Posts By Terence P. Stewart

Who will be the next WTO Director-General? Nominating Period Closes in One Day

With the WTO’s Director-General Roberto Azevedo stepping down at the end of August, the World Trade Organization’s efforts to select a replacement heat up this week as the one month nominating period comes to an end at the close of business on July 8 in Geneva. The roster of candidates is presently five. While one or more additional candidates could be put forward on July 8th, the most likely scenario is that the five candidates put forward to date will be the slate for evaluation.

When the window for nominations closes tomorrow, the Chair of the General Council, Amb. David Walker (NZ), will transmit a consolidated list of nominees to the WTO membership. The CVs of the five candidates became available on the WTO website under news releases as WTO Members nominated individuals. Thus, Mexico’s Jesus Seade was first to be nominated on June 8 and news of the nomination and his bio are available in the press release that day. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/dgsel_mex_08jun20_e.htm.

Nigeria’s Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala was the second candidate put forward and was reported on June 9. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/dgsel_nga_09jun20_e.htm.

Egypt’s Abdel-Hamid Mamdouh was also nominated on June 9th and was so reported that same day as the third candidate. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/dgsel_egy_09jun20_e.htm.

Moldova submitted the name of Tudor Ulianovschi on June 16th as the fourth candidate for the Director-General slot. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/dgsel_egy_09jun20_e.htm.

And then the Republic of Korea nominated Yoo Myung-hee on June 24 as the fifth candidate. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/dgsel_kor_24jun20_e.htm.

The biographies and cover letters from the individual governments are available to WTO Members in a series not available to the public, WT/GC/INF/23-26.

Next steps

The Chairman of the General Council has set meetings with the candidates for the Director-General position next week, starting on July 15 and continuing on July 16 and 17 as needed. In a communication to delegations on July 1, the Chairman of the General Council outline procedures and time limits for the GC meetings that mirror activities undertaken in the 2013 process. Specifically, each candidate will have 15 minutes to make an opening statement and the WTO Members will have up to 75 minutes to ask questions and receive answers (with the last five minutes to be used by the candidate to provide final comments if he/she so wishes). Members are limited to one question of no more than sixty seconds. Members wishing to ask questions need to notify the WTO and then during the meeting names will be pulled from a box so all delegations have a chance to ask questions. In 2013, generally about 20-25 Members asked questions of any candidate.

In a communication on July 3, the Chair reviewed the timing reviewed above and noted that delegations would be limited to one person each at the meetings for social distancing purposes, though delegations could participate virtually for additional members or for the delegation as a whole if so desired.

If there are just five candidates, then the General Council meetings will likely be limited to July 15 and 16. Nothing will obviously be decided until the nomination window closes. But if there are only five candidates a likely schedule would be to have two candidates interviewed the afternoon of July 15 and three candidates considered on July 16 (one morning, two afternoon).

The timing of the GC meetings with candidates is much quicker than what happened in 2013 when the meetings were 29-31 days after the nomination period closed. This year, the GC meetings will be just 7-9 days after the nomination period closes.

What isn’t known about next steps is how much time candidates will be given to interface with WTO Members not just in Geneva but also in capitals. The procedures adopted back in 2002 for finding a new Director-General envisioned three months after the closing of the nomination process for candidates to engage in outreach to WTO Members. That was to be followed by a two month period for the Chair of the General Council and his/her facilitators to meet with Members to work towards finding a candidate that can achieve consensus support. Stated differently, the procedures adopted in 2002 envisioned the period from the close of nominations to the selection of a new Director-General to be five months or roughly 150 days.

Since the WTO will lose its existing Director-General 54 days after the close of the nominating period, the WTO will either need to shorten both the period for outreach and the period for reaching consensus considerably (by close to 100 days) or will have to also gear up for selecting an Acting Director-General from among the four Deputy Directors-General. It is understood that the Chair of the General Council desires to expedite the remaining process, but it is unclear where the Members will be on a serious reduction in time lines. Factors that are out there will be travel limitations and communication challenges for WTO delegations during the COVID-19 pandemic and the normal August break in activity at the WTO (more specifically, whether Members will agree to work through August on the Director-General issue). Hopefully, there will be clarification on the process agreed to and whether Members need to address selecting an acting Director-General in the next several weeks.

Boxes that different candidates fill

The search for a new Director-General is presumably a search for the most qualified person to take on the task at the given point in time. But there are many qualifications/characteristics that get talked about as potentially relevant or that Members may focus on in deciding which candidate is preferred.

There is in the procedures the characteristic of geographical diversity where candidates are equally qualified. Two candidates are from Africa which has not had a Director-General of the WTO (or of the GATT before it). There has not been a Director-General from North America (though some may view the Mexican candidate from the characteristic of Mexico being a Latin country following the current DG from Brazil). Europe has had many DGs in the WTO and GATT (including Pascal Lamy from France before the current DG); while Moldova has never presented a candidate for DG before, being European could be viewed as a negative by those focused on geographical diversity. There has been one Asian DG, though no one from Korea.

All DGs to date have been men. Two candidates (Nigeria and Korea) are women. The desire to have a woman Director-General at this time could be a consideration for some Members in the DG selection process.

All candidates except the Nigerian candidate have extensive trade backgrounds. While there have been DGs where the DG had no significant trade background, the lack of trade background could be viewed by some Members as a negative for the Nigerian candidate if depth of knowledge of the WTO is considered important at this juncture with the various crises engulfing the WTO.

All candidates except the Egyptian candidate have held high political positions (e.g., ambassador, minister, etc.) in their governments (whether trade or non-trade). For those Members viewing political experience as relevant, this could be a negative for the Egyptian candidate.

Two candidates (Mexico and Nigeria) have extensive experience with other multilateral organizations as well as experience with their home governments. For those who view trade as importantly being interrelated with finances and investment, such experiences could be viewed as a plus for these candidates.

The characteristic of whether a country is a developed or developing country, which has been viewed as relevant by some Members in the past, would seem to be irrelevant if the number of candidates remains at five as all of the candidates are from developing countries based on WTO self-selection (although both Mexico and Korea are OECD members and Moldova is an Eastern European country that has been negotiating with the EU).

Conclusion

Each of the five candidates (and more if additional candidates are put forward tomorrow) will have the chance to present their thoughts on leading the WTO next week to the General Council and to answer questions posed by Members. The WTO Members have important decisions to make on whether to truncate the time for outreach by candidates and the time for consultations with the Chair of the General Council and his facilitators on the selection of a new Director-General. Depending on the timeline agreed to, there may also be the need for WTO Members to select an acting Director-General from the four Deputy Directors-General. Members will likely need to include some engagement during August even if wishing a longer period for selecting the new DG to engage in the selection of an acting DG. Look for a busy summer and possibly rest of 2020 before a new Director-General is in place.

COVID-19 — the sharp expansion of new cases will put increased pressure on finding vaccines and therapeutics and complicate global economic recovery

The last two weeks have seen an extraordinary explosion of new cases of COVID-19 in the United States, the rest of the Americas, and in many developing and least developed countries in Asia and Africa. Total infections globally now exceed 11.2 million up close to 2.5 million in the last two weeks (from 8.767 million) and up close to 100% from the two week period ending May 24. All figures are taken from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control daily reports.

The top five countries in the world with most cases account for 53.94% of global cases through July 5 and are:

United States 2,839, 542

Brazil 1,577,004

Russia 674,515

India 673,165

Peru 299,080

Three of these countries (the United States, Brazil and India) have not yet reached a peak and had the three largest number of new cases in the last two weeks — 584,423 for the U.S.; 509,425 for Brazil; 262,704 for India. While Russia and Peru appear to have peaked (last two weeks are 28.89% and 37.18% below their respective peak periods), the number of new cases in the last two weeks was the fourth and eight largest of any country (97,563 for Russia; 47,742 for Peru). The top five countries for cases to date also accounted for 60.81% of new cases during the last two weeks.

The U.S. which had seemingly peaked in the two weeks end April 26 at 409,102 and seen declines to 297,391 for the two weeks ending June 7, has seen a resurgence since then (335,058 for two weeks ending June 21) with a staggering growth in the last two weeks to 584,423 new cases. Thus, the U.S. has seen a dramatic growth in cases — up 96.52% from the June 7th two weeks; up 74.42% from the prior two weeks ending June 21; and up 42.86% since the prior peak for the two weeks ending April 26.

The United States has been in the process of opening up over the last two months after lockdowns in most states and has seen dramatic growth in cases in large parts of the country (south, southwest, west coast), with some substantial contraction in areas hardest hit back in March and April (Middle Atlantic states including New York and New Jersey). While other countries that have been opening up have had some resurgence as well (e.g., France, Germany, South Korea, Japan), the growth has been from very low numbers and has typically been relatively small absolute increases.

The United States is the only developed country to be having the challenges it is having getting the COVID-19 pandemic under control. Indeed, no other developed country has not peaked in the number of new cases. All other developed countries have generally seen very large decreases in the number of new cases from their peaks back in March or April. Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases in the U.S., has warned that the United States could reach infection rates of 100,000 cases per day without increased adherence to the straightforward but challenging control criteria of social distancing, wearing masks, handwashing, testing, tracing and isolation.

With mixed messages from government leaders at the federal, state and local levels, with COVID-19 fatigue among many U.S. residents, and with lower rates of infection and generally less severe infections for younger people (leading many to be less concerned about the pandemic), the path forward in the U.S. is unclear particularly prior to the development of effective vaccines and therapeutics.

So large are the increases in new cases from the U.S., Brazil and India in the last two weeks that the U.S. and Brazil’s two week totals exceed the total cases since December 31 for all other countries except Russia and India; India’s new cases over the last two weeks exceed every country’s total number of COVID-19 cases since December 31 except the U.S., Brazil, Russia, Peru, Chile, and the United Kingdom).

The alarming rate of growth in the United States is masking the focus on the rapid growth of the pandemic in many developing and least developed countries. For countries with the largest number of confirmed cases, Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, Nigeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iraq, and the Philippines are seeing cases grow in number with no peak as yet. This is also true among many countries in the Middle East where World Bank listings would not have them as lower income countries – Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. For the developing and least developed countries who are not among the forty-two countries who account for 90.62% of total cases through July 5, the rate of growth of new cases in the last two weeks is roughly 50% greater than for the 42 countries — 39.59% increase versus 26.87% increase (47.34% greater).

So the pandemic continues to grow rapidly and is affecting an increasing number of developing and least developed countries. The WHO has repeatedly reviewed the steps any country needs to take to bring the COVID-19 pandemic under control. See WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 – 1 July 2020, https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19—1-july-2020. The world is not adhering to the required steps, at least for many countries including the United States.

Trade implications

Prior posts have reviewed the array of health and economic challenges for governments that are going through increasing cases during the pandemic. The WTO and others have cataloged the number of export restraints on medical goods imposed by certain countries during the pandemic. Because of the huge increase in demand that occurs for many medical goods when the pandemic spreads in a country, the world has been faced with challenges of adequacy of supplies, openness of markets, and ability to ramp up production as needed. While some restraints have been lifted, many continue. There have also been some export restraints on agricultural goods introduced by countries concerned about access to food supplies during the pandemic despite no actual global food shortage for major crops.

There also have been many efforts at liberalization by countries as they attempt to lower the cost of imported medical goods, streamline customs procedures to expedite delivery of goods, maintain open markets and for other reasons.

Groups of countries at the WTO, in the G20 and through other entities have put forward a range of proposals and action steps to ensure that trade plays its part in minimizing the downside to countries from the pandemic both in terms of health consequences and in terms of economic activity.

With rapidly growing numbers of new COVID-19 cases, one can predict that pressures will continue on export restraints and on needed efforts to ramp up production and inventories of key medical goods. As the number of tests, number of hospitalizations and other medical activities increase, governments will be struggling to find supplies. The United States has had significant problems in the past and will likely experience medical goods shortages again if the number of new cases in the U.S. is not brought under control.

For many developing and least developed countries, there are joint efforts by countries through the Supply Chain Task Force (chaired by the World Health Organization and World Food Programme) to identify medical equipment needs and to work to develop contracts to secure needed supplies and get them to the countries in need. See COVID-19 supply chain system, requesting and receiving supplies, https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/covid-19-supply-chain-system-requesting-and-receiving-supplies. The write-up explaining how it operates is embedded below and reflects the global commitment to see that both medical goods and any eventual vaccines and therapeutics and improved diagnostics are equitably available at affordable prices.

covid-19-supply-chain-system-requesting-and-receiving-supplies-2

While the joint efforts of various UN and other organizations are providing assistance to some 130 countries, challenges exist both as to funding and to access to adequate supplies as demand grows. Below are notes for the record from the Supply Chain Task Force meeting of 23 June 2020 followed by the catalogue of products being covered by the Emergency Global Supply Chain System.

supply-chain-taskforce-nfrs-20200623

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Availability of medical goods should improve as many countries who have gone through the worst of the pandemic (at least phase 1) who produce medical goods are increasingly in a position to increase exports. The challenges will be with overall global capacity and whether certain countries tie up global supplies to safeguard against growing demand in the current phase or to develop inventories should there be a second phase.

Vaccines and therapeutics – developments and challenges for access

There have been extraordinary efforts to ramp up research and development around the world to address COVID-19. Through the WHO and other efforts, there have been greater efforts at coordination of R&D and at the identification of gaps in knowledge and research. Large sums are being committed by some countries and NGOs to help ensure that all countries will have access to vaccines and therapeutics that get developed and that such access will be at affordable prices.

On July 1-2, the WHO held a two day virtual conference both to track progress on COVID-19 research and development efforts and to identify new research priorities. See https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/global-scientific-community-unites-to-track-progress-on-covid-19-r-d-identifies-new-research-priorities-and-critical-gaps.

The WHO has a summary table that shows where different vaccine development projects are. The document is embedded below.

novel-coronavirus-landscape-covid-19-1

However, a major challenge for equitable and affordable access to both vaccines and therapeutics involves the needs of major governments to lock- up capacity for potential vaccines and early therapeutics to take care of their own populations regardless of global giving events or commitments of individual countries to the principles of equitable and affordable access for all.

Prior posts have reviewed efforts of the United States, the European Union and others to lock up large quantities of vaccines from particular manufacturers of vaccines in trials should the trials prove successful. Most countries don’t have the financial capabilities to copy that approach. In addition, many vaccine trials are in China by Chinese pharmaceutical companies raising questions as to how vaccines developed by those companies (in which the Chinese government has investments for some or all of the companies) will be handled and made available to other countries with needs.

Developments in the last week show the challenge will apply equally with therapeutics that are viewed as effective in treating COVID-19. For example, there is one treatment which to date has been shown to shorten the recovery time in patients who have COVID-19. The product is remdesivir produced by U.S. company Gilead. A preliminary report on the results of testing of remdesivir was published in May 2020. See The New England Journal of Medicine, Remdesivir for the Treatment of COVID-19 — Preliminary Report, May 22, 2020.

In a July 4 article in The Guardian, entitled, “Trump is scooping up the world’s remdesivir. It’s a sign of things to come,” the author states “Trump boasted this week that the US had bought the world’s entire supply of remdesivir, the antiviral drug produced by the U.S. biotechnology company Gilead. Though low- and middle-income countries can still produce their own generic versions of the drug, European and other high-income countries are not able to buy remdesivir or produce it for three months. Fortunately the UK and Germany have stockpiled enough of the drug to treat all the patients who need it.” https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jul/04/trump-remdesivir-covid-19-drug.

A Reuters article from July 3rd reviews remdesivir getting conditional EU clearance. See Reuters, Gilead’s COVID-19 antiviral remdesivir gets conditional EU clearance, July 3, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-eu-remdesivir/gileads-covid-19-antiviral-remdesivir-gets-conditional-eu-clearance-idUSKBN2441GK. “”The EU’s green light broadens the use of remdesivir around the world – the United States has cleaered it for emergency use and it is also approved as a COVID-19 therapy in Japan, Taiwan, India, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates, Gilead said on Friday.”

It is fair to say that with the huge growth in the number of confirmed cases in the U.S. and with the U.S.’s control of supply for the next three months, remdesivir is likely the poster child of the challenges the global community will face in ensuring equitable and affordable access to vaccines and therapeutics going forward.

Conclusion

More than six months into the COVID-19 pandemic, the world continues on a sharp upward trajectory of new cases with a major shift from developed countries to developing and least developed countries as nearly all developed countries (excluding the United States) have managed to get the pandemic under control. With the United States apparently unable to get its house in order, there will be increased stress on medical goods supplies as demand from the U.S. will certainly continue to grow. Global efforts to arrange supplies for developing and least developed countries are showing some positive results. However, such efforts will become more challenging in the coming months as the number of cases in those countries continue to surge and those countries and buying groups compete with the U.S. for supplies.

It has long been known that the world would not be safe from COVID-19 until there were vaccines and therapeutics equitably available to all. For that to be the case, the vaccines and therapeutics need to be affordable for all.

There has historically been the perceived need for countries with the means to secure supplies for their populations during pandemics before making supplies available to all on an equitable basis and at affordable prices. With the COVID-19 seemingly out of control in the United States, there is little doubt that the United States will be doing its best to lock up supplies of vaccines and therapeutics as it has done and as it apparently will need to do to get to the other side of the pandemic.

Activities by the U.S., the EU and others on arranging commitments for promising vaccines and therapeutics will make the global objective of equitable and affordable access harder to achieve.

The reasons for optimism that a better approach will be followed during this pandemic include commitments made by many countries to ensure equitable access at affordable prices, the existence of multilateral organizations working to get getting vaccines to those in need, and the global footprint of at least some of the major companies and consortia developing vaccines and therapeutics which should provide regional production capabilities better able to service global demand.

Look for a challenging rest of 2020 and first half of 2021.

WTO Dispute Settlement — How to Handle Allegations That an Appellate Body Member is Affiliated with a Government and Hence Not Properly an Appellate Body Member?

In the first twenty-five years of the World Trade Organization, there have generally been few challenges to Appellate Body members in terms of violations of their obligations under Art. 17.3 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding or of the Rules of Conduct, WTO/DSB/RC/1.

The dispute brought by Canada against a countervailing duty order issued by the United States on supercalendered paper from Canada has resulted in such an issue arising. The WTO summary of the case is contained here, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds505_e.htm. The Appellate Body Report was circulated on February 6, 2020 under the document number WT/DS505/AB/R.

The United States had taken an appeal from certain aspects of the panel report. At the Dispute Settlement Body meeting of February 26, 2020, the U.S. had objected to the DSB considering the Appellate Body report as invalid for various reasons, including the fact that two of the three AB members’ terms had expired and had not received authorization from the DSB to continue to participate in appeals, that the report was issued far beyond the maximum 90 days laid out in the DSU (Art. 17.5 of the DSU). Most importantly, the United States claimed that the third person hearing the appeal was in fact affiliated with a government in contravention of DSU 17.3 and that her participation in the appeal was inappropriate for that reason and the fact that many of the cases relied upon by Canada to establish a practice were cases involving the government of China, the government with which the AB member was allegedly affiliated creating justifiable doubts as to the person’s independence or impartiality (WT/DSB/RC/1, Art. III.1). The U.S. position was that in light of the problems, the only consensus possible would be a positive consensus and that the U.S. would agree to a positive consensus on certain findings by the panel that were not appealed by the U.S.

