World Trade Organization

Global agricultural trade — U.S. efforts at the WTO to expand agricultural trade

The United States has a long history of promoting expanded agricultural trade. It has been an issue of importance to many countries, though the level of protection in the agricultural space has been and remains very large. The Uruguay Round was an initial effort to tariffy various distortions restricting trade in agriculture, cap and make an initial reduction in tariffs, ensure minimum market access, cap and reduce subsidies and more. Future agricultural negotiations were built into the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Agriculture. While elements of liberalization have been agreed since 1995(e.g., elimination of agricultural export subsidies), there has not been success on opening up agricultural markets through tariff liberalization.

For the last seven years, the United States has sought better understanding of the challenges to agricultural trade from tariff implementation issues. See Tariff Implementation Issues, Communication from the United States of America, G/AG/W/132, 4 June 2014.

Starting in the Trump Administration, the United States teed up six areas affecting market access from Members’ implementation of tariffs that need discussion and potential action. See Tariff Implementation Issues – June 2018 Update, Communication from the United States, JOB/AG/141, 25 July 2018.

“The United States of America has identified six areas within the area of market access that further analysis of Members’ current implementation of tariffs should be considered and discussed by Members in order to better understand Members’ current tariff regimes. This includes: (i) bound versus applied tariffs, (ii) complex tariffs, (iii) high tariffs (e.g., tariff peaks), (iv) issues with TRQs, (v) agricultural safeguards (SSGs), and (vi) regional/preferential trade agreements.” (page 2).

While the June 2018 submission from the U.S. looked at all six areas listed, the U.S. has since submitted more detailed papers on the first four topics during the remainder of the Trump Administration, and, on March 31, 2021, the Biden Administration submitted a paper on the fifth topic, agricultural safeguards. See Tariff Implementation Issues — Bound versus Applied Tariffs, Communication from the United States, JOB/AG/147, 9 November 2018; Tariff Implementation Issues — Complex Tariffs, Communication from the United States, JOB/AG/164, 31 July 2019; Tariff Implementation Issues — Tariff Peaks, Communication from the United States, JOB/AG/167, 24 October 2019; Tariff Implementation Issues — Issues with Tariff Rate Quotas, Communication from the United States, JOB/AG/169, 22 November 2019; Tariff Implementation Issues — Issues with Special Agricultural Safeguards, Communication from the United States, JOB/AG/192, 6 April 2021.

The 2014 submission by the United States had flagged the first three of the six issues and introduced the need for analysis. See G/AG/W/132 at 1-3.

“1.1. Market access barriers, and namely tariffs, continue to be an important obstacle to realizing the WTO’s objective of promoting trade. However, no multilateral discussions have been undertaken in this area since 2008.

“1.2. Under the various WTO agreements, tariffs are the only permitted import restriction (other than WTO-consistent non-tariff measures)1, and all agriculture tariffs are now bound. The manner in which tariffs are administered, however, can have significant effects on actual market access. In some cases, market access is facilitated, for example through the application of tariffs at levels below bound rates or through preferential access as a result of reciprocal trade agreements. In other cases, market access may be impeded, for example through the administration of complex tariff regimes or through the utilization of high tariffs and peak tariffs.

“1.3. The need for an updated understanding of the current state of Members’ tariff regimes is urgent if Members expect to have productive discussions on a possible market access result as part of the Post-Bali Work Program. In this regard, and as a start, we request that the Secretariat issue, in one compilation for the Membership, the most recent tariff and trade data available, including on Members’ average bound and applied tariff rates in agriculture, the percentage of agricultural tariffs bound at zero by Members, as well as Members’ global share of agricultural imports and exports. We also urge Members to ensure that all WTO notifications relevant to market access are up to date. This includes Integrated Data Base (IDB) notifications, as well as notifications of regional trade agreements.

“1.4. This paper identifies some of the issues associated with tariffs, supported with examples of tariff application and administration from the United States of America and other Members. The United States of America invites other Members to provide similar reports of their current administrative schemes in upcoming meetings of the Committee on Agriculture (CoA).

“2 BOUND VERSUS APPLIED TARIFF RATES (CORRESPONDING WITH EXHIBIT A)

“2.1. Many WTO Members maintain high bound rates in their WTO market access commitments. However, in practice, these Members oftentimes apply significantly lower tariffs allowing a government to modify its rates in response to domestic and international market conditions. As demonstrated in Figure 1, some Members have bindings substantially greater than applied rates, while others apply tariffs at the bound level. To illustrate this situation, it is useful to consider the situation of a diverse group of Members: Brazil, Chile, India, and Indonesia. These countries on average apply less than one-third of their average bound tariff, while Mexico applies on average less than one-half of its average bound commitment. However, a number of other Members, such as China and the United States of America, have lower bindings and tariffs for all agricultural products with tariffs applied at the bound level.

“2.2. The U.S. simple average bound agricultural tariff rate, according WTO tariff profile data, is 5% and applied tariffs also average 5%. The United States of America applies a tariff less than its bound level for three agricultural tariff lines, all of which are wool products2. Exhibit A illustrates bound and applied rates for several WTO Members to demonstrate the gap between bound and applied tariffs.

3 COMPLEX TARIFFS

“3.1. Another tariff issue concern the use of non-simple (ad valorem or specific) tariffs. These include formulaic measures (e.g. Minimum Import Prices, Price Bands, Variable Levies, Gate Price mechanisms) as well as simple discretionary tariff increases and decreases. These measures are aimed at controlling import competition and limiting competition for domestic producers. Oftentimes, this is accomplished by ensuring imports do not enter the domestic market at prices below domestic market prices. By blocking consumers’ access to price competition, these measures distort trade flows by restricting imports and allowing high-priced domestic products to be competitive. Ultimately, this reduces overall quantities imported.

“3.2. Approximately 30 Members choose to bind some tariffs at non-ad valorem (NAV) terms such as specific (a set value per quantity), compound (e.g. ad valorem and specific in same tariff), or mixed rates (e.g. either ad valorem or applied, whichever is higher). The share of NAV tariffs ranges from as low as 0.2% (Israel and Indonesia) to as high as 77% (Switzerland) of all agricultural lines. Based on the World Tariff Profiles 2013, nine countries including Canada, the
European Union, Iceland, Malaysia, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Thailand, and the United States of America bound a significant share of their agricultural goods in NAV format.

“3.3. The United States of America applies specific duties for some agricultural products, as well as some compound duties. Specific duties have the virtue of predictability and are eroded over time with price inflation.

4 HIGH TARIFFS (CORRESPONDING WITH EXHIBIT B)

“4.1. An additional tariff issue is the use of high tariffs. High tariffs are a particular problem for trade in agriculture, as some Members that otherwise may have low average tariffs reserve “tariff peaks” for sensitive tariff lines. Tariffs in agriculture can exceed 1,000% and some Members apply tariffs at a very high level across an entire sensitive sector. Examples include: Canadian dairy and poultry tariffs (which exceed 200%); Japanese rice tariffs (which are between 500 and 700%); and most of the India’s agricultural tariff schedule (where tariffs are bound at 300%, 180%, or 100% for nearly all products).

“4.2. As displayed in Figure 2, the average tariff within various categories of agriculture is low. The United States of America has bound approximately 33% of its tariffs on agriculture at zero, approximately 43% at 1-5%, approximately 20% at 6 – 25%. Only a few tariffs exceed these tariff categories, including peanuts and sugar (with maximum rates of over 150%); dairy (140%); and some processed products (at 100%). The highest U.S. tariff is for a tobacco line, which has an ad valorem equivalent of over 400%. See Exhibit B for a summary comparison of average tariff rates by sector compared to the maximum tariff for the sector. Understanding which sectors and which countries have the most protective tariffs in place will help the Committee better understand the application of trade restrictions.

“1 See, e.g. Agreement on Agriculture, Article 4.2.

“2 USHTS 5101.21, 5101.29, and 5101.30. Bound rate of 6.5 cents/kg + 5%, applied tariff of zero.”

The 2018 effort by the United States provided additional rationale for focusing on tariff implementation issues and expanded the list of issues from three to six as noted above. See JOB/AG/141 at 1.

“1.1. In June 2018, the World Trade Organization Agriculture and Commodities Division and the Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation organized the Symposium on the Agriculture Policy Landscape to discuss the relationship between trade and agriculture. All of the various experts from around the world emphasized the need for more trade to improve global welfare, help producers, and address the challenges of sustainably feeding a growing world population. To achieve this, they stressed the importance of market-oriented trade as a means of advancing consumer and farmer welfare in all countries.

“1.2. In the agricultural sector, tariffs remain much higher than for other sectors, but have been reduced by more than one-quarter since 2001.1 Reducing tariffs, as was done through the Uruguay Round, contributes to the welfare gains from trade. However, it is important to have reciprocal reductions in tariffs. Indeed, it was shown that these welfare gains were greatest because of tariff reductions from both developed and developing countries. Reductions by only developed countries or only by developing countries resulted in suboptimal welfare gains.2 Further, locking in tariff reductions by all countries can contribute to substantial gains to global welfare going forward.3

“1.3. In June 2014, the United States of America submitted “Tariff Implementation Issues” (G/AG/W/132) to the Committee on Agriculture. In that communication, the United States of America noted that agricultural tariffs can distort global markets and make it difficult for consumers to have access to producer’s products. However, in some cases, market access is facilitated, for example, through the application of tariffs at levels below bound rates or through
preferential access as a result of reciprocal trade agreements.

“1.4. In order for Members to have productive discussions to address the challenges facing agricultural trade today, an understanding of the current state of Members’ tariff regimes, amongst other policy types, is needed. In 2014, the United States of America requested that the Secretariat issue, in one compilation for the Membership, the most recent tariff and trade data available, including on Members’ average bound and applied tariff rates in agriculture, the percentage of agricultural tariffs bound at zero by Members, as well as Members’ global share of agricultural imports and exports. While the United States of America is resubmitting this request to the Secretariat, the United States of America also urges Members to ensure that all WTO notifications relevant to market access are up to date. This includes Integrated Data Base (IDB) notifications, as well as notifications of regional trade agreements.

“1 Bureau, Guimbard and Jean, Agricultural Trade Liberalization, 2018, page 20, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1477-9552.12281.

“2 Caliendo, et. al., Tariff Reductions, Entry, and Welfare: Theory and Evidence for the Last Two Decades, April 2017, http://www.nber.org/papers/w21768.pdf.

“3 Bureau et. al. (2018).”

In the five papers looking at individual tariff implementation issues, the U.S. provides a conclusion based on its analysis.

For “bound versus applied tariffs, the relevant conclusions are:

“1.13. Water is prevalent in all major agricultural product groups. In addition, although differences between bound and applied rates occur for both developed and developing Members and large and small trading economies, the level of water is larger for developing Members and smaller trading economies than it is for most developed Members and large trading economies.

“1.14. The United States also notes the issues of transparency specified in the beginning of the paper. The United States once again, requests the Secretariat to compile information and that Members ensure that all WTO notifications relevant to market access are up to date. The United States further urges Members to consider what other data could improve Members’ knowledge.” JOB/AG/147 at 8.

On the issue of complex tariffs, the relevant conclusions are:

“1.22. This paper constitutes the United States’ attempt to provide a deeper understanding of the tariff treatment faced by Members. In its analysis, the United States has found that complex tariffs are prevalent in all major agricultural product groups (with an exception of cotton). In addition, complex tariffs can be found in both developed and developing Members, large and small trading economies. However, complex tariffs are more prevalent in developed Members and large trading economies than most developing Members and smaller trading economies.

“1.23. Improving access to customers contributes to the likelihood that farmers get better prices for their products and in turn the more production they can undertake. Similarly, expanding access to more producers benefits consumers who have more choice and competition when seeking supplies. More open and transparent markets contribute to greater productive efficiencies, particularly for value chains, and foster competition that spurs investment and technological innovation.

“1.24. The United States again notes the issues of transparency. It requests that the Secretariat continue to compile information and that Members ensure that all WTO notifications relevant to market access are up to date and consider what other data could improve Members’ knowledge.” JOB/AG/164 at 9.

On the issue of high tariffs (tariff peaks), the U.S. conclusions are:

“1.16. In its attempt to provide a deeper understanding of the tariff treatment faced by Members, the United States of America has found that tariff peaks are prevalent in all major agricultural product groups (with an exception of cotton). In addition, tariff peaks can be found in both developed and developing Members, large and small trading economies. The tariff range is larger for developed Members and large trading economies than most developing Members and small trading economies. The same can be said in regards to the frequency of tariffs above 50%. When considering the WTO definition of “tariff peaks” however, developing Members and large agricultural trading economies have higher frequency of tariff peaks than developed Members and small trading economies.

“1.17. Improving access to customers contributes to the likelihood that farmers get better prices for their products and in turn the more production they can undertake. Similarly, expanding access to more producers benefits consumers who have more choice and competition when seeking supplies. More open markets contribute to greater productive efficiencies, particularly for value chains, and foster competition that spurs investment and technological innovation.

“1.18. The United States of America again notes the issues of transparency as specified in the beginning of the paper. It requests the Secretariat to continue compiling information noted in this submission and Members to ensure that all WTO notifications relevant to market access are up to date and consider what other data could improve Members’ knowledge.” JOB/AG/167 at 7-8.

On the question of issues with TRQs (tariff rate quotas), the U.S. conclusions are:

“1.37. The United States aims to deepen Members’ understanding of the prevalence and different methods of administration of tariff rate quotas. In its analysis, the United States has found that TRQs are used by 40 Members, both developing and developed Members alike. TRQs are prevalent in all major agricultural product groups, with dairy, sugar and animal products having a larger share of TRQs than other product groups. However, it is worth mentioning that nearly half of scheduled quotas are administered as applied tariffs.

“1.38. Although TRQs were designed as a tool of access, very high over quota and in-quota tariffs, low fill rates, and confusing operation and administration of TRQs are still prevalent today that can make TRQs a tool of protection rather than liberalization.

“1.39. The United States requests that the Secretariat continue to compile and publish information on TRQ administration, with a focus on deeper analysis of the issues identified in this submission. Likewise, the United States requests that Members ensure that all WTO notifications relevant to TRQs are up to date and incorporate data that could improve other Members’ knowledge.” JOB/AG/169 at 15.

On special agricultural safeguards, the U.S. conclusions are:

“1.27. The United States aims to share this analysis to deepen Members’ understanding of SSG utilization and notification. In its analysis, the United States has found that 33 Members have recourse to the SSG, both developing and developed Members alike, covering on average, 16% of their respective bound tariff schedules. However, less than one-third of the Members have actually taken recourse of SSGs in the last 10 years, applying the safeguard to, on average, 40% of the scheduled SSG lines. Those lines are largely made up of “animal products”, “dairy products” and “cereals and preparations”. Over the last 10 years, developing Members have utilized SSGs to a greater degree than developed Members.

“1.28. In its assessment of Member notifications, the United States has also encountered issues with Members either failing to notify SSG use or non-use, or not notifying within the timeframe specified in G/AG/2. In addition, Members that notify SSG usage lack consistency in reporting the information. These issues may cause confusion for importers and exporters of concerned products and reduces transparency for the WTO Members in reviewing utilization of the SSG in the context of the AoA. Therefore the United States encourages Members to examine these issues and discuss approaches to strengthen compliance with requirements and improve notification practices related to the SSG.

“1.29. The United States also requests that the Secretariat continue to compile and publish information on SSGs, akin to the note from January 2017 (TN/AG/S/29/Rev.1), with a focus on deeper analysis of the issues identified in this submission. Likewise, the United States requests that Members ensure that all WTO notifications relevant to SSGs are up-to-date and notified.” JOB/192 at 12.

Conclusion

There is an effort as part of preparation for the 12th Ministerial Conference to pursue a number of agriculture issues that have been pressed by various Members for a number of years. A number of the issues being pursued are looking at providing greater protections to developing countries. Of interest to many developed and developing countries are market opening measures, although it is unclear if anything will happen in this area with regard to tariffs.

For the United States, agricultural market access is a critical issue to most sectors and has broad Congressional support in both parties. The effort to develop a greater understanding of how tariffs are working in fact started in the Obama Administration following the impasse in the Doha Development Agenda in 2008 including on agricultural market access, was pursued in the Trump Administration and is being continued in the Biden Administration. The U.S. focus is useful to help flag just how distorted agricultural trade remains, the lack of transparency on many issues and the fact that greater market access for all necessarily must involve reduction in tariffs and countries handling all aspects of tariffs (including TRQs and SSGs) in a manner consistent with the obligations undertaken. The U.S. submissions are neutral in coverage and include U.S. actions as well as major agricultural exporters and importers.

What was described by the U.S. in its June 2018 on tariff implementation issues, continues to be true as the world tries to move through the COVID-19 pandemic. As was previously quoted from the U.S. communication, “All of the various
experts from around the world emphasized the need for more trade to improve global welfare, help producers, and address the challenges of sustainably feeding a growing world population. To achieve this, they stressed the importance of market-oriented trade as a means of advancing consumer and farmer welfare in all countries.”

The question for the WTO membership and the new WTO Director-General is whether in agriculture the WTO can in fact expand market access for agricultural goods as part of the 12th Ministerial Conference or whether meaningful agricultural liberalization will continue to evade the WTO.

Because of the wealth of analysis contained in the U.S. submissions, the documents referenced in this note are embedded below.

W132

JobsAG141

JobsAG147

JobsAG164

JobsAG167

JobsAG169

JobsAG192

Global vaccinations against COVID-19; developments and challenges in the roll-out for many countries

Globally there have been extraordinary developments of vaccines to help against the COVID-19 vaccine. UNICEF has set up a COVID-19 Vaccine Market Dashboard which notes that at present 14 vaccines have been approved by one or more countries, that the companies in production or testing vaccines report existing or intended capacity in 2021 of 21 billion doses (depends on other vaccines being approved and companies overcoming any bottlenecks in supply), indicates that there are 10.4 billion “secured vaccine doses”, that there are 3.56 billion doses “secured and optioned for the COVAX facility” and that prices in the market range from $2.06/dose to $44.00/dose. See UNICEF, COVID-19 Vaccine Market Dashboard, https://www.unicef.org/supply/covid-19-vaccine-market-dashboard (visited April 2, 2021). The dashboard contains a great deal of information looking at information on products, capacity, agreements, price and delivery.

The COVAX facility, administered by Gavi, put out in early March the first round of allocation of vaccine doses procured for low- and middle-income countries and others choosing to participate in acquiring through COVAX to improve equitable and affordable access for all. 142 of the countries participating in the COVAX facility were identified as allocated delivery of specific quantities of vaccine from a total of 237 million doses that were expected to be available to COVAX during the February – May timeline. See The COVAX Facility, First Round of Allocation: Astra Zeneca/Oxford Vaccine (manufactured by Astra Zeneca & licensed and manufactured by Serum Institute of India), https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/covid/covax/COVAX-First-round-allocation-of-AZ-and-SII.pdf . 87 of the 92 countries who will receive doses at no cost or reduced cost are included in the first round allocation (“AMC” countries). The March 2, 2021 document is embedded below.

COVAX-First-round-allocation-of-AZ-and-SII

In an April 1, 2021 update, Gavi notes that to date COVAX has shipped more than 33 million doses to 74 country. See GAVI, COVAX vaccine roll-out, https://www.gavi.org/covax-facility (visited April 2, 2021). While the ramp-up of deliveries to COVAX is scheduled to occur over time, COVAX received notice in late March of delays for shipments from India (Serum Institute of India) in both March and April, which COVAX has estimated could be a delay for as much as 90 million doses and indicated the delays were due to internal needs in India for more doses to support their own vaccination program. See UNICEF, COVAX updates participants on delivery delays for vaccines from Serum Institute of India (SII) and AstraZeneca, 25 March 2021,https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/covax-updates-participants-delivery-delays-vaccines-serum-institute-india-sii-and. The bulk of the press release is copied below.

GENEVA/NEW YORK/OSLO, 25 March 2021 – Deliveries of COVID-19 vaccines produced by the Serum Institute of India (SII) to lower-income economies participating in the COVAX Facility will face delays during March and April as the Government of India battles a new wave of COVID-19 infections. COVAX and the Government of India remain in discussions to ensure some supplies are completed during March and April.

“According to the agreement between Gavi and the Serum Institute of India (SII), which included funding to support an increase in manufacturing capacity, SII is contracted to provide COVAX with the SII-licensed and manufactured AstraZeneca (AZ)-Oxford vaccine (known as COVISHIELD) to 64 lower-income economies participating in the Gavi COVAX AMC (including India), alongside its commitments to the Government of India.

“To date, COVAX has been supplied with 28 million COVISHIELD doses and was expecting an additional 40 million doses to be available in March, and up to 50 million doses in April.

“COVAX has notified all affected economies of potential delays. SII has pledged that, alongside supplying India, it will prioritize the COVAX multilateral solution for equitable distribution.

“Participating economies have also received WHO guidance on optimizing the national deployment doses of the AstraZeneca-Oxford vaccine in a constrained supply environment.

“Separately, the COVAX Facility has informed participants allocated AstraZeneca-manufactured doses of the AstraZeneca-Oxford vaccine that some of the first deliveries due in March are now set to take place in April.

“In this early phase of COVID-19 vaccine roll-out, vaccine manufacturers require time to scale and optimize their production processes. AstraZeneca, which uses a novel supply chain network with sites across multiple continents, is working to enable initial supply to 82 countries through COVAX in the coming weeks.

“COVAX retains its objective of supplying initial doses of vaccines to all participating economies in the first half of the year before ramping up significantly in the second half of 2021. To date, COVAX has shipped vaccines to over 50 countries and economies.”

While there have been various manufacturing challenges in the early months of vaccine roll-outs, the decision by India to slow distribution of vaccine doses purchased by COVAX will clearly slow distribution to many least developed and developing countries dependent on COVAX for their vaccine doses. Since as much as a third of vaccine doses that COVAX has distributed have gone to India, the Indian government has what is at least a public relations challenge at the present time. See India Today, India received one-third of vaccines made for poor countries by India under COVAX programme: Report, 30 March 2021, https://www.indiatoday.in/coronavirus-outbreak/vaccine-updates/story/india-received-one-third-of-vaccines-made-for-poor-countries-by-india-under-covax-programme-report-1785242-2021-03-30. However, with a number of variants of the virus circulating widely and with infections increasing in many countries around the world, the delays are of concern to many governments with anxious populations looking for a path past the pandemic.

In a paper from Airfinity and the St. Gallen Endowment for Prosperity through Trade on March 31, 2021, an effort is made to look at the likely damage to low income countries from the announced delays in shipments to COVAX. See Simon J. Evenett and Matt Linley, Halting India’s Vaccine Exports: The Fallout, 31 March 2021. The paper estimates that the delays in shipments will push back achieving even minimum vaccinations by 60-90 days for many of the COVAX recipient countries. The paper is embedded below.

AF-SGEPT-TL1-31-March-2021-finalised

While there is a lot of positive news being reported (e.g., expansion of capacities and expected shipments in 2021, effectiveness of some of the existing vaccines against some of the new variants, agreement between the United States, Japan, India and Australia to generate one billion doses of a vaccine in India for distribution in the Indo-Pacific area in 2021 and 2022, and the United States hosting a funding effort for COVAX later in April to help close the funding needs for 2021 (after the U.S.’s $4 billion contribution)), delays for up to 90 million doses ( 37.97% of the total doses expected in the February – May 2021 time period by COVAX) to those dependent on COVAX is a significant challenge. See, e.g., Gavi, United States to host launch event for Gavi COVAX AMC 2021 investment opportunity, 29 March 2021, https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/united-states-host-launch-event-gavi-covax-amc-2021-investment-opportunity; March 25, 2021, Global vaccinations for COVID-19 — continued supply chain and production issues and a new wave of infections in many countries delay greater ramp up for some until late in the second quarter of 2021, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/25/global-vaccinations-for-covid-19-continued-supply-chain-and-production-issues-and-a-new-wave-of-infections-in-many-countries-delay-greater-ramp-up-for-some-until-late-in-the-second-quarter-of-2021/; March 12, 2021, COVID-19 vaccines – U.S., Japan, India and Australia agree to one billion doses for Indo-Pacific countries, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/12/covid-19-vaccines-u-s-japan-india-and-australia-agree-to-one-billion-doses-for-indo-pacific-countries/; March 12, 2021, The 8-9 March  “Global C19 Vaccine Supply Chain and Manufacturing Summit” – efforts to ramp-up production, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/12/the-8-9-march-global-c19-vaccine-supply-chain-and-manufacturing-summit-efforts-to-ramp-up-production/.

The WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala is planning a meeting on vaccines later in April that was described in a WTO press release as follows.

“DG Okonjo-Iweala also said that she plans to convene an event in mid-April to discuss ramping up COVID-19 vaccine production and how the WTO can contribute to a more rapid and equitable distribution of vaccines. 

“The event, to be held under Chatham House rules, will include all regional member groups, representatives from vaccine manufacturers from developing and developed countries, civil society groups working on access to medicine, and other relevant stakeholders.

“’The idea is to move us along on our quest to solve this unacceptable inequitable access of poor countries to vaccines,’ she said. ‘At the bottom of this is a very serious scarcity in supply. And how to solve it is to look at how we expand manufacturing in all its ways.’ 

“She stressed that the event would help advance global discussions on access to vaccines. She expressed hope both for increased vaccine manufacturing in the short- to medium-term, and a longer-term framework agreement that would provide for automatic access to vaccines and other medical products for developing countries in future health crises, including a way forward on the TRIPS waiver proposal many of them support.

“’We also need to look to the future and agree a framework where countries do not need to stand in the queue in order to get access to life-saving vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics,’ she said, emphasizing that this can be done while still incentivizing research and development.”

WTO, Director-General urges WTO members to deliver concrete results this year, 30 March 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/dgno_30mar21_e.htm.

Conclusion

Governments are understandably focused on trying to end the pandemic at home as a first priority. The efforts of the WHO, Gavi, CEPI and UNICEF through the COVAX facility in recent years has provided a welcome source of hope for many nations for greater equity in distribution and in affordability of vaccines, including in the last year addressing the enormous challenge presented by the COVID-19 pandemic. Many countries and private groups have stepped up with major funding contributions to make vaccine available. Individual governments are also working to increase supplies globally. Many bottlenecks have arisen with the large number of inputs and the enormous increase in demand that has arisen over the last year. There is a need for continued efforts by governments and businesses to address the challenges and to see that the needs of the low- and middle-income countries can be met in a timely manner as well. While there will be a lot more production in the second half of 2021, there are and will continue to be challenges in the second quarter. Focus on identifying challenges and global cooperation to solve bottlenecks will do a lot to ensure greater global success in the remainder of 2021.

When will WTO DG Okonjo-Iweala reveal choices for Deputy Directors-General?

Today, March 31, 2021, marks the end of the tenure of the four existing Deputy Directors-General of the WTO. Normally, an incoming Director-General would have identified his/her choices for the four Deputy Director-General slots ahead of assuming office himself/herself. See, e.g., March 6, 2021, WTO’s four Deputy Directors-General tenure reportedly concludes at the end of March 2021 — thanks for an outstanding job, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/06/wtos-four-deputy-directors-general-tenure-reportedly-concludes-at-the-end-of-march-2021-thanks-for-an-outstanding-job/ ( “It is normal for existing Deputy Directors-Generals (DDGs) to depart shortly after the arrival of a new Director-General and to be selected before the new Director-General takes office. Indeed, typically DDGs have four year terms that start one month after the Director-General’s term. Pursuant to procedures adopted in late 2002, DDGs employment starts later and ends later than the DG’s. See PROCEDURES FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF DIRECTORS-GENERAL, Adopted by the General Council on 10 December 2002, WT/L/509 (20 January 2003) at para. 22 (‘In order to ensure continuity at the senior management level, the terms of office of the Director-General and of the Deputy Directors-General shall be staggered, such that the terms of the Deputies expire subsequent to the expiry of the Director-General’s term.’). Because of the short time from appointment (February 15, 2021) to start (March 1, 2021) as Director-General for Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, presumably the DDG selection process was delayed until after she took up her position on March 1.”).

With less than eight months til the 12th Ministerial Conference at the end of November in Geneva, there is a great deal of work to be done if the Ministerial Conference is going to be successful. As reviewed in a WTO press release of March 30, DG Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala spoke at an informal General Council meeting on March 30. See WTO, Director-General urges WTO members to deliver concrete results this year, 30 March 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/dgno_30mar21_e.htm. The press release reviews her comments and those of General Council Chair Ambassador Dacio Castillo (Honduras) and is copied below.

“The meeting was called by General Council Chair Ambassador Dacio Castillo (Honduras) to initiate a process of consultations on the nature of the prospective outcome document for the Twelfth Ministerial Conference (MC12), which will take place in Geneva the week of 29 November.

“He described the options in front of members, based on the documents that emerged from earlier Ministerial Conferences: a consensus Ministerial Declaration, a summary issued under the conference chair’s own responsibility, and a ‘hybrid’ document containing elements of the two.

“Members ‘may wish to start thinking about what type of outcome document we might realistically envisage for MC12, including its structure and elements,’ the General Council Chair added, announcing he would begin consultations on these issues with interested delegations. He cautioned that this process should not divert attention from ongoing substantive negotiations.

“With only seven working months until MC12, DG Okonjo-Iweala called on members to “create a recipe for success upfront,” starting with “two or three or four concrete deliverables” in areas such as fisheries and agreeing on work programmes for other items where differences remain.

“She noted that MC12 would come at the end of a series of international policy discussions aimed at ‘examining the lessons from this pandemic and trying to put the framework for tackling the next.’ If trade ministers emerge at the end of the year ‘with no agreement, no contributions to the meaningful issues that are being faced by the world today, nothing to add in terms of a framework for tackling the next pandemic, it will not look good.’

”’My wish is for all the Ambassadors, Ministers and Leaders on trade to come out of MC12 looking good. Looking good means being seen by the world as having delivered for today’s problems,’ she said.

“DG Okonjo-Iweala also said that she plans to convene an event in mid-April to discuss ramping up COVID-19 vaccine production and how the WTO can contribute to a more rapid and equitable distribution of vaccines.

“The event, to be held under Chatham House rules, will include all regional member groups, representatives from vaccine manufacturers from developing and developed countries, civil society groups working on access to medicine, and other relevant stakeholders.

“‘The idea is to move us along on our quest to solve this unacceptable inequitable access of poor countries to vaccines,’ she said. ‘At the bottom of this is a very serious scarcity in supply. And how to solve it is to look at how we expand manufacturing in all its ways.’

“She stressed that the event would help advance global discussions on access to vaccines. She expressed hope both for increased vaccine manufacturing in the short- to medium-term, and a longer-term framework agreement that would provide for automatic access to vaccines and other medical products for developing countries in future health crises, including a way forward on the TRIPS waiver proposal many of them support.

“‘We also need to look to the future and agree a framework where countries do not need to stand in the queue in order to get access to life-saving vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics,’ she said, emphasizing that this can be done while still incentivizing research and development.”

Obviously, having a full team, including the four Deputy Directors-General, on board to help facilitate work by Members on items of interest to the Members will be critical to permitting the Secretariat to support the WTO Members in their work in these coming months.

In a prior post, I had suggested the need for DG Okonjo-Iweala to pick a team that respects the historical geographical distribution of positions but also to pick individuals with sufficient trade and political gravitas to help the DG achieve the range of initiatives facing the WTO. See February 13, 2021, Leadership change at the WTO — with Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala’s arrival next week, what support team and early changes in the role of the Secretariat could help WTO Members move forward?, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/02/13/leadership-change-at-the-wto-with-dr-ngozi-okonjo-iwealas-arrival-next-week-what-support-team-and-early-changes-in-the-role-of-the-secretariat-could-help-wto-members-move-forward/.

Press reports have indicated that there is, as there always is, a lot of lobbying by Members, on the composition of the Deputy Directors-General. Hopefully DG Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala will announce the new DDGs soon. The Director-General faces many issues with a deeply divided membership. A strong team including at the DDG level will improve the chances that the Secretariat can help the messy process of Member negotiations and moving to reform.

China and the WTO – remarks by Dennis C. Shea to the Coalition for a Prosperous America

On March 26, 2021, the former Deputy USTR in Geneva during the Trump Administration, Amb. Dennis C. Shea, spoke to the Coalition for a Prosperous America. While the remarks were made in his individual capacity, the remarks reviewed the challenges for the World Trade Organization remaining relevant with the current activities of the People’s Republic of China. His remarks, entitled “Three hard truths” can be found on his linkedin page. See Remarks to CPA, 3.26.2021, https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6781608096750956544/?updateEntityUrn=urn%3Ali%3Afs_feedUpdate%3A%28V2%2Curn%3Ali%3Aactivity%3A6781608096750956544%29.

The three hard truths from his remarks are copied below.

“The first of these hard truths is that China’s economic system – with its unique melding of public, private, and Chinese Communist Party resources, all harnessed to advance industrial policy objectives – is incompatible with the WTO norms of market orientation, transparency, non-discrimination, and reciprocity.”

“The second hard truth is that the WTO has proven itself incapable of restraining the trade disruptive activities of the Chinese non-market economic system.”

“The third hard truth is that China does not want change at the WTO.”

Amb. Shea reviews in some detail the actions of China post-accession to move away from market reforms that trading partners expected from China’s accession to the WTO and why such actions frustrate the proper functioning of the WTO. He also reviews China’s willingness to retaliate against trading partners for their legitimate use of WTO rights and to punish trading partners for comments China views as against their interests. The import bans against Australian products when Australia urged an independent investigation into the source of the COVID-19 virus is one example mentioned. Finally, on the issue of not wanting change at the WTO, Amb. Shea reviews China’s opposition to every reform issue raised by the United States.

Amb. Shea’s remarks are worth a close read. While he doesn’t address a road forward, his well founded concerns about China’s role in the trading system and its incompatible economic system with WTO rules bring to mind a piece by a former EC Director General for Trade, Mogens Peter Carl which I reviewed in an earlier post. See July 25, 2020, A new WTO without China?  The July 20, 2020 Les Echos opinion piece by Mogens Peter Carl, a former EC Director General for Trade and then Environment, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/07/25/a-new-wto-without-china-the-july-20-2020-les-echos-opinion-piece-by-mogens-peter-carl-a-former-ec-director-general-for-trade-and-then-environment/ . I reproduce much of that post below.

“Earlier this week (July 20), a former EC Director General for Trade, Peter Carl, penned an opinion piece in Les Echos with the provocative title, “A new WTO is needed without China” (literally A new WTO must see the day without China). https://www.lesechos.fr/idees-debats/cercle/opinion-une-nouvelle-omc-doit-voir-le-jour-sans-la-chine-1224748.

“Mr. Carl indicates in the opinion piece that ‘Europe’s trade policy has stagnated for twenty years. It no longer meets the demands of today’s world and the European public attributes the loss of millions of jobs to China.’ (all quotes from the opinion piece are informal translations by Google Translate ). The opinion is remarkable as it comes from a former senior EC trade official.

“‘Our policy is outdated and based on an outdated ideology that is identical to what it was before the arrival of China on the world state, after its accession to the WTO in 2001. Its centralized economy, its powerful industrial policy in all the key sectors, its enormous state subsidies, combined with a government apparatus and a political repression as powerful as those of the ex-USSR, swept large swathes of European and American industry. However, we act as if we were in the heyday of the 1990s, when our main competitors were other market economies, Japan, Korea, the United States. Our inaction resembles the ostrich policy and unilateral pacifism of the 1930s. We know the results. We must therefore protect our liberal economies and our open societies against adversaries. This requires a fundamental review of the trade policy of the European Union and the WTO.’

“Mr. Carl calls for a complete reform of the WTO with the EU teaming up with the U.S. and other like-minded Members but recognizes that meaningful reform will be blocked by China. ‘The solution: withdraw from the WTO and create a new international trade organization without China. Most countries would follow our example. We would return to an open world economic order between market economy countries sharing the same ideas, on the basis of clear and reinforced principles in favor of the free market.’ Mr. Carl advocates for the adoption of rules that would deal with ‘abuses’ of the China model including improved subsidy disciplines and ‘rules against social, environmental dumping and inaction on climate change.’ Such new rules are needed to permit the EU to green its economy.

“Mr. Carl, addressing concerns that his proposal represents a turn to managed trade, says simply that ‘This is what we already have, although only China manages it, and we are suffering the consequences.’

“That Mr. Carl felt the need to publish such a strongly worded opinion shows the underlying and growing tensions felt by major trading partners from a major economic power with a fundamentally different economic system than that pursued by the historic major players in world trade.

“For WTO Members and their businesses and workers, the rising discontent by many with the functioning of the WTO and its ability to achieve meaningful reform should be a wake-up call. The WTO to be relevant must have rules that address the world in the 21st century. The WTO must also be able to have Members assume increased responsibilities as their stage of economic development evolves. Similarly, the WTO must confront whether existing rules can be modified to generate greater coverage of practices by different types of economic systems. If not, the WTO must consider whether it can survive where all Members don’t follow similar economic systems.

“Unfortunately, there appears little likelihood that many of these critical reforms will be addressed in the coming years. China has objected to WTO Members trying to modify existing agreements to address distortions caused by China’s economic system. China has also objected to the U.S. effort to have Members consider whether WTO rules require Members to operate market-economy based systems. China and others have objected to U.S. efforts to define ‘developing country’ and effectively have Members take on obligations commensurate to their stage of economic development. Stated differently, China is working hard to defend the status quo and prevent consideration of reforms that would achieve greater balance among all WTO Members.

“While USTR Lighthizer and others have said that if the WTO didn’t exist, it would have to be created, Mr. Carl’s opinion suggests that one option that may take on greater appeal is the withdrawal from the WTO and the creation of a new international trade regime among countries with similar economic systems. Such a move away from the WTO would certainly involve enormous economic upheaval and political tensions. The more desirable course of action is to achieve timely reform of the WTO so that all Members feel the system achieves reasonable reciprocity.

“Time will tell whether WTO Members find a path forward or whether the WTO becomes less and less relevant and even ceases to function. In a Member driven organization, the answer lies with the membership.”

The WTO now has a new Director-General who is working to see if Members can achieve breakthroughs on the existing fisheries subsidies, make significant progress on Joint Statement Initiatives, while encouraging Members to limit export restraints on medical goods needed to address the COVID-19 pandemic, promote rapid return to trade growth post pandemic, and work on WTO reform.

The Biden Administration has a desire to work with trading partners in multilateral organizations like the WTO and has articulated the need of allies to work together to address problems caused by non-market economies like China. While the Biden Administration will certainly pursue WTO reform, Amb. Shea’s final paragraph of his remarks is on point.

“The Biden Administration has made working with friends and allies a hallmark of its diplomatic approach, particularly when it comes to China. When the Administration brings this approach to the WTO, I sincerely hope our friends and allies will appreciate the gravity of the moment and what’s at stake.”

The 8-9 March “Global C19 Vaccine Supply Chain and Manufacturing Summit” — Efforts to Ramp-Up Production

On Monday and Tuesday of this week, the Chatham House hosted an event that was”sponsored by COVAX (the COVID-19 vaccine initiative led by the World Health Organization, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance), together with the Developing Countries Vaccine Manufacturers Network (DCVMN), the Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO), and the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA).” WTO, DG calls on COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers to increase production in developing countries, March 9, 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/dgno_09mar21_e.htm. Because the event was conducted under Chatham House rules, the information available is from the participants’ releases.

The participants had a document and apendix to provide some factual background to help the discussion. “Towards Vaccinating the World: Landscape of Current COVID-19 Supply Chain and Manufacturing Capacity, Potential Challenges. Initial Responses, and Possible “Solution Space” — a Discussion Document” is the 28 page background document. It is accompanied by a 12 page Appendix. The introduction provides a useful overview of efforts to address the COVID-19 pandemic and the areas for discussion at the meeting. The introduction is copied below and is followed by both the background document and appendix being embedded.

Introduction

“I feel like I didn’t just get a vaccine, I got a shot of hope. It’s hope that this is the beginning of the end of this terrible pandemic.” – Dr Hagan, Frontline Worker1

“With over 2.6 million deaths as of 3rd March 2021,2 and economic cost estimated at 5-14 trillion USD per year3 due to COVID-19, mitigating the pandemic is a paramount global priority and vaccines are a critical part of the solution.

“Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the world has seen unprecedented progress in vaccine development, manufacturing ramp-up, and deployment. Within a record time of less than a year, 11 vaccines are already in clinical use in the countries where they obtained approval (often with emergency/limited authorisation), more than 80 additional candidates are in clinical trials, and hundreds of candidates are in the pre-clinical phase. At the same time, vaccine manufacturers and suppliers of vaccine components are scaling up for COVID-19 vaccine production from zero to billions of doses, with an announced cumulative supply target of up to 14 billion doses by the end of 2021. This represents three to four times the pre-COVID-19 annual global demand for all vaccines of 3.5-5.5 billion.4 The impact of these efforts is starting to be seen, with over 270 million people globally vaccinated as of 3rd March 2021.5

“The increase in capacity is remarkable because of the complexity of vaccine manufacturing processes that require specific know-how and equipment. It usually takes more than five years to build manufacturing capacity and 18-30 months to transfer production to other sites or manufacturers.6 The use of new technologies such as mRNA in response to COVID-19 poses additional challenges because no large-scale manufacturing capacity nor specific raw materials existed at the outset of the pandemic. COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers ramped up their own manufacturing in parallel to clinical development (“scale-up”) in response to this challenge. They also formed more than 150 partnerships7 with contract development and manufacturing organisations (CDMOs) and other multinational biopharmaceutical companies to transfer their technology and increase their overall production (“scale-out”). Notwithstanding these efforts, the strain on manufacturing capacities and capabilities is very high, in light of the immediacy and scale of the demand, which may be exacerbated further if a broader coverage of the population is needed and if boosters are needed due to waning efficacy and need to protect from new variants.

“However, it has become apparent that many COVID-19 vaccine input supplies of raw and packaging materials, consumables and equipment are in short supply which may result in several COVID-19 vaccine manufactures not being able to meet their current vaccine manufacturing commitments. Such shortages will also impact the ability to manufacture other lifesaving vaccines and biologics. Mechanisms to ensure input supplies for current and increased manufacturing capacity intent need to be put in place with short, medium and long-term solutions.

“Supply of COVID-19 vaccines will more than double the annual volume of vaccines procured via UNICEF. These additional COVID-19 vaccine needs from manufacturers of routine vaccines and other essential supplies is of concern to UNICEF. There is a need for expanded manufacturing capacity while building on existing mechanisms to sustain and scale current investments that the Vaccine Alliance has achieved thus far.

“The summit will evaluate all potential bottlenecks of supply chain for input supplies, from manufacturing, through procurement, export, delivery and use of the materials for COVID-19 vaccine manufacture. It is of paramount importance to anticipate, understand, and establish an open dialogue with all stakeholders to find and implement additional short-term and sustainable solutions to the inevitable supply chain challenges.

“For this reason, Chatham House – with co-sponsorship from COVAX (CEPI, Gavi, WHO, UNICEF), IFPMA, BIO, and DCVMN – has convened the COVID-19 Vaccine Manufacturing and Supply Chain Summit with key public, private, and other vaccine stakeholders on 8th and 9th March 2021, to explore the emerging input supply challenges in depth and to start to work towards strategies to avoid or mitigate them. The main goals of the Summit are:

“▪ Help to identify and define the most critical bottlenecks across the supply network for a diverse array of COVID-19 vaccines with an emphasis on input supply

“▪ Provide a platform to explore a range of solutions to address bottlenecks.

“▪ Lead to a series of recommendations, and ideally commitments, on the priority areas for monitoring and/or action.

“Today, the only element that can be predicted about the future is its high degree of uncertainty. The objective of this document is to provide a structured fact base to serve as background for participants, not to attempt to predict any aspect of the future course of this pandemic. This fact base builds on perspectives and information developed and provided by Summit conveners and participants. Given the rapid pace of events in this space, it should be considered as a ‘best effort’ guide towards a high-level analysis and assessment of the state of play today but it is unlikely to be complete and may have omissions. Any estimates should be validated before being used for decision-making. The discussion document should be viewed as a discussion guide for participants and is structured into the following sections:

“1. Introduction to Vaccine Manufacturing and Supply Chain

“2. COVID-19 Vaccine Supply and Demand Overview

“3. Input Supply Challenges

“4. Manufacturing Capacity and Interdependencies beyond COVID-19 Vaccine

“5. Overview of Potential Solutions for Discussion

“6. Moving to Action

In parallel to the Chatham House Summit, many discussions are ongoing on how further to increase available manufacturing capacity of vaccine drug substance/drug product and accelerate technology transfer.

The purpose of this Summit, and this discussion document, is not aimed to identify or assign responsibility. COVID-19 is an exceptional crisis with unforeseen and shifting challenges. The aim is to bring stakeholders together to understand and align on how to move forward together leveraging their combined capabilities to optimise access to vaccines against COVID-19 for good of the world.

“1 New York Times, ‘A Shot of Hope’: What the Vaccine Is Like for Frontline Doctors and Nurses. 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/14/us/coronavirus-vaccine-doctors-nurses.html

“2 WHO; Economist

“3 Airfinity; IMF

“4 WHO Global Vaccine Market Report 2019, 2020. http://who.int/immunization/programmes_systems/procurement/mi4a/platform/module2/2019_ Global_Vaccine_Market_Report.pdf?ua=1#:~:text=Global%20market%20volumes%20increased%20approximately,large-scale%20campaigns%20in%20India.

“5 WHO, WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard. https://covid19.who.int/; Bloomberg, COVID-19 Vaccine tracker. https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-vaccine-tracker-global-distribution/

“6 McKinsey & Company, Why tech transfer may be critical to beating COVID-19. 2020. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/why-tech-transfer-may-be-critical-to-beating-covid-19

“7 Airfinity”

Summit_Landscape_Discussion_Document

Summit_Landscape_Discussion_Document_Appendix

The background paper is useful by pulling together information on demand, likely production, a review of the challenges in supply chains, and the fact that globally only 3% of likely 2021 vaccines had been manufactured by March 3, 2021, meaning there are huge production increases coming in the remaining ten months driven by more vaccines being approved for use by countries and the WTO. Several exhibits from the report are copied below (Exhibit 2, page 7; Exhibit 5, page 12; Exhibit 6, page 14; Exhibit 7, page 16) and show the distribution of manufacturers with approved vaccines or vaccines in third stage trials, projected supply under three scenarios, input supply bottleneck issues, and a “summary of major supply challenges and drivers”.

There was a joint press release which is embedded below. See Global C19 Vaccine Supply Chain and Manufacturing Summit Press Release, March 9, 2021, https://www.dcvmn.org/IMG/pdf/global_covid-19_vaccine_supply_chain_manufacturing_summit_press_release_1_.pdf.

global_covid-19_vaccine_supply_chain_manufacturing_summit_press_release_1_

Several paragraphs on the first page review the supply chain issues and then review areas for potential additional work. Because of their importance, they are copied below (emphasis added).

“Vaccine manufacturers and upstream suppliers are increasingly reporting shortages of raw and packaging materials, critical consumables, and equipment. Over time such shortages, if left unaddressed, will lead to shortages of vaccines and impact delivery commitments. Such shortages will also impact the ability to manufacture other lifesaving vaccines and biologics. Preventing bottlenecks in the system requires among others: addressing export restrictions, immediate easing and facilitation of access to raw materials and upstream supplies; regulatory prioritization of validation of supply, batch release and achieving greater visibility on vaccines demand forecasts to enable upstream suppliers to do better supply planning.

