the contrary.  See, e.g.,   https://insidetrade.com/trade/grassley-confident-china-will-meet-phase-one-commitments.

With April 2020 U.S. export data now available, what is clear is that China is far behind in meeting the levels of purchases from the United States in a wide range of goods categories to meet the first year growth over 2017 on goods of $63.9 billion.  Total U.S. domestic exports to China in 2017 were $119.910 billion.  The $63.9 billion increase of U.S. exports of goods were on a subset of total U.S. goods exports, just $66.381 billion.  Thus, the rate of increase in the first twelve months under the agreement is expected to be 96.26% on the categories contained in Annex 6.1 to the Agreement.  There are specific commitments with regard to certain manufactured goods (increase of $32.9 billion over 2017 levels), agriculture (increase of $12.5 billion over 2017 levels) and energy (increase of $18.5 billion over 2017 levels).  While there are no specific commitments on other products the U.S. exports to China, the rate of increase as measured against all U.S. domestic exports to China in 2017 would be 53.29% if all other products were at the same level as in 2017.

Unfortunately, looking just at March and April 2020 (the first two full months after the agreement took effect for which U.S. export data are available), U.S. domestic exports of the products contained in Annex 6.1 to the agreement declined by 4.04% from the March-April 2017 period.  All other U.S. domestic exports of goods to China declined 39.35% in March-April 2020 compared to the same period in 2017.  In total U.S. domestic exports to China of all products declined by 20.24% in March-April 2020 compared to the same months in 2017.  Thus, the early months of the first year of the Phase I Agreement are moving in the wrong direction in terms of U.S. exports.  While challenges in China and in the United States from the pandemic have undoubtedly dampened both demand in China and ability to ship from the U.S. for some products, that situation has changed in May and will presumably improve moving forward.

The above figures do not account for increased U.S. services exports to China contained in Annex 6.1 to the agreement (increase of $18.5 billion over 2017 levels).  Data for U.S. services exports for 2020 are not available by country at this point for January-April.  But overall U.S. services exports have been hard hit in the first four months of 2020 and this will include U.S. exports to China.  U.S. exports of services to the world were $169.482 billion in the January-April 2020 time frame, down from $193.010 billion in 2019, with March and April 2020 being more sharply contracted, $72.117 billion vs. $97.103 billion in 2019.  See https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/current_press_release/ft900.pdf (page 16).

The table below shows the 18 categories of goods for which there are growth commitments in Annex 6.1 of the Agreement.  All figures are in U.S.$ billions.

Product CategoryMarch-April 2017March-April 2020Change
Manufactured goods
1. Industrial machinery$1.845$2.091+$0.246
2. Electrical Equipment
and machinery
$0.694$0.867+$0.173
3. Pharmaceutical
products
$0.323$0.501+$0.178
4. Aircraft (orders and
deliveries
$0$0 $0
5. Vehicles$1.747$0.716-$1.031
6. Optical and medical
instruments
$0.522$0.566+$0.044
7. Iron and steel$0.232$0.081-$0.151
8. Other manufactured
goods
$1.737$2.224+$0.487
Subtotal — MFG goods$7.099$7.046-$0.053
Agriculture
9. Oilseeds$0.747$0.230-$0.517
10. Meat$0.106$0.582+$0.476
11. Cereals$0.224$0.194-$0.030
12. Cotton$0.229$0.200-$0.029
13. Other agricultural
commodities
$0.000$0.354+$0.354
14. Seafood$0.231$0.152-$0.079
Subtotal – Agriculture$1.536$1.712+$0.175
Energy
15. Liquefied natural
gas
$0.014$0.162+$0.148
16. Crude oil$0.658$0.210-$0.448
17. Refined products$0.334$0.193-$0.241
18. Coal$0.090$0.016-$0.074
Subtotal – Energy$1.096$0.581-$0.515
Total of 1.-18.$9.731$9.339-$0.392

Conclusion

The Trump Administration has had an aggressive program over the last several years to address perceived serious problems in our bilateral relationship with China. The Phase I Agreement was viewed as a down payment with the more challenging issues still on the table to be negotiated in a phase 2 agreement. There is no sign that Phase 2 negotiations have started. The history of U.S.-China consultations has been a great many promises of change by China and relatively little action by China to address U.S. concerns.

It is a positive that a number of the specific changes China has agreed to in the Phase I Agreement have been implemented to date. The U.S. has also made modifications it agreed to make in the Phase I Agreement. But the core issue for the Trump Administration is to see if its different approach to China can achieve meaningfully greater reciprocity in our trade relationship with China. That has been the justification for the large tariff increases on large parts of Chinese exports — getting long overdue changes to Chinese actions that harm American businesses and workers and obtain greater market access to the Chinese market.

Through April, U.S. trade data don’t show meaningful expansion of exports to China despite the commitments contained in Annex 6.1 to the Agreement. Indeed, U.S. exports are down sharply to China (U.S. imports from China are down sharply as well).

Despite the ongoing bilateral differences and actions causing a continuation of tensions between the two largest economies in the world, improving bilateral trade to a more reciprocal level would be in both countries’ interest. With China having recovered from COVID-19 constraints and with the U.S.having started its reopening process, the coming months will reveal whether the Agreement represents a further lost opportunity or a sea change in trade flows.

Digital Services Taxes – New U.S. Section 301 Investigations on Nine Countries and the European Union

In 2019, the United States initiated a section 301 investigation on France’s digital services tax (“DST”), made a finding that France’s DST “is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. Commerce.”  84 Fed. Reg. 66956 (Dec. 6, 2019).  Additional duties of up to 100% were proposed on French goods valued at $2.4 billion.  France agreed to hold up application of its tax until the end of 2020 and the U.S. agreed to hold up tariffs to give the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development time to conclude discussions on a possible agreed international tax structure for digital services.

On June 2, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative announced the initiation of 301 investigations on nine countries and the European Union who have either implemented DSTs or who have such DSTs under development.  https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/june/ustr-initiates-section-301-investigations-digital-services-taxes.  The countries who are subject to the investigations include Austria, Brazil, the Czech Republic, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.  The notice of initiation of the investigations will appear in the Federal Register on June 5, 2020 but was posted on the USTR website on June 2.  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/assets/frn/FRN.pdf.

Because of the COVID-19 situation, written comments are being accepted but it is unclear if there will be a public hearing.  Written comments are due by July 15, 2020.  The Federal Register notice pre-publication is embedded below.

USTR FR notice 301 investigation on digital services

The focus of the investigation will be on the following aspects of DSTs:

“The investigation initially will focus on the following concerns with DSTs: discrimination against U.S. companies; retroactivity; and possibly unreasonable tax policy. With respect to tax policy, the DSTs may diverge from norms reflected in the U.S. tax system and the international tax system in several respects. These departures may include: extraterritoriality; taxing revenue not income; and a purpose of penalizing particular technology companies for their commercial success.”  Page 5.

Based on the prior investigation into the French DST, there is little doubt that all of the programs will be found to violate Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, in some respect.

For example, in the French case, the USTR made five findings relevant to some or all of the current investigations:

‘First, the evidence collected in this investigation indicates that the French DST is
intended to, and by its structure and operation does, discriminate against U.S. digital companies.”

“Second, the evidence collected in this investigation indicates that the French DST’s
retroactive application is unusual and inconsistent with prevailing tax principles and renders the tax particularly burdensome for covered U.S. companies, which will also affect their customers, including U.S. small businesses and consumers.”

“Third, the evidence collected in this investigation indicates that the French DST’s
application to gross revenue rather than income contravenes prevailing tax principles and imposes significant additional burdens on covered U.S. companies.”

“Fourth, the evidence collected in this investigation indicates that the French DST’s
application to revenues unconnected to a presence in France contravenes prevailing international tax principles and is particularly burdensome for covered U.S. companies.”

“Fifth, the evidence collected in this investigation indicates that the French DST’s
application to a small group of digital companies contravenes international tax principles counseling against targeting the digital economy for special, unfavorable tax treatment.”

USTR, Section 301 Investigation, Report on France’s Digital Services Tax, Dec. 2, 2019, pages 1, 3, 4, 5.  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Report_On_France%27s_Digital_Services_Tax.pdf.

The EU and the EU-member states covered have DSTs similar to France’s (without retroactivity) with some DSTs already in effect.  Other countries’ systems appear to be similar as well with many countries already applying their DST.  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/assets/frn/FRN.pdf.

The full USTR report on France’s DST is embedded below.

Report_On_France’s_Digital_Services_Tax

Where taxes are already in place, action by USTR will be likely even ahead of the end of the year absent agreement with the trading partner to postpone collection.  The start of investigations at this time will enable the U.S. to complete the investigation this summer or early fall, take public comments on possible tariffs to be added if no resolution with individual countries or the EU is possible.  More specifically, the U.S. will have handled domestic legal requirements to act if other DSTs go into effect without an OECD agreement or where the tax imposed is not consistent with the OECD terms.  As stated in the USTR press release yesterday, “’President Trump is concerned that many of our trading partners are adopting tax schemes designed to unfairly target our companies,’ said USTR Robert Lighthizer. ‘We are prepared to take all appropriate action to defend our businesses and workers against any such discrimination.’”  https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/june/ustr-initiates-section-301-investigations-digital-services-taxes.

Conclusion

The OECD efforts to develop an agreed model for taxing digital services are supposed to conclude this year.  The U.S. and its leading digital services companies have been very concerned about the efforts of trading partners to impose taxes that will effectively apply only or disproportionately to them.

At the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic has added pressure on governments to find new sources of revenue, and digital services are an inviting target.

Expect this to be a very important issue in the second half of 2020.  Failure to find an acceptable solution to the United States will result in a significant escalation of trade tensions both with the EU and with many other countries going forward.