Canada, the EU, and China all made comments at the DSB meeting in late February. Canada argued that despite the allegations raised by the US which should be looked at but not in the context of a DSB meeting, the DSB would adopt the Appellate Body report absent negative consensus. China agreed and defended the Appellate Body member who was from China. The EU reviewed procedures for raising the types of allegations raised by the US but like Canada and China viewed the DSU as mandating adoption of the AB report where a negative consensus did not exist.

The U.S. did not agree that adoption was permitted or appropriate and continued to oppose. The WTO webpage coverage of the dispute view the AB and panel reports as adopted on 5 March 2020. The minutes of the WTO DSB meeting of February 28 and March 5, 2020 are presented in WT/DSB/M/441 at pages 18-25 (14 May 2020). The document is embedded below and the reader is encouraged to read the discussion on those pages in full to understand the competing positions of the parties and major third parties.

WTDSBM441

While the Rules of Conduct describe a process for presenting information “of a material violation of the obligations of independence, impartiality, or confidentiality or the avoidance of direct or indirect conflicts of interest by covered persons which may impair the integrity, impartiality or confidentiality of the dispute settlement mechanism,” parties are told “at the earliest possible time and on a confidential basis, submit such evidence to the Chair of the DSB, the Director-General or the Standing Appellate Body, as appropriate.” WT/DSB/RC/1 Art. VIII.1. Paragraph 2 of Art. VIII says that the alleged failure to disclose by itself is not a sufficient ground for disqualification “unless there is also evidence of a material violation of the obligations of independence, impartiality, confidentiality or the avoidance of direct or indirect conflicts of interests and that the integrity, impartiality or confidentiality of the dispute settlement mechanism would be impaired thereby.”

Paragraphs 14-17 address how to address alleged violations by a member of the Appellate Body basically calling for the information to be shared with the other party to the dispute and to the Standing Appellate Body.

But the basic premise of the Rules of Conduct is that allegations and resolutions will occur before the panel or Appellate Body process is complete to permit time to substitute a new panelist or an Appellate Body member into the dispute before final resolution.

Challenges of the Supercalendered Paper case

After December 10, 2019, there was only one Appellate Body member. The United States communicated with the Director-General of the WTO and the Chair of the Dispute Settlement Body (the other two entities to whom evidence of possible violations could be sent if other than an Appellate Body member) on January 30, 2020 about the alleged violation of the one remaining AB member as she was affiliated with the government of China and the case, while brought by Canada involved mainly cases in which China was involved. While the evidence wasn’t sent to the Standing Appellate Body, that was not a practical option under the circumstances.

It is unclear whether the Director-General or the Chair of the Dispute Settlement Body did anything with the information provided. Certainly, no action was expeditiously undertaken to permit a resolution of the allegation before the time when the DSB would take up the Appellate Body Report and panel report. There is no reference in the minutes of the March 5, 2020 meeting to any action being taken.

The position of Canada and the EU was that the U.S. would have to wait until the Appellate Body was functioning again to have the issue reviewed. Yet such an approach is counter to the need to determine whether a material violation has occurred expeditiously so that corrective action (e.g., replacement of AB member or panelist) could occur if appropriate.

What is clear is that a system which doesn’t permit the timely evaluation of allegations against the propriety of an Appellate Body member, a panelist or other individual involved in the dispute settlement system, serving on a dispute weakens the integrity of the system and the perceived impartiality of the AB members and panelists.

Nor have Canada, the EU, China or others identified what a later review of allegations would permit in terms of correction of the particular dispute if the allegations are deemed to be confirmed. Nor do the Rules of Conduct seem to provide for retroactive correction of earlier disputes where a panelist or Appellate Body with a demonstrated serious violation of obligations served (and hence either there may have been a split decision on certain issues if there was a dissenting view and where you would not have had three proper AB members participate).

One would assume that the U.S. will make addressing these shortcomings in the existing system part of what needs to be addressed before the Appellate Body is reconstituted.

Continuing saga

Despite the fact that Canada agrees that the U.S. has raised serious issues, Canada has sought rights to retaliation and the topic was discussed at Monday’s Dispute Settlement Body meeting (June 29, 2020). The WTO press release on the meeting included this summary of the discussion of supercalendered paper:

“Paper from Canada

“Canada noted its request to suspend concessions against the United States for the US failure to comply with the WTO’s ruling in DS505. Canada said the US has neither informed the DSB of its intentions in regard to complying with the ruling, nor has it proposed a reasonable period of time to ensure compliance. Thus, Canada was pursuing its right to retaliate.

“The United States objects to the premise that the DSB adopted the ruling in this dispute on 5 March. The US position is that there was no valid Appellate Body report, and there was no consensus for the DSB to adopt the ruling. The report was not valid for three reasons: 1) the ruling was issued after the 90-day deadline set under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU); 2)
two of the Appellate Body members were not authorized by the DSB to continue working on the case after their terms as members expired; and 3) the third Appellate Body member — Hong Zhao of China — was disqualified from serving as a member because she currently serves as vice president of an academy which is a public institution under Chinese law and subordinate to China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), and thus she was neither independent nor impartial.

“The US also said Canada was not suffering any trade impact from the measures in question, particularly since the countervailing duties had been removed two years earlier. Nevertheless, the US said it had objected to the Canadian request on 26 June, meaning that the matter is automatically referred to WTO arbitration.

“Canada was joined by China, the EU, Japan, Australia and Mexico in rejecting the notion that the Appellate Body ruling in DS505 was not valid and that the DSB never adopted the ruling. Canada said the minutes of the DSB meeting on 5 March show that the ruling was adopted on the basis of Article 17.14 of the DSU, whereby a ruling can only be rejected if all WTO members present agree to reject it. Canada added that its request is based on a formula to ensure that retaliation can be exercised only if and when the US applies its WTO-inconsistent ongoing conduct to imports from Canada in the future.

“China rejected the accusations that Ms Zhao was not impartial and independent, declaring that the Chinese institute with which she is affiliated is an independent legal entity, and that the US raised no objections to her when she was first appointed to the WTO, nor when she was involved in rulings that were favorable to the United States.

“The US countered that China has not denied US statements regarding Ms Zhao’s affiliation with the institute and its affiliation with, and financial support from, MOFCOM.”

https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/dsb_29jun20_e.htm.

The United States releases its statement to the Dispute Settlement Body meetings on the US Mission Geneva webpage. See Statement of the United States at the Dispute Settlement Body Meeting, Geneva, June 29, 2020, https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Jun29.DSB_.Stmt_.as-deliv.fin_.public13218.pdf The relevant portion (pages 20-24) of the U.S. statement this past Monday is copied below.

“12. UNITED STATES – COUNTERVAILING MEASURES ON SUPERCALENDERED PAPER FROM CANADA

“A. RECOURSE TO ARTICLE 22.2 OF THE DSU BY CANADA (WT/DS505/13)

“ On June 18, 2020, Canada filed a request that the DSB authorize Canada to suspend concessions because it considers that the United States failed to comply with the recommendations of the DSB.

“ The United States objects to the premise of Canada’s request, which is that the DSB adopted recommendations in this dispute on March 5, 2020. As we will explain again, the position of the United States is that no DSB recommendation was or could be adopted because there was no valid Appellate Body report, and there was no consensus for the DSB to adopt the reports.

“ The United States has also repeatedly expressed concern that Canada continues to pursue a dispute that has no real world effect on Canadian exporters – a fact conceded by Canada’s recent request.

“ Canada’s request asks for authorization based on speculation – that is, related to an alleged nullification or impairment that occurs ‘if the ‘ongoing conduct’ continues to exist and [if it] applies to exports from Canada in the future’.

“ Canada is unable to even assert that it suffers from any nullification or impairment today because the alleged conduct is not applied to any Canadian good.

“ Only one determination in this dispute involved Canada – Supercalendered Paper – and that countervailing duty order was revoked two years ago.

“ Therefore, Canada suffers no nullification or impairment from the alleged measure, nor can it say that the alleged measure continues to exist, nor that Canada will suffer nullification or impairment in the future.

“ Nevertheless – and without prejudice to the U.S. position that no recommendations were adopted by the DSB – by letter dated June 26, 2020, the United States also objected to the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations proposed by Canada.

“ Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, the filing of the objection by the United States automatically results in the matter being referred to arbitration. Article 22.6 does not refer to any decision by the DSB, and no decision is therefore required or possible.

“ Consequently, because of the U.S. objection under Article 22.6, the matter already has been referred to arbitration. Although unnecessary, the DSB may take note of that fact and confirm that it may not therefore consider Canada’s request for authorization.

“ The United States recalls that at the March 5, 2020, DSB meeting, we did not join a consensus to adopt the reports put forward. There were multiple reasons why the appellate document was not a valid Appellate Body report under Article 17 of the DSU. First, the DSB had taken no action to permit two ex-AB members to continue to serve after their terms expired; second, the report was not issued within 90 days, as required by Article 17.5; and third, one person serving was affiliated with the Government of China, and therefore was not a valid member of the Appellate Body under Article 17.3.12

“ Indeed, separate from this dispute, on January 31, 2020, the United States informed the WTO Director-General and the DSB Chair by letter of discovered information that disqualified a Chinese national, Ms. Zhao, from the Appellate Body.

“ At the March 5 meeting, the United States detailed for Members the evidence demonstrating that Ms. Zhao is not “unaffiliated with any government.” No information has been presented, before, during, or after the March 5 DSB meeting that contradicts that evidence.

“ Because of Ms. Zhao’s affiliation with the Government of China, the appellate document is not a valid Appellate Body report because it had not been provided and circulated on behalf of three Appellate Body members, as required under DSU Article 17.1.

“ At the March 5 DSB meeting, Canada agreed that the allegations of Ms. Zhao’s lack of independence are serious and stated that they deserve full and impartial consideration. Canada asserted that the Rules of Conduct addressed such situations.

“ The United States agrees with Canada’s apparent concern that Ms. Zhao’s participation in the appeal may also be inconsistent with the Rules of Conduct.

“ The procedures under the Rules of Conduct for the Appellate Body itself to conduct an inquiry are not available in current circumstances. However, this does not mean that no inquiry may be conducted. To the contrary, in general the Rules provide for the DSB Chair or the Director-General to conduct the relevant inquiry.

“ The DSB Chair and Director-General would be natural leaders of such an inquiry given their roles in the WTO dispute settlement system and the trust Members repose in them.

“ The United States notes that the conduct at issue also would have constituted a breach of the obligation in DSU Article 17.3 to avoid a direct or indirect conflict of interest.13 Ms. Zhao was demonstrably connected with the Chinese Government, which had a direct interest in this appeal as the “ongoing conduct” complained of related almost exclusively to China.14 This reinforces the importance of an alternative form of ethical inquiry.

“ Therefore, given Canada’s acknowledgement of serious issues of independence and impartiality, the United States would support an alternative inquiry under the Rules of Conduct.

“ Even aside from the fact that Ms. Zhao was not a valid Appellate Body member under DSU Article 17.3, such an inquiry would confirm her disqualification from serving on the appeal.

“Second Intervention

“ Canada asserts that the appellate report must have been adopted by negative consensus. But it is evident that not any document issued with the title “Report of the Appellate Body” is such a document. For example, if such a document were signed by three members of the Appellate Body Secretariat, no one would seriously argue the report must be adopted by the DSB by negative consensus. That is because the alleged “Report” would not be consistent with DSU Article 17, which requires an appeal to be decided by three Appellate Body members.15

“ In this dispute, the facts are not seriously contested. First, the DSB had taken no action to permit two ex-AB members to continue to serve after their terms expired; this is evident from the fact that no such decision was ever proposed to the DSB.

“ Second, the report was not issued within 90 days, as required by Article 17.5; this too is not contested.

“ Third, one Appellate Body member was affiliated with the Government of China; as the United States has pointed out, the evidence of affiliation brought forward by the United States has not been directly contested. Therefore, this affiliated person was not a valid member of the Appellate Body under Article 17.3.

“ Given that there was no valid Appellate Body report before the DSB, the document could not be adopted by negative consensus under Article 17.14 as that rule did not attach to this document. Therefore, the DSB could only adopt the document by positive consensus. The United States made clear at the DSB meeting that it objected and did not join a consensus on adoption.

“ As there was no consensus for adoption, the DSB did not adopt any reports in this dispute. Accordingly, there was no recommendation for the United States to bring a measure into conformity with a covered agreement.

“ Regarding Canada’s comments concerning application of the Rules of Conduct, we note these rules were agreed by Members in order to help preserve the integrity and impartiality of the WTO dispute settlement system. That does not mean that the Rules are all that is necessary to do so. Rather, first and foremost, it is for WTO Members, and all participants in the system, to take responsibility for safeguarding that system.

“ When Canada says only the Appellate Body may apply the obligations of impartiality and independence to a person serving on an appeal, and therefore the Rules cannot be applied now, Canada would actually use the Rules to undermine the integrity and impartiality of the WTO.

“ If there are valid ethical concerns with the service by a person in an appeal, they should be investigated. It would be thoroughly inconsistent with our experience and close relationship with Canada to see it defend the behavior of the Chinese official in this dispute.

“ And there is no question that Ms. Zhao’s professional connections with the Government of China raise serious ethical concerns. For instance, given Ms. Zhao’s professional connections with the Government of China, her participation in the appeal is not consistent with the obligations to be ‘independent and impartial’ and ‘avoid direct or indirect conflicts of interest,’ provided for in paragraph II:1 of the Rules of Conduct.16

“ We therefore look forward to further conversations with Canada to find a shared approach through which we can maintain the integrity and impartiality of WTO dispute settlement.

“ At the March 5 DSB meeting and again today, China has responded to the evidence explained by the United States. Importantly, and revealingly, China has not denied the following:

“o Ms. Zhao serves as Vice President of MOFCOM-AITEC.

“o Ms. Zhao receives or has received a salary for her position of Vice President.

“o MOFCOM-AITEC is an “affiliated” entity “subordinate” to MOFCOM.

“o MOFCOM-AITEC’s budget is part of MOFCOM’s budget, such that the salary for Ms. Zhao’s Vice President position at MOFCOM-AITEC is funded by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

“ The fact that China did not deny these statements or assert that they are incorrect only confirms that Ms. Zhao is affiliated with the Government of China and is therefore not a valid member of the Appellate Body.

“12 See U.S. Statement at the March 5, 2020, Meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body (Item 8).

“13 See DSU Art. 17.3 (“They [persons serving on the Appellate Body] shall not participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct or indirect conflict of interest.”).

“14 See United States – Countervailing Measures on Supercalendered Paper from Canada (Panel), WT/DS505/R, para. 7.295 and Tables 1-4 (seven of nine proceedings involving China).

“15 DSU Art. 17.1 (“The Appellate Body shall hear appeals from panel cases. It shall be composed of seven persons, three of whom shall serve on any one case.”).

“16 Rules of Conduct, Section II (“Governing Principle”), para. 1 (“Each person covered by these Rules … shall be independent and impartial [and] shall avoid direct or indirect conflicts of interest . . . so that through the observance of such standards of conduct the integrity and impartiality of that mechanism are preserved.”).”

Conclusion

The dispute settlement system at the WTO is facing challenges flowing from long standing concerns about the Appellate Body conforming to the limited role given it by the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the expansive reading of the Appellate Body’s role by AB members over time and the largely ineffective negotiating function of the WTO which has prevented meaningful oversight of the Appellate Body by WTO Members.

Added to the longstanding concerns raised by the United States and others comes a concern that goes to the heart of the dispute settlement system’s legitimacy — the need for impartial decision making and how to ensure prompt resolution of allegations of violations of obligations by AB members or panelists. The allegations against the remaining Appellate Body member raised by the United States in the supercalendered paper dispute have not been addressed by the Director-General of the WTO or by the Chair of the Dispute Settlement Body. Other WTO Members seem to be willing to see challenged reports adopted instead of having allegations pursued. Adopting a report put out by the AB including the challenged member and Canada’s pursuit of retaliation rights make a mockery of a properly functioning system and will do lasting harm to the DSB’s legitimacy. And so the downward spiral at the WTO continues in its dispute settlement function.

COVID-19, EU move to permit some international travel in addition to intra-EU travel, effects on tourism

Many countries have imposed travel restrictions on visitors from other countries during the COVID-19 pandemic. The International Air Transport Association (“IATA”) reports that there are 163 countries that have some travel restrictions and that 96 countries impose quarantine requirements. See IATA, COVID-19 Government Public Health Mitigation Measures, https://www.iata.org/en/programs/covid-19-resources-guidelines/covid-gov-mitigation/.

Travel and tourism is one of the most seriously harmed economic sectors from the global COVID-19 pandemic for many countries. The UN World Tourism Organization has created “the first global dashboard for tourism insights”. https://www.unwto.org/unwto-tourism-dashboard. The dashboard indicates that COVID-19 will result in the reduction of some 850 million to 1.1 billion tourists with a loss of US$ 910 billion to US $ 1.2 trillion in revenues from tourists with the potential loss of as many as 100-120 million jobs in the sector. These are obviously staggering figures for a sector that has contributed to global economic growth over recent decades. The dashboard has ten slides which shows data for tourism through April 2020 with some projected figures for full year 2020 under various assumptions. Data are presented both globally and for some slides by regions and in a few within regions by country. Thus, in slide 2, global tourism grew 2% in January 2020, declined 12% in February, declined 55% in March and declined 97% in April for a January-April total decline of 43.8%. By region, Europe declined 44%, Asia and the Pacific declined 51%, the Americas declined 36%, Africa declined 35%, and the Middle East declined 40%. While data for May and June are not yet available and may be less severe in terms of contraction than April, the decline in global tourism through June will likely exceed 50% and possibly be even more severe. For data through April 2020 see the link, https://www.unwto.org/international-tourism-and-covid-19.

In prior posts, I have provided background on the sector and the likely toll from the COVID-19 pandemic. See April 30, 2020, The collapse of tourism during the COVID-19 pandemic, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/04/30/the-collapse-of-tourism-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/; May 3, 2020, Update on the collapse of travel and tourism in response to COVID-19, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/05/03/update-on-the-collapse-of-travel-and-tourism-in-response-to-covid-19/.

As many countries in parts of Asia, Oceania, Europe and a few other countries have seen significant declines following first wave peaks of COVID-19 cases, restrictions within countries and increasingly on international travel are starting to be relaxed.

The European Union is a large tourist destination and on June 30 announced recommendations for member states to consider in opening up for tourists from both other EU countries and for travelers from outside of the area for nonessential travel. Specifically, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Recommendations on the temporary restriction on non-essential travel into the EU and the possible lifting of such restriction on 30 June 2020. See https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9208-2020-INIT/en/pdf. Intra EU travel, travel from Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and certain other countries is not part of the third country nonessential travel affected by the recommendations (to the extent adopted by EU members).

