China

USTR 2021 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers — areas of concern with a focus on China

Terence P. Stewart · April 8, 2021 · U.S. 2021 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers · Aragentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Ecuador, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Made in China 2025, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Vietnam · No Comments

Every year for the last 36 years, USTR releases a National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. This year’s forward provides a little background on the report. See USTR, 2021 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, page 1, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2021/2021NTE.pdf.

“The 2021 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE) is the 36th in an annual series that highlights significant foreign barriers to U.S. exports, U.S. foreign direct investment, and U.S. electronic commerce. This document is a companion piece to the President’s 2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report, published by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in March.

“In accordance with section 181 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by section 303 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 and amended by section 1304 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, section 311 of the Uruguay Round Trade Agreements Act, and section 1202 of the Internet Tax Freedom Act, USTR is required to submit to the President, the Senate Finance Committee, and appropriate committees in the House of Representatives, an annual report on significant foreign trade barriers. The statute requires an inventory of the most important foreign barriers affecting U.S. exports of goods and services, including agricultural commodities and U.S. intellectual property; foreign direct investment by U.S. persons, especially if such investment has implications for trade in goods or services; and U.S. electronic commerce. Such an inventory enhances awareness of these trade restrictions, facilitates U.S. negotiations aimed at reducing or eliminating these barriers, and is a valuable tool in enforcing U.S. trade laws and strengthening the rules-based system.”

This year’s report covers 65 countries or country groups, so not all trading partners are covered by the annual report. China has the largest section of the report for an individual country (36 pages) while the European Union (covering 27 countries) has the largest section overall (52 pages). Other important trading partners with significant sections in the report include India (24 pages), Russian Federation (20 pages), Japan (18 pages), Indonesia (16 pages), Republic of Korea (14 pages), Brazil (14 pages), Vietnam (14 pages). the USMCA partners had smaller sections — Canada (8 pages) and Mexico (12 pages). the countries covered account for nearly 100 percent of U.S. trade in goods and nearly 90% of U.S. services trade.

The USTR press release from March 31, 2021 (majority of release copied below) provides an outline of some of the major areas of concern. See USTR, Ambassador Tai releases 2021 National Trade Estimate Report, March 31, 2021, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/march/ambassador-tai-releases-2021-national-trade-estimate-report.

“Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports in 65 Trading Partners Detailed

“WASHINGTON – United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai today released the 2021 National Trade Estimate (NTE) Report, providing a detailed inventory of significant foreign barriers to U.S. exports of goods and services, investment, and electronic commerce.

“’The President’s Trade Agenda released earlier this month outlined a clear vision for supporting America’s working families by promoting a fair international trading system that boosts inclusive economic growth,’” said Ambassador Tai. ‘The 2021 NTE Report identifies a range of important challenges and priorities to guide the Biden Administration’s effort to craft trade policy that reflects America’s values and builds back better.’

“Published annually since 1985, the NTE Report is a comprehensive review of significant foreign trade barriers affecting U.S. exports of goods and services. The 570-page report examines 65 trading partners and country groups, including the U.S.’ largest trading partners, all 20 U.S. FTA partners, and other economies and country groupings of interest such as the Arab League, the United Kingdom (included as a separate entity for the first time in this report), and the European Union. Together, these economies account for 99 percent of U.S. goods trade and 87 percent of U.S. services trade.

“The NTE Report covers significant trade barriers in 11 areas, including (1) import policies such as tariffs, import licensing and customs barriers; (2) technical barriers to trade; (3) sanitary and phytosanitary measures; (4) subsidies; (5) government procurement; (6) intellectual property protection; (7) services barriers; (8) barriers to digital trade and electronic commerce; (9) investment barriers; (10) competition; and (11) other barriers.

“Taken as a whole, the NTE Report highlights significant barriers that present major policy challenges with implications for future U.S. growth opportunities, and the fairness of the global economy. Examples of these significant obstacles include:

“Agricultural Trade Barriers: The NTE Report details an array of tariff and nontariff barriers to U.S. agricultural exports across trading partners and regions, ranging from non-science-based regulatory measures, opaque approval processes for products of agricultural biotechnology, burdensome import licensing and certification requirements, and restrictions on the ability of U.S. producers to use the common names of the products that they produce and export. USTR will continue to engage foreign governments on barriers that hamper the ability of U.S. farmers, ranchers and food processors to access markets worldwide.

“Digital Trade: The 2021 NTE Report details restrictive data policies in India, China, Korea, Vietnam, and Turkey, among other countries; local software pre-installation requirements in Russia, Indonesian tariffs on digital products, and existing or proposed local content requirements for online streaming services in Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, EU, Mexico, Ukraine, and Vietnam; and discriminatory tax measures in Austria, India, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the UK. USTR will continue to engage foreign governments on digital policies that threaten the regulatory landscape for U.S. exporters of digital products and services and undermine U.S. manufacturers’ and service suppliers’ ability to move data across borders.

“Excess Capacity: China’s state-led approach to the economy and trade makes it the world’s leading offender in creating non-economic capacity, as evidenced by the severe and persistent excess capacity situations in several industries, including steel, aluminum, and solar, among others. China also is well on its way to creating severe excess capacity in other industries through its pursuit of industrial plans such as Made in China 2025, pursuant to which the Chinese government is doling out hundreds of billions of dollars to support Chinese companies and requiring them to achieve preset targets for domestic market share–at the expense of imports–and global market share in several advanced manufacturing industries. USTR will continue its bilateral and multilateral efforts to address these harmful trade practices.