“All stakeholders agreed there is a need to expand capacity and in a way that promotes equitable access and leaves no one behind. Other approaches were discussed including:

“1. Free flow of goods and workforce;

“2. Continue technology transfer and manufacturing partnerships between innovators and manufacturers to scale up and scale out COVID19 vaccine capacity;

“3. Better demand forecasting and inventory management of raw materials and critical consumables;

“4. Support from the highest political level is needed;

“5. Value of regulatory harmonization and streamlining to accelerate manufacturing capacity and supply;

“6. Better production, demand and supply, forecast and visibility;

“7. Give consideration to the potential impacts of COVID-19 production on non-COVID products

The quotes from the six organizations participating fell along predictable lines — CEPI’s CEO focused on the need to address bottlenecks to ensure delivery of supplies; IFPMA’s DG reviewed the huge build up of capabilities and need to address bottlenecks while recognizing the need to continue to expand capacity; the CEO of GAVI viewed the event as “an important step in building the global consensus needed to solve the bottlenecks and supply constraints”; the WHO’s chief scientist focused on equitable distribution and in the “longer term more sustainable approach will be to enable technology transfer to manufacturing sites in LMICs that have the capacity”; the President and CEO of BIO noted that “We must invest across all of the ecosystem to ensure that there is not only manufacturing capacity but also increasing amounts of the vital production supplies needed for that capacity”; the President of the DCVMN focused on expanding production in developing countries, “Global products, local manufacturing, and leave no one behind.”

The WTO’s Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala who is a former Chair of GAVI, spoke to the participants on March 9 urging licensing and partnerships with vaccine manufacturers in developing countries and repeating her themes of recent days of focusing on ending or phasing out export restrictions. See WTO, DG calls on COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers to increase production in developing countries, March 9, 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/dgno_09mar21_e.htm. The press release is copied below.

“Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala on 9 March called on COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers to do more to ramp up production in developing countries to combat the vaccine supply shortage that is excluding many lower-income nations from access. In remarks to an event hosted by the UK think tank Chatham House, she said cooperation on trade, and action at the WTO, would help accelerate vaccine scale-up.

The scarcity of COVID-19 vaccine supplies had led to a situation in which around 75 countries are able to move ahead with vaccination while 115 countries wait as people die, DG Okonjo-Iweala told the Global C19 Vaccine Supply Chain and Manufacturing Summit.

Not only was this morally “unconscionable,” she said, it would prolong the pandemic and cause economic harm to all countries. Instead of restricting exports and bidding up prices, she argued, “it is in all of our self-interest to cooperate in dealing with this problem of the global commons.”

The Director-General saw cause for hope in the first vaccine deliveries to developing countries by the COVAX facility, the global mechanism for procuring and equitably distributing COVID-19 vaccines. Nevertheless, production and delivery volumes remained too low.

“We have to scale up and scale out COVID-19 vaccine production, particularly in emerging markets and developing countries,” she said. Given the years required to build new manufacturing facilities from scratch, increasing production in the short-term means “making the most of existing manufacturing capacity — finding existing sites and turning them around.” Recent experience suggests that repurposing facilities and vetting them for safety and quality can happen in six or seven months, less than half as long as previously thought.

“By bringing more production online around the world, she said, vaccine manufacturers would send a signal that they are taking action, and ‘that people and governments in low- and middle-income countries can expect to get access to affordable vaccines within a reasonable timeframe.’

“DG Okonjo-Iweala observed that companies in India and elsewhere were already manufacturing COVID-19 vaccines under licence but said that more such arrangements are necessary.

“Discussions during the conference had highlighted three constraints to ramping up production, the Director-General noted: scarcity of raw materials, shortages of qualified and experienced personnel, and supply chain problems linked to export restrictions and prohibitions as well as excessive bureaucracy. The WTO’s mandate on trade facilitation, quantitative trade restrictions, and trade policy monitoring were relevant to the latter challenges in particular.

“Because vaccine production relies on sourcing components and ingredients from multiple countries, she said, trade restrictions would slow down production, and make it more expensive.

“Nevertheless, DG Okonjo-Iweala noted, WTO rules do allow for export restrictions or prohibitions to be ‘temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages’ of essential products. That said, such restrictions must be notified to all members. Restrictions should be transparent, proportionate to the problem at hand, and members should provide timelines for when they will be phased out, she said.

“She reported that WTO monitoring indicates that 59 members and 7 observers still had some pandemic-related export restrictions or licensing requirements in place at the end of February, primarily for personal protective equipment. It was welcome that these figures were lower than the 91 countries that had brought in such measures over the past year. However, ‘not all pandemic-related export restrictions have been notified,’ she said. ‘Not all of them appear to be temporary. Not all of them are proportionate.’

“’We must strengthen our monitoring and reporting function,’ DG Okonjo-Iweala said, explaining that her objective would be to encourage members to drop or reduce export restrictions, or set timelines for phaseout, to help minimize problems in the vaccine supply chain.

“With regard to trade-related bureaucracy, she invited manufacturers to tell the WTO about the problems they are encountering in real time, ‘so we can put them before our membership and find ways they can be minimized and if possible solved.’ She said a little-appreciated fact about trade policy during the pandemic is that members’ trade-facilitating measures, such as electronic customs procedures and simplified paperwork requirements, have far outnumbered trade-restricting policies, and covered a higher value of merchandise.

“On both export restrictions and trade facilitation, DG Okonjo-Iweala noted, prospects for action at the WTO would improve as businesses are seen to step up efforts on vaccine production.

“The Director-General referred to the ongoing debate at the WTO on a proposal to waive standard WTO intellectual property rules for COVID-related vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics.

“’Many of the proposal’s supporters are developing and least developed countries, deeply marked by the memory of unaffordable HIV/AIDS drugs,’ she told conference participants. ‘Many, many people died who should not have. More recently, they remember being left at the back of the queue for H1N1 vaccines as richer countries bought up available supplies, which in the end were not used.’ Critics of the proposed waiver, she noted, say it could threaten investment and innovation, and other members have asked for more evidence that intellectual property protections are an inhibiting factor in vaccine scale-up.

“While these ‘vitally important discussions are intensifying here in Geneva,’ she said, ‘the fact is that each additional day the vaccine shortage continues, people will pay with their lives.’ She argued that it was possible to ‘walk and chew gum at the same time,’ continuing the search for solutions in the TRIPS debate, while simultaneously taking action to increase production, ‘especially in emerging markets and developing countries where such possibilities exist.’

“She expressed hope that it would be possible for manufacturers from developed and developing countries to come together with civil society groups, organizations such as the World Health Organization, Gavi, and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness (which together run the COVAX facility), and business associations including the International Chamber of Commerce to find ways to increase vaccine production.

“’We must make sure that in the end we deliver so that the millions of people who are waiting for us with bated breath know that we are working on concrete solutions,’ she said.

“The 8-9 March ‘Global C19 Vaccine Supply Chain and Manufacturing Summit’ was convened by Chatham House and sponsored by COVAX (the COVID-19 vaccine initiative led by the World Health Organization, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance), together with the Developing Countries Vaccine Manufacturers Network (DCVMN), the Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO), and the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA). The meeting was held under the Chatham House rule, so the above report on the Director-General’s speech does not reflect views attributed to other participants.”

Conclusion

Countries around the world are starting the process of vaccinating their populations. The COVAX vaccine roll-out, which includes efforts to get doses to low- and middle-income countries, appears to be on target for its goal of two billion shots in 2021. While vaccine doses from COVAX started at the very end of February, by March 11, COVAX was reporting 28.5 million doses had been shipped to 37 countries. See Gavi, COVAX has so far shipped over 28.5 million COVID-19 vaccines to 37 countries, March 11, 2021, https://www.gavi.org/covax-vaccine-roll-out.

All countries working with vaccine producers have encountered some delays as manufacturers are having both start-up challenges at their own facilities and supply chain issues as reviewed in the background paper used by participants at this week’s Chatham House event. There are clearly supply chain issues that pose risks to current manufacturing efforts and already scheduled ramp ups of capacity. The major pharmaceutical groups have worked hard to develop capacity and upgrade supply chains. They all appreciate that more can and will be done.

There are a host of issues on COVID vaccines that need to be addressed that fall within the WTO’s wheelhouse — control of export restraints, easing and access to raw materials and upstream supplies to name two. As DG Okonjo-Iweala noted, the WTO TRIPS Council is considering whether to recommend a waiver of TRIPS obligations for medical products for COVID-19 use during the pandemic. Indeed another meeting of the TRIPS Council was held on March 10-11. See WTO, Members discuss TRIPS waiver, LDC transition period and green tech role for small business, March 11, 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/trip_11mar21_e.htm. However, not only is the requested waiver opposed by major developed countries and at least one developing country (and hence unlikely to obtain consensus to forward to the General Council), but also a review of the background document shows the complexity of technology transfer in the best of situations. Pharmaceutical and biotech companies are opposed to the waiver and view such action as almost certain to slow the ramp up of production. See, e.g., IFPMA, Pharma delivers COVID-19 solutions, but calls for the dilution of intellectual property rights are counterproductive, 20 December 2020, https://www.ifpma.org/resource-centre/pharma-innovation-delivers-covid-19-solutions-beyond-expectations-but-calls-for-the-dilution-of-intellectual-property-rights-are-counteproductive/; Bio, Letter to President Biden, March 5, 2021, https://www.bio.org/letters-testimony-comments/bio-sends-letter-president-biden-discussing-collaboration-ensure-patient; PhRMA, letter to President Biden, March 5, 2021, https://phrma.org/Public-Communication/Letter-to-President-Biden-from-31-PhRMA-Board-Members.

The Chatham House event was a timely and practical effort to have the major participants review challenges currently being faced and to exchange ideas on how to move forward. Efforts such as we have seen under the Biden Administration to help address bottlenecks through the use of the Defense Production Act should be undertaken by other governments to help streamline the ramp up process for both vaccines and the key inputs and other materials needed for expanded production. The seven “other approaches” identified in the joint press release are sound and ambitious but will require not only government involvement (regulatory harmonization; support at the highest level of government) but also improved data gathering and dissemination (supply and demand forecasts). The size of the planned ramp up of production (assuming vaccines that are in stage three end up being approved and supply chain issues can be handled) as shown in Exhibit 5 of the background document is truly impressive. The addition of more capacity through additional licensing or partnership arrangements will further improve the outlook for 2021 for the world.

While COVAX was set up with the ambitious objective of 2 billion doses to the 192 countries (including 92 low- and middle-income countries were vaccines will be provided without charge) COVAX is serving in 2021, most scenarios in the background paper show the likelihood of additional billions of doses available by the end of the year. This suggests that the challenge may not be production but rather securing funding for the additional doses that will be available and/or movement of additional unneeded supplies from developed countries in the latter part of 2021. The G20 and others should be able to help with the financing. It is likely that doses may be available for transfer from at least some developed countries by the fourth quarter.

So there is a lot that is happening and lots that needs to be done to see that the COVID-19 pandemic is fully addressed. Waiving TRIPS obligations is not one of them.

WTO Director-General Okonjo-Iweala’s statement on International Women’s Day, a broader read on gender equality; U.S., EU and New Zealand actions and statements

In my post yesterday, I pulled some information from a short video put together by the WTO, UNCTAD and ITC that dealt with the issue of priorities for the three organizations in terms of recovering from the pandemic. I also reviewed some actions President Biden was taking in the United States. See March 8, 2011, March 8, 2021, International Women’s Day — statements of UN Women Executive Director,  heads of WTO, UNCTAD and International Trade Centre, and U.S. Executive Orders and Statement by President Biden, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/08/march-8-2021-international-womens-day-statements-of-un-women-executive-director-heads-of-wto-unctad-and-international-trade-centre-and-u-s-executive-orders-and-statement-by-president-biden/.

WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala

Yesterday the WTO hosted a virtual event entitled “Women in leadership: Achieving an equal future in a COVID-19 world,” Director-General Okonjo-Iweala gave an opening statement which chronicles both the disproportionate harm women have encountered during the COVID-19 pandemic but also some of the actions some governments are taking to address the challenges facing women. See WTO, International Women’s Day: Focus on women for a stronger recovery, March 8, 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/women_08mar21_e.htm. While the two priorities of the Director-General (DG) reviewed in yesterday’s post are also present in her statement at yesterday’s event (equitable and affordable access to vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics; eliminating or phasing out export restraints), there is a lot more ground covered in the statement. The women and trade agenda at the WTO is relatively limited at the present time. Having a woman as Director-General can lead to changes in the organization and structure of the Secretariat — which is identified as a topic DG Okonjo-Iweala will be addressing — and can help ensure that women are at the table for all negotiations so that trade policy and negotiations include an understanding of the implications for gender equality and empowerment of women and girls. DG Okonjo-Iweala reviews the reasons women have been disproportionately affected — including being overrepresented in sectors heavily impacted by the pandemic (textile and apparel manufacturing, tourism), being heavily concentrated in the informal economy of countries with limited or no safety net if jobs are lost, for entrepreneurs, being in small businesses with limited financial resources making surviving a pandemic more challenging, shouldering heavy loads at home in terms of child care, and facing great health care risks because of the concentration in medical and essential services jobs, The text of DG Okonjo-Iweala’s statement, which ls linked to the press release is copied below. See Speeches — DG Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, 2021 WTO International Women’s Day: “Women in Leadership: Achieving an Equal Future in a COVID-19 World”, March 8, 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spno_e/spno2_e.htm.

“Ladies and gentlemen,

“Today is my first International Woman’s Day as the WTO Director-General. Given the particular challenges the pandemic has brought to women globally, I wish to focus my opening remarks today on what the WTO can do to help address these challenges. But I am keenly aware that achieving gender equality is also one of the top priorities for the Secretariat itself, and we will find an occasion soon to have a focused discussion on gender issues for the Secretariat.

“The COVID-19 pandemic has deepened inequalities of every kind. Between countries with money to spend on vaccines and economic relief, and those that cannot. Between workers who must risk their health every day, and those who can safely work from home. Between big firms and small businesses.

“But perhaps no divide has deepened more than that between men and women.

“In both paid and unpaid work, women bore the brunt of the pandemic’s social and economic impact.

“Globally, 5% of women lost jobs in 2020.  The employment loss of men was 3.8%. Women have also been much more likely than men to drop out of the labour market and become inactive.

“In low-income countries without the means to offer economic support during lockdowns, many women lost their only source of income. As family incomes fell, many girls stayed home when schools reopened, or went to work.

“Why has the recession caused by the pandemic had such a disproportionate impact on women?

“First, women are overrepresented in sectors that have been more negatively affected than others.

“This includes jobs requiring in-person contact, such as food service and retail — sectors that either shut down or became much riskier. Women also account for a large share of workers in services such as tourism — sectors directly affected by travel restrictions.

“Women also outnumber men in the manufacturing sectors hardest hit by the pandemic, such as textiles and apparel, where factories shut down early in the pandemic in response to plummeting export demand. In Bangladesh, for example, female employees represent 80 per cent of the workforce in ready-made garment production. Industry orders declined by 45.8 per cent over the first quarter of 2020 — by 81 per cent in April 2020 alone.

Second, more women work in informal sectors than men. Women make up 58% of employment in informal sectors, and the numbers are higher in developing and least-developed economies. In Africa, for example, almost 90% of employed women work in the informal sector.​ These women workers are hurt the most because they are likely to have lost their only source of income and been left with no social and legal protection. 

“Third, many women entrepreneurs own or manage small businesses that already struggle with limited financial resources and borrowing capacity. The pandemic worsened these pressures.

“And within families, women continue to shoulder a heavier burden than men. Temporary school closures made fathers step up a little, but mothers stepped up much more. Working mothers changed work schedules, reduced hours or took unpaid leave far more frequently than working fathers. In Germany, 6% of fathers but 62% of mothers indicate they have taken on the primary responsibility for their children during school closures.

“Finally, women face greater health risks as they work more in areas such as health and social care, sales of food and other necessary goods. In many countries, women comprise over 75% of the healthcare workforce. In certain countries (Italy, Spain, and the US), a higher proportion of women healthcare workers (69%, 75.5%, and 73% respectively) were found infected with COVID-19: although work is still ongoing to understand the reasons for this, one possible reason is that personal protection equipment has been designed to fit for men and even the smallest size is too big for some women.

“Even before COVID-19, progress towards gender parity had been too slow, too uneven. Now, unless we act quickly, the pandemic’s disproportionate impact on women could last for decades. This would be a moral failure — and an economic disaster.

“The biggest thing the WTO can do right now is to work with Members to keep trade open.

“As the economic data shows, trade has proven crucial in the global fight against the pandemic.

“While too many export restrictions remain in place, trade helped improve access to key medical products over the past year. In the first half of 2020, while global trade contracted by 14% compared to the year before, total imports of personal protective equipment and other COVID-related products rose by 29%. The value of trade in textile face masks grew six-fold. PPE trade grew by 50%. Trade thus enhanced supply resilience, particularly for those countries without manufacturing capacity.

“The pandemic has also highlighted how the temporary movement of healthcare workers, of whom many are women, has particularly helped the most affected countries to deal with the crisis. Open trade will continue to be key to building faster and more inclusive growth.

“Second, WTO Members must minimize or remove existing export restrictions that are impeding access to essential medical supplies and disrupting supply chains. Transparency on any export trade restrictions should also be improved through prompt notifications.

“In all these efforts, our priority should be to contribute to making vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics available and affordable in all countries. Until we have successfully tackled health challenges for everyone, we cannot tackle economic ones.

“Third, trade can be a source of more and better jobs, and increased purchasing power for women. Overall, countries that are more open to trade, as measured by the ratio of trade to gross domestic product, have higher levels of gender equality.

“For one, women are more likely to be in formal jobs if they work in trade-integrated sectors with higher levels of exports, thereby giving them opportunities for benefits, training, and job security. A recent World Bank survey shows that, for women, the probability of being informal declines from 20% in sectors with low levels of exports to 13% in sectors with high levels of exports. 

“Digital technologies can also help women overcome gender-based barriers to trade, reach broader markets, and weather the impact of crises better. Women facemasks producers in Kenya, for example, found ways to develop and even expand their businesses during lockdowns using growing e-commerce opportunities. Rwandan women coffee producers were able to export their products directly to China. Let’s close the existing gender digital divide and help all women benefit from the opportunities created by digital technologies.

“Finally, all these efforts must be supported by targeted support measures for women.

“Women could be left behind in the recovery unless adequate measures are put in place to address the uneven impact of the pandemic on them. Let me give you one example of how targeted intervention can make a difference: in Zambia, the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) and the International Trade Centre (ITC) helped women-owned businesses selling textiles, leather, and honey to attend trade fairs and other B2B activities. The result: they were able to break into 10 new international markets, and generate hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of new sales. They also expanded their supplier networks, and many of those new suppliers were also run by women.

“Governments need to prioritize women in the labour force and in the home through financial, legal, and educational measures. Fiscal support for women will be particularly crucial. Yet currently less than 40 per cent of all measures taken globally for the recovery are gender sensitive, with only 7 per cent containing measures supporting women’s economic security.

“This is a crude reminder for all of us that women must be at all decision-making tables equally as men. As Dame Graça Machel once said, “…socio-economic transformation will only be realized once we aggressively address gender-specific challenges, prioritize gender equality and women’s participation, and firmly entrench women in leadership positions at all levels in society.”

“The cost of gender inequality is enormous. A few years ago McKinsey estimated that if women played a fully equal role to men in the labour market, global economic output could increase by as much as $28 trillion per year. To put it in perspective, this pandemic reduced global output last year by between $3 and 4 trillion.

“The COVID-19 pandemic is setting women back in all domains of society.

“At the same time, it has reminded everyone of the enormous value of care and other kinds of work traditionally associated with women. And it has highlighted the power and effectiveness of women’s leadership. Although no analytical study has been conducted yet, anecdotal examples show that economies led by woman leaders (e.g. New Zealand, Denmark, Chinese Taipei, Iceland, Finland, and Norway) have outperformed their peers in terms of management of this pandemic.

“We cannot expect to make good policy for all members of society if half of the population is not properly and equally represented at the table.

“Gender equality is a fundamental human rights issue and also an economic empowerment issue. We should all work harder in our respective roles to achieve complete gender equality.

“I wish you all a happy International Women’s Day!”

Additional actions by President Biden

In yesterday’s post, I also reviewed actions President Biden was taking in the form of two Executive Orders (one Executive Order on Establishment of the White House Gender Policy Council, a second Executive Order on Guaranteeing an Educational Environment Free from Discrimination on the Basis of Sex, Including Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity). But President Biden on March 8th reviewed additional actions he has taken including nominating two women to hold command positions in the U.S. Military and putting forward to Congress the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2021. See Statement by President Biden on the Introduction of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2021 and Remarks by President Biden on International Women’s Day (“On Friday, I submitted to the Senate for confirmation my first slate of nominations for four-star command positions in our Armed Forces — among them, two outstanding and eminently qualified warriors and patriots.  General Jacqueline Van Ovost in the United States Air Force is currently the only female four-star officer serving in our military.  I nominated her as Commander of the United States Transportation Command.  And when confirmed, the Lieutenant General Laura Richardson, of the United States Army, will be promoted in rank and join General Van Ovost as the only four-star — as another four-star general.  I nominated her as Commander in the United States Southern Command.  And, when confirmed, they will become the second and third women in the history of the United States Armed Forces to lead combatant commands.”). The Biden Administration also had a press briefing with the two co-chairs of the Gender Policy Council. See Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, Co-Chair of the Gender Policy Council and Chief of Staff to the First Lady Julissa Reynoso, and Co-Chair and Executive Director of the Gender Policy Council Jennifer Klein, March 8, 2021. And Vice President Kamala Harris reported participated in a discussion with an EU Parliamentary Committee. See eudebates.tv, We are all in this together! Jacinda Ardern on International Women’s Day, March 8, 2021, https://www.eudebates.tv/debates/world-debates/australia/we-are-all-in-this-together-jacinda-ardern-on-international-womens-day/ (“.During the plenary session of the European Parliament in Brussels, Jacinda Ardern, Prime Minister of New Zealand joined MEPs to celebrate the International Women’s Day during a debate. Prime Minister Jacinda was one of a number of high-profile guests, including US Vice President Kamala Harris, to address the European Union Parliament for International Women’s Day.”)..

So the Biden Administration has been taking actions to bring women into positions of power in a unprecedented manner in the United States and to embark on reviews to ensure problems to achieving gender equality are identified and addressed.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen

The EU has had relatively strong programs promoting gender equality over time. Like the United States, the EU is looking to do more. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made a statement yesterday at the EP FEMM Interparliamentary Committee meeting reviewing the important contributions of women to the development of COVID-19 vaccines and the actions the EU will be taking to improve gender equality. Like President Biden’s cabinet, EC President von der Leyen has much greater balance in the Commission composition in terms gender representation. See Opening speech by President von der Leyen at the EP FEMM Interparliamentary Committee meeting, on the occasion of the International Women’s Day 2021, March 8, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_21_1017. Her speech is copied below.

“Thank you very much Evelyn Regner,

“Presidents and Honourable Members,

“It is an honour to be with you today, in the company of so many amazing women. And allow me to begin by mentioning three women who are not with us today. Doctor Özlem Türeci. Professor Sarah Gilbert. Doctor Kizzmekia Corbett. Some of you may have never heard their names before. But we owe them a lot. They are three scientists from Germany, the UK and the U.S. And these three extraordinary women lead the teams that developed the first three vaccines against coronavirus. BioNTech, Moderna and AstraZeneca.

“And I am sure that they, like many of us, have fought against all sorts of stereotypes. But this is how women respond to stereotypes: By going their way, showing leadership and excelling in their field. And today the whole world can see that we are all better off when women get the opportunities they deserve. Of course, women are made for science. Of course, women are fit to lead. Of course, career and motherhood can go together. It is obvious, but unfortunately it still needs to be said.

“This year’s International Women’s Day is for women like these three scientists. This Women’s Day is for women on the front-line, and for women in the back-office. It is for the health workers, who have been our guardian angels, and it is for our sales assistants, who have kept our supermarkets open. And indeed, let us never forget that almost 80% of them are women.