 

 

 

 

 

COVID-19 Trade and Economic Fallout — Are current projections too optimistic?

The COVID-19 pandemic is not simply a global health crisis but also a global economic crisis of unprecedented proportions.

The WTO has projected that global trade will decline between 13 and 32 percent in 2020 before rebounding in 2021.  https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr855_e.htm.

The IMF in its April 2020 update of the global economy modified its projection to show global GDP contraction of 3.0% for 2020 with a 6.1% contraction by advanced economies (U.S., -5.9%; Euro Area, -7.9%; Japan, -5.2) and a 1.0% contraction for emerging markets and developing economies.  https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/04/14/weo-april-2020.

Developments in global trade and the national economy for the United States and the rising severity of the pandemic in some of the emerging and developing countries will likely cause future downward revisions to the global trade and economic fallout occurring in 2020 and reemphasize the importance of global cooperation both in responding to the pandemic but also in posturing the world for an economic recovery in the second half of 2020 and beyond.

United States data through April as an example

Gross domestic product in the United States declined 5.0% in the first quarter of 2020 based on a May 28, 2020 second estimate provided U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis.  https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/gdp1q20_2nd_0.pdf.

With more than 40 million people filing for unemployment benefits between mid-March and the end of May, the projection for second quarter GDP from at least one source on June 1, 2020 is an extraordinary contraction of 52.8%.  See https://www.frbatlanta.org/cqer/research/gdpnow.  This compares to the Congressional Budget Office’s projection of a 39.6% decline in the second quarter.  https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56335.  The CBO estimate uses a 3.5% decline in GDP for the first quarter and an annual projected decline of 5.6% for 2020.

With the current first quarter data GDP contraction in the U.S. at 5.0% and the most recent data from a model similar to that used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis projecting a 52.8% contraction in the second quarter, it is highly likely that the U.S. contraction in 2020 will exceed the 5.9% projected in the April IMF data.

Indeed, with the number of bankruptcies being reported in the U.S. and the large number of small and medium sized companies that may not be able to return to operation as reopening occurs, the economic rebound may not be as strong as current projections estimate either.  The continued large number of new cases in the United States may be a contributing cause as some states either delay the speed of reopening or face larger resurgence of cases once reopening occurs because of the continued high level of COVID-19 in the population.

While the number of cases in the United States has at least stabilized and has been  trending down, the rate of decline is far lower than that experienced in western Europe.  For example, the United States continues to have the largest number of new confirmed cases of any country in the world, many weeks after the U.S. peak.  Indeed in today’s European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control report on the COVID-19 situation update worldwide, as of 2 June 2020, the U.S. has 302,679 cases reported in the last fourteen days of the continuing to grow global total of 1,477,362 new cases in the last fourteen days.  European countries have relatively few (7,973 for Spain; 7,311 for Italy, 9,188 for France and 6,818 for Germany).  https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases.  In a prior post, data were shown for various countries over the period December 31, 2019 – May 24, 2020.  Most European countries show reductions from their peak two week period of 80-90% while the United States has shown declines of only 23.5% through May 24 (slightly more through June 2, 26.0%).  See COVID-19 – new hot spots amidst continued growing number of confirmed cases,  https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/05/25/covid-19-new-hotspots-amidst-continued-growing-number-of-confirmed-cases/.  To the extent that IMF projections are based on infection rates that decline more rapidly than the actual U.S. experience with COVID-19, that would be another reason to believe the IMF projected contractions for the U.S. are too low. 

On the trade front, the United States was doing well until mid-March.  But the COVID-19 challenges that resulted in government actions led to 1st quarter 2020 exports from the U.S. of goods being down 1.2%, services exports down 21.5% for a total contraction of U.S. exports of 6.7%.  U.S. imports of goods were down 11.5%, led by contraction of imports from China due to various additional duties imposed on Chinese goods.  U.S. imports of services were down 29.9% for total imports being down 15.5%.  See Bureau of Economic Analysis, News Release BEA 20-23, May 28, 2020 at 7, https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/gross-domestic-product-1st-quarter-2020-second-estimate-corporate-profits-1st-quarter.

The U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau puts out a “Monthly Advance Economic Indicators Report”.  The April 2020 report was released on May 29th and showed estimated data for imports and exports of goods (seasonally adjusted).  April exports for the U.S. were down 29.9% with individual sectors being down 5.3% (food, feeds and beverages) to 70.8% (automotive vehicles).  Similarly, U.S. imports were down 20.6% for April with sectors varying from being down 5.6% (foods, feeds and beverages) to 57.0% (automotive vehicles).  https://www.census.gov/econ/indicators/advance_report.pdf.

Thus, U.S. trade contractions in April suggest that the range put forward by the WTO (13-32% for the year) is probably the correct range. 

Rising Number of COVID-19 cases in South America and in India

The IMF revised 2020 projections from April likely understate the negative effects that emerging and developing countries are experiencing.  Specifically, Latin America and the Caribbean are seeing major outbreaks of COVID-19 cases with the peak not yet reached in a number of important countries like Brazil, Peru, Chile and Colombia and also in Mexico.  Depending on developments in these major countries and the spread in others, the likely economic contraction in the region could be significantly higher than the 5.2% contained in the April 2020 projections by the IMF.  Brazil was estimated to experience a GDP contraction of 5.3% by the IMF, but recent estimates show a steadily growing projected contraction, latest figures showing 6.25%.  See https://www.statista.com/statistics/1105065/impact-coronavirus-gdp-brazil/.  With the COVID-19 cases still growing in Brazil, the contraction in GDP for 2020 will likely continue to worsen.

Similarly, India was projected to have GDP growth of 1.9% in 2020.  The country’s challenges with COVID-19 cases are just starting with the current total number of confirmed cases at just under 200,000 but with nearly half of the cases reported in the last fourteen days (97,567 of 198,706).   Indeed, some recent projections by Oxford Economics now have India’s GDP contracting in 2020.  See https://www.icis.com/explore/resources/news/2020/06/01/10513907/india-gdp-growth-slows-to-4-2-lockdown-stays-at-manufacturing-hubs.

Other countries are also seeing increasing case numbers and the global totals of new cases have not peaked as yet which likely mean greater numbers of cases than most models have anticipated.  If so global contraction could be significantly worse than the April estimates of the IMF.

High national debt levels are growing higher   

The collapse of economic activity even for a few months is reducing tax revenues, increasing government spending in many jurisdictions and worsening national debt levels.  For example, in the United States the Congressional Budget Office blog from April 24 estimated that the U.S. budget deficit in 2020 and 2021 will be $2.7 billion and $1.1 billion higher than earlier estimates and that federal debt held by the public is likely to grow from 79% of GDP in 2019 to 101% of GDP in 2020 and 108% of GDP in 2021.  https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56335.  The actual deficits and federal debt are likely to be significantly higher as the CBO estimates are based on forecasts for GDP contraction that already understates the severity experienced through the first quarter and assumes no further federal assistance will be required to pull the economy out of the steep contraction being experienced in the second quarter.  As governors across the country have made clear, the serious budget shortfalls being experienced by the states because of closed businesses, reduced revenues and increased expenditures are not sustainable.  If these 2020 shortfalls are not addressed through federal legislation, the outcome will be large reductions in state and local services and massive layoffs of state and municipal employees including police, fire, health care and teachers.  So either the budget shortfall of the federal government is understated because of additional stimulus funding needs or the expected recovery of the economy (and hence government revenues) is overstated because of the challenges for many states.

Virtually every country is facing budget challenges as they attempt to address the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic fallout.  See, e.g., articles on growing budget deficits for France, Italy, Brazil and India; https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-France-budget/france-more-than-doubles-crisis-package-cost-to-100-billion-euros-idUSKCN21R2J2; https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/05/22/world/americas/22reuters-brazil-economy.html; https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-italy-budget-exclu/exclusive-italy-sees-2020-budget-deficit-near-10-of-gdp-source-idUSKBN21Y2U9; https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/indias-fiscal-deficit-may-shoot-to-6-2-of-gdp-in-fy21-fitch-olutions/articleshow/74928660.cms?from=mdr#:~:text=NEW%20DELHI%3A%20India’s%20fiscal%20deficit,Fitch%20Solutions%20said%20on%20Wednesday.  

Budget shortfalls, the need to borrow more money and the pressure to reduce national, regional and local services all affect the ability of nations to contribute to international institutions, to provide financial assistance to the poorest countries and to facilitate short-, medium- and longer-term growth.

Conclusion

The global COVID-19 pandemic is creating economic havoc in addition to the heavy health toll on countries around the world.  A global challenge of this magnitude hasn’t been faced since World War II.  The projections that have been made by multilateral and national organizations have been for huge contractions in world trade and in global economic growth.  Unfortunately, the estimates at least on global GDP contraction are likely too optimistic both in terms of the severity of the second quarter 2020 contraction and the anticipated level of  second half 2020 recovery.  Moreover, there is likely to be significantly more national stimulus programs needed to help economies recover increasing already huge national debts for many countries and the likely greater need for trade financing and debt support for many developing and least developed countries because of the severity of the global trade and GDP contraction. 

The challenges being faced affect the health and livelihood of billions of people but are occurring at a time of reduced trust in multilateral institutions, increased trade frictions between major nations and groups of nations and a lack of strong leadership within and among nations.  

How severe the damage to the world turns out to be from the pandemic will depend on –

(1) whether countries come together to ensure open markets;

(2) whether countries both coordinate information about and promote expanded production of essential medical goods to ensure adequate and equitable availability to all at affordable prices,

(3) whether countries support efforts of both public and private players on the development of effective vaccines and therapeutics and facilitate the sharing of information while ensuring equitable availability to all at affordable prices where breakthroughs occur,

(4) whether countries support multilateral organizations’ efforts and individually support the bolstering of health care infrastructure of least developed countries and some developing countries where COVID-19 cases could easily overwhelm internal capabilities;

(5) whether countries cooperate for a strong global recovery by pursuing stimulus programs that don’t distort markets and create other challenges to global participation, and by providing multilateral organizations with the resources to address debt and trade financing needs of the poorest among us.