The EU Council selected third countries whom the Council recommended have access based on criteria which “relate to the epidemiological situation and containment measures, including physical distancing, as well as economic and social considerations, and are applied cumulatively.” Page 6. The Council lists three critieria: (1) whether the number of new cases over the last 14 days per 100,000 inhabitants is close to or below the EU average (15 June 2020); (2) whether the trend of new cases over the prior 14 day period is stable or decreasing; and (3) considering “the overall response to COVID-19 taking into account available information aspects such as testing, surveillance, contact tracing, containment, treatment and reporting as well as the reliability of available information and data sources and, if needed, the total average score across all dimensions for International Health Regulations (IHR).” Page 6.

Based on these criteria, the EU Council recommends that 15 countries (with China being subject to confirmation of reciprocity by China to EU travelers) “whose residents should not be affected by temporary external borders restriction on non-essential travel into the EU” (Annex I, page 9): Algeria, Australia, Canada, Georgia, Japan, Montenegro, Morocco, New Zealand, Rwanda, Serbia, South Korea, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay and China. The Council may review every two weeks whether the list should be modified.

Annex II to the Council recommendations provides an identification of travelers with essential functions for whom the restrictions should not apply. These include healthcare professionals, health researchers, and elderly care professionals, frontier workers, seasonal workers in agriculture, transport personnel, diplomatic personnel, passengers in transit, passengers traveling for “imperative family reasons,” seafarers, third-country nationals traveling for the purpose of study and a few others. Annex II, page 10.

The EU Council Recommendations are embedded below as is a Council press release on the recommendations.

ST_9208_2020_INIT_EN

Council-agrees-to-start-lifting-travel-restrictions-for-residents-of-some-third-countries-Consilium

Obviously many countries are not included on the list of third countries where loosening of restrictions on travel is recommended. The United States, Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa are just a few for whom nonessential travel restrictions are not recommended to be lifted. For most of these countries, either the number of new cases has not peaked or has not receded significantly.

For the EU, getting agreement among its members to lift travel restrictions for other EU countries and to start lifting restrictions for travelers from thrid countries has been important as the summer holiday season of July-August arrives. Data from EU tourism statistics showed 710 million international visitors in 2018 (when there were 28 EU members, including the UK). 81% or 575 million visitors were intra-EU, that is traveling from one EU country to another. Thus, for the EU, the biggest return of tourism business involves reopening to travelers from other EU countries. By contrast, visitors from third countries in total were some 19% of the total or 135 million visitors. The US accounted for 11.6% of third country visitors in 2017, some 15.7 million in number. While an important source of third country tourists, The U.S. was just a little over 2.2 percent of total EU global visitors. See http://www.condorferries.co.uk (tourism in Europe statistics). Thus, for tourism, the EU’s reopening recommendations will not return travel and tourism to pre-COVID-19 levels. But the partial reopening could result in a significant rebound in its tourism sector which will be good news for EU businesses involved in the travel and tourism space. Time will tell just how much of a rebound actually occurs.

For other nations, the more countries who get COVID-19 under control and are thus able to open international travel and tourism responsibly, the greater the likely rebound in global travel and tourism will be. However, because many businesses in the travel and tourism space in any country are small businesses, the risk for many countries (whether in the EU or elsewhere) is that the rebound whenever it occurs will happen with a much smaller business base to serve customers. While governments can provide targeted assistance through legislative initiatives, operating conditions for many such businesses post opening do not permit profitable operation where social distancing and other important steps remain critical to safe functioning. So unlike other global crises in the past, there may be large and permanent job losses in the travel and tourism sector flowing from COVID-19.

WTO Dispute Settlement – With Appellate Body Currently Non-Operational, AB Secretariat Personnel Have Been Shifted to Other Divisions

As of December 11, 2019, there was only one remaining Appellate Body member whose term had not expired. Agreement amongst WTO Members permitted a number of pending appeals (those where hearings had already happened) to be completed even though this would mean completion by individuals whose terms had terminated but who would operate under AB rule 15. The last Appellate Body reports were released on June 9, 2020. AUSTRALIA – CERTAIN MEASURES CONCERNING TRADEMARKS, GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AND OTHER PLAIN PACKAGING REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO TOBACCO PRODUCTS AND PACKAGING, WT/DS435/AB/R and WT/DS441/AB/R (9 June 2020).

The WTO has contractual arrangements with the remaining Appellate Body member and with many of the Appellate Body Secretariat staff. As a result, the WTO Director-General has worked to move the AB Secretariat staff to other Divisions within the WTO in light of the reduced 2020 Appellate Body budget, the reduced workload and now the termination (at least temporarily) of any work by the Appellate Body.

For example, the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration meeting of March 9, 2020 had an appearance by Director-General Azevedo. The write-up on the meeting noted that “Turning to the Appellate Body Secretariat, the Director-General observed that until a political agreement emerges as to the format of the future appeals process, 23 staff members of the Appellate Body Secretariat have been temporarily re-assigned to other Divisions.” Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration, Report of meeting held on 9 March 2020, WT/BFA/185/Rev. 1 at para. 1.10.

Last Friday, June 26, 2020, Director-General Azevedo wrote to all the WTO membership to alert them to the creation of a new Division on July 1 “responsible for Knowledge and Information Management, Academic Outreach and the WTO Chair’s Programme”. The new Division will be headed by Mr. Werner Zdouc who was being reassigned. Mr. Zdouc has since 2006 served as the director of the Appellate Body Secretariat. It is assumed that by July 1st all Appellate Body Secretariat staff have either left the WTO or been reassigned. The June 26 letter is embedded below.

DG-letter-to-PRs-re-New-Division-Zdouc-June-2020

Press accounts from 2019 suggested that Mr. Zdouc was viewed as contributing to the problems at the Appellate Body long complained of by the United States and some others, particularly on the issue of precedent (i.e., whether AB reports were precedential) and on the practical problem of whether the Appellate Body would correct elements of decisions that were viewed as wrongly decided by Members. See Inside U.S. Trade’s World Trade Online, Appellate Body’s future could depend on whether its director keeps his job, December 8, 2019.

Movement of WTO Appellate Body Secretariat staff doesn’t end the conflict on second-tier review

While there has been hope amongst some that WTO Members would continue to pursue in 2020 a path to reform that would permit the reactivating of the Appellate Body, that hope seems to have no short-term prospect for fulfillment.

Parties remain locked in their existing positions. With U.S. elections scheduled for November, some WTO Members may be deciding that they will simply await the outcome of the election before further engaging. Ambassador Lighthizer said at the recent U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means hearing on the President’s 2020 trade agenda that it would be ok if the Appellate Body never comes back.

Without an operational Appellate Body, WTO Members have various options including arbitration under DSU Article 25. However, there are ongoing skirmishes at the WTO pertaining to the coverage of costs by the WTO of arbitration costs for Members pursuing arbitration through the interim arbitration agreement to which the EU, Canada, China and many other countries are signatories. See JOB/DSB/1/Add. 12, 13 and 14.

During the 2020 budget discussions held at the end of 2019, the U.S. had pushed for a clarification for how arbitrators would be paid (same as panelists which was significantly lower than AB member daily charges; no monthly retainer) and for a reduction in the Appellate Body budget in light of the lack of sufficient AB members. See, e.g., Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration, Report of the Meeting Held on 12 and 27 November and 5 December 2019, WT/BFA/183 (6 December 2019).

Recent press accounts have reported that there continue to be challenges by the United States to the interim arbitration agreement on various fronts including payment from the WTO budget. See Inside U.S. Trade’s World Trade Online, June 12, 2020, Shea: U.S. opposes use of WTO budget for interim appellate plan (article includes a link to the June 5 letter from Amb. Shea to DG Azevedo). As stated in Amb. Shea’s June 5th letter to DG Azevedo, the U.S. objects to the interim arbitration agreement that the EU, China and others are party to because it “exacerbates some of the worst aspects of the Appellate Body’s practices.” The U.S. also objected “to the use of WTO budget funds for a process that is clearly far more than a simple Article 25 arbitration.” The letter is embedded below.

June-5-2020-letter-from-Amb.-Shea-to-DG-Azevedo

Conclusion

With a reduced 2020 budget for the Appellate Body and with the conclusion of disputes on which Appellate Body reports will be prepared until such time as the Appellate Body is reactivated, the WTO has reassigned Appellate Body Secretariat staff to other divisions and has started a new division which will be headed by the former Director of the Appellate Body Secretariat.

Unfortunately, shifting personnel to different divisions does nothing to eliminate the deep divisions on how to proceed with dispute settlement after panel reports. Moreover, there is no apparent willingness to move reform of the dispute settlement system forward at the present time. Efforts by the EU and others to create an interim process that mirror many of the problems found in the Appellate Body practices have simply moved the deep divisions among Members over the Appellate Body into what is permissible under DSU Art. 25. So we will have a crisis in the dispute settlement area at least until 2021 and probably beyond.

EC Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan withdraws his name from consideration for WTO Director-General

An Bloomberg article last week indicated that the Irish Government would be nominating Phil Hogan as a candidate for position of next Director-General of the World Trade Organization.

Today, Commissioner Hogan issued a statement indicating that he would not be putting his name forward in light of the important trade issues facing the EU and the expected delays in completing the selection process which would require him to be absent for a considerable period from the EC Commissioner post. See Statement by Commissioner Phil Hogan on election of new WTO Director-General, 29 June 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/hogan/announcements/statement-commissioner-phil-hogan-election-new-wto-director-general_en. The statement is embedded below.

Statement-by-Commissioner-Phil-Hogan-on-election-of-new-WTO-Director-General-_-European-Commission

The announcement leaves the number of candidates at five (Jesus Seade Kuri from Mexico, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala from Nigeria, Abdel-Hamid Mamdouh from Egypt, Tudor Ulianovschi from Moldova, and Yoo Myung-hee from Korea). None of the candidates is from a developed country (as understood within the WTO). Some have suggested that the WTO has moved to an informal rotation between developed and developing Member candidates when selecting a Director-General. Since Roberto Azevedo is from a developing country (Brazil), following that logic, WTO members should, assuming well qualified candidates from both developed and developing countries, select a developed country candidate. Indeed the last four Directors-General have come from developed (New Zealand), developing (Thailand), developed (France), and developing (Brazil) countries. Others argue that selection should be from a geographic area that hasn’t held the Director-General position or hasn’t held the position recently. The WTO Members from Africa are stressing that view, and there are two candidates from African countries among the five. There is also interest in having a qualified woman take the Director-General position as there has never been a woman in the DG slot.

The nominating period ends at the close of business on July 8. It is not clear if some other European from the European Union will be nominated (e.g., Spain could nominate Arancha Gonzalez Laya, the current Spanish foreign minister; she has been mentioned in various press accounts as a possibility) or whether one or more nominations may yet come from other developed or developing countries. Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland from the developed world all have experienced current or past officials. The United States historically has not nominated individuals and will presumably not do so this time. There are many other Members who consider themselves to be developed who might also submit a candidate, though that seems less likely with the current group of candidates.

Today’s Financial Times provides its analysis of Commissioner Hogan’s withdrawal. See Financial Times, June 29, EU trade commissioner Phil Hogan abandons interest in WTO role, https://www.ft.com/content/f94683c0-5020-4570-8a14-85bb13016f6a.

Update on fisheries subsidies draft consolidated text from June 25

In my last post, I reviewed the fact that a draft consolidated text on fisheries subsidies had been pulled together by the Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules (fisheries subsidies) and distributed to members at a meeting on June 25. See Chair of Rules Negotiating Group releases draft consolidated fisheries subsidies text at informal meeting on June 25, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/06/27/chair-of-rules-negotiating-group-releases-draft-consolidated-fisheries-subsidies-text-at-informal-meeting-on-june-25/

While the document (RD/TN/RL/126) was released as a “room document” and hence not publicly available, a copy of the draft consolidated text was published on June 26 by Washington Trade Daily (pages 2-7 of its June 26th edition). As the Washington Trade Daily article reviews, the Chair has made specific (as is often done on these types of texts but particularly on this draft), nothing is viewed as agreed to regardless of whether text is bracketed or not.

The draft consolidated text has ten articles, although the last three are placeholder titles only awaiting further work. The articles are:

  1. Scope;
  2. Definitions;
  3. Prohibition on subsidies to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (“IUU fishing”);
  4. Prohibition on subsidies concerning overfished stocks;
  5. Prohibition on subsidies concerning overcapacity and overfishing;
  6. Specific provisions for LDC members;
  7. Technical assistance and capacity building;
  8. Notification, transparency and/or surveillance;
  9. Institutional arrangements;
  10. Dispute settlement.

The negotiations have always been limited to marine wild capture fishing and don’t cover aquaculture. Article 1 is consistent with the intended reach of any agreement.

Article 2, definitions, has just three — “fishing”, “fishing related activities” and “vessel”.

Prohibiting subsidies on IUU fishing is a critical part of the UN sustainable development goal 14.6. Article 3 lays out the prohibition and how the actions of a fishing vessel are determined to be “illegal, unreported or unregulated”. Various Members (coastal, flag State, port State, subsidizing) or regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements (Art. 3.2) can make such findings “based on positive evidence; follow fair, transparent , and non-discriminatory procedures” (Art. 3.3).

Articles 4 and 5 address the other core objective of UN Sustainable Development Goal 14.6, prohibiting subsidies on overfished stocks, overcapacity and overfishing. Both articles contain exceptions or special and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries (LDCs). Depending on whether advanced developing countries waive such provisions, there will be problems for some Members (including the U.S.) in having such exceptions or S&D provisions included in the text. Specifically, LDCs are exempted from the prohibitions of Art. 5.1 “for fishing or fishing related activities at sea” (Art. 5.6(a)) and developing countries “for fishing or fishing related activities at sea within their territorial sea” (Art. 5.6(b)). The draft consolidated text attempts to cover some developing and LDC countries despite the above two exceptions where certain criteria are met (Art. 5.6(c)). It is assumed that Korea, Singapore and Brazil consistent with their prior statements that they would forego special and differential treatment in future agreements would not be eligible for the exceptions or S&D contained in the draft agreement if the final agreement contains such provisions.

There may also be concerns for some Members with what is and isn’t included within the terms capital costs (Art. 5.1.2.(a)) and operating costs (Art. 5.1.2.(b)) as some may feel the terms cover too much while others may view the terms as permitting significant subsidization to continue.

Art. 5.2 lays out some limitations on subsidies for fishing and fishing related activities beyond a Member’s jurisdiction and will also likely be the subject of close scrutiny as being either too limited or too broad depending on Member views.

Article 6 has two subparts, one giving LDCs a transition period once a country is no longer an LDC and the other having Members “exercise due restraint in raising matters involving an LDC Member”.

Article 7 calls on developed country Members and such developing country Members who indicate being in a position to do so to “provide targeted technical assistance and capacity building assistance” to developing countries and LDCs.

As noted, Articles 8-10 have not been fleshed out in the draft consolidated text.

The next meeting on fisheries subsidies is the July 21st open-ended informal meeting of the negotiating group. The efforts of the Chair and his facilitators to explore options on various key issues and to develop this draft consolidated text are a welcome step in trying to get the fisheries negotiations back on track and over the finish line consistent with Ministers’ decision from the 11th Ministerial Conference and the deadline within the UN Sustainable Development Goals. If an agreement is to be reached before the end of the year, there is an urgent need for Members to step forward and find agreed text. Let’s hope for progress next month.

Chair of Rules Negotiating Group releases draft consolidated fisheries subsidies text at informal meeting on June 25

The WTO started negotiations on fisheries subsidies as part of the Doha Development Agenda at the end of 2001.

At the 11th WTO Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina in December 2017, WTO members adopted a decision to complete fisheries subsidies negotiations by the next Ministerial Conference. See WT/MIN(17)/64; WT/L/1031:

“FISHERIES SUBSIDIES

“MINISTERIAL DECISION OF 13 DECEMBER 2017

“The Ministerial Conference

Decides as follows:

“1. Building on the progress made since the 10th Ministerial Conference as reflected in documents TN/RL/W/274/Rev.2, RD/TN/RL/29/Rev.3, Members agree to continue to engage constructively in the fisheries subsidies negotiations, with a view to adopting, by the Ministerial Conference in 2019, an agreement on comprehensive and effective disciplines that prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, and eliminate subsidies that contribute to IUU-fishing recognizing that appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing country Members and least developed country Members should be an integral part of these negotiations.

“2. Members re-commit to implementation of existing notification obligations under Article 25.3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures thus strengthening transparency with respect to fisheries subsidies.”

In mid-January of this year, I posted a piece that looked at Fisheries Subsidies – Will the WTO Members Reach Agreement Before June 2020?, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/01/13/fisheries-subsidies-will-the-wto-members-reach-agreement-before-june-2020/. The post included the text of the 11th Ministerial decision on fisheries subsidies and a review of the challenges facing the world from overfishing. WTO Members had been aiming to have a completed agreement by the time of the 12th Ministerial which was scheduled to be held in Kazakhstan in early June of this year.

However, with the restrictions on travel in many parts of the world and with restrictions on in-person meetings at the WTO beginning in March of this year because of the efforts to limit the spread of COVID-19, there has been a lack of forward movement on the fisheries subsidies negotiations. Specifically, the 12th WTO Ministerial was postponed from June 2020 to an unspecified time in 2021, and WTO Members could not agree to conduct negotiations without face-to-face meetings. While this inability to negotiate affected all areas of WTO work and negotiations, it called into question whether the WTO Members would be able to deliver the one aspect of the UN Sustainable Development Goals that was in the WTO’s area of competence and expertise.

Now that face-to-face meetings can occur at the WTO and as Members are gaining experience with virtual meetings, the Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules (fisheries subsidies), Amb. Santiago Wills of Colombia, held an informal meeting of the heads of delegations and presented both a draft consolidated text and provided extensive introductory remarks. While there is a short press release from the WTO on the meeting, the two documents shared with Members are not publicly available as they were labeled as room documents, despite similar statements and draft text having routinely been released publicly both in the fisheries subsidies negotiations previously but also generally in all multilateral negotiations at the WTO over the last 25 years The press release is titled “Fisheries subsidies negotiations chair introduces draft consolidated text to WTO members,” is dated June 25 (date of the meeting) and can be found here, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/fish_25jun20_e.htm. The draft consolidated text is apparently six pages in length and is in a document coded RD/TN/RL126. The lengthy introductory remarks by the Chair are supposedly twelve pages in length and are in a document coded RD/TN/RL/126/Add.1 (Chair’s Introductory Remarks at HoD Meeting on June 25, 2020). The listing of some of the room documents in the Rules negotiating area that include the two documents from June 25, 2020 is embedded below.

RD-TN-RL-docs-part-1

It is obviously excellent news that a new draft consolidated text has been finally circulated to Members and that the Chair is attempting to see if Members can fulfill the objective of reaching a meaningful agreement on fisheries subsidies by the end of 2020. One meeting is scheduled for July 21 (10 a.m., open-ended Negotiating Group on Rules (Fisheries Subsidies). Presumably other meetings will be scheduled for the remainder of the year. While the WTO is typically in recess during August, Members may decide to have some meetings at least on the topic of selecting a new Director-General and arguably could decide to pursue fisheries subsidies as well in August. If not, I would expect a fairly aggressive program of meetings on fisheries subsidies in the fall and into December to achieve an agreement if possible.