“Women’s Day is also for all the mothers who have taken care of their children during the lockdowns, while also working from home. But this Women’s Day is also for the women who lost their job during the crisis. And Women’s Day is for those who no longer want to settle for discriminations, insecurity and unfairness. As a female leader, I would like 2021 to bring good news to all of them, to all European women. And this is what we are working on: Putting women at the centre of all our policies.

“And let me start with the basics. Later this year we will propose new legislation to fight violence against women. This has become even more urgent because of the lockdowns. Living free from fear and violence is a basic human right. And we must ensure adequate protection for all women, in all European countries, online and offline, and especially at home.

“Second, women must be at the centre of the recovery. This is a clear requirement for all national recovery plans. NextGenerationEU will finance good jobs for women and men alike. It will invest in quality education for girls and women, including scientific education. NextGenerationEU will be for all Europeans, women and men.

“Third, today indeed we are presenting our new Action Plan to implement the European Pillar of Social Rights. We have set ambitious targets on jobs, skills, and poverty reduction. These are clear and measurable goals to drive our work.

“And let me take one of them: By 2030, at least 78% of European adults should be employed. And this can only be achieved by having more women in the labour market. But to do this we need to make progress on work-life balance. Ensuring parental leave for mothers and fathers. Investing in childcare and good schools. And indeed creating a child guarantee, so that all parents, from all social backgrounds, can send their kids to childcare and school. And this is what empowerment means. Freedom to be a mother and to have a career, for all women.

“And this adds up to the fourth point, today we are also proposing a Directive for pay transparency. It builds on a very simple idea: Equal work deserves equal pay. And for equal pay, you need transparency. Women must know whether their employers treat them fairly. And when this is not the case, they must have the power to fight back and get what they deserve.

“And finally, women should always be able to reach for the top, including in private companies. I fought for this when I was a Minister in Germany. And I will not stop pushing for gender quotas on boards until we get a fair system for all European countries. We simply cannot exclude half of our talents from leadership positions.

“Having women in leadership position should become the norm, not the exception. And slowly but steadily, Europe is changing. Five EU governments are now led by women. For the first time, an EU country, Estonia, is led by two women, as President and Prime Minister. And you, President Sakellaropoulou, are the first woman to be elected as Greek President.

“For the first time in our history, not only the European Commission is led by a woman, but we have also achieved gender-balance in the College of Commissioners. As you know, this is something I promised on my nomination. I asked every European country to present a man and a woman as candidates for each post. It was not always easy. But we made it. And it shows that everything can change, with tireless perseverance.

“All of this matters. It matters to the quality of our decision-making. And it matters to our daughters. It tells them that they can reach for the top. It tells them that hard work pays off. That they will be judged on their ideas, their dedication and their talent, not for their chromosomes. A gender-balanced Europe is a better Europe. Not just for women, but for all of us.

“And in this spirit: Long live Europe, and happy Women’s Day!”

New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Arden

New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda Arden also spoke to the European Parliament yesterday. Her speech can be found here. eudebates.tv, We are all in this together! Jacinda Ardern on International Women’s Day, March 8, 2021, https://www.eudebates.tv/debates/world-debates/australia/we-are-all-in-this-together-jacinda-ardern-on-international-womens-day/. New Zealand has done a lot to promote gender equality and has leadership in government that is roughly in number equal between women and men. But challenges remain as the Prime Minister notes in her speech including women being “overrepresented in job loss and low paid work and domestic violence statistics.” The Prime Minister’s speech is copied below (headers are from the webpage).

“Jacinda Ardern European Parliament speech on International Women’s Day 

“I’m honoured to see this kind invitation to speak with you and I bring warm greetings from New Zealand. President Sassoli, thank you for convening this session and for the focus on women’s empowerment and leadership during the covid crisis. To say this is a challenging time would be, of course, a monumental understatement. The world is reeling from the effects of the covid-19 pandemic.

“It has had far reaching consequences that have affected every one of us. This is a critical time for us as leaders and representatives to come together, even if it is by video in these constrained times. Covid-19 highlights how truly interdependent we all are, how reliant we are on cooperation, communication and compassion to successfully combat the virus.

“Jacinda Ardern puts people at the centre

“It highlights how important it is that we work together for a sustainable recovery that delivers for our economies and our planet. But it also puts people at the centre of our decision making. In New Zealand our approach in battling covid-19 has been one of inclusivity. The idea that everyone needs to do their bit to protect one another, especially our most vulnerable.

“I want to talk about our population as the team of five million, and we may be a small team, but one that nonetheless has proven the power and importance of the collective. And now that’s exactly what we need from the world. It’s a haunting legacy if the virus drags on around the globe. It has become clear no country is safe until every country is safe. As we move to a phase of vaccination we are not a team of five million, but we are a team of seven point eight billion

“The success of individual countries or regions means little unless we are all successful. In New Zealand‘s indigenous language Te Reo Maori, we say “we are all in this together”. But some have felt the effects of covid-19 even more acutely than others. Covid-19 has ravaged our health systems, our economies, our livelihoods. But it is also exacerbated structural inequalities that disproportionately impact women and girls.

“Women are at the forefront

“Women are at the forefront of fighting the covid crisis. Amongst the doctors, nurses, scientists, communicators, caregivers and frontline and essential workers who face the devastations and challenges of this virus every day. Along with being directly affected by the virus itself and its immediate impacts on our livelihoods, we’re also the subjects of intensified domestic violence.

“Now this is being reported as the shadow pandemic in all corners of the world. Not only by fully and meaningfully including women and girls in leadership and decision making at all levels can we ensure that our responses to the pandemic meet the needs of everyone. As prime minister of a small country on the far side of the world, I’m proud of what our team of five million in New Zealand has been able to achieve over the last year.

“We have a proud history of championing gender rights since we became the first country in the world to give all women the right to vote in 1893. I’m part of the most diverse and inclusive parliament New Zealanders have ever elected, with women making up forty eight per cent of our parliament and fifty five per cent of my party in government.

“Women hold top positions

“Women also hold the post of Governor-General, Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition and Chief Justice, and increasingly holding senior roles in our public service and business sector. And now, for the first time and long overdue, I might add, New Zealand‘s Minister of Foreign Affairs is a woman. She is a skilled, values driven indigenous woman with a contemporary worldview.

“And yet for all of that, we have so much more to do because it doesn’t matter how many women are in leadership, so long as we have women overrepresented in job loss and low paid work and domestic violence statistics. In my mind, that is the true measure of whether we have made progress and whether we have equality.

“As we look towards the year ahead we all know it will be tough. There will be big challenges and demands made of all of us as leaders. We will be tested. We must all do more to support women lead business, including small enterprises, to be part of the covid-19 economic recovery so they can more readily experience the benefits of trade.

“The European Union and New Zealand. We are Like-Minded Partners with so many values and interests in common, we both desire the stability and freedom afforded us all by global rules and institutions, free and open markets and a world where human rights are valued and prioritised.

“As we all turn towards creating a sustainable global economic recovery, my message to you is simple. We need to stick together because we are all in this together. I wish your Parliament and all our people the very best for the challenges that lie ahead. Stay safe. Stay well.”

Conclusion

Gender equality is an issue that needs a permanent place on agendas of organizations and governments to ensure progress is made for half the world’s people. Progress has been too slow in too much of the world and discrimination or unequal treatment can be found in various forms in nearly all countries. It is unimaginable that the world has not progressed more. We can and must do better.

WTO Chairman of the General Council to Announce Outcome of First Round of Consultations on the Candidates for Director-General this Friday (18 September 2020)

The Chairman of the General Council, Amb. David Walker (New Zealand), emailed the heads of delegations today that there would be an informal meeting of the Heads of Delegation on Friday 18 September 2020 at 11 a.m. (Geneva) at which Amb. Walker with his two facilitators (Amb. Castillo of Honduras, Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body; Amb. Aspelund of Iceland, Chairman of the Trade Policy Review Body) would “report to the membership on the outcome of the first round of consultations, as required under the Procedures.” Since 7 September until today, the three Chairs have held confessionals with delegations to learn which four of the eight candidates for the position of Director-General of the WTO each Member supports. After compiling the information received, Amb. Walker and his facilitators will determine which five candidates have the best chance at achieving consensus. The three candidates not included in that list will be asked to withdraw. The five candidates who go on to Round 2 of the consultations will be identified at the informal meeting this Friday.

Amb. Walker will also announce when the second round of consultations will commence. During the second round, Members will be asked to present the names of two candidates whom the individual Member supports. When the consultations are concluded, the Chairman of the General Council and his facilitators will again review the results and inform the Membership of which two candidates have been viewed as most likely to achieve consensus and hence will move on to the third round of consultations. The other three candidates will be asked to withdraw.

The third round of consultations will then be conducted to find the candidate that, based on Members information to Amb. Walker and his facilitators, is viewed as most likely to achieve consensus.

If Members agree that the candidate has the support of the Membership, the Chairman of the General Council will call a General Council meeting at which the selection can be confirmed by consensus.

It is anticipated that all three rounds of consultations will be concluded by November 7.

Today’s email from Amb. Walker is embedded below.

09-18-HoDs-convening-notice-first-round

WTO Search for a New Director-General – Moldova’s Tudor Ulianovschi is the Fourth Candidate Put Forward

The Republic of Moldova has forwarded to the World Trade Organization the name of Tudor Ulianovschi as a candidate for the Director-General post. Mr. Ulianovschi is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, a former Moldovan Ambassador to Switzerland and Liechtenstein and a former Permanent Representative to the WTO.

Moldova, a land-locked country in Eastern Europe between Romania and Ukraine, became a Member of the WTO on July 26, 2001. The bulk of its trade is with the Russian Federation, other parts of the former Soviet Union and the European Union. Moldova has been working to become part of the European Union and has an Association Agreement with the EU that was fully implemented on July 1, 2016.

Mr. Ulianovschi joins Jesus Seade (Mexico), Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (Nigeria) and Abdel-Hamid Mamdouh (Egypt) who previously were nominated by their governments. WTO Members have until July 8 to put forward nominations.

Moldova is a lower middle-income country as classified by the World Bank with a small population (2.7 million) and small total GNI ($11.44 billion). It is unclear whether the addition of Mr. Ulianovschi will affect whether one or more candidates from existing EU countries or from the United Kingdom are put forward or whether Mr. Ulianovschi will be the sole European candidate. It is assumed one or more EU-country candidates will in fact be forwarded in the next several weeks.

Similarly, there is speculation that candidates from Asia (Japan, Republic of Korea) and/or Oceania (Australia, New Zealand) may be put forward. So the total number of candidates is likely to continue to grow in the coming days making the completion of a selection process before the end of August less and less likely.

Mr. Ulianovschi’s biography as forwarded to the WTO is embedded below.

bio_mda_e

In other news about the first three candidates, a subscription service, Inside U.S. Trade has published articles based on interviews with Jesus Seade and with Abdel-Hamid Mamdouh. Inside U.S. Trade’s World Trade Online, June 10, 2020, “Seade says he can be an effective, creative facilitator as director-general”; June 15, 2020, “Egypt’s Mamdouh: WTO needs to find its ‘common purpose’ again”. Foreign Affairs on April 30, 2020 published an article by Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, “Finding a Vaccine Is Only the First Step, No One Will Be Safe Until the Whole World Is Safe,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-04-30/finding-vaccine-only-first-step.

Recent World Bank and OECD forecasts show deeper 2020 economic contraction, need for increased global cooperation

The year 2020 is now forecast to result in the sharpest economic contraction since World War II. This is the first recession in 150 years flowing entirely from a health pandemic. With data collected over the last five and a half months (Dec. 31 – June 13), confirmed COVID-19 cases are more than 7.625 million globally and total deaths are more than 425,000 (with both numbers viewed as significantly understated). The global trend line on new cases continues to rise as of June 13 while the number of reported deaths has declined from its peak and stabilized at a high rate.

The International Monetary Fund’s forecast for 2020 went from affirmative growth at the beginning of the year to a decline of 3.5% in April. A recent report from the World Bank now projects global GDP contraction of 5.2% while a June OECD report shows estimates of global GDP contraction of 6.0% if COVID-19 is limited to a “single-hit” scenario and 7.6% contraction if there is a second wave of COVID-19 cases in 2020. See World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, June 2020 at 4, Table 1.1, Real GDP, https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects; OECD Economic Outlook, June 2020, at 13, Table 1.1, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/0d1d1e2e-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/0d1d1e2e-en.

The OECD outlook data show for a single pass of COVID-19, declines for the world at 6.0%, the G20 at 5.7%, OECD at 7.5%, the U.S. at 7.3%, the Euro area at 9.1%, Japan at 6.0%, non-OECD at 4.6%, China at 2.6%, India at 3.7%, and Brazil at 7.4%. Id at 13, Table 1.1. The projections if there is a second wave of COVID-19 cases are significantly worse for all countries.

The OECD’s projection for the U.S. is for greater contraction than the recent estimate from the Federal Reserve of 6.5% in 2020. See, e.g., https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/10/fed-economy-shrink-65-percent-2020-311212.

The World Bank’s estimates for 2020 are similar for some areas and lower for the United States (-6.1%) but shows China growing versus the OECD projected contraction. Here are the data for 2020 for selected countries from the World Bank publication:

United States -6.1%

Euro Area -9.1%

Japan -6.1%

China +1.0%

Indonesia 0.0%

Thailand -6.0%

Russia -6.0%

Turkey -3.8%

Poland -4.2%

Brazil -8.0%

Mexico -7.5%

Argentina -7.3%

Saudi Arabia -3.8%

Iran -5.3%

Egypt +3.0%

India -3.2%

Pakistan -2.6%

Bangladesh +1.6%

Nigeria -3.2%

South Africa -7.1%

Angola -4.0%

The World Bank and OECD also have different levels of trade contraction projected for 2020 in their June publications. The World Bank’s projection is for a contraction of 13.4% (page 4) while the OECD’s projection is for a contraction of 9.5% in 2020 (pae 13). These projections compare to the latest WTO projections of contractions between 13% and 32%. April 8, 2020, WTO press release, Trade set to pluge as COVID-19 pandemic upends global economy, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr855_e.htm.

Foreward to the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects

The World Bank’s recent report in its foreward by the Bank’s President David Malpass provides a stark summary of the challenges for many emerging markets and developing economies and the efforts of the World Bank in finding solutions. The foreward (pages xiii – xiv) is reproduced below:

Foreword

“The COVID-19 pandemic and the economic shutdown in advanced economies and other parts of the globe have disrupted billions of lives and are jeopardizing decades of development progress.

“This edition of the Global Economic Prospects assesses the impacts of the pandemic and analyzes possible courses and outcomes. It presents clear actions needed by the global community and national policymakers—to limit the harm, recover, and rebuild better and stronger than before.

“The report describes a global economy suffering a devastating blow. Our baseline forecast envisions the deepest global recession since World War II. The report also includes an exhaustive analysis of the outlook for emerging market and developing economies, many of which are now fighting on two fronts—containing the domestic outbreak and its consequences while coping with the economic spillovers from the deep recessions in advanced economies.

“Looking a layer deeper, the report investigates the depth and breadth of the economic and humanitarian storm. The COVID-19 recession is the first since 1870 to be triggered solely by a pandemic. The speed and depth with which it has struck suggests the possibility of a sluggish recovery that may require policymakers to consider additional interventions. For many emerging market and developing countries, however, effective financial support and mitigation measures are particularly hard to achieve because a substantial share of employment is in informal sectors.

“Beyond the staggering economic impacts, the pandemic will also have severe and long-lasting socio-economic impacts that may well weaken long-term growth prospects—the plunge in investment because of elevated uncertainty, the erosion of human capital from the legions of unemployed, and the potential for ruptures of trade and supply linkages.

“The World Bank Group is committed to helping alleviate financing breakdowns from the COVID-19 crisis in ways that work toward a more resilient recovery. Some examples include expanding and increasing the coverage of safety net programs, providing trade finance, and supporting the working capital needs of small and medium-sized enterprises. In the broad COVID-19 response for the poorest nations, World Bank Group resources are being scaled up dramatically and debt service payments by official bilateral creditors were suspended on May 1, with comparable treatment expected by commercial creditors.

“Yet these steps toward financing and liquidity will not be enough. Even before the pandemic, development for people in the world’s poorest countries was slow to raise their incomes, enhance living standards, or narrow inequality. The pandemic and economic shutdown in advanced economies and elsewhere are hitting the poor and vulnerable the hardest – through illnesses, job and income losses, food supply disruptions, school closures and lower remittance flows.

“Thus, policy makers face unprecedented challenges from the health, macroeconomic and social effects of the pandemic. To limit the harm, it is important to secure core public services, maintain a private sector and get money directly to people. This will allow a quicker return to business creation and sustainable development after the pandemic has passed. During this mitigation period, countries should focus on targeted support to households and essential public and private sector services; and remain vigilant to counter potential financial disruptions.

“During the recovery period, countries will need to calibrate the withdrawal of public support and should be attentive to broader development challenges. The Global Economic Prospects report discusses the importance of allowing an orderly allocation of new capital toward sectors that are productive in the new post-pandemic structures that emerge. To succeed in this, countries will need reforms that allow capital and labor to adjust relatively fast—by speeding the resolution of disputes, reducing regulatory barriers, and reforming the costly subsidies, monopolies and protected state-owned enterprises that have slowed development.

“To make future economies more resilient, many countries will need systems that can build and retain more human and physical capital during the recovery—using policies that reflect and encourage the post-pandemic need for new types of jobs, businesses and governance systems.

“Emerging market and developing economies are devoting more public resources to critical health care and support for livelihoods during the shutdown, adding to the urgency of their allowing and attracting more private sector investment. This makes the financing and building of productive infrastructure one of the hardest-to-solve development challenges in the post-pandemic recovery.

“The transparency of all government financial commitments, debt-like instruments and investments is a key step in creating an attractive investment climate and could make substantial progress this year. Faster advances in digital connectivity are also necessary and should get a vital boost from the pandemic, which heightened the value of teleworking capabilities, digital information, and broad connectivity. Digital financial services are playing a transformative role in allowing new entrants into the economy and making it easier for governments to provide rapidly expandable, needs-based cash transfers.

“This edition of the Global Economic Prospects describes a grave near-term outlook. The speed and strength of the recovery will depend on the effectiveness of the support programs governments and the international community put in place now; and, critically, on what policymakers do to respond to the new environment. The World Bank Group is committed to seeking much better outcomes for people in emerging market and developing countries, especially the poor. During the crisis, we call on policymakers to act fast and forcefully: our interventions should be no less powerful than the crisis itself.”

Editorial by Chief Economist to OECD June Economic Outlook

Echoing the challenging times ahead in 2020, the OECD’s Chief Economist Laurence Boon reviews the tightrope that OECD countries face before a vaccine is available. The editorial is reprinted below (pages 7-9)

Editorial

After the lockdown, a tightrope walk toward recovery

The spread of Covid-19 has shaken people’s lives around the globe in an extraordinary way, threatening health, disrupting economic activity, and hurting wellbeing and jobs. Since our last Economic Outlook update, in early March, multiple virus outbreaks evolved into a global pandemic, moving too fast across the globe for most healthcare systems to cope with effectively. To reduce the spread of the virus and buy time to strengthen healthcare systems, governments had to shut down large segments of economic activity. At the time of writing, the pandemic has started to recede in many countries, and activity has begun to pick up. The health, social and economic impact of the outbreak could have been considerably worse without the dedication of healthcare and other essential workers who continued to serve the public, putting their own health at risk in doing so.

Governments and central banks have put in place wide-ranging policies to protect people and businesses from the consequences of the sudden stop in activity. Economic activity has collapsed across the OECD during shutdowns, by as much as 20 to 30% in some countries, an extraordinary shock. Borders have been closed and trade has plummeted. Simultaneously, governments implemented quick, large and innovative support measures to cushion the blow, subsidising workers and firms. Social and financial safety nets were strengthened at record speed. As financial stress surged, central banks took forceful and timely action, deploying an array of conventional and unconventional policies above and beyond those used in the Global Financial Crisis, preventing the health and economic crisis from spilling over into a financial one.

As long as no vaccine or treatment is widely available, policymakers around the world will continue to walk on a tightrope. Physical distancing and testing, tracking, tracing and isolating (TTTI) will be the main instruments to fight the spread of the virus. TTTI is indispensable for economic and social activities to resume. But those sectors affected by border closures and those requiring close personal contact, such as tourism, travel, entertainment, restaurants and accommodation will not resume as before. TTTI may not even be enough to prevent a second outbreak of the virus.

Faced with this extraordinary uncertainty, this Economic Outlook presents two possible scenarios: one where the virus continues to recede and remains under control, and one where a second wave of rapid contagion erupts later in 2020. These scenarios are by no means exhaustive, but they help frame the field of possibilities and sharpen policies to walk such uncharted grounds. Both scenarios are sobering, as economic activity does not and cannot return to normal under these circumstances. By the end of 2021, the loss of income exceeds that of any previous recession over the last 100 years outside wartime, with dire and long-lasting consequences for people, firms and governments.

The pandemic has accelerated the shift from ‘great integration’ to ‘great fragmentation’. Additional trade and investment restrictions have sprung up. Many borders are closed across large regions and will likely remain so, at least in part, as long as sizeable virus outbreaks continue. Economies are diverging, depending on when and to what extent they were hit by the virus, the preparedness of their healthcare system, their sectoral specialisation and their fiscal capacity to address the shock. Emerging-market economies have also been shaken by the crisis. Commodity prices have plummeted. Large capital outflows, plummeting remittances, weaker healthcare systems and a large share of informal workers have threatened their health, economic and social resilience. Everywhere, the lockdown has also exacerbated inequality across workers, with those able to telework generally highly qualified, while the least qualified and youth are often on the front line, unable to work or laid off, with the effects further compounded by unequal access to social protection. Private debt levels are uncomfortably high in some countries, and business failure and bankruptcy risks loom large.

Extraordinary policies will be required to walk the tightrope towards recovery. Even if growth does surge in some sectors, overall activity will remain muted for a while. Governments can provide the safety nets that allow people and firms to adjust, but cannot uphold private sector activity, employment and wages for a prolonged period. Capital and workers from impaired sectors and businesses will have to move towards expanding ones. Such transitions are difficult, and rarely happen fast enough to prevent the number of failing firms from rising and a sustained period of unemployment. Governments will need to adapt support and accompany the transition, allowing fast restructuring processes for firms, with no stigma for entrepreneurs, providing income for workers in between jobs, training for those laid off and transitioning to new jobs, and social protection for the most vulnerable. We have previously called for a rise in public investment in digital and green technologies to promote long-term sustainable growth and lift demand in the short term. This is even more urgent today with economies having been hit so hard.

Today’s recovery policies will shape economic and social prospects in the coming decade. Ultra-accommodative monetary policies and higher public debt are necessary and will be accepted as long as economic activity and inflation are depressed, and unemployment is high. However, debt-financed spending should be well targeted to support the most vulnerable and the investment necessary for a transition to a more robust economy. Public support needs to be transparent and fair. Corporate support from governments must come with transparent rules, with private bond and equity holders taking a loss when government steps in, so that their rewards for taking risks are not excessive. Improving employer-employee relationships should accompany ongoing public support for workers and firms, paving the way for stronger social cohesion and ultimately a stronger and more sustainable recovery.

The recovery will not gain steam without more confidence, which will not fully recover without global cooperation. Confidence needs to be boosted both at the national and international levels. Household saving rates have soared in most OECD countries, with high uncertainty and rising unemployment holding back consumption. Trade disruptions and the associated threats to supply chains also impede the necessary reduction in uncertainty for investment to resume. Global cooperation to tackle the virus with a treatment and vaccine and a broader resumption of multilateral dialogue will be key for reducing doubt and unlock economic momentum. The international community should ensure that when a vaccine or treatment is available it can be distributed rapidly worldwide. Otherwise the threat will stay. Likewise, resuming a constructive dialogue on trade would lift business confidence and the appetite for investment.

Governments must seize this opportunity to engineer a fairer and more sustainable economy, making competition and regulation smarter, modernising government taxes, spending, and social protection. Prosperity comes from dialogue and cooperation. This holds true at the national and global level.”