There are some efforts to address each of the five items above although the U.S. announced withdrawal from the World Health Organization handicaps efforts reviewed in (3). 

More needs to be done and could be done with greater cooperation among the top 50 countries in the world.  However, we may be at the maximum of what is the art of the possible at the moment.  For the 7.8 billion people living on earth in 2020, let us hope that more is possible quickly. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

U.S. Withdrawal from the World Health Organization and Decision to Revoke Preferential Treatment for Hong Kong — Reduced Cooperation as COVID-19 Pandemic Rages on

On May 29, 2020, President Trump indicated that the United States was withdrawing from the World Health Organization (“WHO”) because of the WHO’s failure to adopt reforms the U.S. had demanded and the belief of a bias within the WHO towards China and China’s failure to provide timely information on the start of the virus and the likely nature of the problem. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/us/politics/trump-hong-kong-china-WHO.html. This followed the U.S.’s earlier temporary withholding of funds from the WHO while awaiting developments on reforms.

President Trump also indicated that in light of actions by China to assert security controls over Hong Kong, the U.S. viewed China as violating its commitment to maintain “one China, two systems” and would accordingly be taking actions to remove special treatment provided Hong Kong in a wide range of areas (extradition, export controls, etc.) and would be treating Hong Kong as part of China for tariffs, export controls, etc. https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-cancel-visas-for-some-chinese-graduate-students-11590744602.

Not surprisingly, China has reacted negatively to the statements of President Trump on Hong Kong and has threatened to take retaliatory actions if the U.S. takes actions contrary to China’s interests and indicated that any U.S. action was doomed to fail. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-30/china-says-us-action-on-hong-kong-doomed-to-fail; https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/30/china-says-us-action-on-hong-kong-doomed-to-fail.html.

Concerns have also been raised that U.S. action would be a double-edged sword in light of the large trade surplus the U.S. has with Hong Kong and the enormous presence of U.S. businesses in Hong Kong. For example, based on U.S. Census data as compiled by the U.S. International Trade Commission, the United States had a trade surplus with Hong Kong (total exports – general imports) of $26.086 billion in 2019 [the trade surplus based on domestic exports – imports of consumption being lower at $11.845 billion]. While China has not identified actions it is considering, harming U.S. interests in Hong Kong would obviously be one avenue China might take.

The trade implications, in terms of U.S. imports from Hong Kong, are relatively minor. If imports from Hong Kong are treated as imports from China, imports of items subject to additional duties from the 301 investigation would be relatively minor. That is because U.S. imports for consumption from Hong Kong in 2019 were just $4.646 billion, with half of that being under HS 9810 for articles that have been imported after exportation, after repair, etc. If China were to impose additional duties on U.S. exports to Hong Kong, the effect would be larger. U.S. domestic exports to Hong Kong in 2019 were $16.491 billion.

Increased tensions; reduced cooperation

Whatever the merits of the actions being taken by the United States (and the reactions anticipated from China), the results are predictable — we are entering a period of reduced cooperation and coordination of actions to address the pandemic as well as increasing bilateral tensions between the U.S. and China at a time of global economic contraction. This despite the fact that cooperation has been less than robust even before the current increased tensions.

In the trade arena, the pandemic continues to grow in severity as confirmed cases continue to climb globally with the hot spots shifting. Cooperation at the WTO and G20 is critical in terms of keeping markets open, minimizing export restraints, addressing logistics needs in a manner that preserves the health needs of importing countries, avoiding inventory builds of agricultural products, the introduction of export restraints where there is no underlying agriculture production problem globally, taking actions to expand production of medical goods to meet the demand surge flowing from the pandemic, ensuring transparency, and promoting best practices. The world is struggling already to achieve the trade needs identified above. Reduced cooperation will make the challenges that much harder.

Similarly, the search for vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics to effectively prevent, treat and identify medical needs requires global cooperation, information sharing and the work of a multilateral institution like the WHO and various NGOs to ensure all peoples who need these products have equitable and affordable access to them when developed. Trials on potential vaccines are at various stages in China, in the United States and in Europe and possibly other areas. Often the research is amongst companies working jointly from multiple jurisdictions. Which research project or projects will prove effective, if any, is obviously not known. Implications of a lack of cooperation between countries should effective vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics be developed are for the possible hording of products, refusal to sell to other countries or delays in sharing and other actions that would make global escape from the pandemic harder, longer and more deadly.

And for many developing and least developed countries, the pandemic, whether significantly affecting individual countries directly, threatens most countries through contraction in global trade (estimated to be between 13 and 32% by the WTO in 2020), limited financial capabilities to address budget shortfalls and increased unemployment and challenges to existing health care infrastructure from the pandemic. Multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the IMF and others are critical here but are dependent on the cooperation of key members like the U.S., China, and others. While these organizations have been working effectively to date, the size of the challenge posed by the pandemic which is unprecedented will likely result in additional funding needs in the coming months or years which will require cooperation to meet.

Conclusion

The United States and China have very different economic and political systems. In the trade sphere, the United States has reached the conclusion that coexistence of such disparate systems doesn’t make sense under the World Trade Organization’s rules which are premised on market-based economic policies. The U.S. actions vis-a-vis China on trade have been an effort to achieve reciprocity with China, a situation not possible under the existing WTO rules. That the U.S. effort to obtain reciprocity in fact is proving contentious is hardly surprising and will not likely lessen in bilateral tensions in the near future.

In the political sphere, our two systems have resulted and will continue to result in periodic tensions, such as we are currently witnessing over the actions of China on security measures in Hong Kong.

Historically, major nations who view each other as adversaries have been able to cooperate effectively on issues of mutual interest. That was true during the cold war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on certain issues. Whether the U.S. and China view each other as adversaries as well as competitors at the present time, the same ability to cooperate between them should be true when looking at issues such as addressing the pandemic effectively and efficiently.

Let us hope that regardless of the bilateral tensions and of the U.S. departure from the WHO, all WTO Members can step up their efforts to keep markets open and transparent and that governments will cooperate to ensure that medical developments are available to all on an equitable and affordable basis and that the financial resources are available to help those least able to weather the pandemic’s effects alone to survive and move forward.

The future of the WTO — restoring relevance

The World Trade Organization has 164 Members at present with 23 more countries or territories in the process of accession. Nearly all international trade in goods and services is handled by WTO Members and those seeking accession.

At the beginning of 2020, the WTO officially turned 25 years old. Despite some successes in the first 25 years in terms of negotiated improvements, the WTO set of agreements are largely reflective of the world in the 1980s. Advances in technology, manufacturing make-up and importance of certain service sectors (e.g., e-commerce) are not covered by the existing agreements.

The WTO’s negotiating function has been nearly moribund on a multilateral level for more than a decade, with most successes at the WTO keyed to actions by plurilateral groups of Members (action by the willing). A system built on consensus decision making has been the hallmark of activity during the GATT and now during the WTO years but has proven unworkable in moving many topics forward amongst an expanded membership.

Similarly, the dispute settlement function of the WTO, long referred to as the “jewel” of the WTO, has been in a state of crisis for the last several years and now has a nonfunctioning Appellate Body (“AB”) as longstanding systemic concerns of the United States about the Appellate Body’s operation and adherence to the Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) have led to the United States blocking appointments of Appellate Body members until the system is corrected consistent with the DSU. With only one of seven AB members still in place as of December 11, 2019, the AB is unable to hear appeals (as all appeals must be heard by three AB members).

At the same time, many WTO Members have not kept current with notification requirements contained in each Agreement and intended to help Members understand actions of trading partners and their likely compliance with WTO Agreement obligations. This lack of full transparency limits the ability of Members to address issues and seek compliance with underlying obligations.

With the increased importance of China and other countries with economic systems not consistent with the GATT’s and now WTO’s architecture, there have also grown concerns by some Members on the ability of the WTO to handle different economic systems under the existing rules with the U.S., EU and Japan seeking new rules addressing some of the major elements flowing from the different systems.

The WTO, unlike other multilateral institutions, has a process of self-selection of developing country status. Least developed countries do have a clear definition consistent with other organizations. As there has been substantial economic development of many countries describing themselves as “developing” during the first 25 years of the WTO’s existence, there is conflict on the need to change current classification and/or the need for special and differential treatment.

On top of all of these ongoing concerns, the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in WTO Members acting first for their own domestic interests, particularly in light of huge shortfalls in global supplies and capacity for medical supplies versus the needs of countries facing spikes in the number of cases. The result has been dozens of export restraints (styled as temporary) and dozens of unilateral actions by countries to reduce duties, simplify or prioritize entry procedures for medical supplies. While the WTO has established a webpage for COVID-19 information and provides information on actions taken by Members (either export restraints or import liberalizing), the WTO Members have not agreed on a course of action for all Members to pursue.

The COVID-19 pandemic has also disrupted the functioning of the WTO as in-person meetings have been cancelled for the last several months, and many developing countries have insisted that virtual meetings not be used for decision making, essentially halting the negotiations on areas like fisheries subsidies.

The challenges reviewed above raise the question about the WTO’s continued relevance and as importantly what reforms are needed to restore the WTO’s relevance going forward. The short-term challenges for the WTO are compounded by the decision by Director-General Azevedo to step down at the end of August which will divert much energy at the WTO into the process for finding a replacement Director-General.

Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff’s virtual presentation at a webinar hosted by the Korean International Trade Association

Earlier today, the WTO’s Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff made a virtual presentation in a webinar that was hosted by the Korean International Trade Association. The title of the presentation was “COVID-19 and the Future of World Trade. A link to the presentation can be found here. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/ddgaw_27may20_e.htm.