The lack of public access to the draft text and the introductory remarks obviously limits the ability of many stakeholders to understand the level of ambition and the areas of concern that remain in the text. To show the departure from what I would describe as normal WTO procedures, I embed below three documents. The first two are parts of TN/RL/W/232 (the cover letter entitled “Working Document from the Chairman”) and Annex C dealing with Fisheries Subsidies (the Chair’s draft text, along with comments from Members). The third is JOB/RL/6 from 1 December 2016 (WTO document is dated 6 December) and is entitled “CHAIR’S REPORT TO THE INFORMAL MEETING OF HEADS OF DELEGATIONS ON THE RULES NEGOTIATIONS”. Obviously, the draft consolidated text in RD/TN/RL/126 is not substantively different in type of document than the chair’s draft text in TN/RL/W/232 (Annex C). Similarly, the introductory remarks to the HoD meeting on June 25 contained in RD/TN/RL/126/Add.1 would appear to be the same type of information as was contained in JOB/RL/6. The retreat from transparency is worrisome to members of the public and should be to WTO Members.

TNRLW232-00

TNRLW232-03

JobsRL6

Conclusion

WTO Members have been pursuing agreement on fisheries subsidies for nearly nineteen years. During that time, the problems of overfishing and the challenges to the world’s supply of wild caught fish have gotten much worse. With the added incentive of being able to address one of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, WTO Members have been attempting to reach an agreement on fisheries subsidies this year. The chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules (fisheries subsidies), working with facilitators, has pulled together a consolidated draft text which has now been given to Members with a renewed work program ahead for negotiators. Whether the new text will actually achieve the sustainable development objective or the literal terms of the 11th Ministerial decision won’t be known til an agreement is reached.

While the development of a draft text is obviously very desirable, the inexplicable move away from transparency to the public by the act of calling the text and introductory comments “room documents” and thus not releasing them is not only unfortunate but will do nothing to help obtain greater public support for the WTO. Hopefully, the coding of the documents as “room documents” will be corrected (or additional copies with different codes created) and the two documents will be released publicly immediately. Time will tell if this lack of transparency is yet another part of the building existential crisis for the organization.

Will the EC Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan be nominated by Ireland for the WTO Director-General position?

There have been many news articles over the last few weeks on the possibility of Phil Hogan being nominated by Ireland as a candidate for the Director-General position at the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). See, e.g., Politico, May 30, 2020, European trade chief mulls bid for WTO top job, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/30/phil-hogan-wto-european-union-290660. The WTO is in the middle of the period for receiving nominations, a period which began on June 8 and will end on July 8. To date five candidates have been put forward from Mexico (Jesus Seade Kuri), Nigeria (Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala), Egypt (Abdel-Hamid Mamdouh), Moldova (Tudor Ulianovschi) and the Republic of Korea (Yoo Myung-hee).

Commissioner Hogan has indicated he has been thinking about the possibility. See, e.g., Irish Times, June 9, 2020, Phil Hogan confirms he is weighing bid to become WTO chief, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/phil-hogan-confirms-he-is-weighing-bid-to-become-wto-chief-1.4274865. There have been articles about the European Union seeking a candidate all EU countries would support and certain ethical limitations on a sitting Commissioner seeking another position. See, e.g., Reuters, June 9, 2020, EU weights single bid for WTO job, trade chief Hogan confirms interest, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-eu-trade/eu-weighs-single-bid-for-wto-job-trade-chief-hogan-confirms-interest-idUSKBN23G1RE; Financial Times, June 16, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/c45a56ab-5b2d-4a8c-af83-6aedec645bff.

A Bloomberg report on June 23 indicated that Ireland would be submitting his nomination and that Commissioner Hogan would announce his candidacy on Thursday (today), though delays for unspecified reasons have apparently occurred. Bloomberg, June 23, 2020, Ireland to nominate EU Trade Chief Hogan for Top WTO post, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-23/ireland-to-nominate-eu-trade-chief-hogan-for-top-wto-post. As of 5 p.m. Geneva time, no nomination has been received and there are no updates on Commissioner Hogan making an announcement.

The EU webpage for Commissioner Hogan provides the following shorthand biography of positions held over the last thirty-three years:

Biography

  • European Commissioner for Trade2019 – present
  • European Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development2014-2019
  • Minister for Environment, Community and Local Government, Ireland2011-2014
  • President of the Council of EU Environment Ministers2013
  • Minister of State at the Department of Finance, Ireland1994-1995
  • Member of Dáil Éireann (Lower House of Parliament)1989
  • Member of Seanad Éreann (Upper House of Parliament)1987-89

If Commissioner Hogan is nominated in the coming days, he will be the first candidate from a country that is a “developed” country Member of the WTO. To the extent WTO Members look at having the Director-General from a developed country versus a developing country following DG Azevedo’s departure on the thought that there should be rotation between developed-developing country leadership, then Commissioner Hogan would be the first (and to date, only) developed country candidate. The candidate from the Republic of Korea may view herself as from a developed country, though Korea has self-declared itself a developing country at the WTO though has agreed not to seek special and differential treatment in future agreements.

Other possible positives for Members will be his experience in trade (first agriculture and now trade overall), his political and his technical competence, his support of the WTO overall, his support for reform at the WTO.

Challenges for Commissioner Hogan’s candidacy may include the number of European Directors-General there have been at the WTO (and at the GATT before then) suggesting those wanting geographical diversity of leaders may be less interested in another European. Commissioner Hogan will also have potential challenges based on positions he has taken on behalf of the European Union on important issues before the WTO (e.g., United States on dispute settlement and whether convergence or coexistence is a key need for WTO Members). Candidates are obviously expected if selected to be the next Director-General to be honest brokers and facilitators and not to be representing the views of the Member who nominated them. But in an environment in which there are fundamental differences in views of existing rights and obligations and the needs of the WTO, it is possible that Commissioner Hogan will have a special challenge in demonstrating his neutrality and openness to all issues and views.

Conclusion

With thirteen days left in the WTO DG nomination process, there are five candidates who have been put forward. It is likely that several more will be put forward before the close of the process on July 8. It appears that the European Commissioner Phil Hogan will be nominated in the coming days by Ireland which would expand the field of candidates to six. It is unclear if the delay in the announcement of his nomination that was apparently originally scheduled for today, June 25, flows from internal EU or Irish logistics, from a lack of consensus within the EU member countries to support Commissioner Hogan or reflects some other issue that simply delays the timing and not the likelihood of his nomination.

WTO receives Republic of Korea’s nomination of Minister Yoo Myung-hee for Director-General

In yesterday’s post, I indicated that press reports stated the Republic of Korea would nominate their Minister for Trade Yoo Myung-hee for the position of Director-General. The WTO received the nomination today, June 24, and Minister Yoo’s bio is available on the WTO webpage and is embedded below.

bio_kor_e-1

Minister Yoo is the first Asian candidate in this cycle and the fifth candidate put forward by Members to date. Other candidates are from Mexico (Jesus Seade Kuri), Nigeria (Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala), Egypt (Hamid Mamdouh) and Moldova (Tudor Ulianovschi). The nominating window opened on June 8 and will close at the end of the day on July 8.

Republic of Korea to nominate Minister for Trade Yo Myung-hee as candidate for WTO Director-General post

According to KBS World Radio, the Republic of Korea will put forward Korea’s Trade Minster on Wednesday as a candidate for the WTO Director-General post. That will make Minister Yoo Myung-hee the fifth candiate put forward to date. The link to the news clip is here, https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=154349.

This is Korea’s third nomination of a candidate for the Director-General position, the other nominees also having been trade ministers for the Director-General positions in 1994 and 2012 (former ministers Kim Chul-su and Bank Tae-ho).

Information of Minister Yoo’s background is available from Wikepedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yoo_Myung-hee#:~:text=Yoo%20Myung%2Dhee%20(Korean%3A,it%20was%20created%20in%201948. Her education and prior jobs are listed on the Ministry for Trade webpage, http://english.motie.go.kr/en/am/minister/TradeMinister/TRADEMINISTER/TradeMinister.jsp. She received a B.A. and an M.A. from Seoul National University in Korea and a Juris Doctor degree from Vanderbilt Universty Law School in the United States. Minister Yoo assumed the trade minister position in March of 2019 and has been part of the Korean government in various positions since 2006.

Once her nomination is received by the World Trade Organization on Wednesday, her bio as forwarded to the WTO will be posted on the WTO website.

Korea treats itself as a developing country although it has indicated to the United States that it will not seek special and differential treatment in future agreements.

Candidates for the Next Director-General of the WTO — four and counting, an update

Two weeks after the WTO opened the nomination process for candidates to fill the Director-General post which becomes vacant on September 1, 2020, four countries have put forward candidates — Mexico, Nigeria, Egypt and Moldova. The period for nominations will come to a close on July 8 (COB Geneva time), so there are still sixteen days for additional candidates to be put forward.

There are many rumors and a few facts on possible candidates not yet announced. Press have indicated that Benin, which had had a candidate identified for consideration by the African Union, has withdrawn H.E. Mr. Eloi Laourou (Benin’s current Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the WTO) from consideration and will be supporting Nigeria’s candidate, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. See The Africa Report, Benin drops its WTO candidate in support of Nigeria’s Okonjo-Iweala (15 June 2020), https://www.theafricareport.com/29941/benin-drops-its-wto-candidate-in-support-of-nigerias-okonjo-iweala/.

The other African name floated as a possible candidate has been Kenya’s Amina Mohamed, current sport and culture minister and former Kenyan Ambassador to the WTO who was the first woman to chair the WTO’s General Counsel. She was also a candidate for the Director-General position in 2012-2103 when Roberto Azevedo of Brazil was selected. While mentioned early, there has been little in the press indicating Kenya will be nominating her, but there is obviously still time if Kenya so chooses. See Financial Times, Contenders Set Out Stalls to Succeed Azevedo at Helm of WTO, May 17, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/fc5fda8e-56cb-4866-b477-f4c3af603b5c.

Possible Developed Country Candidate(s)?

It has been rumored that there would be one or more developed country candidates and some WTO Members or their trade ministers, like the EU, have articulated a belief that the next Director-General should be from a developed country, consistent with the recent rotation between developed and developing country having the post of Director-General. Since DG Azevedo is from Brazil, a developing country, developed countries should take the next turn, according to this logic.

An article in the New York Times indicates that the European Trade Commissioner, Phil Hogan (Ireland) has confirmed he is considering a bid. See New York Times, Who’s Bidding to Be Next World Trade Organization Chief?, June 22, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/06/22/business/22reuters-trade-wto-factbox.html.

Spain’s Foreign Minister Arancha Gonzalez Laya has also been repeatedly identified as a potential candidate. She was chef de cabinet for Director-General Pascal Lamy who served from 2005-2013.

Other developed countries could decide to nominate one or more candidates, though press accounts indicate that Australia is not planning on submitting a candidate (at least not at present) and the U.S. has historically not put forward a candidate from the U.S. See Financial Review, No Australian candidate for WTO boss, Birmingham says, June 22, 2020, https://www.afr.com/world/europe/no-australian-candidate-for-wto-boss-birmingham-says-20200619-p554gf

Rumors have suggested that the Republic of Korea may submit a candidate. Japan has been very active in recent years through their ambassadors to the WTO but is not believed to be likely to put forward a candidate.

New Zealand had a Director-General two decades ago, Michael Moore, and its Trade Minister and former Ambassador to the WTO, Tim Groser, ran in 2012-2013. It is unclear whether New Zealand will put forward a candidate, whether former Minister Groser or someone else.

There is a rumor in Geneva that more nominations are likely and that at least one more may materialize later this week. If such an event materializes, I would suspect someone from an EU country or from Korea will become the fifth candidate.

Outreach by existing candidates and legal wrangling between African countries

The advantage of being an early announced candidate in the current process is that candidates can get their views out through the media ahead of the General Council meeting, and there is more time for their governments to court support from other WTO Members. Particularly when there is interest in expediting the selection process because of the near-term departure of existing Director-General Azevedo, such opportunities for pre-General Council wooing of other Members and media outreach will be more limited for candidates joining closer to the end of the nominating time period. The General Council meeting to meet and hear from the candidates is understood to likely be sometime in the week of July 12. If there is actually an effort to expedite the selection process after July 8, time will be very limited for candidates after the General Council meeting.

It is clear that at least the first three candidates are taking advantage of media to articulate their vision for the WTO and their role if selected as the next DG. Nominating governments are also doing outreach to trading partners seeking to build up support for their candidate.

For example, Jesus Seade Kuri, the Mexican candidate, provided an interview to the South China Morning Post which was published on June 18, 2020, Mexico’s nominee for top WTO job, Jesus Seade, vows to ‘bring US and China back to the table’, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3089452/mexicos-nominee-top-wto-job-jesus-seade-vows-bring-us-and.

Similarly, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala had her views on the WTO DG job published in various publications including the Pulse, ‘I’m a strong negotiator, reformer,’ Okonjo-Iweala makes her case for ‘challenging’ WTO job, June 17, 2020, https://www.pulse.ng/business/okonjo-iweala-former-minister-makes-case-for-wto-job/y123dsb.

Outreach has also been made by Egypt’s Abdel Hamid Mamdouh as he laid out what he considered to be important aspects of his candidacy in an article that appeared in The Africa Report on June 11. See Egypt’s Abdel Hamid Mamdouh bid for the WTO – Five things to know, June 11, 2020, https://www.theafricareport.com/29730/egypts-abdel-hamid-mamdouh-bid-for-the-wto-five-things-to-know/.

All candidates have recognized the challenges with the tensions between the United States and China, the need to be an honest broker, how their background gives them strengths needed to address the role of Director-General amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and need for reform at the WTO.

While Mexico is working on shoring up support for Mr. Seade amongst WTO Members in the Americas (and elsewhere), the two African candidates are working to gain support from their African colleagues (and others). Little has been in the press as yet as to what actions Moldova or its candidate are taking in the early days after Tudor Ulianovschi’s nomination.

Egypt has attempted to have Nigeria’s candidate disqualified on the grounds that Nigeria had another proposed candidate submitted to the African Union but withdrew that candidate and put forward Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala past the deadline for such nominations. The African Union’s counsel concurred but that position has been challenged by Nigeria. In any event, WTO procedures limit who may nominate candidates to WTO Members. Nigeria is a member while the African Union is not. Therefore, whatever is relevant for African Union member consideration, it is not relevant to whether Nigeria or any other AU member can propose a candidate to the WTO by July 8. See The Cable, Okonjo-Iweala still eligible to run for office of DG, says, WTO, June 20, 2020, https://www.thecable.ng/exclusive-okonjo-iweala-still-eligible-to-run-for-office-of-dg-says-wto. This type of public discord will not be helpful to obtaining solidarity around a single African candidate which has been the presumed purpose of the African Union’s process.

Conclusion

With roughly half of the nomination time period having run, it is clear that there will be a significant number of candidates. It is unclear how many developed country candidates will end up running and to what extent members will focus more on geographical area, development status, or gender of the candidates in their considerations.

With the U.S., the EU and China having very different views of what needs to be done to return the WTO to relevance and with the recent USTR statement that any candidate to receive U.S. backing must “understand the need for reform and the problems of free economies in dealing with China” (New York Times, U.S. Wants WTO Head Who Understands Problems Dealing with China: Lighthizer, June 17, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/06/17/world/asia/17reuters-usa-trade-wto.html), the road ahead will be challenging for all candidates with no guarantee that the process will succeed in either an expedited or normal time period.

Hopefully, the Chairman of the General Council (Amb. David Walker) and the WTO Secretariat have the four Deputy Directors-General warming up in case one of them is needed to serve as the Acting Director-General beginning September 1st.

COVID-19 — the global rate of increase of confirmed cases is surging

By the close of business on June 22, there will be more than 9 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 with the rate of growth exploding more than six months after the first cases were reported in China, with deaths approaching a half million. For the two weeks ending June 21, the number of new cases approached 2 million (1,932,024), up 24.0% from the two weeks ending June 7 (1,557,983) which in turn were up 21.5% from the two weeks ending May 24 (1,281,916). Thus, the last six weeks have seen the rate of new cases grow by 50.7%. Indeed, the last six weeks account for 54.25% of total cases since the end of 2019 (roughly 25 weeks).

As the worst of the pandemic has passed (at least the first wave) for most of the developed world (other than the United States and countries in the Middle East), the sharp growth in cases is mostly due to the spread of the virus in the developing world where healthcare infrastructure and ability to handle the challenges of the pandemic are likely less than for the developed world.

Central and South America, parts of Asia and the Middle East are the current hot spots of infections with growth in a number of African countries as well. The United States which peaked during the two week period ending April 26, has by the far the largest number of total cases (more than 2.2 million) and is seeing the number of cases rise again in the most recent two weeks.

Afghanistan, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Arab Republic all have significant numbers of cases and all but Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE are still growing rapidly in terms of new cases where peaks have not been reached. Thus, the likelihood of even greater number of new cases is a near certainty for the coming weeks.

Some recent developments

Most of western Europe has been engaged in reopening in recent weeks as the rates of infection are dramatically lower than in the March-April period. Indeed, travel within the EU and some neighboring countries is opening up in time for the July-August vacation season. Time will tell if the steps being taken to test, trace and quarantine any cases found going forward will minimize any upward movement in cases.

China and parts of Asia with low rates of infections where economic interruption has been less (e.g., Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Japan), are seeing low numbers of new cases. China has taken strong measures to address a new outbreak in Beijing (numbers are a few hundred cases).

Australia and New Zealand have few if any new cases and the numbers for Canada are also way down with reopening occurring as would be expected.

The U.S. and Canada and the U.S. and Mexico are maintaining travel restrictions between themselves (though excluding movement of goods and services).

In the United States, the story on the control of the pandemic is very mixed as individual states have been engaged in reopening at different rates in part reflecting different infection rates and growth rates. However, reopening in some states is occurring despite conditions in the state not being consistent with the Administration’s guidelines from the Center for Disease Control ad Prevention (“CDC”) on when reopening should occur. Thus, there are states seeing large increases in recent days and weeks while many other states are seeing significant declines or at least stable rates of infection. It is unclear how the infection rate in the U.S. will progress in the coming weeks and months.

Trade Considerations

As my post from last week on the Ottawa Group communication reviewed, there are lots of proposals that have been teed up by WTO Members to keep trade flowing during the pandemic and to potentially reduce the likelihood of such trade disruptions as are being experienced at present in future pandemics.

But large numbers of export restraints remain in place, transparency is better than it was in the first quarter but still not what is needed. However, import liberalization/expedition is occurring in many countries to facilitate obtaining medical goods needed at the lowest price.

The toll flowing from the pandemic and the closing of economies to control the pandemic is enormous despite efforts of governments to provide funding to reduce the damage. This has led the WTO to project 2020 trade flows to decline between 13 and 32% from 2019 levels. As data are available for the March-June period, the severity of the decline for various markets is being fleshed out and resulting in lower global GDP growth projections.