With a lack of Global Cooperation, the WTO is limited to a monitoring of actions by Members and providing transparency

Many of the challenges facing countries, their companies, workers and citizens are not trade related as reviewed in the World Bank and OECD excerpts provided above. But trade does play a role and for many countries a central role in terms of access to needed medical goods and other items. The WTO, as the GATT before it, offers significant leeway to Members to impose export restraints during health emergencies and in other situations. Where there has been a lack of global planning and preparedness for a pandemic, as has been the case with COVID-19, the world finds itself in a situation where demand for medical goods far exceeds supply for extended periods of time for different countries. The desired trade approach of keeping markets open sounds good and is critical for countries with import needs but is typically ignored by many countries that have production capacity and/or inventories, at least temporarily, as all governments look to protect their own populations first.

The G20 has announced some trade actions they are pursuing to ensure trade remains open, although important issues like limiting export restraints and promoting import liberalization are hortatory in nature reflecting the fact that many G20 members have taken and some maintain export restraints or are not supportive of other than ad hoc liberalization initiatives that are necessarily other than temporary.

Two recent speeches by Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff review what the WTO has been able to do to date in the pandemic (limited to seeking notifications of actions by Members, publishing information on the same, developing a trade forecast), what WTO Members have proposed as potential WTO initiatives (to date proposals have been from mid-sized economies and are open for signature by other Members) and the opportunities and challenges for reform of the WTO moving forward. See DDG Wolff, “The challenges are not over”, June 5, 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/ddgaw_05jun20_e.htm; DDG Wolff, “There can be no permanent retreat from what has been created”, June 10, 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/ddgaw_11jun20_e.htm.

The information collected by the WTO and posted on its website, the information notes on various trade topics affected by the pandemic, the efforts to interact with other multilateral organizations and with the business community are all helpful for Members and their constituents to understand what is happening in the trade environment and how the pandemic is affecting areas of trade, types of Members and so on.

It is also the case that initiatives proposed and actions taken by individual countries to improve the market environment, ensure greater market openness and speed availability of medical goods are helpful even if not embraced by the entirety of the WTO membership.

But there is little doubt that there is not the level of global cooperation nor the leadership from the major players to minimize the global fallout from the pandemic or to maximize the speed of the global recovery.

There is no obvious road ahead to greater cooperation or to the meaningful emergence of leadership by the majors in the remainder of 2020. Let’s hope that observation proves to be incorrect. The costs of failure to better cooperate and for the majors to lead in fact are likely unprecedented and will affect the lives of billions of people.

WTO Director-General Selection Process — 2nd Nomination, Nigeria’s Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, received on June 9.

As reviewed in yesterday’s post, Nigeria had announced that it would be nominating Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. Nigeria’s nomination was received at the WTO today, June 9. Dr. Okonjo-Iweala has twice served as Nigeria’s Finance Minister and had a two-decade career at the World Bank. Her resume as submitted to the WTO is embedded below.

bio_nga_e

The African Union is reported to be meeting virtually later this week to consider which African candidate it will support for the WTO Director-General (“DG”) position. There are likely at least two other African candidates being considered as reviewed yesterday. See Selecting a new WTO Director-General – “the game is afoot”; Mexico’s Jesus Seade Kuri is the first nominee, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/06/08/selecting-a-new-wto-director-general-the-game-is-afoot-mexicos-jesus-seade-kuri-is-the-first-nominee/.

Each candidate put forward to date has strengths and possible perceived weaknesses in terms of the DG position, although the qualifications of candidates outlined in the procedures are broad: “In broad terms, candidates should have extensive experience in international relations, encompassing economic, trade and/or political experience; a firm commitment to the work and objectives of the WTO; proven leadership and managerial ability; and demonstrated communications skills.” WT/L/509, para. 9 The procedures, wherein candidates are given time to make themselves known to Members both in Geneva and in capitals and the General Council meeting to give each candidate an opportunity to present their credentials and vision for the WTO provides important opportunities for each candidate to demonstrate his or her qualifications.

Just looking at the biographies provided to the WTO for the first two candidates, I would make the following preliminary comments:

Jesus Seade has a strong trade background and is knowledgeable about the operations of the WTO having served as Mexico’s Ambassador to the GATT and having served as a Deputy Director-General of the GATT and WTO as well as having served as Mexico’s Chief Negotiator for the USMCA in wrapping up negotiations on the recently completed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement and Under-Secretary for North America. His background also includes time at both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. If he has weaknesses, it could be that Mexico is viewed as part of Latin America and outgoing DG Azevedo is from Brazil, another Latin American country. For equally qualified candidates, a factor to be considered would be whether a Mexican candidate following a Brazilian DG would reflect “the diversity of the WTO’s membership in successive appointments to the post of Director-General.” WT/L/509, para 13. Mexico also asserts the status of a developing country. Should Members decide to alternate between developed and developing (as it has on the last four DGs, being from a developing country would weigh against him. It is also the case that his last direct involvement with the WTO goes back several decades, so he might have less familiarity with current WTO Missions and Member capitals than other possible candidates may have.

Dr. Okonjo-Iweala has an impressive resume with senior government positions (Finance Minister) and senior positions at a major international organization, the World Bank. Being from Africa, which has never had a Director-General, could be viewed as an advantage under the geographic diversity factor that can be considered where there are equally qualified candidates. WT/L/509, para. 13. While the sex of a candidate is not a specifically listed factor to be considered, there has not been a female Director-General and so that may be a positive for Dr. Okonjo-Iweala where other candidates are equally qualified but male. As to potential negatives, her background is in finance, not in trade, which could be viewed as a negative. Just as for Mexico, Nigeria is a developing country at the WTO. If the Members decide to rotate between developed and developing, coming from a developing country would be a negative factor. Finally, Dr. Okonjo-Iweala would likely be less well known among Geneva Missions and trade officials in capitals which could also be a negative.

Conclusion

With two nominees in the first two days of the month-long period for nominations, it is unknown how many candidates there will be in total by July 8. The procedures adopted in 2002 encourage nominations from a broad cross-section of Members. “In order to ensure that the best possible candidate is selected to head the WTO at any given time, candidatures representing the diversity of Members across all regions shall be invited in the nominations process.” WT/L/509, para. 13. The first two candidates are obviously very talented individuals with very different career paths. WTO Members will be attempting to determine which candidate would be best able to lead the Organization forward in a period of great challenges. Because there may be very different views as to which direction Members want the organization to go in the future, the road ahead for the selection process is not necessarily a smooth one.

If it turns out to be a crowded field, it is less likely that Members will be comfortable with a truncated timeline for considering the candidates which will require selecting an acting Director-General from the four Deputy Directors-General. To use the Chinese saying, “may we live in interesting times.”

Selecting a new WTO Director-General — “the game is afoot”; Mexico’s Jesus Seade Kuri is the first nominee

June 8, 2020 is the start of the one month process for WTO Members to put forward a nomination of a national to be considered for the position of the next Director-General. All nominations must be submitted to the Chair of the General Council by the close of business (Geneva time) on July 8. Using a term first expressed by Shakespeare in King Henry IV Part I but probably better known as uttered by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, “the game is afoot”.

There is little doubt that the selection of the next Director-General of the WTO will be important for an organization struggling from major divisions within its membership on direction, need for reform, and ensuring continued relevance while looking for collective action during the COVID-19 pandemic to facilitate trade and minimize the damage to Member and global economies.

In prior posts, I reviewed the general procedures that the WTO will follow in conducting the selection process and thoughts on how to expedite the selection process if WTO Members want to find a replacement before the current Director-General departs at the end of August. See World Trade Organization – Search for a new Director-General, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/05/15/world-trade-organization-search-for-a-new-director-general/; WTO selection of a new Director-General – one individual from a developed country previously reviewed could shorten the process, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/05/19/wto-selection-of-a-new-director-general-one-individual-from-a-developed-country-previously-reviewed-could-shorten-the-process/.

Potential nominees

The WTO Secretariat will be posting the names of nominees and their CVs as they are received. As of 5:15 p.m. Geneva time on June 8th, the WTO had listed the first nomination to be received, Jesus Seade Kuri nominated by Mexico. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/dgsel_mex_08jun20_e.htm.

Jesus Seade is a former Ambassador to the GATT, a former Deputy Director-General at the WTO and recently involved in concluding the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement as Deputy Secretary for North America. Press from earlier today noted his nomination.https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-08/mexico-to-nominate-seade-as-its-wto-candidate-el-universal; https://business.financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/mexico-to-nominate-seade-as-its-wto-candidate-el-universal. The WTO news contains his CV which is embedded below.

bio_mex_e

Information on other potential nominees is from press or other sources and doesn’t reflect information on actual nominations received by the WTO by the afternoon of June 8.

Press accounts over the weekend indicate that Nigeria has changed their desired candidate from Yonov Frederick Agah (currently one of the WTO’s Deputy Director-Generals) to Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, a former Nigerian finance minister and former World Bank official. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-05/nigeria-nominates-okonjo-iweala-as-wto-director-general.

At least two other African officials are being considered by the African Union, a candidate from Egypt, Hamid Mamdouh, and a candidate from Benin, Eloi Laourou. Mr. Mamdouh is a former WTO Secretariat Director of the Trade in Services and Investment Division and now working for a law firm. https://www.kslaw.com/people/abdelhamid-mamdouh. He also has a webpage being developed for any run for Director-General with a media kit. https://hamid-mamdouh.com/. H.E. Mr. Eloi Laourou is the current Benin Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the WTO (and to UN entities in Geneva).

It appears that the African Union will be holding a meeting by video- conference this week in an effort to see if there is agreement on one candidate for the African Union countries.

European countries are also considering potential candidates including possibly European Commissioner for Trade Phil Hogan (Ireland) and Spain’s Foreign Minister Arancha Gonzalez (she previously served as Chef de Cabinet for Director-General Pascal Lamy). See, e.g., https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/phil-hogan-exploring-idea-of-wto-director-general-role-1.4266073; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-23/spain-foreign-minister-gonzalez-favorite-to-lead-wto-wiwo-says.

And there will undoubtedly be more Members considering whether to nominate an individual to be considered in the selection process.

The process is intended to focus first on qualifications, and then if there are equally qualified individuals, “Members … shall take into consideration as one of the factors the desirability of reflecting the diversity of the WTO’s membership in successive appointments to the post of Director-General”. WT/L/509 para. 13. For example, no individual from Africa has previously served as the Director-General (“DG”) of the WTO.

Other factors besides geographical location of the nominee could be whether the nominee is from a developed or developing country and whether the candidate is male or female.

Press has indicated that the EU is seeking a developed country DG in light of the fact that the last DG is from a developing country (Brazil). Indeed, the last four DGs have rotated between developed and developing country nominees. Other developed countries (besides EU members) would include the United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Canada, United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and possibly a few others. The United States has never put up a candidate and is unlikely to do so this time either, but has apparently communicated with Australia a desire to broaden the group of candidates.

As all WTO DGs up to the present have been male, if there are equally qualified male and female candidates, this may be a factor considered by Members.

Expediting the process?

Press accounts indicate an expressed desire to find a replacement for DG Azevedo by the end of August. This seems a nearly impossible objective in light of travel limitations from efforts to control the pandemic, the likely number of candidates and the normal closure of the WTO to most business during the month of August.

But the agreed procedures do permit expedition of the process if agreed by the Members. WT/L/509 para. 23.

It is understood that the General Council meeting with all candidates may be held the week immediately after the close of the receipt of nominations, i.e., the week of July 13. If correct, this approach would have this step occur three weeks earlier than the comparable timing during the 2012-2013 DG selection process when the General Council meeting happened January 29-31 after the nomination process concluded on December 31.

Whether other steps to expedite the process are possible will depend on the will of the Members, limited by the obligation “to be guided by the best interests of the Organization, respect for the dignity of the candidates and the Members nominating them, and by full transparency and inclusiveness at all stages.” Appointment of the Next Director-General, Communication from the Chairman of the General Council to Members, JOB/GC/230 (20 May 2020).

An obvious area where time could be saved would be the three month time frame that candidates have to get themselves known to Members. With travel limitations, meetings with Members in Geneva and in capitals will presumably have to happen virtually. It is possible that governments could agree to a one month period for such outreach by candidates but would require availability of Missions and of officials in capitals with an interest to meet the candidates. If handled during the first month of the post-nomination process, this would suggest conclusion by August 8 (with possible frontloading of meetings for Members who will not extend general operations into August).

If handled on such an expedited basis, the Chairman of the General Council and his two facilitators could do “confessionals” during August to reduce the field of candidates to the one deemed most likely to achieve consensus by the end of the month with a General Council meeting set for Friday, August 28 to permit confirmation of the candidate (if consensus is achieved). Such an timeline would permit a new DG to be confirmed one business day before the departure of DG Azevedo.

To achieve such an outcome, either WTO Members would need to remain in Geneva during August or permanent representatives would need to be reachable and able to provide input during the month and all would need to be amenable to participating in the GC meeting (possibly remotely for some) at the end of August.

If such expedition is not possible, then Para. 23 of the procedures (WT/L/509) calls for the selection by consensus of an acting Director-General from among the four current Deputy Directors-General.

If the full six months to a decision are needed, this would suggest the General Counsel meeting in early December to meet the December 8 timeline. Nothing in the procedures requires a new Director-General to wait three months after confirmation before taking up the position when there is a vacancy/use of an Acting Director-General.

Of course, the objective for the selection process is consensus. While voting is an option, if there were failure to achieve a consensus through the procedures agreed to in 2002, Members could continue to meet with the Chairman of the General Counsel and his facilitators to attempt to achieve consenus. They could also take the extraordinary step of voting although such an approach on a new Director-General would likely have significant negative effects from the imposition of a DG opposed by some significant part of the membership.

Conclusion

As the game is now afoot for the selection of a new Director-General, one can expect a lot of energy of trade officials to be diverted in coming weeks to examining the candidates and choosing preferred candidates. It is clear that there will be a significant number of candidates put forward in the coming weeks which will complicate the ability to expedite the selection process. WTO Members could significantly expedite the process if willing to telescope meetings with candidates virtually and remaining available for decisions and confessionals during August.

We should know in a few weeks whether Members have agreed to a process to find a new DG before DG Azevedo departs or whether there will be some period of time where an acting DG is needed.

The future of the WTO — restoring relevance

The World Trade Organization has 164 Members at present with 23 more countries or territories in the process of accession. Nearly all international trade in goods and services is handled by WTO Members and those seeking accession.

At the beginning of 2020, the WTO officially turned 25 years old. Despite some successes in the first 25 years in terms of negotiated improvements, the WTO set of agreements are largely reflective of the world in the 1980s. Advances in technology, manufacturing make-up and importance of certain service sectors (e.g., e-commerce) are not covered by the existing agreements.

The WTO’s negotiating function has been nearly moribund on a multilateral level for more than a decade, with most successes at the WTO keyed to actions by plurilateral groups of Members (action by the willing). A system built on consensus decision making has been the hallmark of activity during the GATT and now during the WTO years but has proven unworkable in moving many topics forward amongst an expanded membership.

Similarly, the dispute settlement function of the WTO, long referred to as the “jewel” of the WTO, has been in a state of crisis for the last several years and now has a nonfunctioning Appellate Body (“AB”) as longstanding systemic concerns of the United States about the Appellate Body’s operation and adherence to the Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) have led to the United States blocking appointments of Appellate Body members until the system is corrected consistent with the DSU. With only one of seven AB members still in place as of December 11, 2019, the AB is unable to hear appeals (as all appeals must be heard by three AB members).

At the same time, many WTO Members have not kept current with notification requirements contained in each Agreement and intended to help Members understand actions of trading partners and their likely compliance with WTO Agreement obligations. This lack of full transparency limits the ability of Members to address issues and seek compliance with underlying obligations.

With the increased importance of China and other countries with economic systems not consistent with the GATT’s and now WTO’s architecture, there have also grown concerns by some Members on the ability of the WTO to handle different economic systems under the existing rules with the U.S., EU and Japan seeking new rules addressing some of the major elements flowing from the different systems.

The WTO, unlike other multilateral institutions, has a process of self-selection of developing country status. Least developed countries do have a clear definition consistent with other organizations. As there has been substantial economic development of many countries describing themselves as “developing” during the first 25 years of the WTO’s existence, there is conflict on the need to change current classification and/or the need for special and differential treatment.

On top of all of these ongoing concerns, the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in WTO Members acting first for their own domestic interests, particularly in light of huge shortfalls in global supplies and capacity for medical supplies versus the needs of countries facing spikes in the number of cases. The result has been dozens of export restraints (styled as temporary) and dozens of unilateral actions by countries to reduce duties, simplify or prioritize entry procedures for medical supplies. While the WTO has established a webpage for COVID-19 information and provides information on actions taken by Members (either export restraints or import liberalizing), the WTO Members have not agreed on a course of action for all Members to pursue.

The COVID-19 pandemic has also disrupted the functioning of the WTO as in-person meetings have been cancelled for the last several months, and many developing countries have insisted that virtual meetings not be used for decision making, essentially halting the negotiations on areas like fisheries subsidies.

The challenges reviewed above raise the question about the WTO’s continued relevance and as importantly what reforms are needed to restore the WTO’s relevance going forward. The short-term challenges for the WTO are compounded by the decision by Director-General Azevedo to step down at the end of August which will divert much energy at the WTO into the process for finding a replacement Director-General.

Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff’s virtual presentation at a webinar hosted by the Korean International Trade Association

Earlier today, the WTO’s Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff made a virtual presentation in a webinar that was hosted by the Korean International Trade Association. The title of the presentation was “COVID-19 and the Future of World Trade. A link to the presentation can be found here. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/ddgaw_27may20_e.htm.

Everyone interested in the future of the multilateral trading system should take the time to read DDG Wolff’s presentation. The presentation reviews actions needed by WTO Members to respond to COVID-19, measures WTO Members can take to assist with the economic recovery from the pandemic, and systemic reform that WTO Members should consider. It is the last of these that takes up the bulk of the presentation.

In talking about reform, DDG Wolff states that —

“It is necessary to understand what values the multilateral trading system is designed to promote before it can be reformed.

“A serious inquiry into this subject would serve three purposes:

“(1) to know the value of what we have in the current system,

“(2) to determine if the values of the current system enjoy the support of all WTO Members, and

“(3) to address the degree to which the WTO is of sufficient continuing relevance as it is at present or whether it needs fundamental change.

“My list of the underlying values of the WTO has 16 entries. They include a number of basic principles.

“The first two, not obvious to all of us today, are supporting peace and stability. This was the key concern of the founders of the multilateral trading system in 1948 and the central objective of conflict-affected and fragile acceding members today.

“Other values, such as nondiscrimination, transparency, reciprocity, international cooperation and the rule of law are more obvious. Still others are more nuanced, less obvious perhaps, and emerge only upon reflection. They include well-being, equality, sovereignty, universality, development, market forces, convergence and morality.

“A recent addition to the list is sustainability.

“A serious discussion of WTO reform is long overdue. The pandemic simply adds to the urgency of it taking place.”

Not surprising, DDG Wolff’s review of the sixteen entries is well done and presents a much broader understanding of the importance and value of a global trading system than trade negotiators, businesses, workers, and governments generally bring to the table.

I won’t review the presentation in detail as the value of the presentation in my view is in reviewing the entirety. While DDG Wolff presents the detailed analysis as a possible road to a better future, there are issues identified which similarly suggest the need for a new set of agreements. Consider his discussion of “convergence”:

“Convergence

“A corollary of the principle that market forces are to dictate competitive outcomes is that the rules of the WTO are based implicitly, but without doubt, on convergence and not coexistence. If the desire is to have systems where market forces are not allowed to operate and deliver results, an underlying unstated assumption of the multilateral trading system would not be valid.

“Coexistence would require a different WTO. Where there is no agreement on convergence, a new modus vivendi will inevitably be sought. The arrangement is likely to settle at a lower level of trade than the WTO rules would otherwise provide.”

The United States has in fact raised this exact issue with the WTO Membership in reviewing the market economy basis of the WTO and the incompatibility of state-directed/controlled economies like that of the People’s Republic of China (and others).

Will WTO Members be able to rise to the current needs to engage in reform that supports the 16 principles reviewed in DDG Wolff’s paper? The future relevance of the WTO and the future dynamism of the global trading system depend on it.

WTO selection of a new Director-General — One Individual from a Developed Country Previously Reviewed Could Shorten the Process

In my post from May 15, I reviewed the procedures the General Council uses for selecting a new Director-General (“DG”). May 15, 2020:  World Trade Organization – Search for a new Director-General, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/05/15/world-trade-organization-search-for-a-new-director-general/. With the current DG Roberto Azevedo having announced his intention to depart at the end of August this year, the WTO’s Chairman of the General Council, Amb. David Walker (NZ) is exploring with the Members whether the nine month normal selection process can be expedited to reduce or eliminate any gap period between DG Azevedo and the next DG. It is expected that with DG Azevedo having been from a developing country (Brazil), the next DG will be from a developed country. If true and if few or no developing countries put forward candidates, the WTO may face a smaller number of candidates put forward during the one month nominating process than was true in 2012-2013.

Amb. Walker today via email to the Members has suggested May 25th as the start date for the selection of a new DG. After that date, candidates can be put forward by their Member governments with a one month deadline (June 25). [UPDATE from May 20, start date will be June 8 will all candidates to be put forward by July 8. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/dgsel_20may20_e.htm].

As noted in my prior post on the subject, there was one developed country candidate who was put forward in 2012/2013. If that individual, former New Zealand Minister of Trade, Minister for Climate Change Issues and Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs and former New Zealand Ambassador to the WTO Tim Groser is put forward by New Zealand when the nominating process commences, Members could decide on expedited procedures because of their familiarity with the Honorable Tim Groser, his proven strengths, his knowledge of the WTO and his ability to work with all governments and the review of him by the Members that took place in 2013. While such an approach will likely not be followed by the WTO Membership, if followed, there could be a relatively seamless transition with a very strong candidate taking over from the current DG at the end of August. For an organization facing the challenges the WTO is at the present time, such a smooth transition should be viewed as highly desirable.

The Hon. Tim Groser’s Curriculum Vitae in 2012 and later developments

When New Zealand put Groser forward as a candidate in 2012, he was in the middle of his service as New Zealand’s Minister of Trade, Minister for Climate Change Issues and Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs. He also had extended service in Geneva both during the Uruguay Round and in early years of the Doha Development Agenda negotiations. While in Geneva he served as Chair of the Rules negotiations for a period of time and later served as the Chair for the Agriculture negotiations. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/biography_timgroser_newzealand_e.pdf .

biography_timgroser_newzealand_e

He continued in his capacity as New Zealand’s Minister of Trade and Minister for Climate Change Issues and Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs through 2015. From 2016 through 2018, Groser was New Zealand’s Ambassador to the United States and also served as a Special Envoy to the Pacific Alliance. Since 2019 he has headed up Groser & Associates, a trade consultancy. So the Honorable Tim Groser has a lifetime of commitment to trade expansion and the multilateral trading system.

January 30, 2013 Statement to the General Council

In early 2013, the problems facing the global trading system started with the inability of the WTO Members to conclude negotiations, a situation which has continued and, with few but important exceptions, worsened to the present time. The concerns that candidate Groser reviewed in his statement to the General Council on January 30, 2013 as part of the selection process included challenges to the dispute settlement system in terms of timeliness of decisions and the fundamental challenge of the breakdown in the negotiating function. The threat to the WTO at the time was perceived by candidate Groser to be to the continued relevance of the organization. He also believed that while there is an important political element to negotiations, the key is for progress at the technical and Geneva level before turning to senior trade officials for resolution of remaining issues.

The opening statement of candidate Groser from 2013 has continued relevance in 2020, although the challenges facing the WTO and its Members have gotten more complicated since 2012 with the impasse on the Appellate Body, the need to update the WTO rule book to make it relevant to technological developments, the changing makeup of membership with differing economic systems, and the changing economic capabilities of Members — all issues subsumed under the term “WTO reform”. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has understandably occupied the energies of many countries and the work of much of the WTO to help the global economy keep markets open and support economic recovery.