Everyone interested in the future of the multilateral trading system should take the time to read DDG Wolff’s presentation. The presentation reviews actions needed by WTO Members to respond to COVID-19, measures WTO Members can take to assist with the economic recovery from the pandemic, and systemic reform that WTO Members should consider. It is the last of these that takes up the bulk of the presentation.

In talking about reform, DDG Wolff states that —

“It is necessary to understand what values the multilateral trading system is designed to promote before it can be reformed.

“A serious inquiry into this subject would serve three purposes:

“(1) to know the value of what we have in the current system,

“(2) to determine if the values of the current system enjoy the support of all WTO Members, and

“(3) to address the degree to which the WTO is of sufficient continuing relevance as it is at present or whether it needs fundamental change.

“My list of the underlying values of the WTO has 16 entries. They include a number of basic principles.

“The first two, not obvious to all of us today, are supporting peace and stability. This was the key concern of the founders of the multilateral trading system in 1948 and the central objective of conflict-affected and fragile acceding members today.

“Other values, such as nondiscrimination, transparency, reciprocity, international cooperation and the rule of law are more obvious. Still others are more nuanced, less obvious perhaps, and emerge only upon reflection. They include well-being, equality, sovereignty, universality, development, market forces, convergence and morality.

“A recent addition to the list is sustainability.

“A serious discussion of WTO reform is long overdue. The pandemic simply adds to the urgency of it taking place.”

Not surprising, DDG Wolff’s review of the sixteen entries is well done and presents a much broader understanding of the importance and value of a global trading system than trade negotiators, businesses, workers, and governments generally bring to the table.

I won’t review the presentation in detail as the value of the presentation in my view is in reviewing the entirety. While DDG Wolff presents the detailed analysis as a possible road to a better future, there are issues identified which similarly suggest the need for a new set of agreements. Consider his discussion of “convergence”:

“Convergence

“A corollary of the principle that market forces are to dictate competitive outcomes is that the rules of the WTO are based implicitly, but without doubt, on convergence and not coexistence. If the desire is to have systems where market forces are not allowed to operate and deliver results, an underlying unstated assumption of the multilateral trading system would not be valid.

“Coexistence would require a different WTO. Where there is no agreement on convergence, a new modus vivendi will inevitably be sought. The arrangement is likely to settle at a lower level of trade than the WTO rules would otherwise provide.”

The United States has in fact raised this exact issue with the WTO Membership in reviewing the market economy basis of the WTO and the incompatibility of state-directed/controlled economies like that of the People’s Republic of China (and others).

Will WTO Members be able to rise to the current needs to engage in reform that supports the 16 principles reviewed in DDG Wolff’s paper? The future relevance of the WTO and the future dynamism of the global trading system depend on it.

COVID-19 — new hotspots amidst continued growing number of confirmed cases

On May 25th, there is continued global growth in the number of COVID-19 cases despite apparent control of the virus in its origin, China, and in a number of Asian countries that had early case loads. There also has been a sharp contraction in western Europe which had been a major hot spot for March and April and some decline in the United States, the country with the largest number of cases. Despite the positive news from some parts of the world, there have been sharp upticks in South America, in Russia, in various countries in the Middle East and in parts of Asia. While the numbers remain relatively low in Africa, there are also countries in Africa going through significant growth in the number of cases.

The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control puts out a daily compilation of the global situation and includes epidemiological curves for the world broken by continents (as they have characterized countries and continents). The link to today’s issue is here and shows the bulk of the volume of new confirmed cases continuing to be from the Americas, with increasing volumes of new cases also coming from Asia. The data show reduced volumes of new cases from Europe and growing volumes of new cases (though still quite small) from Africa. https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases.

In South America, Brazil’s case load is skyrocketing, and the country now has the second most cases after the United States. Peru, Chile, Colombia, Argentina, and Bolivia are other countries in South America going through rapid growth rates in the number of new COVID-19 cases in the last two weeks.

In North America, Mexico’s cases are increasing rapidly, and the U.S., while having apparently peaked and started a decline, still shows the largest number of new cases of any country in the last two weeks.

In Europe, Russia, while appearing to have peaked, still has very large numbers of new cases and has the third largest number of cases of any country.

In the Middle East, a number of countries have large increases in the number of new cases, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE.

In Asia, India and Pakistan are seeing large increases in the number of new cases.

In Africa, just two countries have as many as 10,000 confirmed cases — South Africa with 21,343 cases and Egypt with 16,613. Both countries have seen large increases in the last two weeks.

So the bottom line is that five months since data started to be collected on COVID-19 cases, the world is seeing continued growth in the number of new cases reported daily with a significant shift in the number of cases from China, Western Europe and parts of Asia to new hot spots in Russia, South America, the Middle East, certain large countries in Asia and in Africa.

Looking at twenty-two countries who were either early countries with COVID-19 confirmed cases or countries who have seen large increases in the first five months, there are other take-aways. The table in the embedded document below was compiled from the ECDC data base through May 24 (with updates for the U.K. and Spain for 5/24 since the 5-24 publication stopped at 5-23 for those two countries). The table has eleven columns of fourteen day periods from Jan. 6, 2020 through May 24, 2020 and a twelfth column showing data for the six day period Dec. 31, 2019 – January 5. The twenty-two countries shown accounted for 4,289,037 confirmed cases of the 5,273,572 global total cases shown in the May 24th publication (81.33% of all cases). Yet despite the presence of China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, France, Germany, Italy and Spain among the 22 (all of whom show sharp declines in new cases in the last month or so), the number of new cases from the 22 countries collectively continues to increase each two weeks.

COVID-19-geographic-disbtribution-worldwide-2020-05-24

Countries who have dealt with COVID-19 most successfully had relatively short periods of peak numbers of new cases and sharp contractions of new cases within a month of the peak. The United States has had a relatively longer-term plateau of high infection rates and more limited reductions after the peak. Some of the new hot spots are still growing and so haven’t even peaked. If their internal efforts to control the spread of COVID are not more successful than the experience of the United States, the world is likely to continue in a period of upward growth of global cases which will keep extreme pressure on the global supply of medical goods needed by first responders and the public more generally. New hot spots will also necessarily mean a shifting of where health care systems are overwhelmed by rising numbers of cases.

In a prior post, I reviewed the recent G20 Trade and Investment Ministers statement and agreed program to support keeping trade flowing during the COVID-19 pandemic and addressing longer term needs, including increased capacity for medical goods. See G20 Trade and Investment Ministerial Meeting – Meaningful Help for COVID-19 Response and WTO Reform? https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/05/17/g20-trade-and-investment-ministerial-meeting-meaningful-help-for-covid-19-response-and-wto-reform/.

There have been various articles reviewing some of the increased production occurring in China, in the EU and in the United States, among other countries. Such increased production provides the hope that the gap between supply and demand has been reduced or eliminated for some products. Declining number of new cases for many countries also means that their internal needs have decreased, which should permit redirecting supplies to countries in need.

For example, with the expansion of U.S. production of ventilators and the peaking of new cases about a month ago in the U.S., the U.S. has shifted from searching the world for ventilators to indicating it will export ventilators to countries in need (including the recent export of 50 U.S.-made ventilators to the Russian Federation). The level of increased production in the United States, an increase of more than 100,000 units, should significantly reduce any global supply deficiency for ventilators going forward. See https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/05/21/860143691/u-s-sends-ventilators-to-russia-in-5-6-million-coronavirus-aid-package; https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/21/trump-ventilators-africa-aid-199006.

One risk that remains is whether any increased production will be maintained over time or permitted to atrophy once the pandemic’s first phase has run its course.

Another risk goes to whether countries will address whatever barriers or disincentives exist to develop the needed capacity, increase the reliability of supply chains (with the possibility of some reshoring or building in greater redundancies in supply chain capabilities), or develop the inventories of medical supplies needed for addressing a phase 2 or some subsequent pandemic.

Finally, dozens of countries have imposed export restraints on medical goods to address domestic demand needs as the number of cases were increasing in the individual country. While the WTO provides flexibilities for countries to impose such restraints, the flexibilities are intended to be used only for temporary purposes. Many of the restraints imposed have not been removed by countries even if their current situation should permit the reduction or elimination of the restrictions. Hopefully the WTO review process and agreements by G20 and other groups will facilitate a rapid elimination of such restraints when no longer needed or justified.

Conclusion

Most of the developed world has come through the first phase of the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of controlling the spread and reducing the number of new confirmed cases. Countries who have gotten past their peak infection rates are now starting to reopen their economies to reduce the economic damage that has already been extraordinary for many countries.

Unfortunately, other countries, who have not been the hot spots for COVID-19, see increases in cases that surpass the declines in those who have gotten through the peaks of infections in their countries. Thus, total new cases continue to increase even after five months since data were first collected.

The growing number of confirmed cases make collective efforts to keep markets open and any export restraints imposed temporary in fact, to expand production of medical supplies, to share best practices, to ensure adequate financial resources for the world’s poorest countries and to expedite development of vaccines and therapeutics critical if the extent of the economic and human damage from this pandemic is to be capped and reduced going forward in the second half of 2020.

Continued Stress in U.S.-China relations — Reduced Cooperation in Multilateral Fora

The two largest economies in the world view each other as competitors and potential adversaries. With significantly different political and economic systems and ideologies, the United States and China have had different perspectives on commitments and obligations undertaken in the economic sphere.

U.S. concerns

Specifically, the United States has viewed its bilateral trade negotiations with China and the later conclusion of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) as having created a commitment by China to continue on market-based reforms with the eventual conversion of the Chinese economy into a market-economy consistent with the basic rules of the WTO. There have been high level dialogues between the two countries for years with a feeling in the U.S. that repeated commitments by China to fulfill commitments have not been honored and that the bilateral relationship had growing serious problems.