Because the COVID-19 pandemic hit many developed countries hard before spreading to most of the developing world, developing countries have seen economic effects from the pandemic preceding the health effects in their countries. Reduced export opportunities, declining commodity prices (many developing countries are dependent on one or a few commodities for foreign exchange), reduced foreign investment (and some capital flight), higher import prices for critical goods due to scarcity (medical goods) and logistics complications flowing from countries efforts to address the spread of the pandemic are a few examples of the economic harm occurring to many developing countries.

The needs of developing countries for debt forgiveness/postponement appears much larger than projected although multilateral organizations, regional development banks and the G20 have all been working to provide at least some significant assistance to many individual countries. Trade financing will continue to be a major challenge for many developing countries during the pandemic. Harm to small businesses is staggering and will set many countries back years if not decades in their development efforts when the pandemic is past.

As can be seen in developed countries, sectors like travel and tourism (including airlines, hotels, restaurants, entertainment venues) are extraordinarily hard hit and may not recover for the foreseeable future. The need for social distancing makes many business models (e.g., most restaurants, movie theaters, bars, etc.) unworkable and will result in the loss of large portions of small businesses in those sectors in the coming months. For many developing countries, travel and tourism are a major source of employment and income. Losses in employment will likely be in the tens of millions of jobs, many of which may not return for years if at all.

Role of WTO during Pandemic

The WTO views itself as performing the useful functions of (1) gathering through notifications information from Members on their actions responding to the pandemic and getting that information out to Members and the public, (2) providing forecasts of the trade flows during the pandemic, and (3) providing a forum for Members to bring forward proposals on what action the WTO as a whole should consider. Obviously the success of all three functions depends on the openness and engagement of the Members.

WTO agreements don’t really have comprehensive rules for addressing pandemics or for the policy space governments are likely to need to respond to the economic tsunami that may unfold (and will unfold with different intensities for different Members). Some recent proposals would try to address some of the potential needs for the trading system to better respond to pandemics. However, most proposals seem to suggest narrowing the policy space. Last week’s Committee on Agriculture was reported to have had many Members challenging other Members actions in the agriculture space responding to the extraordinary challenges flowing from the pandemic. While Committee activity is designed to permit Members the opportunity to better understand the policies of trading partners, a process in Committee which focuses simply on conformance to existing rules without consideration of what, if any, flexibilities are needed in extraordinary circumstances seems certain to result in less relevance of the WTO going forward.

Most countries have recognized that the depth of the economic collapse being cased by the global efforts to respond to COVID-19 will require Members to take extraordinary steps to keep economies from collapsing. Looking at the huge stimulus programs put in place and efforts to prevent entire sectors of economies from collapsing, efforts to date by major developed countries are some $10 trillion. Concerns expressed by the EU and others have generally not been the need for such programs, but rather have been on ensuring any departures from WTO norms are minimized in time and permit a return to the functioning of market economies as quickly as possible.

Members have not to date proposed, but should agree, that the WTO undertake an evaluation of programs pursued by Members and how existing rules do or do not address the needs of Members in these extraordinary times.

WTO possible actions to facilitate recovery from COVID-19, the Ottawa Group’s June 16 Communication

A number of WTO Members have submitted proposals for action by the WTO Membership to address the global trade challenges flowing from the COVID-19 pandemic including speeding recovery and minimizing future disruptions from later health challenges. Most proposals address what to do about export restrictions, simplifying import procedures and/or reducing import duties, and improved transparency of actions taken.

The Ottawa Group June 2020 Statement: Focusing Action on COVID-19

The latest contribution comes from the “Ottawa Group” and was submitted on June 16, 2020. June 2020 Statement of the Ottawa Group: Focusing Action on COVID-19, WT/GC/217. The Ottawa Group is a group of WTO Members who describe themselves as “champions of WTO reform”. The group consists of the following WTO Members — Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, European Union, Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore and Switzerland.

The Ottawa Group statement provides the following introduction followed by six areas for potential WTO action:

“The world continues to grapple with the profound human health and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to these challenges, thinking has begun on trade policy actions that would support an inclusive, sustainable, and resilient recovery as well as what trade rules should be adapted or developed to guide collaborative policy responses to future global crises. In this context, the WTO must play an important role in helping ensure coordination and coherence between actions its members take. This will require initiative and engagement by WTO Members in order to be successful.

“In this environment, there is an opportunity for the Ottawa Group to provide leadership, critical thinking and analysis, as well as ideas and proposals on potential actions that the broader WTO membership could take. In order to make best use of resources, this paper sets out six areas where concrete actions could be taken.” Page 1

The six action items are identified with a discussion of why the area is important and what steps the Group views as important to take. The Ottawa Group recommendations are summarized at the end of the communication (pages 4-5):

Summary:

Action Item 1: Transparency and Withdrawal of Trade-Restrictive Measures

Action Point: Ministers instruct officials to: 1) ensure any measures introduced in response to COVID-19 are promptly notified in accordance with relevant WTO requirements; 2) support efforts by the WTO Secretariat to collect and share information and best practices on trade-related measures taken in response to COVID-19 5/; 3) discuss the principle of ‘targeted, proportionate, transparent, temporary and consistent with WTO rules’; and 4) lead by example and withdraw or end any trade restrictive measures introduced in response to COVID-19 as quickly as possible.

“5/ Including by: (a) returning to the quarterly cycle of trade monitoring reports as during the financial crisis; and (b) including trade-related economic support measures in the trade monitoring reports and (c) and to the extent possible, making a technical assessment of members’ trade-related economic support measures in reaction to COVID-19.

Action Item 2: Keeping Open and Predictable Trade in Agricultural and Agri-Food Products

Action Point: Ministers instruct officials to: 1) engage in ongoing discussions on the fulfilment of joint declarations on maintaining predictable and open agriculture trade; 2) lead by example, and withdraw or end any emergency measures introduced in response to COVID-19 that may adversely affect trade in agriculture as quickly as possible; and 3) advance analysis and consideration on what steps WTO Members could take to continue improving agriculture trade based on the lessons learned from COVID-19 to ensure that future crises will not undermine trade, food security, and the stability of agricultural markets in the long-term.

Action Item 3: E-commerce

Action Point: Ministers instruct officials to prioritize and accelerate work on the Joint Statement Initiative on E-commerce, including through informal and virtual discussions, ahead of the rescheduled MC12 in 2021, including by the development of a consolidated negotiating text by the end of 2020 at the latest. In this regard, we will support the efforts of the co-convenors.

Action Item 4: Trade Facilitation – Use of Information Technology and Streamlined Procedures

Action Point: Ministers instruct officials to identify ways to take full advantage of the opportunities for trade facilitation in the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and to promote best practices for the implementation of the TFA. This includes how the adoption of digital solutions can support the movement of essential goods across borders as smoothly as possible.

Action Item 5: Initiative on Medical Supplies

Action Point: Ministers instruct officials to advance analysis and consideration in order to identify what steps WTO Members could take to facilitate trade in medical supplies to help ensure that the world is better positioned to deal with future health emergencies and to help ensure that versatile, diversified and resilient supply chains exist that allow all members access to vital medical supplies. This work should include analysis of the objectives and effects of policies affecting trade of medical supplies in response to the current pandemic and support for international organizations, including the WTO, in analyzing the potential impacts and outcomes of measures and recommending policies.

Action Item 6: Deepen Engagement with Stakeholders

Action Point: Ministers instruct officials to explore how best to pursue intensified engagement with stakeholders in order to better inform policymaking.”

The Ottawa Group proposals include topics not addressed in other proposals, such as the importance of prioritizing conclusion of the e-commerce joint statement initiative. During the pandemic, the critical importance of e-commerce to and expanded use by many businesses and consumers has reduced the damage to economies and to global trade. All Ottawa Group members are participating in the ongoing e-commerce talks, talks involving 84 countries or territories.

On issues like export restraints, the Ottawa Group has some positive ideas while reflecting the reality that some Ottawa Group members have used export restraints on medical goods during the pandemic. The idea of giving definition to the terms “targeted, proportionate, transparent, temporary and consistent with WTO rules” could be useful for administrations to be able to evaluate intended actions. However, the spread of a pandemic such as COVID-19 and internal political pressures to help one’s own population will render any such clarifications of marginal actual assistance if the underlying challenge of global supply/demand imbalance is not addressed on an ongoing basis.

As has been seen in agricultural goods, increasing information on global supplies both reduces the likelihood of countries imposing export restraints and gives trading partners greater leverage in pushing for roll backs of export restraints imposed by individual countries where there is no actual shortage. The Ottawa Group’s recommendations on agricultural goods reflects that the ability to disarm restrictions where shortages do not in fact exist.

The Ottawa Group submission from June 16 is embedded below.

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EU’s June 11, 2020 Concept Paper, Trade in Healthcare Products

Some WTO Members, including Ottawa Group member countries, have taken unilateral action to liberalize trade in medical goods by reducing tariffs (at least temporarily) and by streamlining entry of medical goods needed for handling the pandemic. Some members, like the EU, have suggested creating an expanded medical goods duty-free agreement to go beyond the 1995 pharmaceutical agreement. For example, in a concept paper of 11 June 2020 entitled Trade in Healthcare Products, the EU, inter alia, provides in the Annex (pages 9-14) a list of goods that WTO Members could consider for total duty elimination. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/june/tradoc_158776.pdf The EU notes in a footnote that its concept paper “is meant to contribute to an exploratory discussion on a possible initiative to facilitate trade in healthcare products and is without prejudice to the EU’s position in potential negotiations.” Page 1 footnote 1.

The EU concept paper covers a number of other areas besides tariff eliminations, but for purposes of this note, the discussion will be limited to the product coverage for possible duty elimination. The EU provides a list of 152 6-digit HS categories in its Annex. At the six-digit level, import categories may cover many products not relevant to a particular pandemic, but the six-digit HS level is the most fragmented level of harmonization provided by the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Systems. Interestingly the EU Annex does not cover all products identified by the World Customs Organization and World Health Organization as relevant to fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, there are thirty products (with accompanying HS numbers that are in the WCO list that are not in the EU proposed Annex. See World Customs Organization Prepared jointly with the World Health Organization, HS classification reference for Covid-19 medical supplies, 2.1 Edition, http://www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/nomenclature/covid_19/hs-classification-reference_2_1-24_4_20_en.pdf?la=en.

Specifically, under the WCO’s Section II dealing with face and eye protection, there are two face and eye protection products which are not part of the EU list (HS 9004.90 and 3926.90); four of five glove categories are not in the EU list (HS 3926.20, 4015.19, 6116.10, 6216.00); and eight of nine of the other products are not in the EU list (HS 6505.00, 3926.20, 4015.90 and 4818.50, 6210.40, 6210.40, 6210.50, 6210.50).

Similarly, in Section III, disinfectants and sterilisation products, two products in the WCO list are not covered by the EU (HS 2207.10, 2208.90).

In Section IV, oxygen therapy equipment and pulse oximeters, there is one product in the WCO list not covered by the EU Annex (HS 9026.80).

In Section V, other medical devices and equipment, the EU Annex doesn’t cover three products covered by the WCO list (HS 8413.19, 9028.20, 7324.90).

In Section VI, other medical consumables, there are four products shown in the WCO list that are not part of the EU Annex (HS 2804.40, 3923.29, 3926.90, 3926.90).

Section VII of the WCO list covers vehicles; with the exception of wheelchairs (which are covered by the EU Annex), the other three WCO products are not covered — ambulances, mobile clinic vehicles, mobile radiological vehicles (HS 8703, 8705.90, 8705.90).

Finally, in the WCO’s Section VIII, other products, three of four products in the WCO list are not covered by the EU Annex (HS 8421.39, 7311.00, 7613.00).

Because the WCO/WHO list reflects items needed by countries dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic, it is unclear what the logic is of not including such items in a proposed duty-free list compiled by the EU. Many of the items not included in the EU Annex (e.g., gloves, face shields, etc.) would be needed in addressing the current as well as future pandemics. If there is an effort to seek a duty-free agreement on medical goods, presumably the list will change from that put forward by the EU to be more comprehensive.

While the United States under the Trump Administration is not likely to enter into an agreement to eliminate tariffs on medical goods while the pandemic is afoot (as indicated by Amb. Lighthizer), the reality is that nearly all of the goods in the EU Annex are already duty free in the United States. Specifcally, 135 of the 152 6-digit HS items are duty free (Column 1 rate) in the U.S. in 2020. That is 88.8% of the HS categories. On a dollar value basis, 98.4% of imports into the U.S. during 2019 of products in the EU Annex are under HS numbers that are duty free. Of the remaining 1.6% of imports, a large part of the imports would be duty free under an FTA or GSP or other preferential program. Imports from China, some of which may be subject to supplemental duties flowing from the Section 301 investigation and resulting additional tariffs on Chinese goods, are 6.2% of total imports and some of those goods, if covered by additional duties, are subject to existing or potential exclusions.

Stated differently, should there be an effort to do a sectoral duty free agreement, in considering whether there is a critical mass, sponsors should be evaluating the existing tariff structures of non-participants.

The EU Concept Paper and the WCO list are embedded below.

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Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff’s Jun 17 speech, Pandemic underlines need to improve trading system’s relevance and resilience

This past week, Deputy Director-General Wolff spoke at a Think20 virtual panel on Policy Recommendations for a Post-COVID 19 World. DDG Wolff reviewed both actions that the WTO has taken (transparency on actions taken by Members; developing a trade forecast; providing a forum for members to share proposals and consider collective action) and proposals that had been put forward by Members. See https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/ddgaw_18jun20_e.htm.

DDG Wolff identified two imperatives — “where the current rules are least prescriptive, they should be strengthened”; “where collective action would be helpful it should occur.” He then reviews WTO Members who have put forward proposals (Korea, Canada, Singapore, New Zealand, Switzerland, the Ottawa Group, the Cairns Group) and provided his summary of some of the suggestions made:

“Some specific suggestions that have been made include the following:

” A major effort can be undertaken to increase transparency. Member notifications can be supplemented by enhanced monitoring and reporting of measures by the Secretariat.

“There is little guidance in the WTO rules as to the appropriate use of export controls where it is felt that there exists short supply. Further guidance could be crafted. Sometimes the existence of extensive policy space is contrary to the common interests of all.

“Government interventions to procure needed supplies reduce the scope for market forces to determine competitive outcomes. A number of the practices witnessed in the last three months in response to the pandemic are not explicitly regulated by the current WTO rules. Included under this heading would be subsidization conditioned on supplying the domestic market, and pre-emptive government purchasing and investment. Additional disciplines could be considered.

“Leaving the allocation of scarce necessities solely to market forces may also not be a completely satisfactory alternative if the poorest countries are priced out of participation.

“Consideration can be given to agreeing, as in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, to require that a country planning to impose an export restriction consider the effect on others of applying the measure.

“Additional provisions could provide for prior notice before export restrictions are put into place and a commitment to engage in timely consultations.

“Consideration can be given to including in any restrictions a sunset clause and providing for a roll-back of current trade restrictions.

“Multilaterally-agreed guidance could be given for the sharing of scarce medical supplies, including vaccines.

“Concerted efforts could be made to have relevant tariff liberalization, not just for medical goods, equipment and pharmaceuticals, but more broadly.

“Consideration can be given to creating, a Members’ Emergency Task Force or other mechanism to flesh out options for consideration by Members.

“Where options are devised by groups of Members, an effort and process are needed to gain broader Member support for their recommendations and to assure implementation of concrete steps forward.

“A Long-Range Policy Planning Network for the Multilateral Trading System could be created. There is insufficient attention paid to assessing the future needs of the multilateral trading system, in part due to the daily need to deal with current challenges.

“For the recovery, there are at least three immediately identifiable ways
in which the multilateral trading system can contribute. Consideration
can be given to:

“Lowering the costs of trade by lowering tariffs and other impediments to trade broadly;

“Engaging in a collective effort to accelerate the implementation of
the Trade Facilitation Agreement, and

“Working with international financial institutions and banks to
foster the restoration of trade finance.”

A broad array of suggestions have been made at the WTO as can be seen. The challenge, of course, is in generating momentum for group action. If the major players are not pulling in the same direction, it is hard to see how that momentum will be generated. Typically times of crisis create opportunities for bold action. Is today’s crisis such an opportunity considering the significantly different perspectives of China, the EU and the U.S.?

Many developing countries (and those who claim developing status at the WTO) typically have the highest tariffs and can be motivated for short-term tariff action on specific goods (as this pandemic has demonstrated), but have not shown a willingness to lead on tariff liberalization when developed countries typically have very low tariff levels already. Is the pandemic a reason for such countries to rethink their contribution to the global trading system?

A number of the proposals go to the functioning of the WTO and its governance. Considering the desire by many for broader reform but with significant differences in what type of reforms are appropriate, can the proposals identified generate consensus support in the coming months?

With the economic damage to the world’s economies much larger than originally projected, certainly there has never been a greater need for collective action to minimize human health and economic costs from the pandemic and to speed economic recovery. The coming months will show whether the great divides among the majors can be bridged for the good of all.

U.S. approach to trade – USTR Lighthizer’s Foreign Affairs article and Congressional testimony on June 17

Every year, the U.S. House of Representative’s Committee on Ways and Means and the U.S. Senate Finance Committee hold hearings to understand the Administration’s trade agenda for the year. This year both Committees held hearings on June 17 where the sole Administration witness was U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer.

Ambassador Lighthizer had separately prepared an article for Foreign Affairs entitled “How to Make Trade Work for Workers, Charting a Path Between Protectionism and Globalism” which had been reviewed by many of the Committee members prior to the hearings. The article is available here and presents the Trump Administration’s approach to trade policy. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-make-trade-work-workers.

The Foreign Affairs article

Ambassador Lighthizer uses the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic to state that it is time for discussions to reach a new consensus on “the future of U.S. trade policy.” Amb. Lighthizer’s summary of the approach of the current Administration are repeated below:

“That debate should start with a fundamental question: What should the objective of trade policy be? Some view trade through the lens of foreign policy, arguing that tariffs should be lowered or raised in order to achieve geopolitical goals. Others view trade strictly through the lens of economic efficiency, contending that the sole objective of trade policy should be to maximize overall output. But what most Americans want is something else: a trade policy that supports the kind of society they want to live in. To that end, the right policy is one that makes it possible for most citizens, including those without college educations, to access the middle class through stable, wellpaying jobs.

“That is precisely the approach the Trump administration is taking. It has broken with the orthodoxies of free-trade religion at times, but contrary to what critics have charged, it has not embraced protectionism and autarky. Instead, it has sought to balance the benefits of trade liberalization
with policies that prioritize the dignity of work.”

The paper reviews the history of trade liberalization, what the Administration views as its limits, their perception that many trade advocates have extolled the benefits of liberalization while discounting or ignoring the economic costs of liberalization. Unlike other areas of government policy, trade liberalization was viewed as an absolute good and not weighed against the costs of the policy in fact.