The 2012 statement of the Honorable Tim Groser is embedded below.

jobgc32newzeland_e

WTO Members were also able to raise questions to the candidates, though the time limitations meant that during the General Council meeting only selected countries could raise questions to a given candidate. The Q&A session for candidate Groser is included in the minutes of the General Council meeting held on January 29-31, 2013. See, e.g., WT/GC/M/142 at Annex D, Questions and Answers, pages 46-55. During the 75 minutes of questioning, twenty-four WTO Members were able to ask candidate Groser questions — Singapore, Czech Republic, Italy, Canada, Trinidad & Tobago, Dominica, Chile, the United States, Uruguay, Croatia, China, Spain, Nepal, Thailand, the Netherlands, Paraguay, Haiti, Malaysia, Saint Lucia, Brunei Darussalem, Ecuador, Argentina, Dominican Republic, Japan.

Finally, all candidates were given the opportunity to have a press conference following their meeting with the General Council. The link to candidate Groser’s press conference is here. His comments to the media summarized his main points from his direct presentation and then responded to media questions. https://www.wto.org/audio/2013_01_30_dg_sel_groser.mp3.

Personal observation

Over the last thirty years, I have spent a great deal of time in Geneva meeting with government officials from many Members and with many GATT and now WTO Secretariat staff. I have been privileged to know many of the Ambassadors and other Mission staff over that thirty year time period, including Amb. Groser. I know of no one that I met with who did not have a very high opinion of the capabilities of Amb. Groser when he was in Geneva. The Secretariat staff who worked with Amb. Groser on the Rules negotiations or the Agriculture negotiations are similarly personally familiar with his leadership ability and ability to find paths forward on seemingly impossible issues.

As one friend from Geneva recently said to me, “I have seen literally thousands of officials, Trade Ministers and experts pass through the GATT and WTO in the decades I worked for the system. If I had to pick one person who I think has the capacity and integrity to address these systemic issues it would be the Honourable Tim Groser – New Zealand’s Trade Minister for seven years and prior to that a legendary official in Geneva from the moment he arrived in the mid-1980s as his country’s senior negotiator at the start of the Uruguay Round.”

Conclusion

As DG Azevedo has made clear, the WTO faces enormous challenges going forward. With his departure in a little over three months, the WTO needs a new Director-General who will oversee the member-driven effort to address the challenges. Specifically, the new Director-General will need to help the Membership approach the postponed 12th Ministerial Conference sometime in 2021, hopefully conclude ongoing multilateral negotiations on fisheries subsidies and plurilateral talks on e-commerce. The new Director-Gernal will also need to help the Membership deal with the complex issues of WTO dispute settlement reform and the restart of the Appellate Body, the pressing need to modernize the WTO’s rule book to cover new technologies and current issues, revitalize the negotiating function, and reflect the changing makeup of the Membership and the relevance of existing rules to different economic systems of Members.

While there are likely many potential candidates who would be “well qualified”, the normal selection process could take to the end of the year with implementation possibly delayed until sometime in 2021, requiring use of an acting Director-General. That process could be significantly reduced if (1) New Zealand chose to renominate the Honorable Tim Groser and (2) the major Members of the WTO viewed his strong credentials as a basis for reducing the number of candidates to permit expedited selection of a new Director-General. One can always hope.

G20 Trade and Investment Ministerial Meeting — Meaningful Help for COVID-19 Response and WTO Reform?

On May 14, 2020, the G20 trade and investment ministers held a virtual meeting to consider proposals for joint action pulled together by the Trade and Investment Working Group (“TIWG”) on the topic of “G20 Actions to Support World Trade and Investment Through the COVID-19 Pandemic”.

The Ministerial statement released on the 14th endorsed the TIWG proposals which were attached to the statement and contain both short-term actions designed to “alleviate the impact of COVID-19” and longer-term actions intended to “support the necessary reform of the WTO and the multilateral trading system, build resilience in global supply chains, and strengthen international investment.” https://g20.org/en/media/Documents/G20SS_Statement_G20%20Second%20Trade%20&%20Investment%20Ministerial%20Meeting_EN.pdf.

The WTO’s Director-General Roberto Azevêdo welcomed the Ministerial statement and provided the following characterization of its content:

“DG Azevêdo hails G20 pledges on trade cooperation in COVID-19 response

“WTO Director-General Roberto Azevêdo welcomed G20 ministers’ endorsement of collective action measures to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on trade and investment and help foster
global economic recovery. The initiatives were endorsed at a virtual meeting of the G20 trade and investment ministers on 14 May.

“The actions include short-term responses designed to prevent trade logjams and facilitate trade in products needed to contain COVID-19, as well as longer-term support to reform the multilateral trading system, build resilience in global supply chains, and strengthen international investment.

“The G20 ministers pledged to promote WTO reform and ‘support the role of the multilateral trading system in promoting stability and predictability of international trade flows’. They agreed to ‘explore COVID-19 related WTO initiatives’ to promote more open and resilient supply chains, and expand production capacity and trade in pharmaceuticals, medical and other health-related products

“’These commitments by G20 ministers represent an important collective response to the trade-related challenges raised by the COVID-19 pandemic,’ said DG Azevêdo. ‘Maintaining stability and predictability in trade relations is critical to ensuring that essential medical supplies are available to save lives, and that global food security and nutrition do not become a casualty of this pandemic.’

“Echoing language from their first crisis meeting in late March, G20 ministers said that any emergency restrictions on trade in vital medical supplies and services should be targeted, proportionate, transparent and temporary, and should not create unnecessary barriers to trade or disrupt global supply chains. They also agreed to strengthen transparency and notify the WTO of any trade-related measures taken. They urged governments to refrain from excessive food stockpiling and export restrictions on agricultural products.

“In addition, the G20 ministers endorsed trade facilitation initiatives, including accelerated implementation of provisions in the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement, such as pre-arrival processing and expedited shipment, which could speed up access to essential goods during the pandemic. They also called for streamlining customs procedures and encouraging greater use of international standards to reduce sanitary and technical barriers to trade.

“Ministers also agreed to work together to identify key areas where investment is needed, in particular for critical medical supplies and sustainable agriculture production, and to encourage
investment in new production capacity for medical supplies.

“The extraordinary meeting of G20 trade and investment ministers was organized by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which currently holds the group’s rotating presidency.”

https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/igo_14may20_e.htm.

Because the G20 member countries have differing views on flexibilities needed, already taken, and potential space that may be needed in the future, much of the “actions” agreed to are more aspirational than commitments to avoid trade restrictive actions.

ANNEX to Ministerial Statement of May 14, 2020, G20 Actions to Support World Trade and Investment in Response to COVID-19

The Annex to the Ministerial Statement contains 19 “short-term collective actions” broken into five areas — “trade regulation”; “trade facilitation”; “transparency”; “operation of logistics networks”; and “support for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs)”.

Trade regulation

On trade regulation, the three specific actions don’t ban export restraints for medical goods or agricultural products but rather provide avenues for such actions to be taken.

On medical goods, the action taken merely repeats the prior statement from the trade and investment ministers that any such actions are “targeted, proportionate, transparent, temporary” and “do not create unnecessary barriers to trade or disruption to global supply chains, and are consistent with WTO rules”. Para. 1.1.1.

Similarly, on agricultural restrictions, G20 countries agree to “refrain from introducing export restrictions” “avoid unnecessary food-stockpiling” but “without prejudice to domestic food security, consistent with national requirements.” Para. 1.1.2.

Finally, there is an aspirational action to “Consider exempting humanitarian aid related to COVID-19 from any export restrictions on exports of essential medical supples, medical equipment and personal protective equipment, consistent with national requirements.” Para. 1.1.3.

Considering the number of G20 countries who have had in place or continue to have in place export restraints on medical goods and the history of export restraints on agricultural goods and/or buildup of food stockpiling by some G20 countries, it is not surprising that more ambitious objectives have not been possible. For example, information compiled by the WTO Secretariat shows that nearly all G20 countries have had or continue to have export restraints on medical goods flowing from the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, the US, EU, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey and the United Kingdom are in the WTO data. While China is not included, their export restrictions on medical goods likely predated the data collection done by the WTO Secretariat. See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_goods_measure_e.htm. Similarly, Russia has agricultural export restraints in place and China, India and Indonesia have used them in the 2007-2008 food shortage challenge.

Trade facilitation

The Annex includes eight agreed “actions” under the heading of trade facilitation. Most of these actions are similarly not binding but are aspirational or encouraged. In fact five of the eight include the word “encourage”. Others include language like “to the extent possible” or “as appropriate and according with applicable national legislation”.

That said, many of the G20 countries and others have been taking actions to streamline the release of imported medical goods and other actions that are consistent with the objectives of the Trade Facilitation Agreement.

Two of the provisions under trade facilitation really go to the issue medical goods capacity, product availability and capacity expansions and are noteworthy as encouraging sharing of information on producers of product and also encouraging expansion of medical goods capacity. Paras. 1.2.4 and 1.2.5. As I have noted in prior posts, there has been and continues to be an imbalance between global capacity to produce the medical goods needed to fight COVID-19 and the demand for countries experiencing outbreaks. See, e.g., Shifting Trade Needs During the COVID-19 Pandemic, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/04/28/shifting-trade-needs-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/. If the world doesn’t address the supply/demand imbalance, it is highly improbable that most countries won’t enact export restraints to prevent the loss of needed goods that are in country during surging demand. While neither G20 agreed action is binding, both are helpful to improve knowledge of available supplies and hopefully to expand that supply.

The last trade facilitation action merely calls for G20 countries to “Support the efforts of international organizations (WTO, FAO, WFP, etc.) to analyze the impacts of COVID-19 on global agricultural supplies, distribution chains and agri-food production and trade.” Para. 1.2.8. Many of the G20 are signatories to statements indicating they will not impose export restraints on agricultural goods or urge restraint on the use of such restraints. There has not been a food shortage in 2020, and mechanisms put in place after the 2007-2008 food shortages to monitor food supplies have helped to provide governments with better information on likely problems. At the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic has created challenges in getting agricultural products harvested, processed and distributed. If these challenges are not properly handled, the world could find local or regional food shortages not because of lack of product but from an inability to get the product harvested, processed and distributed. With COVID-19 outbreaks in meat processing plants in various countries (United States, Canada, Germany to name just three) and with travel restrictions limiting movement of temporary farm workers, the challenges are real. Work of the international organizations is important for information gathering and dissemination.

Transparency

There are two action items under transparency — to share experiences and best practices; to notify trade-related measures to the WTO as required by obligations to the WTO.

The first should be helpful depending on openness of governments and willingness of governments to share experiences in fact. The latter action reflects the fact that countries (whether G20 or otherwise) have in some cases been slow to provide notifications or have taken limited views of their obligations to report certain trade related activities.

Operation of logistics networks

The four agreed actions under this title all involve trade ministers encouraging G20 Transport Ministers to take actions that will speed the movement of medical goods, increasing air cargo capacity, improve transparency on enforcement measures and “to abide by international practices and guidelines to ensure the movement of goods through maritime channels.” Paras. 1.4.1 – 1.4.4.

Support for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs)

There are two action items for this topic — calling for reports from international organizations that would look at the “disruption of global value chains caused by the pandemic on MSMEs”; and encouraging enhancement of communication channels and networks for MSMEs, including through deepened collaboration with the private sector.” Paras. 1.5.1 and 1.5.2.

MSMEs are important engines of economic growth for all countries and are significantly adversely affected by the governmental actions needed to address the COVID-19 pandemic. For many countries, the bulk of the response for MSMEs will be through financial support legislation as can be seen by summaries of actions taken compiled by one or more of the international organizations. See, e.g., IMF, Policy Responses to COVID-19, https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19 Thus, the two actions contained in the G20 trade and investment ministers statement are helpful for considering future actions but don’t address the core immediate needs which are handled by other ministers.

Longer-term collective actions

The Annex also contains nineteen specific agreed actions for the longer term. The actions are broken into three topics — supporting the mutilateral trading system; building resilience in global supply chains; and strengthening international investment.

Like the short-term actions, the agreed list reflects the limitations on achieving G20 consensus because of different perspectives of G20 members. Some members like the EU have an interest in pursuing tariff eliminations on medical goods, an issue that the U.S. is not willing to explore until the pandemic has passed. Thus, there is no action item to achieve tariff elimination on such products in the longer-term actions.

Supporting the multilateral trading system

There are seven action items which include WTO reform (para 2.1.1), how the G20 can support work at the WTO (para 2.1.2), strengthening transparency and WTO notifications (para. 2.1.3), working “together to deliver a free, fair, inclusive, non-discriminatory, transparent, predictable and stable trade and investment environment and to keep our markets open” (para. 2.1.4), “work to ensure a level playing field” (para. 2.1.5), importance of interface between trade and digital economy and need for e-commerce agreement (para. 2.1.6), and exploring “COVID-19 related WTO initiative to promote open and more resilient supply chains, and expand production capacity and trade” in medical goods (para. 2.1.7).

These action items will have very different meanings depending on the G20 member who is interpreting them. Thus, the EU, Japan and the U.S. would have very different interpretations of ensuring a level playing field than would China and possibly others. India and South Africa have different views on e-commerce and making permanent no tariffs on digital trade than would the U.S., Japan and others

Still support for WTO reform, global rules on e-commerce, increased transparency and the other issues should help provide some focus in the ongoing efforts at the WTO for a future agenda and reform.

As noted in the short-term actions, greater focus by G20 countries on the supply/demand imbalance in medical goods is critical to avoid many of the same shortage issues in future pandemics or future waves of the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, the support for para. 2.1.7 is potentially important.

Building resilience in global supply chains

There are five action items included under this topic which are positive. These include sharing best practices, strengthening cooperation on regulation of trade (including customs and electronic document management), ensuring transparency of trade-related information useful to MSMEs, encouraging cooperation between multinationals and MSMEs, and establishing voluntary guidelines that would permit essential cross-border travel during a health crisis. Paras. 2.2.1 – 2.2.5.

While these action items could be useful going forward, there is a major omission in this important category. Does building resilience in global supply chains necessitate building in increased redundancy or for onshoring some products or inputs? This is an important issue that has raised concerns among some G20 members that there is too great dependence on certain countries for input materials and that supply chains don’t have sufficient redundancy or are too “global” and not sufficiently regional or national. The United States, for example, has expressed concerns about over dependence on other countries and has been looking at encouraging domestic production of some key products/inputs. Such an approach is not supported by the EU or China. See statement of Ambassador Lighthizer at the virtual G20 Trade and Investment Ministers meeting of May 14 and the statements of the U.S., EU and Chinese Ambassadors to the WTO’s virtual General Council meeting on COVID-19 responses lays out the different perspective on this and some other issues. See https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/may/second-g20-extraordinary-trade-and-investment-ministers-meeting-remarks-ambassador-robert-e; https://geneva.usmission.gov/2020/05/15/statement-by-ambassador-dennis-shea-at-the-may-15-2020-general-council-meeting/; https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/world-trade-organization-wto/79401/eu-statement-informal-general-council-meeting-15-may-2020_en; http://wto2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/chinaviewpoins/202005/20200502965217.shtml. While G20 countries generally all agree that it is not possible to be self-sufficient in the medical goods area, that view doesn’t answer the question of whether supply chains should be changed or whether there are certain products where a country or countries could decide self-sufficiency is sufficiently important to take different actions. From the very different views on this topic, it is not surprising that the G20 collective long-term actions were limited in the building resilience group of actions, and such differences also likely influenced the language used in the third section on strengthening international investment.

Strengthening international investment

The last seven long-term collective actions focus on the obvious need for improved investment in medical goods to reduce the stress on the global system that has flowed from the imbalance in supply versus demand and the lack of adequate national, regional and global inventories.

Collective actions include sharing best practices on promoting investments in sectors where there have been shortages (para. 2.3.2), working together to identify key areas where additional investment is needed in both medical goods and agriculture (para. 2.3.3), and four paragraphs (2.3.4 – 2.3.7) encouraging investment in new capacity, working with the private sector to identify opportunities, and other items. The last action item calls on G20 governments to “Encourage cooperation on technical assistance and capacity building provided to developing and least developed countries on investment promotion.” Para. 2.3.7.

Because many countries have been encouraging expanded production of medical goods since the outbreak of the pandemic, there is a great deal of investment that has been happening, including converting (at least short term) production lines to medical goods in short supply. Missing from the collective actions is any encouragement to the Finance Ministers to ensure the international organizations work with developing and least developed countries to ensure adequate regional inventories of medical goods to help such countries address outbreaks of COVID-19.

The G20 Trade and Investment Ministers Statement of May 14 is embedded below.

G20SS_Statement_G20-Second-Trade-Investment-Ministerial-Meeting_EN-1

Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to infect millions of people around the world and has resulted in massive economic dislocations and the loss of tens of millions of jobs just in the United States. The G20 has been doing a reasonable job of providing leadership in how to address the pandemic and how to help the world recover as the pandemic recedes. The significant differences between G20 members on some issues have resulted in actions being taken that are either aspirational or simply encouraged, as stronger action was not possible absent consensus. But the May 14 Ministerial Statement is another positive step and provides ongoing recognition of needing to address the supply/demand imbalance to permit all countries to be able to obtain medical goods needed when the pandemic creates hot spots in their countries.

World Trade Organization — Search for a new Director-General

On May 14, 2020, the WTO’s Director-General Roberto Azevedo announced during a virtual meeting of all WTO Members that he would be stepping down from his position on August 31st, one year ahead of the end of his second four year term which ends August 31, 2021. His message to the membership was that the decision was personal and was intended to permit the WTO to choose a new Director-General hopefully before his departure and to avoid a dilution of effort needed for the next Ministerial Conference which has been postponed from June 2020 to either summer or winter of 2021. The current Chair of the WTO General Council, Ambassador David Walker of New Zealand, indicated that he would be notifying Members shortly of the start of the selection process and would be consulting to see if the process could be expedited in light of DG Azevedo’s departure in three and a half months. Both statements are linked here and reproduced below. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/dgra_14may20_e.htm.

WTO-_-2020-News-items-DG-Azevêdo-announces-he-will-step-down-on-31-August

Procedures for the Appointment of Directors-General

Since 2003, there have been procedures for the appointment of directors-general adopted by the General Council of the WTO (10 December 2002), The procedures are included in WT/L/509.

The timeline laid out in the procedures calls for the process to start nine months prior to the “expiry of the term of an incumbent Director-General.” WT/L/509, para. 7. So the current situation will either run over beyond DG Azevedo’s departure (indeed potentially to as late as sometime in February 2021) or will have to be seriously expedited (as potentially permitted under para. 23).

While expediting the process is possible, the various steps required by the process suggest that it is highly unlikely a new WTO Director-General will have been agreed to by the time DG Azevedo steps down. Thus, the WTO will likely face a vacancy for some period of time. Para. 23 of the procedures agreed to would then require the General Council to designate one of the four Deputy Directors-General to serve as Acting Director-General until the selection process for a new Director-General is completed. Thus, if there is a vacancy beginning September 1st, the General Council will be selecting an Acting Director-General from among these individuals — Yonov Frederick Agah (Nigeria), Karl Brauner (Germany), Alan Wolff (US) and Yi Xiaozhun (China).

Timing of Steps Absent Expedition

The procedures (WT/L/509) provide for the following timeline if a selection process occurs within the nine months outlined:

  1. “Members shall have one month after the start of the appointment process to nominate candidates. Nominations shall be submitted by Members only, and in respect of their own nationals.” Para. 8.
  2. Chair of the General Council has materials distributed to members as received and sends a consolidated list of candidates after the close of the one month period. Para. 10.
  3. “The candidates nominated shall then have three months to make themselves known to Members and to engage in discussions on the pertinent issues facing the Organization.” Para. 8.
  4. “As early as possible after the close of the one-month nomination period, candidates shall be invited to meet with Members at a formal General Council meeting. Candidates will be invited to make a brief presentation, including their vision for the WTO, to be followed by a question- and-answer period.” Para. 14.
  5. Months 5 and 6 after initiation, “the General Council shall proceed, through a process of consultations, to narrow the field of candidates and ultimately to arrive at its choice for appointment.” Para. 15.
  6. The process which is led by the Chair of the General Council and several facilitators, looks to find the candidate “around whom consensus can be built.” Para. 17. Depending on the number of candidates, there can be successive rounds to find candidates least likely to attract consensus who are then expected to withdraw. Para. 18.
  7. If successful, the Chair of the General Council with the support of the facilitators will “submit the name of the candidate most likely to attract consensus and recommend his or her appointment by the General Council.” Para. 19.
  8. “The process shall conclude with a meeting of the General Council convened not later than three months prior to the expiry of an incumbent’s term, at which a decision to appoint a new Director-General shall be taken.” Para. 7
  9. If General Council can’t take a decision by consensus, Members can “consider the possibility of recourse to a vote as a last resort.” Para. 20.

The full list of procedures is embedded below (WT/L/509).

WTL509

Assuming Amb. Walker sends out a notification in the next day or so, a normal process would result in a General Council decision in the second half of November. If there is a vacancy, the new Director-General should be able to assume responsibilities as soon thereafter as his/her schedule permits, even if not three months after the decision.

Process in 2012-2013

The selection process in 2012 started in December with nine applications received by December 31. The WTO press release showing the candidates and linking to their statements, CVs and other materials is linked here. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/dgsel_03jan13_e.htm. There was interest by many developing countries in seeing that the selection process kept in mind paragraph 13 of the procedures dealing with representativeness of candidates which states,

“13. In order to ensure that the best possible candidate is selected to head the WTO at any given time, candidatures representing the diversity of Members across all regions shall be invited in the nominations process. Where Members are faced in the final selection with equally meritorious candidates, they shall take into consideration as one of the factors the desirability of reflecting the diversity of the WTO’s membership in successive appointments to the post of Director-General.”

Because the DG slot at the WTO had been filled by three Europeans, one New Zealander and one from Thailand (with Pascal Lamy of France the last DG), many developing countries sought a developing country candidate assuming there were well qualified candidates from many countries. See WT/GC/M/139 at 13-15 (paras. 50 – 60).

Of the nine candidates, eight were from countries that classify themselves as developing countries within the WTO (Ghana, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Kenya, Jordan, Mexico, the Republic of Korea and Brazil). The sole developed country candidate was from New Zealand. All candidates had solid credentials.

Meetings with the candidates by the General Council occurred in late January (29-31) where each candidate was given 15 minutes for an opening statement and then participated in a question and answer session of an hour and fifteen minutes. See, e.g., WT/GC/M/142 (minutes of meeting held on Jan. 29-31) posted 16 May 2013.

Three rounds of consultations were held beginning in early April, with the result that at a General Council meeting on May 14, the Chair of the General Council put forward Roberto Azevedo from Brazil as the candidate most likely to achieve consensus and the General Council agreed. WT/GC/M/144 (minutes of meeting held on May 14) posted 4 July 2013.

Mr. Azevedo then assumed the role of Director-General as of September 1, 2013 and was reappointed for a second four years in 2017.

Prognosis for 2020

One would expect that there will be a number of developed country Members who put forward candidates in the next thirty days on the assumption that the pattern will be developed, developing, developed, developing and Brazil has just completed seven years with their candidate as DG.

Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Switzerland, Norway, the United Kingdom and one or more member countries from the EU would seem to be possibilities. The U.S. is not included in the list simply because of its prior lack of putting forward candidates and current Administration and Congressional concerns with the WTO, although the U.S. concern with the need for reforms could result in a surprise. The Republic of Korea is not included as it has considered itself a developing country, though it may still put forward a candidate and note that it is not seeking special and differential treatment on current or future negotiations in light of its development. I would be surprised if the United Kingdom puts forward a candidate just based on the serious trade negotiations that the U.K. is engaged in with the EU and the United States and their recent resumption of trade policy responsibilities following Brexit.