China concerns

China has had a different view of the world and its obligations to other countries through its joining the WTO. Reforms continued for a while but were replaced with a growing focus on state direction, state investment and heavy subsidization of a widespread number of sectors. China has viewed the United States as attempting to prevent its economic growth and global role and as not respecting its “right” to view itself as a developing country within the WTO and hence to have fewer obligations than a developed country.

Trump Administration changes approach

Under the Trump Administration, the United States has taken a more aggressive approach to dealing with what it perceives as distortions in economic competition and lack of meaningful reciprocity in the bilateral trade relationship. The U.S. has also looked at bilateral and multilateral approaches to address the problems it perceives China has created and is creating with the functioning of the global trading system.

Bilaterally, the U.S. has conducted its 301 investigation on a host of longstanding concerns of the U.S. business community on Chinese policies and practices. The adverse findings from the USTR investigation has led to the U.S. imposing additional tariffs on Chinese goods when resolution of the underlying issues was not achieved followed by retaliation by China and a series of additional rounds of more tariffs and more retaliation. The U.S. and China did engage in negotiations to see if they could resolve the underlying concerns of the United States. A phase 1 agreement was signed in January 2020, with a phase 2 process supposed to have commenced by May.

At the same time, the United States has pursued reform at the WTO (1) to address longstanding and bipartisan concerns with the WTO dispute settlement system, (2) to address rule changes to address some of the distortions that flow from China’s nonmarket economy, (3) to modify the self-selection nature of which Members are “developing” and (4) to improve transparency.

On transparency, many countries are not current on the various notification requirements, but major concerns have existed with China and India in terms of the number and dollar value of subsidy programs that are not being reported in their notifications to the WTO.

Some of the reforms of interest to the United States are being pursued as well by others, such as the EU and Japan on state-invested companies and industrial subsidies and various other countries on transparency.

But the WTO has been struggling to achieve forward movement on many issues of importance to different Members in part due to lack of consensus on issues and a lack of leadership/coordination among major players.

COVID-19 Complicates the Bilateral Relationship

The COVID-19 pandemic has complicated the situation for the WTO and for U.S.-China relations both because of the global reach of the health problem resulting in reduced functionality of the Missions in Geneva and the current inability to hold face-to-face meetings and the widespread use of export restraints on medical goods (including personal protection equipment like masks, gloves, shields, gowns, etc.) as demand in nations with significant number of infections has grossly exceeded existing inventories and production capabilities both in country and globally.

In terms of U.S.-China relations, the lack of complete transparency by the Chinese in the early months of the COVID-19 outbreak, some slowness of action by the World Health Organization, and both missteps on testing and slowness of initial action within the United States (and resulting massive unemployment, costs to the economy and multiple trillion dollar government response) has added finger pointing on the pandemic to the already tense bilateral relations. It has also resulted in the U.S. distrusting the WHO and temporarily suspending U.S. funding for the organization.

With the collapse in global trade, the pandemic has also made it far less likely that China will honor its increased import commitments from the U.S. in 2020 as contained in the Phase 1 Agreement. See U.S.-China Phase I Agreement – some progress on structural changes; far behind on trade in goods and services, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/05/12/u-s-china-phase-i-agreement-some-progress-on-structural-changes-far-behind-on-trade-in-goods-and-services/. That said, the U.S. continues to identify important advances being made at least in agriculture with China. See https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/may/usda-and-ustr-announce-continued-progress-implementation-us-china-phase-one-agreement.

On trade, the pandemic has crippled the economies of many countries with the resulting declines in imports and exports in the March-April time frame and likely going forward for some period, though China as the first country through the outbreak and a major producer of medical goods actually saw increased overall exports to the world in April.

United States Strategic Approach to The People’s Republic of China

Earlier this week, the White House forwarded to Congress a document required by the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, United States Strategic Approach to The People’s Republic of China. On the trade/economic front, the paper repeats the concerns that the Administration has laid out in other documents most of which are summarized above (not including the COVID-19 issues). The U.S. views challenges from China to three broad areas — (1) economic challenges (largely failure to continue reforms to become a market economy, failure to honor commitments made to the US, use of predatory practices, insistence on being a developing country, etc.); (2) challenges to U.S. values; and (3) security challenges. The link to the document is here and the text is embedded below. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Report-5.20.20.pdf.

U.S.-Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Report-5.20.20

Challenges for the WTO

The WTO remains able to move forward where issues are limited to a subset (the “willing”) as progress on e-commerce talks would support. But in a consensus based system, distrust between major players will paralyze large parts of any agenda. Indeed, with the large number of WTO Members (164) at various stages of economic development, there will almost always be a wide divergence of views on any issue. In such a situation, leadership and cooperation among major economies become important to develop a consensus. So it is hard to see how the WTO advances a reform agenda without improved relations between the organization’s two largest Members.

With the recently added challenge for the WTO of selecting a new Director-General, the sour relationship the U.S. and China will likely make finding a candidate who would be supported by a consensus of the Membership that much harder, suggesting at a minimum a process that takes the full six-month time for selection (versus any hoped for expeditious resolution in light of DG Azevedo’s departure at the end of August) and perhaps extended time lines. If the selection process breaks down into highly polarized camps (the existing procedures were developed to try to prevent such an outcome), the ability to move forward the WTO’s reform and existing negotiating agenda will be delayed by certainly months and perhaps longer.

Conclusion

At a time when the world is struggling with a global pandemic which continues to cause huge health challenges to many countries in the world and has devastated the global economy at least temporarily, costing tens of millions of workers jobs, and likely closing hundreds of thousand of businesses around the world while requiring government financial support that will likely exceed ten trillion dollars, there is an unfortunate lack of global cooperation between the major economic players and distrust at least from the U.S. of multilateral institutions viewed as either ineffective to deal with China’s economic system or not operating in an unbiased manner.

A major part of the challenge flows from the distrust that exists between the world’s two largest economies that precedes the pandemic but that has been worsened by the pandemic’s development and handling. The two countries have different economic systems which are essentially non-compatible, have different political systems and different ideologies and view each other as competitors and potential adversaries.

In a change of approach, the United States has decided to take a more aggressive approach to achieve reciprocity in fact with China and not merely on paper or from spoken promises. The change in approach has resulted in the U.S. acting unilaterally in certain situations. China has appeared unable to understand or agree with the concerns raised by the U.S. (and others) and harbors a belief that the real motive behind U.S. actions is “to keep China down”. This mutual distrust has resulted in both hard feelings and an inability to achieve cooperation on a large number of trade, economic and other issues.

The current U.S.-China relationship increases the problems for many multilateral organizations, but certainly for the WTO both in terms of selecting a new Director-General and in developing WTO reforms and moving ongoing negotiations forward.

Look for a challenging second half of 2020.

G20 Trade and Investment Ministerial Meeting — Meaningful Help for COVID-19 Response and WTO Reform?

On May 14, 2020, the G20 trade and investment ministers held a virtual meeting to consider proposals for joint action pulled together by the Trade and Investment Working Group (“TIWG”) on the topic of “G20 Actions to Support World Trade and Investment Through the COVID-19 Pandemic”.

The Ministerial statement released on the 14th endorsed the TIWG proposals which were attached to the statement and contain both short-term actions designed to “alleviate the impact of COVID-19” and longer-term actions intended to “support the necessary reform of the WTO and the multilateral trading system, build resilience in global supply chains, and strengthen international investment.” https://g20.org/en/media/Documents/G20SS_Statement_G20%20Second%20Trade%20&%20Investment%20Ministerial%20Meeting_EN.pdf.

The WTO’s Director-General Roberto Azevêdo welcomed the Ministerial statement and provided the following characterization of its content:

“DG Azevêdo hails G20 pledges on trade cooperation in COVID-19 response

“WTO Director-General Roberto Azevêdo welcomed G20 ministers’ endorsement of collective action measures to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on trade and investment and help foster
global economic recovery. The initiatives were endorsed at a virtual meeting of the G20 trade and investment ministers on 14 May.

“The actions include short-term responses designed to prevent trade logjams and facilitate trade in products needed to contain COVID-19, as well as longer-term support to reform the multilateral trading system, build resilience in global supply chains, and strengthen international investment.

“The G20 ministers pledged to promote WTO reform and ‘support the role of the multilateral trading system in promoting stability and predictability of international trade flows’. They agreed to ‘explore COVID-19 related WTO initiatives’ to promote more open and resilient supply chains, and expand production capacity and trade in pharmaceuticals, medical and other health-related products

“’These commitments by G20 ministers represent an important collective response to the trade-related challenges raised by the COVID-19 pandemic,’ said DG Azevêdo. ‘Maintaining stability and predictability in trade relations is critical to ensuring that essential medical supplies are available to save lives, and that global food security and nutrition do not become a casualty of this pandemic.’

“Echoing language from their first crisis meeting in late March, G20 ministers said that any emergency restrictions on trade in vital medical supplies and services should be targeted, proportionate, transparent and temporary, and should not create unnecessary barriers to trade or disrupt global supply chains. They also agreed to strengthen transparency and notify the WTO of any trade-related measures taken. They urged governments to refrain from excessive food stockpiling and export restrictions on agricultural products.

“In addition, the G20 ministers endorsed trade facilitation initiatives, including accelerated implementation of provisions in the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement, such as pre-arrival processing and expedited shipment, which could speed up access to essential goods during the pandemic. They also called for streamlining customs procedures and encouraging greater use of international standards to reduce sanitary and technical barriers to trade.

“Ministers also agreed to work together to identify key areas where investment is needed, in particular for critical medical supplies and sustainable agriculture production, and to encourage
investment in new production capacity for medical supplies.