The section of the article entitled “The dark side of free trade” reviews the steep economic and human costs for the United States over the period 2000-2016 noting the loss of manufacturing jobs, stagnation of median household incomes, and the devastation to the populations left behind in manufacturing locations. While outsourcing reduces costs, it increases vulnerabilities and reduces the nation’s ability to respond to certain situations, such as the pandemic.

Amb. Lighthizer opines that “A sensible trade policy strikes a balance among economic security, economic efficiency, and the needs of working people.” He reviews how he believes the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (“USMCA”) achieves that balance looking at specific improvements from NAFTA.

The article then goes on to look at “two of the most significant trade challenges [the U.S.] will face in the coming years: market-distorting state capitalism in China and a dysfunctional WTO.”

The Trump Administration changed the approach of trying to deal with China’s trade policy issues pursued by prior Administration (e.g., through bilateral talks and through the WTO dispute settlement system) by going after some of the larger issues through the section 301 investigation with resulting tariffs on imports from China which led to the creation of the Phase 1 Agreement and, depending on success of Phase 1, a potential Phase 2.

On the WTO, the article focuses on the WTO’s Appellate Body and its deviation from its original purpose.

“The challenges in the WTO are also vexing. Like many international organizations, the WTO has strayed from its original mission. Designed as a forum for negotiating trade rules, it has become chiefly a litigation society. Until recently, the organization’s dispute-resolution process was led by its seven-member Appellate Body, which had come to see itself as the promulgator of a new common law of free trade, one that was largely untethered from the actual rules agreed to by the WTO’s members. The Appellate Body routinely issued rulings that made it harder for states to combat unfair trade practices and safeguard jobs. This was one of the reasons why the Trump administration refused to consent to new appointments to it, and on December 11, 2019, the Appellate Body ceased functioning when its membership dipped below the number needed to hear a case.

“The United States should not agree to any mechanism that would revive or replace the Appellate Body until it is clear that the WTO’s dispute-resolution process can ensure members’ flexibility to pursue a balanced, worker-focused trade policy. Until then, the United States is better off resolving disputes with trading partners through negotiations—as it did from 1947, when the General Agreement on Tarifs and Trade was signed, until 1994, when the WTO was created—rather than under a made-up jurisprudence that undermines U.S. sovereignty and threatens American jobs.”

Congressional Hearings

The Congressional hearings provide the opportunity for the Administration to present its record of accomplishments as well as identifying pressing issues being pursued and for members of Congress to inquire about specific issues of importance to their constituents, to challenge the narrative of the Administration (typically by the opposition party), to press for commitments on actions deemed of importance and otherwise to gain clarification of matters of interest to Congressional members.

Yesterday’s hearings had all of the above. Amb. Lighthizer’s opening statement to both Committees stressed what the Administration viewed itself as having achieved and the benefits to working Americans with a focus on China (and the US-China Phase 1 Agreement), USMCA, the US-Japan Phase 1, disputes at the WTO and WTO reform proposals as well as the Administration’s game plan for the WTO, for pending negotiations with the U.K. and Kenya and for WTO reform, and enforcement of existing agreements. His opening statement to the U.S. Senate Finance Committee is embedded below but mirrors his prepared statement to the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee.

17JUN2020LIGHTHIZERSTMNT1

Senate Finance Committee Ranking Member Wyden (D-OR) in his opening statement painted a different picture of the first three years of the Trump Administration’s trade agenda and whether successes had been achieved. His statement is embedded below.

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There were many questions in both chambers on the USMCA agreement, with particular focus on enforcement of labor, environment and other issues. With the final revised USMCA receiving strong bipartisan support in both houses of Congress and with the agreement taking effect on July 1st, many of the questions flagged areas where one of the countries was viewed as not in compliance with obligations in the Agreement (e.g., energy practices in Mexico) and commitments by Amb. Lighthizer to pursue matters where compliance wasn’t in place.

On the issue of Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum products from Canada and Mexico, some members inquired whether examining imposition of such tariffs would be consistent with U.S. agreement with the two countries which had excluded them from the additional tariffs. Amb. Lighthizer reviewed that the agreement excluded Canada and Mexico where volumes remained at historic levels. If the U.S. found surges and decided to impose the tariffs, any retaliation by Canada or Mexico would be limited to the same sectors (i.e., could not retaliate against agricultural products). Amb. Lighthizer indicated that the U.S. was considering whether tariffs should be imposed in light of surges that had been occurring.

There were also many questions about the U.S.-China Agreement with a focus on whether China was likely to meet its obligations on the purchase of goods (with most questions focused on agricultural purchases). Ranking Member Wyden (D-OR) cited a Peterson Institute paper claiming poor compliance with purchase commitments. See https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-phase-one-tracker-chinas-purchases-us-goods Amb. Lighthizer on a number of occasions reviewed what were described as inadequacies in the Peterson data and reviewed strong growth in orders from China on agricultural goods to the present time (vs. exports through April shown in the Peterson graphs which look at January-April, even though the agreement didn’t take effect until February 14, 2020).

There were many questions about reshoring manufacturing of medical goods, particularly personal protective equipment (“PPE”), challenges to such reshoring because of the failure of the Administration to enter into long-term contracts to permit manufacturing to start up, whether broader tariff exclusions should be provided to imports of such products while there were inadequate supplies, concerns about existing supplies of PPEs amidst the ongoing pandemic. The issue featured prominently in Senate Finance Committee Chairman Grassley’s (R-IA) opening statement and in the questions of a number of Senators and House Representatives in the two sessions. Amb. Lighthizer discussed use of tariffs as a longer term issue to support reshoring and contested arguments that the Administration had not done enough to secure supplies during the pandemic. Chairman Grassley’s opening statement is embedded below.

Grassley-at-Hearing-on-the-President

There was also interest in both Houses of the ongoing or soon to be initiated FTA negotiations with the United Kingdom (ongoing, two rounds completed) and with Kenya (to start after July 4). There were questions or statements of support for the U.S.-Japan Phase 1 Agreement particularly by members with agricultural export interests to Japan.

On U.S.-EU trade relations, there were a few questions raised dealing either with the perceived abuse of geographical indications on food products by the EU and its push to get other countries to accept EU indications or with changing EU SPS provisions that appear to members of Congress and USTR as not science based. Amb. Lighthizer characterized both as protectionist trends from our friends in the EU. He also indicated that USTR is considering whether the U.S. should initiate a 301 investigation on the non-science based SPS measures.

On digital services taxes, questions arose about yesterday’s announced U.S. withdrawal from the OECD negotiations. Amb. Lighthizer reviewed USTR’s role in conducting 301 investigations first on France and now on a host of other countries where taxes are being imposed or considered on digital services on a discriminatory basis and on companies with no physical presence in countries imposing the taxes. The OECD effort was started to achieve a global agreement that could be accepted by all. The U.S. withdrew from the talks based on its view that the talks were building in discrimination against U.S. companies. If there is not a solution in the OECD, Amb. Lighthizer made it clear that results from the 301 investigations would permit the U.S. to take appropriate action against countries who proceed without a global agreement.

While Amb. Lighthizer’s opening statement had reviewed various WTO issues relevant to reform efforts — addressing Appellate Body; putting teeth into WTO notification requirements; clarifying which Members are eligible for special and differential treatment, and the concern about bound tariffs which have proven not to reflect current economic realities between countries, there were few questions about WTO reform during the two hearings. Amb. Lighthizer did go through the challenge of a WTO system where tariffs are bound, where the U.S. over 70 years has removed the vast majority of its tariffs and many other countries have maintained very high bound and even applied tariffs with little likelihood that those tariffs would be reduced regardless of the economic advances made by countries with high bindings. India and Indonesia were two of the countries used as examples of where bound tariffs today of such countries were not reflective of their economic advances and hence were unfair to the U.S.

There were also questions that arose from press reports about statements President Trump allegedly made to President Xi in Japan seeking China’s help in his reelection effort and to reports about two USTR professional staff members who had set up a webpage and been contacting automotive companies about helping them with USMCA compliance at a time when they were still USTR employees. Amb. Lighthizer was in a meeting with the U.S. and Chinese Presidents in Osaka, Japan in 2019 and denied that any request for assistance was made by President Trump at that meeting. On the latter issue, Amb. Lighthizer indicated that political appointees clearly could not do what was done by professional staff and that the professional staff had reportedly sought and obtained clearance from the USTR ethics office.

Conclusion

It has long been obvious that the Trump Administration was adopting a significantly different approach to trade policy than had been pursued by prior Administrations over recent decades. Ambassador Lighthizer’s Foreign Affairs article provides an articulation of the underlying concerns that have driven the Administration to the current policy approach. While there are many who remain skeptical about the benefits vs. costs flowing from the modified approach being pursued by the Trump Administration, there is little question that the change in approach has gotten attention of trading partners and at least some important modifications in agreements.

The USMCA has many novel elements, many of which are interconnected in terms of achieving stated objectives. Changes in rules of origin coupled with a high level of labor needing to make a minimum level of hourly wages and labor enforcement provisions are intended to address longstanding concerns of labor and is consistent with Amb. Lighthizer’s articulated objective of making trade work for workers. The willingness to work with the Democrats to achieve the labor and environment provisions contained in the revised agreement objectives permitted broad bipartisan support when implementing legislation was considered in the United States. Similarly, the USMCA provision of a sixteen year sunset of the agreement, extendable every six years should permit Canada, Mexico and the United States to update the agreement on a regular basis preventing the loss of relevance or coverage that normal FTAs have experienced with the passage of time.

On the importance of the U.S. relationship with China, the current Administration has come to the conclusion that China is not interested in converting to a market economy in fact. Reciprocity is unlikely under WTO Agreements since the WTO is premised on market economy Members, and the WTO agreements do not address many of the distortions flowing from the Chinese-style economy. Thus, the Administration has pursued a different approach to achieve a different outcome and greater reciprocity. The importance of the U.S.-China Phase 1 is best understood in that context. While the jury is out on how successful the Phase 1 Agreement will be, Amb. Lighthizer’s review of USTR information on growing orders from China in agriculture and China’s implementation of many of the specific commitments in the SPS area and other areas is encouraging.

On the WTO, the U.S. is looking for fundamental reform to achieve an organization that has rules for all and that reflects the changing capabilities of Members. With the differences in views of the purpose of the Appellate Body between the U.S. and the EU (and others), there is no likelihood of rapid restoration of the Appellate Body. With the EU moving towards taking unilateral action against Members who don’t engage in a second stage review of disputes with them, we are likely facing a period of heightened trade tensions between the U.S. and the EU.

Other U.S. proposals that have already been made at the WTO (notification requirements; eligibility for special and differential treatment; WTO being an organization for market economies ) or are working on jointly with others (e.g., EU and Japan on industrial subsidies and state-owned enterprises), have different challenges in terms of reaching consensus to adopt. The issue not yet formally raised on revisiting tariff bindings and/or how the system addresses changes in economic might over time with existing bindings would seem to require a further major shock to the operation of the WTO to have any chance of being considered.

As trading partners struggle to find new sources of revenue, particularly following the economic challenges flowing from the COVID-19 pandemic, many have looked to tax foreign companies in the digital services space. As the U.S. has many of the major players, there are looming major confrontations over EU and other country efforts to impose discriminatory taxes. The U.S. will defend its interests if an OECD agreed approach cannot be found. Based on yesterday’s withdrawal of the U.S. from the OECD process, major disputes are likely by the end of 2020.

The Trump Administration will continue to utilize all legal tools available to it under U.S. law and pursuant to various Agreements to achieve a rebalancing of the U.S. trade relationship with our major trading partners and with all nations. The Foreign Affairs article provides the Administration’s logic for the approach being pursued.

Qatar’s WTO dispute with Saudi Arabia — panel report released on June 16, 2020

A panel report in the dispute between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia – Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS567/R, was released to the public today, June 16th.

Saudi Arabia and a number of other countries in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region had severed all relations with Qatar on June 5, 2017. Report, Section 2.2.2. “The June 2017 severance of relations and events leading up to it”. A Qatari company with exclusive rights of broadcasting in the MENA region (including Saudi Arabia) a range of sports for various leagues around the world found its materials used by a Saudi company without authorization. The Qatari company was unable to hire Saudi counsel to pursue enforcement actions in Saudi Arabia and criminal actions were not pursued by the Saudi government.

The dispute was one of several by Qatar against Members who cut off all relations for alleged violations of WTO Agreements. In the challenge of Saudi Arabia, various violations of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement were alleged by Qatar. While Saudi Arabia participated in the panel process, its main argument was that the matter was not properly the subject of dispute settlement or was justified by TRIPS Article 73.

Because the question of whether actions by countries pursuant to their national security concerns are properly the subject of WTO dispute settlement is important to many Members and in a number of ongoing disputes, there were many third parties (13 in total) to the dispute, including the United States, the European Union, China, Canada, Japan and others.

Panel findings

The panel did not find that the issues presented could not be decided by the panel. Based on the facts that were before the panel, the panel report had little trouble finding violations of various TRIPS Articles, with the key issue being whether security interests of the defending Member permitted an override of the other obligations. On this latter issue, the panel had different views on the two main violations, finding one (Art. 41.1 and 42) covered by the security exceptions and the other (Art. 61) not. More specifically, the panel found that the inability of the Qatari company to obtain local counsel in Saudi Arabia flowed directly from Saudi Arabia’s actions considered “necessary for the protection of its essential security interests” and which were “taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.” TRIPS Art. 73(b) and (b)(iii). The panel did not find that the claim surrounding the non-application of criminal procedures and penalties to the Saudi company was factually related to the worsened relationship between Saudi Arabia and Qatar and hence did not find Art. 73 overrode the violation of TRIPS Art. 61.

The conclusion to the panel report is embedded below.

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The earlier case that looked at security interests under the GATT, Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WT/DS512/R (adopted 26 April 2019; panel report was not appealed), was an object of interest for a number of the third parties who filed comments. While the U.S. supported the Saudi position that security interests are a matter of self-determination and are not subject to dispute settlement, that view was not supported by most other Members including Canada, China, the EU or Japan. WT/DS567/R/Add.1 at Annex C-4 (Canada), C-5 (China), C-6 (European Union), C-7 (Japan), C-13 (United States). With many countries (but not Japan) having challenges to the United States Section 232 national security action on steel and aluminum pending before panels, the third party positions mirror arguments being presented in those other disputes.

Next Steps

It is not clear that either Qatar or Saudi Arabia will pursue arbitration under DSU Art. 25 or some other approach to reach a final resolution of the dispute. While Saudi Arabia lost the overarching issue at the panel stage, having cut off all relations with Qatar, it is unclear why it would pursue next steps. For Qatar, having obtained a legal victory on some issues at the panel stage and with relations severed with Saudi Arabia, it is unclear what additional benefit they get from pursuing arbitration. They could decide to leave the issue for later appeal by agreeing with Saudi Arabia that they reserve the right to appeal at such time as the Appellate Body is functioning again. As neither Qatar nor Saudi Arabia are parties to the interim arbitration agreement that the EU and 20 other WTO Members are party to (JOB/DSB/1/Add.12, 13 and 14), any decision to pursue arbitration would have to be negotiated between the two countries including procedures, etc.

Conclusion

The panel report released today is important both in terms of providing some interpretation of TRIPS provisions but also for its interpretation of TRIPS Art. 73, which mirrors the language in GATT Art. XXI.

Bigger panel decisions are due out later this year in the large number of challenges to U.S. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, and the actions taken on steel and aluminum products. The U.S. now has two panel reports that don’t agree with the U.S. basic premise that determination of national security interests and appropriate actions to take to defend are matters for Members to determine on their own without review by the dispute settlement system.

Assuming that the upcoming panel decisions go against the United States on that core principle, how the U.S. responds will depend on whether the panel report otherwise upholds the U.S. action as permissible in fact. If the U.S. loses the cases in toto, look for the U.S. to not accept the panel results, and to either negotiate with trading partners individually or take no action. The many countries who took unilateral retaliatory action without WTO disputes will likely continue to do so and may increase the level of retaliation based on the specifics of the decision.

At the same time, the United States has filed a series of challenges to the unilateral imposition of retaliation duties by many trading partners who treated Section 232 relief as being safeguard relief or without any WTO justification. Assuming that the U.S. wins all of these cases at the panel stage, the net outcome for the U.S. and each individual WTO member who has challenged Section 232 relief will depend on the combination of results and presumably bilateral consultations. It is unlikely that the United States will engage in arbitration with any of the disputants.

WTO Search for a New Director-General – Moldova’s Tudor Ulianovschi is the Fourth Candidate Put Forward

The Republic of Moldova has forwarded to the World Trade Organization the name of Tudor Ulianovschi as a candidate for the Director-General post. Mr. Ulianovschi is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, a former Moldovan Ambassador to Switzerland and Liechtenstein and a former Permanent Representative to the WTO.

Moldova, a land-locked country in Eastern Europe between Romania and Ukraine, became a Member of the WTO on July 26, 2001. The bulk of its trade is with the Russian Federation, other parts of the former Soviet Union and the European Union. Moldova has been working to become part of the European Union and has an Association Agreement with the EU that was fully implemented on July 1, 2016.

Mr. Ulianovschi joins Jesus Seade (Mexico), Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (Nigeria) and Abdel-Hamid Mamdouh (Egypt) who previously were nominated by their governments. WTO Members have until July 8 to put forward nominations.

Moldova is a lower middle-income country as classified by the World Bank with a small population (2.7 million) and small total GNI ($11.44 billion). It is unclear whether the addition of Mr. Ulianovschi will affect whether one or more candidates from existing EU countries or from the United Kingdom are put forward or whether Mr. Ulianovschi will be the sole European candidate. It is assumed one or more EU-country candidates will in fact be forwarded in the next several weeks.

Similarly, there is speculation that candidates from Asia (Japan, Republic of Korea) and/or Oceania (Australia, New Zealand) may be put forward. So the total number of candidates is likely to continue to grow in the coming days making the completion of a selection process before the end of August less and less likely.

Mr. Ulianovschi’s biography as forwarded to the WTO is embedded below.

bio_mda_e

In other news about the first three candidates, a subscription service, Inside U.S. Trade has published articles based on interviews with Jesus Seade and with Abdel-Hamid Mamdouh. Inside U.S. Trade’s World Trade Online, June 10, 2020, “Seade says he can be an effective, creative facilitator as director-general”; June 15, 2020, “Egypt’s Mamdouh: WTO needs to find its ‘common purpose’ again”. Foreign Affairs on April 30, 2020 published an article by Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, “Finding a Vaccine Is Only the First Step, No One Will Be Safe Until the Whole World Is Safe,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-04-30/finding-vaccine-only-first-step.

Recent World Bank and OECD forecasts show deeper 2020 economic contraction, need for increased global cooperation

The year 2020 is now forecast to result in the sharpest economic contraction since World War II. This is the first recession in 150 years flowing entirely from a health pandemic. With data collected over the last five and a half months (Dec. 31 – June 13), confirmed COVID-19 cases are more than 7.625 million globally and total deaths are more than 425,000 (with both numbers viewed as significantly understated). The global trend line on new cases continues to rise as of June 13 while the number of reported deaths has declined from its peak and stabilized at a high rate.