Developing countries are not prevented from putting forward candidates, and I assume that there will be some candidates put forward. Singapore would fit a profile similar to Korea in that it has indicated it will not seek special and differential treatment on current or future negotiations. Africa has not had a Director-General selected from among its candidates, and there has been only one Asian candidate selected previously.

What isn’t known is the willingness of the Members to streamline the nomination and selection process to permit a resolution while DG Azevedo is still active. If there are very few candidates, it may be easier for Members to agree to expedited procedures.

With the serious issues facing the world economy and the global trading system, maximum cooperation in selecting a new Director-General would be very important to helping focus a global response and updating of the WTO. Let’s hope that this is an issue on which the membership can agree to act quickly.

The COVID-19 Pandemic – An Update on Shifting Patterns of Infections and Implications for Medical Goods Needs

Since late March there have been significant shifts in the number of COVID-19 cases being reported by countries and within countries. Many countries where the virus hit hardest in the first months of the year have been seeing steady progress in the reduction of cases. Some in Asia, Oceania and in Europe are close to no new cases. Others in Europe and some in Asia have seen significant contractions in the number of new cases. Other countries have seen a flattening of new cases and the beginnings of reductions (e.g., the U.S. and Canada). And, of course, other countries are caught up in a rapid increase of cases (e.g., Russia, Brazil, Ghana, Nigeria, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia).

As reviewed in a prior post, the shifting pattern of infections has implications for the needs for medical goods and open trade on those products. https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/04/28/shifting-trade-needs-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/. As the growth in number of cases is seen in developing and least developed countries, it is important that countries who have gotten past the worst part of Phase 1 of the pandemic eliminate or reduce export restraints, if any, that were imposed to address medical needs in country during the crush of the pandemic in country. It is also critical that the global efforts to increase production of medical goods including test kits and personal protective equipment continue to eliminate the imbalance between global demand and global supply and to permit the restoration and/or creation of national and regional buffer stocks needed now and to address any second phase to the pandemic. And as tests for therapeutics and vaccines advance, it is critical that there be coordinated efforts to see that products are available to all populations with needs at affordable prices.

While there is some effort at greater coordination on research and development as reviewed in a post last week (https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/05/06/covid-19-the-race-for-diagnostics-therapeutics-and-vaccines-and-availability-for-all/), concerns exist that as nations get past the first phase of the pandemic, countries will turn their focus to other needs and not in fact address the severe gaps between pandemic supply needs and existing capacity and inventories. Such an outcome would exacerbate the challenges the world is facing from the current pandemic and its likely phase 2 later this year.

The following table shows total cases as of May 11 and the number of cases over fourteen day periods ending April 11, April 27 and May 11 as reported by the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control. The data are self-explanatory but show generally sharply reduced rates of new infections in Europe and in a number of Asian countries, though there are increases in a few, including in India and Pakistan and in a number of countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia. North America has seen a flattening of the number of new infections in the U.S. and Canada with some small reductions in numbers while Mexico is seeing growth from currently relatively low levels. Central and South America have some countries with rapid increases (e.g., Brazil, Chile, Peru). The Russian Federation is going through a period of huge increases. While there are still relatively few cases in Africa, there are countries who are showing significant increases, albeit from small bases.

Countrycases
through 5-11
14 days
to 4-11
14 days
to 4-27
14 days
to 5-11
Austria15,7875,8631,252598
Belgium53,08119,38316,4876,947
Bulgaria1,965342625665
Croatia2,187909430157
Cyprus89843318481
Czechia8,1233,4531,413719
Denmark10,4293,7732,4011,854
Estonia1,73968333496
Finland5,9621,7441,6021,386
France139,06357,71229,17214,488
Germany169,57569,07632,17714,382
Greece2,7161,045392210
Hungary3,2849671,125701
Ireland22,9965,9689,6073,734
Italy219,07061,07941,31221,395
Latvia939332161127
Lithuania1,47964138730
Luxembourg3,8861,618442163
Malta4962117048
Netherlands42,62714,49412,2584,782
Poland15,9964,5664,9434,379
Portugal27,58111,2047,2793,717
Romania15,3624,1754,7364,326
Slovakia1,45742063778
Slovenia1,45752820250
Spain224,39092,96343,04516,756
Sweden26,3226,6398,1577,682
EU271,018,867370,221220,830109,551
United Kingdom219,18355,72968,56166,343
EU27 + UK1,238,050425,950289,391175,894
United States1,329,799396,874408,339363,889
Canada68,84817,45822,51921,964
Mexico35,0223,12710,01620,345
North America1,433,669417,459440,874406,198
Japan15,7983,8486,1302,413
South Korea10,909972201171
Singapore23,3361,17711,0929,712
Australia6,9412,860391228
New Zealand 1,1476195825
Subtotal58,1319,47617,87212,549
China84,0101,058990-189
India67,1526,57418,74039,260
Indonesia14,0322,4664,6415,150
Iran107,60335,86018,79517,122
Turkey138,65741,33153,17428,527
Israel16,4777,3734,2531,079
Bangladesh14,6573764,7959,241
Kazakhstan5,1266471,7562,409
Krygyzstan1,016281276321
Malaysia6,6562,1851,097876
Pakistan30,9413,5917,95417,613
Saudi Arabia39,0482,54713,06021,526
Taiwan4401134111
Thailand3,0151,38234393
Vietnam2888660
Sri Lanka86391313340
Subtotal529,981105,961130,234143,397
Russian Federation209,68810,88165,179128,739
Ukraine15,2321,9856,2326,223
Belarus22,9731,8877,88512,510
Georgia635153229149
Subtotal248,52814,90679,525147,621
South Africa10,0158332,3735,469
Egypt9,4001,2992,2545,081
Morocco6,0631,1032,4041,998
Algeria5,7231,4561,4682,341
Burkina Faso751302135119
Cameroon2,579715801958
Cote d’Ivoire1,700379576550
D.R. of the Congo1,024165225565
Djibouti1,280137809187
Ghana4,2632419842,713
Guinea2,1462078441,052
Kenya672158158317
Mali70483273315
Mauritius33222480
Niger821428167125
Nigeria4,3992249503,126
Senegal1,7091463911,038
Somalia1,05418411618
Sudan1,363122181,126
Tunisia1,03244424283
U.R. of Tanzania50919268209
subtotal57,4698,59315,95927,990
Switzerland30,22212,1243,7581,244
Liechtenstein832030
Norway8,0992,6631,090594
Iceland1,801785919
Subtotal40,20515,5924,9421,847
Argentina5,7761,2851,5642,009
Brazil162,69916,22139,719100,811
Chile28,8661,9346,11815,535
Colombia11,0631,9342,6035,684
Dominican Republic10,3472,0393,1684,212
Ecuador29,5595,53415,2536,840
Panama8,4482,1882,3792,669
Peru67,3075,26219,99839,790
Costa Rica79229510097
El Salvador958105173660
Subtotal325,81536,79791,075178,307
All Other Countries131,67726,78038,80955,215
Total of all countries4,063,5251,061,5141,108,6811,149,018

The WTO maintains a data base of actions by WTO members in response to the COVID-19 pandemic which either restrict medical goods exports or which liberalize and expedite imports of such products. As of May 8, the WTO showed 173 measures that the WTO Secretariat had been able to confirm, with many countries having temporary export restrictions on medical goods, some restraints on exports of food products, and a variety of measures to reduce tariffs on imported medical goods or expedite their entry. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_goods_measure_e.htm. Some WTO Members other than those included in the list have had and may still have informal restrictions.

The EU and its member states are presumably in a position now or should be soon to eliminate any export restrictions based on the sharp contraction of cases in the EU as a whole over the last six weeks – last 14 days are roughly 59% lower than the 14 days ending on April 11. Similarly, countries with small numbers of cases and rates of growth which seem small may be candidates for eliminating export restrictions. Costa Rica, Kyrgyzstan, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Georgia, Norway and Switzerland would appear to fit into this latter category. Most other countries with restrictions notified to the WTO appear to be either in stages where cases continue at very high levels (e.g., United States) or where the number of cases is growing rapidly (e.g., Russia, Belarus, Saudi Arabia, Ecuador, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan). Time will tell whether the WTO obligation of such measures being “temporary” is honored by those who have imposed restrictions. Failure to do so will complicate the efforts to see that medical goods including medicines are available to all on an equitable basis and at affordable prices.

COVID-19 — the race for diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines and availability for all

With the mounting global death toll, with confirmed infections of over 3.6 million and continuing to climb, with no known effective vaccine and just the beginnings of finding possible therapies to reduce the severity or length of illness from the infection, it is clear to most that there is no full return to normalcy until effective vaccines are developed and made available to all in the world community. Because the costs to the global economy from the pandemic are measured in trillions of dollars and job losses in the hundreds of millions, there is a global urgency to advance medical solutions, despite a history with prior infectious disease outbreaks which would suggest that solutions could be years away.

The severity of the pandemic has led to some extraordinary efforts to have international organizations, pharmaceutical companies, universities and government labs work collaboratively and share data. There have also been a wide range of statements made by international organizations such as the World Health Organization, governments, NGOs, and the pharmaceutical industry that diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines developed to address the COVID-19 pandemic must be developed on an expedited basis, be available equitably and be affordable. The phrase “no one is safe until everyone is safe” sums up what many leaders are saying is the goal.

Many countries with a pharmaceutical industry, university research center invloved in medical research, government agency that addresses disease control and prevention or the safety of medical supplies are engaged in research that may be company specific, university or lab specific or collaborative within the country and across countries. Governments are providing substantial financial assistance to spur research and development.

With the various infectious disease outbreaks of the last few decades, there are also groups which focus on improving the healthcare infrastructure in developing countries and least developed countries and in working to get needed tests, medicines and vaccines to countries unable to address such needs on their own. Groups like CEPI, GAVI, FIND, UNITAID are involved and are supported by the generosity of various governments and other organizations. They are all actively engaged in the response to COVID-19.

G20 Involvement

The G20 countries issued a statement on COVID-19 after an Extraordinary G20 Leaders’ Summit on March 26, 2020 which stated in part,

“We further commit to work together to increase research and development funding for vaccines and medicines, leverage digital technologies, and strengthen scientific international cooperation. We will bolster our coordination, including with the private sector, towards rapid development, manufacturing and distribution of diagnostics, antiviral medicines, and vaccines, adhering to the objectives of efficacy, safety, equity, accessibility, and affordability.”

https://g20.org/en/media/Documents/G20_Extraordinary%20G20%20Leaders%E2%80%99%20Summit_Statement_EN%20(3).pdf.

G20_Extraordinary-G20-Leaders’-Summit_Statement_EN-3

The G20 presidency on April 24, 2020 noted its support of the Access to COVID-19 Tools (“ACT”) Accelerator whose purpose is to speed development, production and equitable distribution of new COVID-19 diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines. The initial cost estimate for the early research and development efforts was estimated at $8 billion. The statement is embedded below

G20SS_PR_G20-ACT-Initiative-Launch_EN

European Union led initiative to obtain pledges for $8 billion

The European Union and a number of individual countries co-led an international pledging event, the Coronavirus Global Response, on May 4 which developed pledges of 7.4 billion Euros ($8 billion) The countries co-leading with the EU were France, Germany, Japan, Norway, Canada, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen moderated the event. Her opening statement is below and reflects the reality that “we will have to learn to live with the virus – until and unless we develop a vaccine”. Collaboration is critical and the objective is to see that vaccines, diagnostics and treatments against coronavirus are deployed “to every single corner of the world. And we must ensure that they are available and affordable for all.” https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_20_804.

Opening_remarks_by_President_von_der_Leyen_at_the_Coronavirus_Global_Response_international_pledging_event

Besides comments from the EC’s president, other speakers included leaders from the European Council; the United Nations; the UN World Health Organization; France; Germany; Japan; Norway; Canada; Spain; United Kingdom; Saudi Arabia (2020 G20 Presidency); Jordan; South Africa (on behalf of African Union); Monaco; Turkey; Italy; Switzerland; Israel; the Netherlands; the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation; Luxembourg; Sweden; Portugal; Croatia; Estonia; the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board; Bulgaria; Ireland; Serbia; Czechia (for itself, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland); Poland; Australia; Denmark; Greece; Austria; Malta; Belgium; Wellcome Trust; Latvia; South Korea; Mexico (for Latin America); Kuwait; Slovenia; Lithuania; Oman; Romania; Finland; United Arab Emirates; China; World Economic Forum; European Investment Bank; World Bank; CEPI (Coalition for Epedemic Preparedness Innovations); GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance; FIND (Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics); UNITAID; IFPMA (International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations), and the DCVMN (Developing Countries Vaccine Manufacturers Network).

The pledging event goes on through the month of May. The kick-off event lasted just under three hours. The list of speakers was impressive covering international organizations, countries (from Europe; parts of Asia, North America and the Middle East; and South Africa), NGOs, philanthropic groups, pharmaceutical companies.

The message from all was fairly uniform – collaboration is crucial to speed the findings of solutions; solutions must be available to all on an equitable basis that is affordable. The $8 billion is simply the first step in a much larger endeavor once new diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines are found and one turns to the need for broad production and distribution.

Press accounts have raised questions about some of the countries which did not participate in the May 4th event – the United States, Russian Federation, India, Brazil to name four countries with active pharmaceutical industries — and with whether the pledges largely reflect expenditures already made or committed versus new commitments. For many of the no shows (and for China which was apparently a late addition and only from the Ambassador to the European Union), important pharmaceutical companies were represented by either IFPMA or by DCVMN. Moreover, there is yet time to join. And these countries all have their own research underway which is generally being done in a collaborative effort within country or with others and are making data available to other players.

There is little doubt that the pharmaceutical companies, the university research centers, and the government labs will be important players in the research and development stage. Consider the following document from IFPMA which reviews how major pharmaceutical companies are engaged in various segments of the R&D effort. IFPMA reviews how its member companies are engaged in (1) repurposing existing and testing new treatments, (2) sharing real-time trial data with governments and other companies; (3) speeding up R&D on safe and effective vaccines; (4) developing diagnostic testing and securing supply; (5) securing essential supplies for medicines and vaccines; (6) increasing and sharing capacity for medicines and vaccines; and (7) supporting global health care systems. See https://www.ifpma.org/print/?url=covid19-print&options=–viewport-size%20%221200×50%22%20–zoom%201.5%20–orientation%20%22Landscape%22.

download

Will a global solution available to all present challenges for holders of intellectual property?

There are billions of dollars being spent by private companies, by research universities, government labs, and various NGOs, philanthropic groups and others in the global race to develop new diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines. Much of the money spent will not result in effective solutions. Some, hopefully, will. Patent rights will arise for those developing the new products and there will thus be questions about how the new products can be made available to all at affordable prices.

Some individuals and companies may make any breakthroughs they are responsible for available to all at no cost (we have seen some of that in the past on medicines and recently on PPE products).

It is also the case, that governments can invoke exceptions to patent rights under certain circumstances and subject to certain limitations. See TRIPS Art. 31 (compulsory licensing).

Some governments (e.g., France) at the pledging event recognized the need to see that the innovators received a fair return on their investment, but also characterized COVID-19 products as “public goods”. The IFPMA in its activities has joined collaborative undertakings and has recognized the need for new diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines to be available to all at affordable prices. But it is unclear what that means to the company or companies who develop a breakthrough product in terms of patent rights and revenues.

While the U.S. pharmaceutical industry has indicated that they are working with governments and insurers to see that new drugs and vaccines are available to all and affordable, they also have a blog post on the continued importance of intellectual property for pharmaceutical companies ability to tackle COVID-10. See The Catalyst, What they are saying: Intellectual property protections are critical as we work to defeat COVID-19, https://catalyst.phrma.org/what-they-are-saying-intellectual-property-protections-are-critical-as-we-work-to-defeat-covid-19.

What-they-are-saying_-Intellectual-property-protections-are-critical-as-we-work-to-defeat-COVID-19

With possible breakthroughs in the next six months or so, how this important trade aspect of rewarding innovation in the fight against COVID-19 plays out could complicate or simplify the core desire of getting effective solutions to all at affordable prices.

Other trade issues

There are already efforts underway to get WTO Members to eliminate customs duties on medical supplies needed to address COVID-19. If not already covered by that effort, one would think it would be doable to get WTO Members to agree to trade any new diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines for treating COVID-19 as duty-free articles (and presumably add the inputs to such new products).

The collapse of tourism during the COVID-19 pandemic

As any of us knows all too well, the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting government efforts to control the spread of the virus has led to sharp reductions in the use of various services, including restaurants, hotels, entertainment venues and travel. This has been true domestically in many countries and has been even more obvious when one looks at international travel and tourism.

In a news release from the UN World Tourism Organization (“UNWTO”) on 28 April 2020, the toll on global tourism is reviewed, and the facts are shocking. See https://webunwto.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2020-04/200428%20-%20Travel%20Restrictions%20EN.pdf. The news release is copied below and is followed by the full report (embedded).

“100% OF GLOBAL DESTINATIONS NOW HAVE COVID-19 TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS, UNWTO REPORTS

Madrid, Spain, 28 April 2020 – The COVID-19 pandemic has prompted all destinations worldwide to introduce restrictions on travel, research by the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) has found. This represents the most severe restriction on international travel in history and no country has so far lifted restrictions introduced in response to the crisis.

“Following up on previous research, the latest data from the United Nations specialized agency for tourism shows that 100% of destinations now have restrictions in place, of these, 83% have had COVID-19-related restrictions in place already for four or more weeks and, as of 20 April, so far no destination has lifted them.

“UNWTO Secretary-General Zurab Pololikashvili said: ‘Tourism has shown its commitment to putting people first. Our sector can also lead the way in driving recovery. This research on global travel restrictions will help support the timely and responsible implementation of exit strategies, allowing destinations to ease or lift travel restrictions when it is safe to do so. This way, the social and economic benefits that tourism offers can return, providing a path to sustainable recovery for both individuals and whole countries.’

Tracking Restrictions by Time and Severity

“As well as a general overview, the UNWTO research breaks down the type of travel restrictions that have been introduced by destinations in all of the global regions, while also plotting the evolution of these restrictions since 30 January – when the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID-19 a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. The latest analysis shows that, of 217 destinations worldwide:

“• 45% have totally or partially closed their borders for tourists – ‘Passengers are not allowed to enter’

“• 30% have suspended totally or partially international flights – ‘all flights are suspended’

“• 18% are banning the entry for passengers from specific countries of origin or passengers who have transited through specific destinations

“• 7% are applying different measures, such as quarantine or self-isolation for 14 days and visa measures.

“Against this backdrop, UNWTO has been leading calls for governments worldwide to commit to supporting tourism through this unprecedented challenge. According to Secretary-General Pololikashvili, the sudden and unexpected fall in tourism demand caused by COVID-19 places millions of jobs and livelihoods at risk while at the same time jeopardising the advances made in sustainable development and equality over recent years.” (emphasis and italics in the original)

TravelRestrictions-28-April

UNWTO data show roughly 1.5 billion arrivals of travelers around the world in 2019 following a long-term growth record in arrivals, accounting for 10% of global jobs and $1.5 trillion of international tourism receipts. See https://www.unwto.org/healing-solutions-tourism-challenge. The UNWTO in late March projected a decline in international tourism receipts for 2020 of 20-30% from 2019 (or $300-450 billion). See https://webunwto.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2020-03/200327%20-%20COVID-19%20Impact%20Assessment%20EN.pdf. The situation is likely more precarious as we enter May with the continued global economic harm flowing from government actions to address the continued strong expansion of number of confirmed cases worldwide and deaths. As noted, every government with international tourism has introduced and continues to maintain travel restrictions. Stay at home orders have closed restaurants (other than take out or delivery), hotels, entertainment venues and more.

While all countries and territories are adversely affected by the toll on international tourism from the pandemic, the harm is greater to island nations and poorer countries where tourism is a high percentage of total GDP. Even for advanced countries, the importance of tourism can be critical to a functioning economy. In the EU, a recent article indicates that 10% of GDP is from tourism with some countries (Greece and Malta) having much higher percentages (20-25%). See https://www.dw.com/en/when-and-how-post-coronavirus-travel-in-the-eu-is-up-in-the-air/a-53273416

Commitments for tourism and travel services under the World Trade Organization

Many World Trade Organization Members have undertaken tourism and travel-related service commitments. As noted on the WTO webpage on Tourism and travel-related services, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/tourism_e/tourism_e.htm, more than 125 WTO members have made services commitments in the tourism area (hotels, restaurants (including catering), travel agencies, tour operator services tourist guide services, etc.). A note from the WTO Secretariat in 2009 provides information on commitments undertaken by Member (at that time, more countries have joined the WTO in the decade since the note) as well as providing other information on travelers by country and receipts. See S/C/W/298 (8 June 2009) embedded below.

SCW298

But, as with trade in goods, trade in services has general exceptions which permit Members to adopt or enforce measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” as long as such measures “are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services”. GATS Article XIV(b). Measures adopted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic restricting travel (and resulting effects on other services) have not been challenged at the WTO and would be likely found permissible even if challenged.

Many of the actions governments are taking to keep supplies of medical goods and food moving are only tangentially relevant to tourism in the broad sense, though of assistance to those needing to travel or moving goods. Removal of restrictions will likely occur over time and tourism’s return will also depend on confidence of consumers in the safety of travel, of dining out, of staying in hotels and of attending entertainment events. That confidence is likely going to flow primarily from the adequacy of testing, tracking and quarantining of those found to be infected, and ultimately with the development and widespread availability of a vaccine.

UNWTO recommendations for actions to address the pandemic and accelerate recovery

In a publication released on April 1, 2020, the UNWTO identifies 23 actions they seek governments to embrace broken into three topics:

1, “Managing the crisis and mitigating the impact” (1-7);

2. “Providing stimulus and accelerating recovery” (8-16)’

3. “Preparing for tomorrow” (17-23).

The 23 action recommendations are listed below. The full UNWTO document is embedded after that. As the list of action recommendations reveals, some of the action recommendations are included in actions already taken by major countries including China, the EU and its members, the United States and others. Actions reviewed in earlier posts by the IMF and others may permit some of these action recommendations to be implemented by some of the developing and least developed countries. Many of the recommendations will likely not be addressable in the near term but may encourage collective activity post pandemic.

“1. Incentivize job retention, sustain the self-employed and
protect the most vulnerable groups

“2. Support companies’ liquidity

“3. Review taxes, charges, levies and regulations impacting
transport and tourism

“4. Ensure consumer protection and confidence

“5. Promote skills development, especially digital skills

“6. Include tourism in national, regional and global economic
emergency packages

“7. Create crisis management mechanisms and strategies

“8. Provide financial stimulus for tourism investment and
operations

“9. Review taxes, charges and regulations impacting travel and
tourism

“10. Advance travel facilitation

“11. Promote new jobs and skills development, particularly
digital ones

“12. Mainstream environmental sustainability in stimulus and
recovery packages

“13. Understand the market and act quickly to restore
confidence and stimulate demand

“14. Boost marketing, events and meetings

“15. Invest in partnerships

“16. Mainstream tourism in national, regional and international
recovery programmes and in Development Assistance

“17. Diversify markets, products and services

“18. Invest in market intelligence systems and digital
transformation

“19. Reinforce tourism governance at all levels

“20. Prepare for crisis, build resilience and ensure tourism is
part of national emergency mechanism and systems

“21. Invest in human capital and talent development

“22. Place sustainable tourism firmly on the national agenda

“23. Transition to the circular economy and embrace the SDGs.” (Sustainable Development Goals).

COVID19_Recommendations_English_1

Conclusion

As the world is exploring ways to reopen individual economies as the worst of COVID-19 (at least phase 1) passes, governments will be under enormous pressure to reopen as quickly as is responsible to do. As data from the UNWTO demonstrate, travel and tourism is a labor intensive sector which has outgrown overall economic growth in the last decade and which can help facilitate recovery when economies are able to reopen.