“The extraordinary meeting of G20 trade and investment ministers was organized by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which currently holds the group’s rotating presidency.”

https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/igo_14may20_e.htm.

Because the G20 member countries have differing views on flexibilities needed, already taken, and potential space that may be needed in the future, much of the “actions” agreed to are more aspirational than commitments to avoid trade restrictive actions.

ANNEX to Ministerial Statement of May 14, 2020, G20 Actions to Support World Trade and Investment in Response to COVID-19

The Annex to the Ministerial Statement contains 19 “short-term collective actions” broken into five areas — “trade regulation”; “trade facilitation”; “transparency”; “operation of logistics networks”; and “support for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs)”.

Trade regulation

On trade regulation, the three specific actions don’t ban export restraints for medical goods or agricultural products but rather provide avenues for such actions to be taken.

On medical goods, the action taken merely repeats the prior statement from the trade and investment ministers that any such actions are “targeted, proportionate, transparent, temporary” and “do not create unnecessary barriers to trade or disruption to global supply chains, and are consistent with WTO rules”. Para. 1.1.1.

Similarly, on agricultural restrictions, G20 countries agree to “refrain from introducing export restrictions” “avoid unnecessary food-stockpiling” but “without prejudice to domestic food security, consistent with national requirements.” Para. 1.1.2.

Finally, there is an aspirational action to “Consider exempting humanitarian aid related to COVID-19 from any export restrictions on exports of essential medical supples, medical equipment and personal protective equipment, consistent with national requirements.” Para. 1.1.3.

Considering the number of G20 countries who have had in place or continue to have in place export restraints on medical goods and the history of export restraints on agricultural goods and/or buildup of food stockpiling by some G20 countries, it is not surprising that more ambitious objectives have not been possible. For example, information compiled by the WTO Secretariat shows that nearly all G20 countries have had or continue to have export restraints on medical goods flowing from the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, the US, EU, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey and the United Kingdom are in the WTO data. While China is not included, their export restrictions on medical goods likely predated the data collection done by the WTO Secretariat. See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_goods_measure_e.htm. Similarly, Russia has agricultural export restraints in place and China, India and Indonesia have used them in the 2007-2008 food shortage challenge.

Trade facilitation

The Annex includes eight agreed “actions” under the heading of trade facilitation. Most of these actions are similarly not binding but are aspirational or encouraged. In fact five of the eight include the word “encourage”. Others include language like “to the extent possible” or “as appropriate and according with applicable national legislation”.

That said, many of the G20 countries and others have been taking actions to streamline the release of imported medical goods and other actions that are consistent with the objectives of the Trade Facilitation Agreement.

Two of the provisions under trade facilitation really go to the issue medical goods capacity, product availability and capacity expansions and are noteworthy as encouraging sharing of information on producers of product and also encouraging expansion of medical goods capacity. Paras. 1.2.4 and 1.2.5. As I have noted in prior posts, there has been and continues to be an imbalance between global capacity to produce the medical goods needed to fight COVID-19 and the demand for countries experiencing outbreaks. See, e.g., Shifting Trade Needs During the COVID-19 Pandemic, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/04/28/shifting-trade-needs-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/. If the world doesn’t address the supply/demand imbalance, it is highly improbable that most countries won’t enact export restraints to prevent the loss of needed goods that are in country during surging demand. While neither G20 agreed action is binding, both are helpful to improve knowledge of available supplies and hopefully to expand that supply.

The last trade facilitation action merely calls for G20 countries to “Support the efforts of international organizations (WTO, FAO, WFP, etc.) to analyze the impacts of COVID-19 on global agricultural supplies, distribution chains and agri-food production and trade.” Para. 1.2.8. Many of the G20 are signatories to statements indicating they will not impose export restraints on agricultural goods or urge restraint on the use of such restraints. There has not been a food shortage in 2020, and mechanisms put in place after the 2007-2008 food shortages to monitor food supplies have helped to provide governments with better information on likely problems. At the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic has created challenges in getting agricultural products harvested, processed and distributed. If these challenges are not properly handled, the world could find local or regional food shortages not because of lack of product but from an inability to get the product harvested, processed and distributed. With COVID-19 outbreaks in meat processing plants in various countries (United States, Canada, Germany to name just three) and with travel restrictions limiting movement of temporary farm workers, the challenges are real. Work of the international organizations is important for information gathering and dissemination.

Transparency

There are two action items under transparency — to share experiences and best practices; to notify trade-related measures to the WTO as required by obligations to the WTO.

The first should be helpful depending on openness of governments and willingness of governments to share experiences in fact. The latter action reflects the fact that countries (whether G20 or otherwise) have in some cases been slow to provide notifications or have taken limited views of their obligations to report certain trade related activities.

Operation of logistics networks

The four agreed actions under this title all involve trade ministers encouraging G20 Transport Ministers to take actions that will speed the movement of medical goods, increasing air cargo capacity, improve transparency on enforcement measures and “to abide by international practices and guidelines to ensure the movement of goods through maritime channels.” Paras. 1.4.1 – 1.4.4.

Support for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs)

There are two action items for this topic — calling for reports from international organizations that would look at the “disruption of global value chains caused by the pandemic on MSMEs”; and encouraging enhancement of communication channels and networks for MSMEs, including through deepened collaboration with the private sector.” Paras. 1.5.1 and 1.5.2.

MSMEs are important engines of economic growth for all countries and are significantly adversely affected by the governmental actions needed to address the COVID-19 pandemic. For many countries, the bulk of the response for MSMEs will be through financial support legislation as can be seen by summaries of actions taken compiled by one or more of the international organizations. See, e.g., IMF, Policy Responses to COVID-19, https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19 Thus, the two actions contained in the G20 trade and investment ministers statement are helpful for considering future actions but don’t address the core immediate needs which are handled by other ministers.

Longer-term collective actions

The Annex also contains nineteen specific agreed actions for the longer term. The actions are broken into three topics — supporting the mutilateral trading system; building resilience in global supply chains; and strengthening international investment.

Like the short-term actions, the agreed list reflects the limitations on achieving G20 consensus because of different perspectives of G20 members. Some members like the EU have an interest in pursuing tariff eliminations on medical goods, an issue that the U.S. is not willing to explore until the pandemic has passed. Thus, there is no action item to achieve tariff elimination on such products in the longer-term actions.

Supporting the multilateral trading system

There are seven action items which include WTO reform (para 2.1.1), how the G20 can support work at the WTO (para 2.1.2), strengthening transparency and WTO notifications (para. 2.1.3), working “together to deliver a free, fair, inclusive, non-discriminatory, transparent, predictable and stable trade and investment environment and to keep our markets open” (para. 2.1.4), “work to ensure a level playing field” (para. 2.1.5), importance of interface between trade and digital economy and need for e-commerce agreement (para. 2.1.6), and exploring “COVID-19 related WTO initiative to promote open and more resilient supply chains, and expand production capacity and trade” in medical goods (para. 2.1.7).

These action items will have very different meanings depending on the G20 member who is interpreting them. Thus, the EU, Japan and the U.S. would have very different interpretations of ensuring a level playing field than would China and possibly others. India and South Africa have different views on e-commerce and making permanent no tariffs on digital trade than would the U.S., Japan and others

Still support for WTO reform, global rules on e-commerce, increased transparency and the other issues should help provide some focus in the ongoing efforts at the WTO for a future agenda and reform.

As noted in the short-term actions, greater focus by G20 countries on the supply/demand imbalance in medical goods is critical to avoid many of the same shortage issues in future pandemics or future waves of the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, the support for para. 2.1.7 is potentially important.

Building resilience in global supply chains

There are five action items included under this topic which are positive. These include sharing best practices, strengthening cooperation on regulation of trade (including customs and electronic document management), ensuring transparency of trade-related information useful to MSMEs, encouraging cooperation between multinationals and MSMEs, and establishing voluntary guidelines that would permit essential cross-border travel during a health crisis. Paras. 2.2.1 – 2.2.5.

While these action items could be useful going forward, there is a major omission in this important category. Does building resilience in global supply chains necessitate building in increased redundancy or for onshoring some products or inputs? This is an important issue that has raised concerns among some G20 members that there is too great dependence on certain countries for input materials and that supply chains don’t have sufficient redundancy or are too “global” and not sufficiently regional or national. The United States, for example, has expressed concerns about over dependence on other countries and has been looking at encouraging domestic production of some key products/inputs. Such an approach is not supported by the EU or China. See statement of Ambassador Lighthizer at the virtual G20 Trade and Investment Ministers meeting of May 14 and the statements of the U.S., EU and Chinese Ambassadors to the WTO’s virtual General Council meeting on COVID-19 responses lays out the different perspective on this and some other issues. See https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/may/second-g20-extraordinary-trade-and-investment-ministers-meeting-remarks-ambassador-robert-e; https://geneva.usmission.gov/2020/05/15/statement-by-ambassador-dennis-shea-at-the-may-15-2020-general-council-meeting/; https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/world-trade-organization-wto/79401/eu-statement-informal-general-council-meeting-15-may-2020_en; http://wto2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/chinaviewpoins/202005/20200502965217.shtml. While G20 countries generally all agree that it is not possible to be self-sufficient in the medical goods area, that view doesn’t answer the question of whether supply chains should be changed or whether there are certain products where a country or countries could decide self-sufficiency is sufficiently important to take different actions. From the very different views on this topic, it is not surprising that the G20 collective long-term actions were limited in the building resilience group of actions, and such differences also likely influenced the language used in the third section on strengthening international investment.

Strengthening international investment

The last seven long-term collective actions focus on the obvious need for improved investment in medical goods to reduce the stress on the global system that has flowed from the imbalance in supply versus demand and the lack of adequate national, regional and global inventories.