The International Monetary Fund’s forecast for 2020 went from affirmative growth at the beginning of the year to a decline of 3.5% in April. A recent report from the World Bank now projects global GDP contraction of 5.2% while a June OECD report shows estimates of global GDP contraction of 6.0% if COVID-19 is limited to a “single-hit” scenario and 7.6% contraction if there is a second wave of COVID-19 cases in 2020. See World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, June 2020 at 4, Table 1.1, Real GDP, https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects; OECD Economic Outlook, June 2020, at 13, Table 1.1, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/0d1d1e2e-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/0d1d1e2e-en.

The OECD outlook data show for a single pass of COVID-19, declines for the world at 6.0%, the G20 at 5.7%, OECD at 7.5%, the U.S. at 7.3%, the Euro area at 9.1%, Japan at 6.0%, non-OECD at 4.6%, China at 2.6%, India at 3.7%, and Brazil at 7.4%. Id at 13, Table 1.1. The projections if there is a second wave of COVID-19 cases are significantly worse for all countries.

The OECD’s projection for the U.S. is for greater contraction than the recent estimate from the Federal Reserve of 6.5% in 2020. See, e.g., https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/10/fed-economy-shrink-65-percent-2020-311212.

The World Bank’s estimates for 2020 are similar for some areas and lower for the United States (-6.1%) but shows China growing versus the OECD projected contraction. Here are the data for 2020 for selected countries from the World Bank publication:

United States -6.1%

Euro Area -9.1%

Japan -6.1%

China +1.0%

Indonesia 0.0%

Thailand -6.0%

Russia -6.0%

Turkey -3.8%

Poland -4.2%

Brazil -8.0%

Mexico -7.5%

Argentina -7.3%

Saudi Arabia -3.8%

Iran -5.3%

Egypt +3.0%

India -3.2%

Pakistan -2.6%

Bangladesh +1.6%

Nigeria -3.2%

South Africa -7.1%

Angola -4.0%

The World Bank and OECD also have different levels of trade contraction projected for 2020 in their June publications. The World Bank’s projection is for a contraction of 13.4% (page 4) while the OECD’s projection is for a contraction of 9.5% in 2020 (pae 13). These projections compare to the latest WTO projections of contractions between 13% and 32%. April 8, 2020, WTO press release, Trade set to pluge as COVID-19 pandemic upends global economy, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr855_e.htm.

Foreward to the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects

The World Bank’s recent report in its foreward by the Bank’s President David Malpass provides a stark summary of the challenges for many emerging markets and developing economies and the efforts of the World Bank in finding solutions. The foreward (pages xiii – xiv) is reproduced below:

Foreword

“The COVID-19 pandemic and the economic shutdown in advanced economies and other parts of the globe have disrupted billions of lives and are jeopardizing decades of development progress.

“This edition of the Global Economic Prospects assesses the impacts of the pandemic and analyzes possible courses and outcomes. It presents clear actions needed by the global community and national policymakers—to limit the harm, recover, and rebuild better and stronger than before.

“The report describes a global economy suffering a devastating blow. Our baseline forecast envisions the deepest global recession since World War II. The report also includes an exhaustive analysis of the outlook for emerging market and developing economies, many of which are now fighting on two fronts—containing the domestic outbreak and its consequences while coping with the economic spillovers from the deep recessions in advanced economies.

“Looking a layer deeper, the report investigates the depth and breadth of the economic and humanitarian storm. The COVID-19 recession is the first since 1870 to be triggered solely by a pandemic. The speed and depth with which it has struck suggests the possibility of a sluggish recovery that may require policymakers to consider additional interventions. For many emerging market and developing countries, however, effective financial support and mitigation measures are particularly hard to achieve because a substantial share of employment is in informal sectors.

“Beyond the staggering economic impacts, the pandemic will also have severe and long-lasting socio-economic impacts that may well weaken long-term growth prospects—the plunge in investment because of elevated uncertainty, the erosion of human capital from the legions of unemployed, and the potential for ruptures of trade and supply linkages.

“The World Bank Group is committed to helping alleviate financing breakdowns from the COVID-19 crisis in ways that work toward a more resilient recovery. Some examples include expanding and increasing the coverage of safety net programs, providing trade finance, and supporting the working capital needs of small and medium-sized enterprises. In the broad COVID-19 response for the poorest nations, World Bank Group resources are being scaled up dramatically and debt service payments by official bilateral creditors were suspended on May 1, with comparable treatment expected by commercial creditors.

“Yet these steps toward financing and liquidity will not be enough. Even before the pandemic, development for people in the world’s poorest countries was slow to raise their incomes, enhance living standards, or narrow inequality. The pandemic and economic shutdown in advanced economies and elsewhere are hitting the poor and vulnerable the hardest – through illnesses, job and income losses, food supply disruptions, school closures and lower remittance flows.

“Thus, policy makers face unprecedented challenges from the health, macroeconomic and social effects of the pandemic. To limit the harm, it is important to secure core public services, maintain a private sector and get money directly to people. This will allow a quicker return to business creation and sustainable development after the pandemic has passed. During this mitigation period, countries should focus on targeted support to households and essential public and private sector services; and remain vigilant to counter potential financial disruptions.

“During the recovery period, countries will need to calibrate the withdrawal of public support and should be attentive to broader development challenges. The Global Economic Prospects report discusses the importance of allowing an orderly allocation of new capital toward sectors that are productive in the new post-pandemic structures that emerge. To succeed in this, countries will need reforms that allow capital and labor to adjust relatively fast—by speeding the resolution of disputes, reducing regulatory barriers, and reforming the costly subsidies, monopolies and protected state-owned enterprises that have slowed development.

“To make future economies more resilient, many countries will need systems that can build and retain more human and physical capital during the recovery—using policies that reflect and encourage the post-pandemic need for new types of jobs, businesses and governance systems.

“Emerging market and developing economies are devoting more public resources to critical health care and support for livelihoods during the shutdown, adding to the urgency of their allowing and attracting more private sector investment. This makes the financing and building of productive infrastructure one of the hardest-to-solve development challenges in the post-pandemic recovery.

“The transparency of all government financial commitments, debt-like instruments and investments is a key step in creating an attractive investment climate and could make substantial progress this year. Faster advances in digital connectivity are also necessary and should get a vital boost from the pandemic, which heightened the value of teleworking capabilities, digital information, and broad connectivity. Digital financial services are playing a transformative role in allowing new entrants into the economy and making it easier for governments to provide rapidly expandable, needs-based cash transfers.

“This edition of the Global Economic Prospects describes a grave near-term outlook. The speed and strength of the recovery will depend on the effectiveness of the support programs governments and the international community put in place now; and, critically, on what policymakers do to respond to the new environment. The World Bank Group is committed to seeking much better outcomes for people in emerging market and developing countries, especially the poor. During the crisis, we call on policymakers to act fast and forcefully: our interventions should be no less powerful than the crisis itself.”

Editorial by Chief Economist to OECD June Economic Outlook

Echoing the challenging times ahead in 2020, the OECD’s Chief Economist Laurence Boon reviews the tightrope that OECD countries face before a vaccine is available. The editorial is reprinted below (pages 7-9)

Editorial

After the lockdown, a tightrope walk toward recovery

The spread of Covid-19 has shaken people’s lives around the globe in an extraordinary way, threatening health, disrupting economic activity, and hurting wellbeing and jobs. Since our last Economic Outlook update, in early March, multiple virus outbreaks evolved into a global pandemic, moving too fast across the globe for most healthcare systems to cope with effectively. To reduce the spread of the virus and buy time to strengthen healthcare systems, governments had to shut down large segments of economic activity. At the time of writing, the pandemic has started to recede in many countries, and activity has begun to pick up. The health, social and economic impact of the outbreak could have been considerably worse without the dedication of healthcare and other essential workers who continued to serve the public, putting their own health at risk in doing so.

Governments and central banks have put in place wide-ranging policies to protect people and businesses from the consequences of the sudden stop in activity. Economic activity has collapsed across the OECD during shutdowns, by as much as 20 to 30% in some countries, an extraordinary shock. Borders have been closed and trade has plummeted. Simultaneously, governments implemented quick, large and innovative support measures to cushion the blow, subsidising workers and firms. Social and financial safety nets were strengthened at record speed. As financial stress surged, central banks took forceful and timely action, deploying an array of conventional and unconventional policies above and beyond those used in the Global Financial Crisis, preventing the health and economic crisis from spilling over into a financial one.

As long as no vaccine or treatment is widely available, policymakers around the world will continue to walk on a tightrope. Physical distancing and testing, tracking, tracing and isolating (TTTI) will be the main instruments to fight the spread of the virus. TTTI is indispensable for economic and social activities to resume. But those sectors affected by border closures and those requiring close personal contact, such as tourism, travel, entertainment, restaurants and accommodation will not resume as before. TTTI may not even be enough to prevent a second outbreak of the virus.

Faced with this extraordinary uncertainty, this Economic Outlook presents two possible scenarios: one where the virus continues to recede and remains under control, and one where a second wave of rapid contagion erupts later in 2020. These scenarios are by no means exhaustive, but they help frame the field of possibilities and sharpen policies to walk such uncharted grounds. Both scenarios are sobering, as economic activity does not and cannot return to normal under these circumstances. By the end of 2021, the loss of income exceeds that of any previous recession over the last 100 years outside wartime, with dire and long-lasting consequences for people, firms and governments.

The pandemic has accelerated the shift from ‘great integration’ to ‘great fragmentation’. Additional trade and investment restrictions have sprung up. Many borders are closed across large regions and will likely remain so, at least in part, as long as sizeable virus outbreaks continue. Economies are diverging, depending on when and to what extent they were hit by the virus, the preparedness of their healthcare system, their sectoral specialisation and their fiscal capacity to address the shock. Emerging-market economies have also been shaken by the crisis. Commodity prices have plummeted. Large capital outflows, plummeting remittances, weaker healthcare systems and a large share of informal workers have threatened their health, economic and social resilience. Everywhere, the lockdown has also exacerbated inequality across workers, with those able to telework generally highly qualified, while the least qualified and youth are often on the front line, unable to work or laid off, with the effects further compounded by unequal access to social protection. Private debt levels are uncomfortably high in some countries, and business failure and bankruptcy risks loom large.

Extraordinary policies will be required to walk the tightrope towards recovery. Even if growth does surge in some sectors, overall activity will remain muted for a while. Governments can provide the safety nets that allow people and firms to adjust, but cannot uphold private sector activity, employment and wages for a prolonged period. Capital and workers from impaired sectors and businesses will have to move towards expanding ones. Such transitions are difficult, and rarely happen fast enough to prevent the number of failing firms from rising and a sustained period of unemployment. Governments will need to adapt support and accompany the transition, allowing fast restructuring processes for firms, with no stigma for entrepreneurs, providing income for workers in between jobs, training for those laid off and transitioning to new jobs, and social protection for the most vulnerable. We have previously called for a rise in public investment in digital and green technologies to promote long-term sustainable growth and lift demand in the short term. This is even more urgent today with economies having been hit so hard.

Today’s recovery policies will shape economic and social prospects in the coming decade. Ultra-accommodative monetary policies and higher public debt are necessary and will be accepted as long as economic activity and inflation are depressed, and unemployment is high. However, debt-financed spending should be well targeted to support the most vulnerable and the investment necessary for a transition to a more robust economy. Public support needs to be transparent and fair. Corporate support from governments must come with transparent rules, with private bond and equity holders taking a loss when government steps in, so that their rewards for taking risks are not excessive. Improving employer-employee relationships should accompany ongoing public support for workers and firms, paving the way for stronger social cohesion and ultimately a stronger and more sustainable recovery.

The recovery will not gain steam without more confidence, which will not fully recover without global cooperation. Confidence needs to be boosted both at the national and international levels. Household saving rates have soared in most OECD countries, with high uncertainty and rising unemployment holding back consumption. Trade disruptions and the associated threats to supply chains also impede the necessary reduction in uncertainty for investment to resume. Global cooperation to tackle the virus with a treatment and vaccine and a broader resumption of multilateral dialogue will be key for reducing doubt and unlock economic momentum. The international community should ensure that when a vaccine or treatment is available it can be distributed rapidly worldwide. Otherwise the threat will stay. Likewise, resuming a constructive dialogue on trade would lift business confidence and the appetite for investment.

Governments must seize this opportunity to engineer a fairer and more sustainable economy, making competition and regulation smarter, modernising government taxes, spending, and social protection. Prosperity comes from dialogue and cooperation. This holds true at the national and global level.”

With a lack of Global Cooperation, the WTO is limited to a monitoring of actions by Members and providing transparency

Many of the challenges facing countries, their companies, workers and citizens are not trade related as reviewed in the World Bank and OECD excerpts provided above. But trade does play a role and for many countries a central role in terms of access to needed medical goods and other items. The WTO, as the GATT before it, offers significant leeway to Members to impose export restraints during health emergencies and in other situations. Where there has been a lack of global planning and preparedness for a pandemic, as has been the case with COVID-19, the world finds itself in a situation where demand for medical goods far exceeds supply for extended periods of time for different countries. The desired trade approach of keeping markets open sounds good and is critical for countries with import needs but is typically ignored by many countries that have production capacity and/or inventories, at least temporarily, as all governments look to protect their own populations first.

The G20 has announced some trade actions they are pursuing to ensure trade remains open, although important issues like limiting export restraints and promoting import liberalization are hortatory in nature reflecting the fact that many G20 members have taken and some maintain export restraints or are not supportive of other than ad hoc liberalization initiatives that are necessarily other than temporary.

Two recent speeches by Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff review what the WTO has been able to do to date in the pandemic (limited to seeking notifications of actions by Members, publishing information on the same, developing a trade forecast), what WTO Members have proposed as potential WTO initiatives (to date proposals have been from mid-sized economies and are open for signature by other Members) and the opportunities and challenges for reform of the WTO moving forward. See DDG Wolff, “The challenges are not over”, June 5, 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/ddgaw_05jun20_e.htm; DDG Wolff, “There can be no permanent retreat from what has been created”, June 10, 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/ddgaw_11jun20_e.htm.

The information collected by the WTO and posted on its website, the information notes on various trade topics affected by the pandemic, the efforts to interact with other multilateral organizations and with the business community are all helpful for Members and their constituents to understand what is happening in the trade environment and how the pandemic is affecting areas of trade, types of Members and so on.

It is also the case that initiatives proposed and actions taken by individual countries to improve the market environment, ensure greater market openness and speed availability of medical goods are helpful even if not embraced by the entirety of the WTO membership.

But there is little doubt that there is not the level of global cooperation nor the leadership from the major players to minimize the global fallout from the pandemic or to maximize the speed of the global recovery.

There is no obvious road ahead to greater cooperation or to the meaningful emergence of leadership by the majors in the remainder of 2020. Let’s hope that observation proves to be incorrect. The costs of failure to better cooperate and for the majors to lead in fact are likely unprecedented and will affect the lives of billions of people.

WTO Appellate Body Reports on Australia’s Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products — Separate Views of One Division Member Merit Close Review

In a post from yesterday, I reviewed the Appellate Body (“AB”) reports released on June 9 in the appeals by Honduras and the Dominican Republic on the panel reports on Australia’s plain packaging regime on tobacco products. As noted, the AB upheld the panel reports that Australia’s regime did not violate any WTO Agreements as alleged by the Appellants. See WTO Appellate Issues Reports on Australia’s Plain Packaging Requirements on Tobacco Products – Last Reports Until WTO Appellate Body Reform Occurs, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/06/09/wto-appellate-body-issues-reports-on-australias-plain-packaging-requirements-on-tobacco-products-last-reports-until-wto-appellate-body-reform-occurs/

There are important “separate views” contained in the AB reports that while agreeing with the final conclusion that there was no violation disagree with the searching review of the underlying record on the claim that the panels had not made an objective assessment of the facts pursuant to DSU Art. 11. The separate views also disagreed with the finding of the other two Division members that appellants’ due process rights were violated based on use of information in the interim panel reports that had not previously been available to the parties.

As WTO disputes have become ever more litigious, lawyers used by Members to handle appeals have increased the frequency of seeking a review of the factual record on the claim that panels have not made an objective assessment of the record. Instead of parties limiting appeals of such claims to extraordinary situations, increasing numbers of appeals have focused on these appeal issues. The result has been greatly complicated appeals, much longer AB reports and an inability for AB Divisions to render decisions in 60-90 days of the filing of an appeal.

The Australia plain packaging appeals were filed by Honduras on 17 July 2018 and by the Dominican Republic on 23 August 2018. Thus, the AB reports released on 9 June 2020 were 693 days and 656 days after the appeals were filed. While certainly part of the delay flows from the inability to fill the AB member vacancies since 2018, a significant part flows from the failure of the AB Divisions to limit review of claims under DSU Art. 11 to situations that plausibly create the extraordinary circumstances required for its invocation.

The AB reports in these appeals are 232 pages in length. The concept that a Division of the AB will draft reports in 60-90 days that are 232 pages in length is obviously implausiible. Eliminating the DSU Art. 11 claims would have reduced the length of the reports by roughly 100 pages and would have permitted the AB to focus on the legal issues and legal interpretations of the panel appealed by the parties. As clear from the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the AB isn’t to review factual issues. Rather DSU Art. 17.6 limits the AB to reviewing legal issues and legal interpretations of the panel.

The proper role of the AB and the need to clarify the limited circumstances when a challenge to facts found by the panel by claims of panel bias or failure to make an objective evaluation of the record (DSU Art. 11) have been some of the ongoing concerns of the United States in looking at the functioning of the AB. The latest AB reports demonstrate the importance of addressing the U.S. concerns. The separate views included in the report are important in articulating how the DSU Art. 11 claims in these appeals should have been handled.

The separate views are copied below and eloquently lay out the correct approach in these appeals. WT/DS435/AB/R at 179 – 183 and WT/DS441/AB/R at 179 – 183

6.2 Separate opinion of one Division Member regarding Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement

6.2.1 Introduction

“6.523. It is well settled that not every error by a panel rises to the level of a breach of Article 11 of the DSU. Under the DSU, panels enjoy considerable discretion with respect to fact-finding and the evaluation of facts. This is underscored by the language of Article 11 that ‘a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case’, read in conjunction with Article 17.6 of the DSU, which says that ‘[a]n appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.’ In other words, Article 11 claims on appeal should be reserved – and entertained – only for rare instances of ‘egregious’ errors by panels, which call into question the good faith of the panel.1433

“6.524. With respect to the appellants’ claims regarding the Panel’s analysis under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, I concur with the majority’s ultimate findings and conclusions. However, I disagree on two points: (i) that it was necessary to examine in detail the appellants’ claims that the Panel erred in determining the degree of contribution of the TPP measures to Australia’s objective; and (ii) that the Panel’s treatment of and reliance on multicollinearity and non-stationarity constituted an error under Article 11 of the DSU.