There are huge challenges in the short- and medium-term for the sector including the depth of the decline, the fragility of many of the businesses financially and the challenges to restoration of consumer confidence. With the United States alone having recorded nearly 30 million people filing for unemployment over the last six weeks, the size of the economic challenge globally is obviously massive. The UNWTO recommended actions address an array of certain needs for many players. For those businesses that survive the pandemic, restoring consumer confidence and having governments withdraw restrictions safely will become the biggest challenges to forward movement. Government actions during the pandemic to provide safety nets for businesses and workers will influence how many businesses and jobs remain when markets do reopen.

Shifting Trade Needs During the COVID-19 Pandemic

As of April 28, the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases around the world is over three million. The EU/UK and U.S. have dominated the number of cases and number of deaths to the present time after the start of the pandemic in China. The EU and UK have more than one million cases and more than 120,000 deaths. The United States will likely surpass one million cases by the end of April 28th with deaths above 55,000. . Together they accounted for roughly 70% of cases through April 27 and 84% of deaths.

But the rate of growth is expanding in other parts of the world while number of new cases is shrinking in Europe and flatlining in the United States. The data below look at the number of cases on April 27 and the percent growth of new cases measuring a fourteen day period ending on April 27 compared to a fourteen day period ending on April 11. What the table makes clear is that Europe has been going through a period of declining numbers (percentage less than 100%), North America (based on the US) is close to zero growth (though Mexico’s 14 day numbers more than tripled) , while parts of Africa, Central and South America and some countries in Asia are experiencing rapid growth, albeit generally from low levels. China has largely gotten through the first wave and so numbers for both fourteen day periods are quite low even though the ratio is close to 100%.

Country/Area Number of cases April 27 ratio 14 day cases 4-27/4-11

EU27 908,316 59.65%

UK 152,840 123.03%

4 (Switz., Nrwy, Icel, Lich) 38,358 31.70%

United States 965,910 102.89%

Canada 46,884 128.99%

Mexico 14,677 320.31%

Japan 13,385 159.30%

South Korea 10,738 20.68%

Singapore 13,624 942.40%

China 84,199 93.57%

India 27,892 285.06%

Iran 90,481 52.41%

Turkey 110,130 128.65%

Russia 80,949 599.02%

21 African countries 29,479 185.71%

8 South & Central America 146,515 249.48%

World Total 2,914,507 104.44%

Source; European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, situation update worldwide, as of 27 April 2020 and 11 April 2020.

As the growth in the number of new cases slows in many developed countries while ramping up in other countries, there will be increasing needs for medical supplies (medicines, equipment, personal protective equipment and other supplies) in countries or territories that heretofore have not had large supply needs.

At the same time, needs for some types of equipment may be reduced in countries that have gotten past the worst of the first wave. Ventilators would be a case in point. In the United States, as hard hit areas like New York see lower hospitalization rates, the state has been able to forward some ventilators to other states with growing case loads. Similarly, the United States has moved from a situation of buying ventilators abroad to being able to send ventilators abroad. That ability is presumably increasing as expanded U.S. production of ventilators kicks into higher gear as we get to the end of April.

Countries like China that have largely gotten through the first wave of COVID-19 have moved from being large importers of medical supplies to being able to export significant quantities of various supplies, including personal protective equipment. They have also ramped up production of some medical supplies and so should be able to both handle any internal needs and continue to expand exports to the world.

However, for countries that have gotten into a period of declining new cases or even flat growth, needs for personal protective equipment, disenfectant, testing equipment and supplies will continue to grow as these countries deal with both ongoing needs for hospital care and the significant increase in testing and tracing needed for a safe reopening of countries and the likely change in protective gear needed for citizens freed from stay at home orders.

Prior posts have reviewed efforts by the multilateral organizations like the WHO, IMF, World Bank, FAO, WCO and WTO to facilitate transparency, financial and other needs of the world during the pandemic as well as efforts at coordinated actions by the G20.

Faced with the worst pandemic in more than a century, the world was generally caught flat footed and without adequate supplies to address the needs of individual countries or the world as a whole.

Transparency and efforts to keep markets open are two of the trade focuses of governments and the WTO. However, a health crisis during a time of grossly inadequate medical supplies has resulted in many countries taking at least temporary actions to secure medical supplies needed for domestic demand. This has occurred through export restraints, commandeering domestic production, using laws aimed for national emergencies and other actions which favor the large and wealthy over other parties.

There appears to be little or no international efforts to coordinate expansion of critical supplies or to monitor demand vs. supply availability to maximize utilization of the scarce supplies that are available in areas hardest hit. If in fact, the pandemic is gaining steam in developing and least developed countries, there is an increasing need for coordinated action in supporting these countries in the weeks and months ahead.

In that regard, Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff provided virtual remarks on April 20th to an event hosted by the Center for China and Globalization in Beijing on the role of the WTO in assisting in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The link to the presentation is here and the materials off of the WTO webpage are embedded below. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/ddgaw_20apr20_e.htm.

WTO-_-2020-News-items-Speech-DDG-Alan-Wolff-DDG-Wolff_-Policy-coordina

While DDG Wolff recognizes that any action by the WTO is based upon initiatives from Members, he includes a series of “[a]genda items for a WTO COVID 19 Response”. Some of the agenda items have been pursued by individual WTO members as well as being part of an agreement between Singapore and New Zealand. These would include tariff suspensions on relevant medical supplies and enhanced trade facilitation for medical supplies. The WTO membership has already authorized transparency on actions taken, although Members have at best a spotty performance in providing the transparency agreed to.

The proposed agenda includes items that appear to be more aspirational in nature, at least during the current pandemic, including an agreement on codes of conduct on topics such as “guidelines on allocating scarcity”, “an accord on export controls and equivalent measures (including, e.g., pre-emptive purchasing in whatever form)”. Such issues will likely have greater likelihood of success after the pandemic has passed.

Of great interest to me is the last posting under “Codes of conduct, best practices and international understandings resulting in” which is “Coordinated efforts to enhance manufacturing of medical equipment and supplies”. It is possible that there are efforts within the WTO or the OECD or other groups to gather information on current capacities and planned expansions. Such an effort if not currently occurring should be made a priority during the pandemic and going forward. As China’s experience demonstrated (where demand in China for masks exceeded China production by ten-to-one during the peak increase in cases), supply is unlikely to meet demand in individual countries without better coordination amongst countries and without a greater global inventory buffer to address extraordinary demand surges.

The last agenda item proposed by DDG Wolff is the “Formation of a WTO Member Emergency Covid 19 Response Committee (ERC) or Task Force”. One would hope that an ERC could be quickly created within the WTO although many Members have shown reluctance during the pandemic (at least during the time where in-person meetings are not possible) to agree to any substantive decisions, although being open to collect information. It is also unclear how quickly an ERC, if created, would be able to advance proposals of interest to Members. But it could certainly be a group focused on gathering greater information relevant to supplies and demand as well as restrictions and liberalizations.

Finally, DDG Wolff in looking at planning for the future advances the idea of creating a WTO Committee for Policy Planning. “It is necessary to assure that there is dedicated policy planning capacity within the WTO Secretariat and networked with Members, including experts in capitals who would be able to participate remotely.” Such a Committee could hopefully, inter alia, help WTO Members come up with policies and rules that would better prepare the world for any future pandemics. While much of what is required to minimize the effects of future pandemics is not within the WTO’s jurisdiction, there are certainly areas that are. Many of those include the items DDG Wolff has included in his suggested agenda for the WTO in response to COVID-19. Hopefully, if not doable during the pandemic, such agenda items will be addressed aggressively after the pandemic, perhaps through a Committee for Policy Planning.

Conclusion

The current health pandemic is continuing at a high level but with growing infections starting to shift geographical areas of interest. As developing countries and least developed countries become areas of increased cases, the challenges of ensuring adequate medical supplies to those in need will become greater and be complicated by health infrastructure in many countries, financial resources, and continued supply/demand imbalances. The best hope for positive outcomes is greater coordination of activity and expanded financial resources available to those in need. The seemingly largest gap in coordinated activity is in the area of current supply abilities, growth in capacity and shifting demand needs. Hopefully international organizations like the WTO can help fill the gap.

Food Security Complications from COVID-19 – Recent UN Information and G20 and WTO Member Statements

With the global health crisis flowing from the COVID-19 pandemic ongoing, the world is also facing the specter of mass starvation flowing from a combination of ongoing armed conflicts, weather events, export restraints on food and potential disruptions in food supply. Export restraints and disruptions in food supply are increasing based on actions to address the COVID-19 pandemic.

Governments of the world are understandably focused on the health pandemic where known deaths since December are approaching 200,000 with confirmed cases over 2.5 million and continuing to increase. To date Europe and the United States and a few other countries account for the vast majority of confirmed cases and deaths from COVID-19, though nearly all countries have some cases and many other countries could see rapidly growing cases in the weeks and months ahead.

In contrast, the number of people in the world facing acute hunger and possible starvation is staggering with death projections for 2020 in key months of likely shortage as high as 300,000/day or more without concerted efforts to prevent! On April 21, David Beasley, the UN World Food Programme Executive Director made a virtual presentation to the UN Security Council. https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-chief-warns-hunger-pandemic-covid-19-spreads-statement-un-security-council. His statement is reproduced below.

Forgive me for speaking bluntly, but I’d like to lay out for you very clearly what the world is facing at this very moment. At the same time while dealing with a COVID-19 pandemic, we are also on the brink of a hunger
pandemic.

“In my conversations with world leaders over the past many months, before the Coronavirus even became an issue, I was saying that 2020 would be facing the worst humanitarian crisis since World War II for a number of reasons.

“Such as the wars in Syria and Yemen. The deepening crises in places like South Sudan and, as Jan Egeland will no doubt set out, Burkina Faso and the Central Sahel region. The desert locust swarms in Africa, as Director General Qu highlighted in his remarks. And more frequent natural disasters and changing weather patterns. The economic crisis in Lebanon affecting millions of Syrian refugees. DRC, Sudan, Ethiopia. And the list goes on. We’re already facing a perfect storm.

“So today, with COVID-19, I want to stress that we are not only facing a global health pandemic but also a global humanitarian catastrophe. Millions of civilians living in conflict-scarred nations, including many women and children, face being pushed to the brink of starvation, with the spectre of famine a very real and dangerous possibility.

“This sounds truly shocking but let me give you the numbers: 821 million people go to bed hungry every night all over the world, chronically hungry, and as the new Global Report on Food Crises published today shows, there are a further 135 million people facing crisis levels of hunger or worse. That means 135 million people on earth are marching towards the brink of starvation. But now the World Food Programme analysis shows that, due to the Coronavirus, an additional 130 million people could be pushed to the brink of starvation by the end of 2020. That’s a total of 265 million people.

“On any given day now, WFP offers a lifeline to nearly 100 million people, up from about 80 million just a few years ago. This includes about 30 million people who literally depend on us to stay alive. If we can’t reach these people with the life-saving assistance they need, our analysis shows that 300,000 people could starve to death every single day over a three-month period. This does not include the increase of starvation due to COVID-19.

“In a worst-case scenario, we could be looking at famine in about three dozen countries, and in fact, in 10 of these countries we already have more than one million people per country who are on the verge of starvation. In many places, this human suffering is the heavy price of conflict.

“At WFP, we are proud that this Council made the historic decision to pass Resolution 2417 in May 2018. It was amazing to see the council come together. Now we have to live up to our pledge to protect the most vulnerable and act immediately to save lives.

“But this is only in my opinion only the first part of the strategy needed to protect conflict-riven countries from a hunger pandemic caused by the Coronavirus. There is also a real danger that more people could potentially die from the economic impact of COVID-19 than from the virus itself.

“This is why I am talking about a hunger pandemic. It is critical we come together as one united global community to defeat this disease, and protect the most vulnerable nations and communities from its potentially devastating effects.”

Lockdowns and economic recession are expected to lead to a major loss of income among the working poor. Overseas remittances will also drop sharply – this will hurt countries such as Haiti, Nepal, and Somalia just a name a couple. The loss of tourism receipts will damage countries such as Ethiopia, where it accounts for 47% of total exports. The collapsing oil prices in lower-income countries like South Sudan will have an impact significantly, where oil accounts for 98.8% of total exports. And, of course, when donor countries’ revenues are down, how much impact will this have on life saving foreign aid.

The economic and health impacts of COVID-19 are most worrisome for communities in countries across Africa as well as the Middle East, because the virus threatens further damage to the lives and livelihoods of people already put at risk by conflict.

“WFP and our partners are going all-out to help them we’ll do everything we possibly can. For example, we know that children are particularly vulnerable to hunger and malnutrition, so we are prioritizing assistance to them.

“Right now, as you may now 1.6 billion children and young people are currently out of school due to lockdown closures. Nearly 370 million children are missing out on nutritious school meals – you can only imagine when children don’t get the nutrition they need their immunity goes down. Where nutritious school meals have been suspended by school closures, we are working to replace them with take-home rations, wherever possible.

“As you know, WFP is the logistics backbone for the humanitarian world and even more so now for the global effort to beat this pandemic. We have delivered millions upon millions of personal protective equipment, testing kits and face masks to 78 countries on behalf of the World Health Organization. We are also running humanitarian air services to get frontline health professionals doctors, nurses, and humanitarian staff into countries that need help, especially while passenger air industry is basically about shut down.

“But we need to do so much more, and I urge this Council to lead the way. First and foremost, we need peace. As the Secretary-General recently said very clearly, a global ceasefire is essential.

Second, we need all parties involved in conflicts to give us swift and unimpeded humanitarian access to all vulnerable communities, so they can get the assistance to them that they need, regardless of who they are or where they are. We also need in a very general sense humanitarian goods and commercial trade to continue flowing across borders, because they are the lifeline of global food systems as well as the global economy. Supply chains have to keep moving if we are going to overcome this pandemic and get food from where it is produced to where it is needed. It also means resisting the temptation to introduce export bans or import subsidies, which can lead to price hikes and almost always backfire.

“WFP is working hand in glove with governments to build and strengthen national safety nets. This is critical right now to ensure fair access to assistance and help maintain peace and prevent rising tensions among communities.

Third, we need coordinated action to support life-saving humanitarian assistance. For example, WFP is implementing plans to preposition three months’ worth of food and cash to serve country operations identified as priorities. We are asking donors to accelerate the (US) $1.9 billion in funding that has already been pledged, so we can build stockpiles and create these life-saving buffers, and protect the most vulnerable from the effects of supply chain disruptions, commodity shortages, economic damage and lockdowns. You understand exactly what I’m talking about.

“We are also requesting a further USD350 million to set up a network of logistics hubs and transport systems to keep humanitarian supply chains moving around the world. They will also provide field hospitals and medical evacuations to the frontline humanitarian and health workers, as needed and strategically.

“Excellencies, two years ago the Security Council took a landmark step when it recognized, and condemned, the devastating human toll of conflict paid in poverty and hunger. Resolution 2417 also highlighted the need for early warning systems, and today I am here to raise that alarm.

“There are no famines yet. But I must warn you that if we don’t prepare and act now – to secure access, avoid funding shortfalls and disruptions to trade – we could be facing multiple famines of biblical proportions within a short few months.

“The actions we take will determine our success, or failure, in building sustainable food systems as the basis of stable and peaceful societies. The truth is, we do not have time on our side, so let’s act wisely – and let’s act fast. I do believe that with our expertise and partnerships, we can bring together the teams and the programs necessary to make certain the COVID-19 pandemic does not become a humanitarian and food crisis catastrophe. So Mr. President, thank you, thank you very much.

Emphasis added. See also https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/04/1062272.

The 2020 Global Report on Food Crises mentioned in Mr. Beasley’s statement can be found here and is embedded below. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000114546/download/?_ga=2.200353390.1965067900.1587648297-1190105299.1587648297.

GRFC_2020_ONLINE_200420

Fifty-six countries or territories are listed as at various levels of concern for hunger in 2019 and potentially for 2020 and are summarized on pages 214-215 of the report. Eleven of the fifty-six countries or territories are categorized as at a phase 4 level (emergency) for the country as a whole or for particular parts. These include Afghanistan, Angola, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Twenty-one others are categorized as phase 3 (crisis). These include Burkino Faso, Cameron, Chad, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Uganada, and the United Republic of Tanzania. Eight countries or territories were ranked phase 2 (stressed). These included Cabo Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, El Salvador, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya and Nicaragua. Two countries or territories were listed as phase 1 (minimal)(Burundi and Rwanda). The remaining fourteen countries or territories had not been given a specific phase, some because the problem related to the presence of large numbers of refugees and what might happen during the year; for others the descriptions of the hunger challenges would suggest serious problems. These countries or territories include Bangladesh, Colombia, Djibouti, Ecuador, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Myanmar, Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela.

While the bulk of the concerns raised in the report go to ongoing conflicts and weather problems, trade restrictions are potentially important contributors. As reviewed in an earlier post, a number of countries have imposed export restraints on certain agricultural goods. With the exception of Myanmar and Ukraine who are listed in the 2020 Global Report on Food Crises, the other countries reviewed in my earlier post are not included in the report. These countries include Russia, Kazakhstan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonsia and Cambodia. The earlier post is linked below.

G20 Agriculture Ministers Communique

Following a virtual meeting on April 21, G20 Agriculture Ministers released a Ministerial Statement that reaffirmed “the importance of working to ensure the continued flow of food, products and inputs essential for agircultural and food production”. The Statement can be found here. https://g20.org/en/media/Documents/G20_Agriculture%20Ministers%20Meeting_Statement_EN.pdf. The statement covers a fair amount of ground but doesn’t prohibit export restraints per se in agriculture but rather repeats the limitations (reflecting existing WTO flexibilities) that trade ministers articulated for medical supplies – any restraints should be targeted, proportionate, transparent, and temporary. The full statement is reproduced below.

“We, the G20 Agriculture Ministers, are deeply saddened by the devastating human losses and suffering caused by the spread of COVID-19. We commit to cooperating closely and taking concrete actions to safeguard global food security and nutrition.

‘We reaffirm the importance of working to ensure the continued flow of food, products, and inputs essential for agricultural and food production across borders in line with our Leaders’ Statement on COVID-19 of March 26, 2020. We acknowledge the challenges of minimizing the risk of COVID-19 while keeping food supply chains functioning. We will continue to work to ensure the health, safety, welfare, and mobility of workers in agriculture and throughout the food supply chain.

We will guard against any unjustified restrictive measures that could lead to excessive food price volatility in international markets and threaten the food security and nutrition of large proportions of the world population, especially the most vulnerable living in environments of low food security. We agree that emergency measures in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic must be targeted, proportionate, transparent, and temporary, and that they do not create unnecessary barriers to trade or disruption to global food supply chains, and are consistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. We recognise the importance of transparency and commend the Trade and Investment Ministers’ commitment to notify the WTO of any trade-related measures taken, including those related to agriculture and essential foodstuffs. We reaffirm our agreement not to impose export restrictions or extraordinary taxes on food and agricultural products purchased for non-commercial humanitarian purposes by the World Food Programme (WFP) and other humanitarian agencies.

“We emphasize the work of the G20 Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) and take note of AMIS’ assessment that at present global food supplies are adequate and food markets remain well balanced. As members, we commit and call on other members to continue providing timely and reliable information on global food market fundamentals to help markets, countries, and consumers make informed choices. Where appropriate, we will coordinate policy responses, supported by the AMIS Global Food Market Information Group and the AMIS Rapid Response Forum. We call for continued support for AMIS, including through voluntary financial contributions.

“We will work together to help ensure that sufficient, safe, affordable, and nutritious food continues to be available and accessible to all people, including the poorest, the most vulnerable, and displaced people in a timely, safe, and organized manner, consistent with national requirements. Acknowledging the critical role of the private sector in food systems, we call for enhanced cooperation between the public and private sectors to help mobilize rapid and innovative responses to impacts of this pandemic on the agriculture and food sectors.

“Under the current challenging circumstances, we stress the importance of avoiding food losses and waste caused by disruptions throughout food supply chains, which could exacerbate food insecurity and nutrition risks and economic loss. We stress the need to strengthen the sustainability and resilience of food systems globally, including to future shocks from disease and pest outbreaks, and to the global challenges that drive these shocks. In line with the One Health approach, we call for strengthened mechanisms for monitoring, early warning, preparedness, prevention, detection, response, and control of zoonotic diseases, and developing science-based international guidelines on stricter safety and hygienic measures for zoonosis control.

“We deeply thank farmers and workers, and small, medium and large scale agri-food businesses for their continuous efforts to ensure our food supply. We will intensify our efforts, in line with WTO rules and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, to support them to sustain their activities and livelihoods during the crisis and to assist their recovery afterwards. Our efforts will support rural communities, especially small-scale farmers and family farms, to be more economically prosperous, resilient and sustainable, and to have improved food security and nutrition, giving special attention to the needs of developing and low-income countries.
We will continue our cooperation with relevant international organizations and within their mandates work to: reinforce international cooperation; identify additional actions to alleviate the impacts of COVID-19 on food security and nutrition; share best practices and lessons learned, such as addressing barriers to supply chains; promote evidence and science-based information and combat misinformation; provide capacity building and technical assistance; and promote research, responsible investments, innovations and reforms that will improve the sustainability and resilience of agriculture and food systems. This work could build on the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO’s) evolving response to COVID-19, the International Fund for Agricultural Development’s (IFAD’s) evolving efforts to support a strong recovery from the effects of COVID-19, policy monitoring and analysis by the OECD, and other relevant initiatives, such as the preparation for the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit.

“We will continue our close cooperation and as necessary update our response to the COVID-19 pandemic and our broader G20 agriculture and food agenda. We stand ready to reconvene as required.” (Emphasis added)

The virtual meeting of G20 Agriculture Ministers included information received from the various UN organizations with expertise. See http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/1272058/icode/

The Ministerial Statement is helpful in encouraging nations to maintain open markets, to not tax humanitarian food aid and to provide transparency in actions taken. But the Ministerial Statement does not commit the G20 members to avoid trade restrictions where such restrictions are temporary, targeted, transparent and proportionate. Based on actions taken by China and India during the 2007-2008 food crisis, it is not surprising that the G20 could not get hard commitments to avoid agriculture export restrictions from all G20 members.

As international organizations are serving as transparency fora and are encouraging joint action, it is not surprising that the Ministerial Statement was warmly received by the WTO as the statement supports transparency and WTO consistency of any actions taken.. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/dgra_21apr20_e.htm.

Communique from Various WTO Members

On July 22, twenty-three WTO Members (including the EU) submitted a joint statement to the WTO entitled RESPONDING TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC WITH OPEN AND PREDICTABLE TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD PRODUCTS, WT/GC/208, G/AG/30. The statement is embedded below.

WTGC208

The statement cautions countries to avoid actions to address the COVID-19 pandemic that would adversely affect trade in agricultural goods. Absent from the joint statement are important Members who have in the past used or who at present are using export restraints on certain agricultural products including China and India (past export restraints) and Russia, Kazakhstan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Myanmar and Cambodia (current export restraints).

The joint statement has strong language on keeping markets open (including the negative effects of export restrictions on agriculture and agri-food products), avoiding waste, maintaining effective transport and logistical services, the importance of transparency in actions taken as well as food production and stocks. Nonetheless, because of existing WTO flexibilities provided to Members, the commitments made by the 23 Members include one which maintains the right to emergency measures that are “targeted, proportionate, transparent and temporary, and not create unnecessary barriers to trade or disruption to global supply chains”.

The joint statement is certainly a positive step with eight specific commitments taken by WTO Members who account for 63% of global agricultural exports and 55% of global agricultural imports. Time will tell if the list of supporters of the commitments expands to other major Members.

Conclusion

Based on current and projected food supplies, there should be no crisis in food supplies to the world if there is collective efforts to keep markets open, provide food aid for populations experiencing severe shortages due to conflict, adverse weather events and any adverse effects from the COVID-19 pandemic. Much of what the UN and its World Food Programme seek (cease fires; access to people regardless of conflicts or sanctions) is not likely to happen based on actions by certain major countries. But keeping world markets open and food aid funded hopefully will occur. The consequences of failure in this regard would greatly exacerbate the health and economic costs already experienced from COVID-19.