Collective actions include sharing best practices on promoting investments in sectors where there have been shortages (para. 2.3.2), working together to identify key areas where additional investment is needed in both medical goods and agriculture (para. 2.3.3), and four paragraphs (2.3.4 – 2.3.7) encouraging investment in new capacity, working with the private sector to identify opportunities, and other items. The last action item calls on G20 governments to “Encourage cooperation on technical assistance and capacity building provided to developing and least developed countries on investment promotion.” Para. 2.3.7.

Because many countries have been encouraging expanded production of medical goods since the outbreak of the pandemic, there is a great deal of investment that has been happening, including converting (at least short term) production lines to medical goods in short supply. Missing from the collective actions is any encouragement to the Finance Ministers to ensure the international organizations work with developing and least developed countries to ensure adequate regional inventories of medical goods to help such countries address outbreaks of COVID-19.

The G20 Trade and Investment Ministers Statement of May 14 is embedded below.

G20SS_Statement_G20-Second-Trade-Investment-Ministerial-Meeting_EN-1

Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to infect millions of people around the world and has resulted in massive economic dislocations and the loss of tens of millions of jobs just in the United States. The G20 has been doing a reasonable job of providing leadership in how to address the pandemic and how to help the world recover as the pandemic recedes. The significant differences between G20 members on some issues have resulted in actions being taken that are either aspirational or simply encouraged, as stronger action was not possible absent consensus. But the May 14 Ministerial Statement is another positive step and provides ongoing recognition of needing to address the supply/demand imbalance to permit all countries to be able to obtain medical goods needed when the pandemic creates hot spots in their countries.

U.S.-China Phase I Agreement — Some Progress on Structural Changes; Far Behind on Trade in Goods and Services

In prior posts, I reviewed the U.S.-China Phase I Agreement and the commitments made by the parties. See https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/01/19/u-s-china-phase-1-agreement-details-on-the-expanding-trade-chapter/; https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/01/15/u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-signed-on-january-15-an-impressive-agreement-if-enforced/. While for many the promised start of a Phase II was viewed as the more important in light of the issues not reached in the partial deal that was struck in January, the COVID-19 pandemic has absorbed much of the global energy for both countries, and no new talks have started.

Moreover, with both countries exchanging charges against the other in terms of the origin of the virus causing the pandemic and more recently concerns about transparency on the virus in China, there have been heightened tensions between the two countries. with some comments in the press calling for an end of the agreement by each country.

A recent telephone call between U.S. Treasury Secretary Mnuchin, USTR Ambassador Lighthizer and China’s Vice Premier Liu He seemed aimed at keeping the Phase I Agreement moving forward. The US press release on the call is reproduced below.

“USTR and Treasury Statement on Call With China

“05/07/2020

“Vice Premier Liu He, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin, and Ambassador Robert Lighthizer participated in a conference call today. They discussed economic and trade issues, including the recently concluded Phase One agreement. The parties shared updates on COVID-19 and their assessments of its effects on economic growth as well as the measures their countries are taking to provide support to their economies.

“The parties discussed the ongoing process of implementing the Phase One agreement between the two countries that went into effect February 14. Both sides agreed that good progress is being made on creating the governmental infrastructures necessary to make the agreement a success. They also agreed that in spite of the current global health emergency, both countries fully expect to meet their obligations under the agreement in a timely manner. Meetings required by the agreement have been conducted via conference call and will continue on a regular basis.”

https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/may/ustr-and-treasury-statement-call-china.

Indeed, notices on Chinese Ministry websites as well as statements from U.S. government officials have made clear that China has been making progress on a number of the changes to laws and regulations where commitments were undertaken in the Phase I Agreement. For example on the large number of agricultural program changes that China agreed to make, USDA and USTR released a joint statement in late February, shortly after the Agreement took effect, reviewing the progress being made. See https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/february/usda-and-ustr-announce-progress-implementation-us-china-phase-one-agreement.

USDA-and-USTR-Announce-Progress-on-Implementation-of-U.S.-China-Phase-One-Agreement-_-United-States-Trade-Representative

Similarly, the United States has taken steps to address obligations that it undertook in the Agreement such as authorizing the importation of citrus products from China. See 85 FR 20975-20983 (April 15, 2020; https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/newsroom/stakeholder-info/sa_by_date/sa-2020/sa-04/china-citrus.

“APHIS Authorizes Importation of Fresh Citrus Fruit from China

“Last Modified: Apr 14, 2020 Print

“The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is authorizing the importation of five types of commercially produced fresh citrus fruit from China into the continental United States. After thorough analysis, APHIS scientists determined that pummelo, Nanfeng honey mandarin, ponkan, sweet orange, and Satsuma mandarin fruit from China can be safely imported into the United States under a systems approach to protect against the introduction of plant pests. 

“A systems approach is a series of measures taken by growers, packers, and shippers that, in combination, minimize pest risks prior to importation into the United States. In this case, the systems approach includes importation in commercial consignments only, registration of places of production and packinghouses, certification that the fruit is free of quarantine pests, trapping program for fruit flies, periodic inspections of places of production, grove sanitation, and postharvest disinfection and treatment. This completes agreements on another Chinese commodity listed in Annex 11: Plant Health of the Economic and Trade Agreement between the United States of America and The People’s Republic of China, Phase One.

“This notice of authorization will go into effect on the date of publication in the Federal Register, April 15, 2020. The docket with information about this decision is available here upon publication on April 15, 2020: http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=APHIS-2014-0005.”

Expanding Trade -Growing Exports to China from the U.S. by $76.7 Billion in 2020

One of the important parts of the Phase I Agreement was the chapter on Expanding Trade and the commitments by China to increase imports from the United States by some $200 billion over 2020 and 2021 above the 2017 figures (i.e., U.S. exports to China ahead of the additional tariffs imposed by the U.S. and then China against goods from each other). The figures for 2020 were for increases of $76.7 billion, $64.9 billion in certain goods and $12.8 billion in certain service sectors.

The challenges to the Chinese economy in the first quarter because of COVID-19 and to the United States (and many other countries) for part of the 1st quarter and at least the second quarter of 2020 because of the pandemic makes the large increase in purchases seem unlikely. Certainly, first quarter figures for U.S. domestic goods exports paint a picture suggesting 2020 will not meet objectives. The goods categories that were included in Annex 6.1 and the Attachment thereto of the Phase I Agreement accounted for 59.1% of U.S. domestic exports to China in 2017 (the base year)– $70.9 billion of $119.9 billion total U.S. domestic exports to China. In the first quarter of 2020, the goods categories covered by the Annex showed U.S. domestic exports of $12.7 billion which would leave $122.1 billion to be exported in the last nine months of 2020 ($13.57 billion/month or greater each month than the U.S. exported in the first quarter of the year).

The remaining $49 billion of U.S. domestic exports don’t have particular export targets, but are running well below 2017 levels and indeed are more than 21% lower than the first quarter 2019 levels, suggesting 2020 levels of just $28.29 billion.

The table below shows the US exports for 2017-March 2020 and the objective for 2020 included in Annex 6.1. All figures are in $ Billions.

Product2017201820191st Qtr.
2019
1st Qtr.
2020
Manufactured goods
1. industrial machinery$10.949$12.288$11.062$2.318$2.500
2. electrical equip. &
machinery
$4.311$4.586$4.283$1.008$1.078
3. pharmaceutical
products
$2.089$2.126$2.362$0.483$0.665
4. aircraft* $0$0$0$0$0
5. vehicles$10.093$6.487$7.050$1.888$1.049
6. optical and medical
instruments
$3.135$3.398$3.527$0.763$$0.806
7. iron and steel$1.176$0.652$0.285$0.075$0.069
8. other manufactured
goods
$10.702$11.168$11.914$3.167$3.021
Total MFG goods$42.456$40.705$40.484$9.702$9.188
Agriculture
9. oilseeds$12.225$3.119$7.989$1.696$1.028
10. meat$0.559$0.440$1.193$0.110$0.727
11. cereals$1.358$0.696$0.313$0.015$0.119
12. cotton$0.973$0.921$0.707$0.197$0.290
13. other agricultural
commodities
$4.504$4.121$3.680$0.765$0.768
14. seafood$1.234$1.055$0.822$0.200$0.132
Total Agriculture$20.852$10.353$14.704$2.983$3.063
Energy
15. liquefied natural
gas
$0.424$0.464$0.063$0.036$0.059
15. crude oil$4.304$5.374$2.478$0.405$0.182
17. refined products$2.444$1.781$0.469$0.185$0.141
18. coal$0.403$0.311$0.127$0.047$0.048
Total Energy$7.575$7.930$3.138$0.674$0.429
Total Phase I Goods HS$70.882$58.987$58.326$13.360$12.680
Other domestic exports$49.028$50.593$36.005$9.435$6.798
Total domestic exports
to China
$119.911$109.580$94.331$22.795$19.478

Annex 6.1 has manufactured goods increasing $32.9 billion above 2017 levels for a total of $75.356 billion for 2020; leaving $66.168 billion for the last nine months of the year or $7,352 billion/month for the last three quarters.

Similarly, Annex 6.1 has agriculture imports by China from the U.S. increasing $12.5 billion over 2017 levels to $33.354 billion for 2020 which would leave $31.015 billion for the last nine months of 2020 ($3.446 billion/month).

Finally, Annex 6.1 shows energy increasing by $18.5 billion in 2020 over 2017 levels. That means 2020 has a target of $26.075 billion with $25.646 billion needing to be exported over the last nine months ($2.86 billion/month).

With the ongoing pandemic and Chinese industry operating below full capacity and U.S. industry and agriculture still coping with the market problems in the U.S. from efforts to cope with COVID-19, it is hard to see the goods commitments being met in 2020.