6.2.2 Addressing the appellants’ claims regarding the contribution of the TPP measures was not necessary to resolve the dispute

“6.525. The complainants’ main argument before the Panel was that the TPP measures are more trade-restrictive than necessary because: (i) they are trade-restrictive; and (ii) they are not apt to, and do not, contribute to Australia’s legitimate public health objective.1434 In the alternative, the complainants argued that, even assuming that the TPP measures contribute to Australia’s legitimate public health objective, they are still ‘more trade-restrictive than necessary’ because there are alternative measures that are reasonably available to Australia and that would be less trade-restrictive while making an equivalent contribution to the objective.1435

“6.526. The Panel rejected those arguments by the complainants, while noting that the TPP measures are necessarily trade-restrictive because all tobacco products are imported into Australia, and that the TPP measures contribute to Australia’s public health objective by reducing consumption of tobacco products. The appellants challenge the Panel’s rejection of their arguments. My discussion of that challenge centres on the two sentences in paragraph 7.1025 of the Panel Report.

“6.527. In the first of these sentences, the Panel found that the complainants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures ‘are not apt to make a contribution to Australia’s objective’.1436 In the second sentence, the Panel found that, ‘[r]ather, … the evidence … , taken in its totality, supports the view that the TPP measures … are apt to, and do in fact, contribute to Australia’s objective.’1437

“6.528. The appellants’ appeals were silent regarding the first sentence. They addressed only the second sentence. In doing that, the appellants have not explained how any errors undermining the Panel’s finding in the second sentence of paragraph 7.1025 would suffice to demonstrate that the Panel erred in forming the conclusion in the first sentence of that paragraph.

“6.529. In response to questioning at the second hearing, the appellants stated that it was unnecessary to raise any independent appeal or challenge of the Panel’s finding in the first sentence, because the Panel’s finding in that sentence is integrally linked to the Panel’s finding in the second sentence. The appellants underscored that the Panel conducted an integrated analysis of the degree of contribution based on the evidence as a whole.1438

“6.530. I read these two sentences as saying different things. The first sentence says that the appellants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures are not apt to make a contribution; the second sentence says that the totality of evidence supports the view that the TPP measures are apt to, and do in fact, make a contribution.

“6.531. Even assuming, arguendo, that the appellants are correct that the Panel relied on the totality of the evidence in forming both conclusions in these two sentences of paragraph 7.1025, I do not see how the errors alleged by the appellants pertaining to the Panel’s second-sentence finding would vitiate the Panel’s finding in the first sentence. The mere fact that the Panel may have relied on the same evidence for both findings does not mean that any errors in the Panel’s second determination – that the evidence supports the view that the TPP measures ‘are apt to, and do in fact’ make a contribution – also would undermine the Panel’s conclusion that the complainants failed to substantiate their burden of demonstrating that the TPP measures are not apt to contribute. Those are two different conclusions.

“6.532. Consequently, in order for us to overturn the Panel’s conclusion that the complainants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures are not apt to contribute to Australia’s objective – expressed in the first sentence of paragraph 7.1025 – the appellants were required to demonstrate that the Panel’s errors in its examination of the evidence vitiated that conclusion, and did so in a manner so egregious as to constitute a violation of Article 11 of the DSU.

“6.533. As noted, the appellants did not appeal the Panel’s finding in the first sentence of paragraph 7.1025. They also did not otherwise address the question of whether any errors in the Panel’s evaluation of the second sentence in that paragraph would vitiate the first sentence, except to argue that the two sentences ‘are linked’ and that the Panel’s evaluation of them was based on the same evidence.

“6.534. As a result, I consider that the Panel’s determination that the complainants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures are not apt to contribute to Australia’s objective is undisturbed on appeal. Since measures are presumed to be WTO-consistent until shown otherwise, it follows that the TPP measures are presumed to be at least capable of making a contribution to Australia’s objective1439, whether or not the Panel might have erred in determining that the totality of evidence supports the view that the TPP measures are apt to, and do in fact, make a contribution to Australia’s objective.

“6.535. It follows that the Panel’s finding, in the first sentence of paragraph 7.1025 of the Panel Report, stands. Since the TPP measures are therefore presumed to be capable of contributing to Australia’s objective, it further follows that: (i) the appellants have failed to demonstrate that the Panel erred in rejecting their principal argument; and (ii) with respect to their alternative argument, whether or not the proposed alternatives make an equivalent contribution to the TPP measures, the appellants did not present an alternative that is less trade-restrictive than the TPP measures1440, and consequently there is no basis for us to overturn the Panel’s overall conclusion that the appellants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures are inconsistent with Article 2.2.

“6.536. Thus, I believe it was unnecessary, for purposes of resolving these disputes, for the majority to consider in detail the appellants’ claims regarding the Panel’s assessment of the TPP measures’ contribution to Australia’s objective. For that reason, I also believe that it was inadvisable for the majority to consider in detail the appellants’ contribution claims. This could have been a much shorter report, I believe, based on the findings that the first sentence of paragraph 7.1025, regarding aptness, stands, that the appellants’ proposed alternatives would not be less trade-restrictive than the TPP measures, and therefore that the appellants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures are inconsistent with Article 2.2.

6.2.3 Due process and Article 11 of the DSU

“6.537. I disagree with the majority’s intermediate finding that, by introducing in its Interim Report econometric analyses that had not been tested with the parties, the Panel failed to observe due process in a way that constitutes a violation of Article 11 of the DSU.

“6.538. In my view, the Panel’s reliance on multicollinearity and non-stationarity to test the robustness of the parties’ evidence was part of the Panel’s reasoning, with respect to which a panel enjoys considerable discretion. The parties to this case submitted to the Panel a large amount of econometric evidence. It was appropriate for the Panel to assess the probative value of that evidence. The Panel tested the robustness of the econometric studies submitted by the parties by taking into account, inter alia, whether the models suffered from multicollinearity and non-stationarity. The mere fact that these two so-called ‘criteria’ were not specifically mentioned by the parties is not sufficient to warrant a different scrutiny of the Panel’s reliance on them, as compared to the Panel’s reliance on other econometric concepts (e.g. overfitting and endogeneity) that the parties had identified. I therefore consider that the Panel acted within the bounds of its discretion as a trier of facts by not only examining the parameters used by each party, but also by going further in its evaluation and testing the robustness of the parties’ econometric evidence for multicollinearity and non-stationarity.

“6.539. With regard to the issue of due process, Australia argues that the complainants could have used the interim review stage to request the Panel to review the relevant parts of the Panel Report pursuant to Article 15 of the DSU but chose not to do so.1441 The appellants submit that interim review would not have provided them with a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to comment on the Panel’s concerns regarding multicollinearity and non-stationarity.1442

“6.540. Article 15.2 of the DSU says, in relevant part, that: Within a period of time set by the panel, a party may submit a written request for the panel to review precise aspects of the interim report prior to circulation of the final report to the Members. At the request of a party, the panel shall hold a further meeting with the parties on the issues identified in the written comments. If no comments are received from any party within the comment period, the interim report shall be considered the final panel report and circulated promptly to the Members.

“6.541. The complainants became aware of the Panel’s analysis of multicollinearity and non-stationarity when they received the Panel’s Interim Report on 2 May 2017. However, the complainants did not raise any substantive concerns with respect to these aspects of the Panel’s analysis in their comments on the Interim Report, nor did they request an interim review meeting. It is reasonable to read Article 15.2 as placing responsibility on the complainants to have raised the Panel’s reliance on multicollinearity and non-stationarity at the interim review stage, especially given the importance that the appellants attribute to these issues on appeal. In my view, the complainants’ failure to raise these issues at the interim review stage undermines the appellants’ claim regarding due process.

“6.542. Thus, since the complainants had an opportunity to raise these issues and did not do so, I do not agree with their claim that the Panel denied them due process by not ‘giving the parties any opportunity whatsoever to comment’.1443 Since the complainants did not attempt to raise their concerns regarding the Panel’s reliance on multicollinearity and non-stationarity at the interim review stage, it is unnecessary to speculate about whether the alleged limited nature of the interim review process, which I do not find to be expressed in the text of Article 15.2, would have been sufficient. Consequently, I disagree with the majority’s interim conclusion on this point.

“6.543. In light of the above, I consider that the appellants have not demonstrated that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the facts of the case as required under Article 11 of the DSU by denying the parties an opportunity to comment on the Panel’s reliance on multicollinearity and non-stationarity.

“1428 Panel Report, paras. 7.1025 and 7.1043.

“1429 Panel Report, para. 7.1255.

“1430 Panel Report, paras. 7.1464 and 7.1531.

“1431 Panel Report, paras. 7.1417 and 7.1495.

“1432 See also Panel Report (DS435), para. 8.1.a; Panel Report (DS441), para. 8.1.b.i.

“1433 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 133. See also Appellate Body Reports, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 141; Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, para. 164; EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), para. 177.

“1434 See Panel Report, paras. 7.426, 7.437, 7.485 and 7.520; Honduras’ and the Dominican Republic’s responses to questioning at the second hearing.

“1435 See Honduras’ first written submission to the Panel, paras. 853 and 911; Dominican Republic’s first written submission to the Panel, paras. 737-739, 980, and 1019.

“1436 Panel Report, para. 7.1025.

“1437 Panel Report, para. 7.1025.

“1438 Honduras’ and the Dominican Republic’s responses to questioning at the second hearing (referring to Panel Report, paras. 7.495-7.497).

“1439 Where a panel finds that the parties’ evidence reveals that a measure is capable of contributing, or the evidence is unclear or mixed as to whether the measure is capable of contributing, a panel should find that the complainant has failed to demonstrate that the measure is incapable of contributing to the objective. This would at the same time mean that, to the extent that the complainant also argues that the measure is inconsistent with Article 2.2 on the basis that there are reasonably available less trade-restrictive alternative measures capable of making an equivalent contribution, the presumption of WTO-consistency requires that a panel presume that the measure is at least capable of making some contribution to the legitimate objective and, on that basis, proceed to examine the remaining factors for determining ‘necessity’, such as the degree of the measure’s trade restrictiveness and the availability of less trade-restrictive alternative measures.

“1440 For the reasons set forth in sections 6.1.3-6.1.4 we have upheld the Panel’s findings that the alternative measures proposed by the complainants would not be less trade-restrictive than the TPP measures.

“1441 Australia’s appellee’s submission, para. 464.

“1442 Honduras’ responses to questioning at the second hearing. In addition, the Dominican Republic noted that, at the interim review stage, it could pose only ‘rhetorical questions’ to the Panel. (Dominican Republic’s responses to questioning at the second hearing).

“1443 Dominican Republic’s appellant’s submission, para. 42. (emphasis omitted).”

WTO Appellate Body Issues Reports on Australia’s Plain Packaging Requirements on Tobacco Products — Last Reports Until WTO Appellate Body Reform Occurs

On June 9th, the long awaited WTO Appellate Body (“AB”) reports on the two challenges to Australia’s plain packaging requirements on tobacco products were released. AUSTRALIA – CERTAIN MEASURES CONCERNING TRADEMARKS, GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AND OTHER PLAIN PACKAGING REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO TOBACCO PRODUCTS AND PACKAGING, WT/DS435/AB/R and WT/DS441/AB/R (9 June 2020). The appellants were Honduras and the Dominican Republic. The Appellate Body essentially upheld the panel reports not finding violations of WTO Agreements by Australia’s actions. The decisions are important for governments and citizens concerned with the need to limit the reach of health harmful products like cigarettes. With plain packaging laws now prevalent in a number of countries, one can expect today’s AB decision to encourage more countries to emulate the approach taken by Australia (in part or in whole).

The WTO Secretariat prepares summaries of findings on cases. Below is the link to the summary followed by the summary of findings from the AB decisions provided on the WTO webpage, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds435_e.htm#bkmk435abr:

“Honduras (DS435) and the Dominican Republic (DS441) (together referred to as the appellants) requested the Appellate Body to reverse the Panel’s conclusions under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, and Articles 16.1 and 20 of the TRIPS Agreement.

  • “1. With respect to Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement:
    • With respect to the contribution of the TPP measures to Australia’s objective, the Appellate Body found that Honduras had not substantiated its claim that the Panel erred in its application of Article 2.2 to the facts of the case. Ultimately, the Appellate Body found that the appellants had not demonstrated that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the facts under Article 11 of the DSU. In particular, the Appellate Body found that, although the Panel erred by disregarding certain evidence adduced by the Dominican Republic, and acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU by compromising the complainants’ due process rights with respect to the Panel’s reliance on multicollinearity and non‑stationarity when reviewing the parties’ econometric evidence, such errors were not sufficiently material to vitiate the Panel’s findings regarding the contribution of the TPP measures to Australia’s objective, namely improving public health by reducing the use of, and exposure to, tobacco products.
    • The Appellate Body found that the appellants had not demonstrated that the Panel erred in its intermediate conclusions pertaining to the trade restrictiveness of the TPP measures. In particular, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding that the impact of the TPP measures on reducing the opportunity for producers to differentiate between different products on the basis of brands did not in itself necessarily amount to a limiting effect on international trade. The Appellate Body also upheld the Panel’s finding that the complainants failed to demonstrate that the TPP measures would necessarily lead to a decline in the value of imported tobacco products as a consequence of consumers shifting from premium to non-premium products in response to the TPP measures (downtrading).
    • With respect to the alternative measures, the Appellate Body found that the Panel erred in finding that the complainants had failed to demonstrate that each of the two alternative measures (the increase in the MLPA and an increase in taxation) would be apt to make a contribution equivalent to that of the TPP measures. However, the Appellate Body found that the Panel did not err in finding that the complainants had failed to demonstrate that these two alternative measures are less trade restrictive than the TPP measures. Consequently, the Panel’s finding that the complainants had not demonstrated that the increase in the MLPA and the increase in taxation would each “be a less trade restrictive alternative to the TPP measures that would make an equivalent contribution to Australia’s objective”, stands.
    • Consequently, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s conclusion that the complainants had not demonstrated that the TPP measures are more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, within the meaning of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
  • “2. With respect to Article 16.1 of the TRIPS Agreement:
    • The Appellate Body found that the Panel did not err in its interpretation of Article 16.1. The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that Article 16.1 of the TRIPS Agreement grants a trademark owner the exclusive right to preclude unauthorized use of the trademark by third parties. However, Article 16.1 does not confer upon a trademark owner a positive right to use its trademark or a right to protect the distinctiveness of that trademark through use.
    • Having found no error in the Panel’s interpretation, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that there was no need to examine further the complainants’ factual allegation that the TPP measures’ prohibition on the use of certain tobacco related trademarks would in fact reduce the distinctiveness of such trademarks, and lead to a situation where a “likelihood of confusion” with respect to these trademarks is less likely to arise in the market.
    • Consequently, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s conclusion that the complainants have not demonstrated that the TPP measures are inconsistent with Article 16.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.
  • “3. With respect to Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement
    • The Appellate Body found that the Panel did not err in its interpretation and application of Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement. In particular, the Appellate Body considered that the Panel did not err in its interpretation of the term ‘unjustifiably’ in Article 20 and in its application of this interpretation to the facts of the case. The Appellate Body thus agreed with the Panel that the complainants had not demonstrated that trademark-related requirements of the TPP measures unjustifiably encumbered the use of trademarks in the course of trade within the meaning of Article 20.
    • Consequently, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s conclusion that the complainants had not demonstrated that the TPP measures are inconsistent with Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement.

“The Appellate Body recalled that, having rejected all of the complainants’ claims, the Panel had declined Honduras’ and the Dominican Republic’s requests that the Panel recommend, in accordance with Article 19.1 of the DSU, that the DSB request Australia to bring the measures at issue into conformity with the TRIPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement.

“Having upheld the Panel’s findings under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement and Articles 16.1 and 20 of the TRIPS Agreement, it followed that the Appellate Body also agreed with the Panel that Honduras and the Dominican Republic had not succeeded in establishing that Australia’s TPP measures are inconsistent with the provisions of the covered agreements at issue. Accordingly, the Appellate Body made no recommendation to the DSB, pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU.”

While the Reports are Not Surprising in Outcome, They Show Many of the Concerns that U.S. has Raised about the AB Over Time

These are the last reports of the Appellate Body until the impasse on the appointment of new Appellate Body members is solved, which will require the United States achieving reforms in the operation of the Appellate Body and the AB’s actual adherence to the Dispute Settlement Understanding as negotiated.

Many of the concerns that the U.S. has long raised are present in the current decisions. For example, the reports were not prepared in 90 days from the date of appeal, nor were the delays in completion of the appeals specifically authorized by the parties. The decisions were prepared by non-current members of the Appellate Body (although Members had agreed to permit conclusion of appeals where hearings had already occurred). The vast majority of the issues in the appeals were challenges to findings of fact by the panels under the guise of DSU Article 11 challenges that the panels failed to make an objective assessment of the facts. While the Appellate Body decisions attempt to limit what the AB should be reviewing where DSU Art. 11 is the basis for the claim, the bulk of the decisions still involve discussions of at least some of the DSU Art. 11 claims made by the appellants. See WT/DS435/AB/R at 38-135 and WT/DS441/AB/R at 38-135.

The United States was a third party to the cases but limited its written comments to a few issues, the most important of which was the need for the Appellate Body not to permit Art. 11 to be used for a review of factual findings, which by DSU are issues for the panel. See WT/DS435/AB/R/Add.1, Annex C-16 at 92-93; WT/DS441/AB/R/Add.1, Annex C-16 at 92-93:

“III. COMPLAINANTS’ CLAIMS OF ERROR UNDER THE DSU

“7. Honduras and the Dominican Republic both appeal dozens of factual findings under DSU Article 11. Both appeals by Honduras and the Dominican Republic to the Appellate Body make numerous claims under Article 11 of the DSU of what clearly are alleged factual errors by the Panel. By agreement of all WTO Members, the DSU expressly limits the scope of an appeal to alleged legal errors by a panel, not factual errors.6 The United States disagrees with these attempts to re-litigate dozens of unfavorable factual determinations by the Panel through claims of breach of Article 11 of the DSU.

“8. The Appellate Body has an opportunity in this appeal to reconsider how its originally limited approach to review the “objective assessment” of a panel has been seized by appellants to cover practically all factual determinations by a panel. Given the lack of textual basis in the DSU for
appellate review of panel fact-finding, the Appellate Body could instead reassert that the proper issues for appeal are issues of law and legal interpretations covered by a panel report.7

“6 See DSU Article 17.6.

“7 Id. (“An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.”).”

Conclusion

The plain packaging decisions by the Appellate Body are the last AB decisions until the impasse over AB member selection is resolved which means that the U.S. concerns of the operation of the AB must be resolved.

While the decisions are important in themselves, they also demonstrate the types of problems which have made Appellate Body decisions untimely and problematic to the United States and other Members.

While some Members are now proceeding with arbitration type actions to maintain a second-level review of disputes, the need for collective action to return the Appellate Body to its proper and limited role continues. With the COVID-19 pandemic and now the Director-General selection process taking up much of the trade oxygen for many WTO Members, the need for Appellate Body reform is likely to slip to 2021 or later before being focused on again.