The challenges for the US service sector in exports to China are equally daunting. Total U.S. exports of services to China in 2017 were $56.009 billion of which $55.458 billion are in categories covered by Annex 6.1. Specifically, category 19, charges for use of intellectual property were $7.591 billion in 2017 for U.S. services exports to China. Business travel and tourism (category 20) showed U.S. exports to China of $32.705 billion in 2017. Financial services and insurance (category 21) had exports to China of $4.208 billion in 2017, while other services (category 22) showed exports of $10.030 billion to China. Finally, cloud and related services had exports to China in 2017 of $0.924 billion.

U.S. services export data for 2020 doesn’t show the breakdown by category by country. However, China has a much larger percent of U.S. services exports in the travel and tourism category (about 25% for all countries vs. 58.4% for China). U.S. data for the first quarter of 2020 show exports of travel and tourism services to the world down 19.5% with March being down more than 50%.

With the travel limitations in place in the U.S. and that have been in place in China and with the slow ability of the U.S. to reopen much of the travel and tourism related sectors (transportation, hotels, restaurants, entertainment venues, etc.), there seems to be no realistic scenario by which US service exports to China grow $12.5 billion in 2020.

Conclusion

The U.S.-China Phase I Agreement was an important step in trying to find a path forward for normalized trade relations between the world’s two largest economies. The path requires the start of a Phase 2 but importantly needs the building of confidence between the two countries based on achieving results in implementing the Phase I Agreement.

There have been extraordinary events clouding the global community as nations struggle to address the COVID-19 pandemic. Those events have complicated the ability of the U.S. and China to achieve in 2020 what the Phase I Agreement contemplates, at least in terms of expanded trade. That said, both China and the U.S. have implemented certain provisions of the Agreement, and there has been a recognition by the U.S. Administration of efforts by China to comply with modifications to laws, regulations, etc. agreed to in the Phase I Agreement.

The first two months that the Agreement has been in place have not resulted in significant movement on implementing the important chapter of expanding trade. For the United States, struggling to right its economy amidst the pandemic, a strong effort by China to honor its commitments to expand trade significantly in 2020, would be a welcome development and hopefully lead to the reengagement by the two countries to start and complete a phase 2 Agreement.

The COVID-19 Pandemic – An Update on Shifting Patterns of Infections and Implications for Medical Goods Needs

Since late March there have been significant shifts in the number of COVID-19 cases being reported by countries and within countries. Many countries where the virus hit hardest in the first months of the year have been seeing steady progress in the reduction of cases. Some in Asia, Oceania and in Europe are close to no new cases. Others in Europe and some in Asia have seen significant contractions in the number of new cases. Other countries have seen a flattening of new cases and the beginnings of reductions (e.g., the U.S. and Canada). And, of course, other countries are caught up in a rapid increase of cases (e.g., Russia, Brazil, Ghana, Nigeria, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia).

As reviewed in a prior post, the shifting pattern of infections has implications for the needs for medical goods and open trade on those products. https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/04/28/shifting-trade-needs-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/. As the growth in number of cases is seen in developing and least developed countries, it is important that countries who have gotten past the worst part of Phase 1 of the pandemic eliminate or reduce export restraints, if any, that were imposed to address medical needs in country during the crush of the pandemic in country. It is also critical that the global efforts to increase production of medical goods including test kits and personal protective equipment continue to eliminate the imbalance between global demand and global supply and to permit the restoration and/or creation of national and regional buffer stocks needed now and to address any second phase to the pandemic. And as tests for therapeutics and vaccines advance, it is critical that there be coordinated efforts to see that products are available to all populations with needs at affordable prices.

While there is some effort at greater coordination on research and development as reviewed in a post last week (https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/05/06/covid-19-the-race-for-diagnostics-therapeutics-and-vaccines-and-availability-for-all/), concerns exist that as nations get past the first phase of the pandemic, countries will turn their focus to other needs and not in fact address the severe gaps between pandemic supply needs and existing capacity and inventories. Such an outcome would exacerbate the challenges the world is facing from the current pandemic and its likely phase 2 later this year.

The following table shows total cases as of May 11 and the number of cases over fourteen day periods ending April 11, April 27 and May 11 as reported by the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control. The data are self-explanatory but show generally sharply reduced rates of new infections in Europe and in a number of Asian countries, though there are increases in a few, including in India and Pakistan and in a number of countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia. North America has seen a flattening of the number of new infections in the U.S. and Canada with some small reductions in numbers while Mexico is seeing growth from currently relatively low levels. Central and South America have some countries with rapid increases (e.g., Brazil, Chile, Peru). The Russian Federation is going through a period of huge increases. While there are still relatively few cases in Africa, there are countries who are showing significant increases, albeit from small bases.

Countrycases
through 5-11
14 days
to 4-11
14 days
to 4-27
14 days
to 5-11
Austria15,7875,8631,252598
Belgium53,08119,38316,4876,947
Bulgaria1,965342625665
Croatia2,187909430157
Cyprus89843318481
Czechia8,1233,4531,413719
Denmark10,4293,7732,4011,854
Estonia1,73968333496
Finland5,9621,7441,6021,386
France139,06357,71229,17214,488
Germany169,57569,07632,17714,382
Greece2,7161,045392210
Hungary3,2849671,125701
Ireland22,9965,9689,6073,734
Italy219,07061,07941,31221,395
Latvia939332161127
Lithuania1,47964138730
Luxembourg3,8861,618442163
Malta4962117048
Netherlands42,62714,49412,2584,782
Poland15,9964,5664,9434,379
Portugal27,58111,2047,2793,717
Romania15,3624,1754,7364,326
Slovakia1,45742063778
Slovenia1,45752820250
Spain224,39092,96343,04516,756
Sweden26,3226,6398,1577,682
EU271,018,867370,221220,830109,551
United Kingdom219,18355,72968,56166,343
EU27 + UK1,238,050425,950289,391175,894
United States1,329,799396,874408,339363,889
Canada68,84817,45822,51921,964
Mexico35,0223,12710,01620,345
North America1,433,669417,459440,874406,198
Japan15,7983,8486,1302,413
South Korea10,909972201171
Singapore23,3361,17711,0929,712
Australia6,9412,860391228
New Zealand 1,1476195825
Subtotal58,1319,47617,87212,549
China84,0101,058990-189
India67,1526,57418,74039,260
Indonesia14,0322,4664,6415,150
Iran107,60335,86018,79517,122
Turkey138,65741,33153,17428,527
Israel16,4777,3734,2531,079
Bangladesh14,6573764,7959,241
Kazakhstan5,1266471,7562,409
Krygyzstan1,016281276321
Malaysia6,6562,1851,097876
Pakistan30,9413,5917,95417,613
Saudi Arabia39,0482,54713,06021,526
Taiwan4401134111
Thailand3,0151,38234393
Vietnam2888660
Sri Lanka86391313340
Subtotal529,981105,961130,234143,397
Russian Federation209,68810,88165,179128,739
Ukraine15,2321,9856,2326,223
Belarus22,9731,8877,88512,510
Georgia635153229149
Subtotal248,52814,90679,525147,621
South Africa10,0158332,3735,469
Egypt9,4001,2992,2545,081
Morocco6,0631,1032,4041,998
Algeria5,7231,4561,4682,341
Burkina Faso751302135119
Cameroon2,579715801958
Cote d’Ivoire1,700379576550
D.R. of the Congo1,024165225565
Djibouti1,280137809187
Ghana4,2632419842,713
Guinea2,1462078441,052
Kenya672158158317
Mali70483273315
Mauritius33222480
Niger821428167125
Nigeria4,3992249503,126
Senegal1,7091463911,038
Somalia1,05418411618
Sudan1,363122181,126
Tunisia1,03244424283
U.R. of Tanzania50919268209
subtotal57,4698,59315,95927,990
Switzerland30,22212,1243,7581,244
Liechtenstein832030
Norway8,0992,6631,090594
Iceland1,801785919
Subtotal40,20515,5924,9421,847
Argentina5,7761,2851,5642,009
Brazil162,69916,22139,719100,811
Chile28,8661,9346,11815,535
Colombia11,0631,9342,6035,684
Dominican Republic10,3472,0393,1684,212
Ecuador29,5595,53415,2536,840
Panama8,4482,1882,3792,669
Peru67,3075,26219,99839,790
Costa Rica79229510097
El Salvador958105173660
Subtotal325,81536,79791,075178,307
All Other Countries131,67726,78038,80955,215
Total of all countries4,063,5251,061,5141,108,6811,149,018

The WTO maintains a data base of actions by WTO members in response to the COVID-19 pandemic which either restrict medical goods exports or which liberalize and expedite imports of such products. As of May 8, the WTO showed 173 measures that the WTO Secretariat had been able to confirm, with many countries having temporary export restrictions on medical goods, some restraints on exports of food products, and a variety of measures to reduce tariffs on imported medical goods or expedite their entry. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_goods_measure_e.htm. Some WTO Members other than those included in the list have had and may still have informal restrictions.

The EU and its member states are presumably in a position now or should be soon to eliminate any export restrictions based on the sharp contraction of cases in the EU as a whole over the last six weeks – last 14 days are roughly 59% lower than the 14 days ending on April 11. Similarly, countries with small numbers of cases and rates of growth which seem small may be candidates for eliminating export restrictions. Costa Rica, Kyrgyzstan, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Georgia, Norway and Switzerland would appear to fit into this latter category. Most other countries with restrictions notified to the WTO appear to be either in stages where cases continue at very high levels (e.g., United States) or where the number of cases is growing rapidly (e.g., Russia, Belarus, Saudi Arabia, Ecuador, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan). Time will tell whether the WTO obligation of such measures being “temporary” is honored by those who have imposed restrictions. Failure to do so will complicate the efforts to see that medical goods including medicines are available to all on an equitable basis and at affordable prices.