“Technical Barriers to Trade: Technical regulations or conformity assessment procedures that unnecessarily restrict trade or curb the movement of innovative products risk lost opportunities to capitalize on America’s leadership in science and high-tech manufacturing, services, and agriculture. The NTE Report’s many examples of this challenge range from non-transparent European Union chemical regulations to Chinese Information Technology cybersecurity and encryption standards, to Indian and Brazilian testing and certification rules for telecommunications equipment, to technology.

“The United States is taking steps to address these issues, and encourage flexible regulatory approaches and transparent, open processes, with these and many other partners. Within APEC, for example, the United States is engaged in projects on cybersecurity and blockchain to identify key public policy issues, and has projects in development on aerial drones and 3D printing. Another key example is USTR’s bilateral and multilateral work on standards and regulations related to electric cars, to ensure that vehicles from different manufacturers can all be charged reliably.

“The NTE Report details thousands of individual barriers to specific manufactured goods, farm products, and services. Each can reduce U.S. opportunities to export, invent, support jobs, and raise wages and incomes. These range from Argentina’s imposition of quota limits on imported books in September 2020 to India’s 38.8 percent average tariff on agricultural goods; the anomalous technical standards Saudi Arabia applies to shoes and electronic equipment; Ecuador’s mandatory and cumbersome process for allocating import licenses for agriculture products such as meats and dairy products; Indonesian local content requirements across a broad range of sectors; and Russian bans on imported food.”

What the NTE has to say about China

The United States has for many years raised multiple concerns with China’s practices which the U.S. views as distorting trade flows and impeding market access to China. While the U.S. and China have engaged bilaterally extensively since China’s WTO accession and the U.S. has pursued several dozen disputes against Chinese practices that were clearly contrary to WTO obligations of China, little overall progress has been made in resolving the wide array of Chinese government distortions created and maintained over the years. These distortions contribute to the extraordinary trade deficit the United States has with China. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, MONTHLY U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES, FEBRUARY 2021, April 7, 2021, https://www.bea.gov/news/2021/us-international-trade-goods-and-services-february-2021 (U.S. trade deficit in 2020 in goods with China was $310.2 billion; U.S. trade surplus in services was $22.1 billion; U.S. deficit in goods with China increased to $50.9 billion in the January – February 2021 period versus $42.1 billion in the first two months of 2020).

The Trump Administration pursued a 301 investigation on a number of intellectual property concerns with China, conducted Section 232 national security investigations on steel and aluminum — two sectors where Chinese actions have created massive global excess capacity — and negotiated with China the U.S.-China Phase I Agreement which took effect in mid-February 2020. The Agreement both addressed a number of problems in agriculture, intellectual property and services and committed China to expanded purchases of goods and services from the United States in 2021-2022 (and going forward). The NTE reviews where Chinese commitments under the Phase I Agreement apply and what progress is being seen. On the purchase commitments, China has not come close to meeting the commitments in 2021 though there were increased imports from the U.S. of agricultural products and energy products. See, e.g., March 20, 2021, The U.S.-China Phase 1 Trade Agreement under the Biden Administration, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/20/the-u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-under-the-biden-administration/. The U.S. has a long history of China promising reforms that are either not carried out or are undermined by additional restrictions. The list of areas of concern making it into the annual NTE is not exhaustive but illustrative of the challenges to obtaining conditions of fair trade with the world’s most populous nation and second largest economy.

Areas of concern for the United States with China shown in the 2021 NTE include:

Tariffs (there are some high agricultural tariffs, and the large tariffs imposed in retaliation to U.S. Section 232 actions on steel and aluminum and U.S. Section 301 actions for Chinese practices reviewed in the investigation).

Non-tariff barriers include

Industrial Policies (such as “Made in China 2025” and described generally as follows, “China continues to pursue a wide array of industrial policies that seek to limit market access for imported goods, foreign manufacturers, and foreign services suppliers, while offering substantial government guidance, resources, and regulatory support to Chinese industries. The beneficiaries of these constantly evolving policies are not only state-owned enterprises (SOEs) but also other domestic companies attempting to move up the economic value chain.),

State-Owned Enterprises (a number of concerns are raised including “China has also previously indicated that it would consider adopting the principle of ‘competitive neutrality’ for SOEs. However, China has continued to pursue policies that further enshrine the dominant role of the state and its industrial plans when it comes to the operation of state-owned and state-invested enterprises.”),

Industrial Subsidies (massive subsidies to industries creating excess capacity and causing harm to U.S. producers globally; U.S. is working with the EU and Japan on possible amendments to Subsidies Agreement to address certain aspects not effectively handled under existing rules)

Fisheries Subsidies (size of subsidies by China to its industry),

Excess Capacity (problem created in many sectors including steel, aluminum, solar panels and others through state programs, subsidies, etc.),

Indigenous Innovation (including preferences for IP developed in China),

Technology Transfer (301 investigation looked at “(1) the use of a variety of tools to require or pressure the transfer of technologies and IP to Chinese companies; (2) depriving U.S. companies of the ability to set market based terms in technology licensing negotiations with Chinese companies; (3) intervention in markets by directing or unfairly facilitating the acquisition of U.S. companies and assets by Chinese companies to obtain cutting-edge technologies and IP; and, (4) conducting or supporting cyber-enabled theft and unauthorized intrusions into U.S. commercial computer networks for commercial gains.”)

Investment Restrictions (different systems for domestic and foreign investment; discriminatory treatment),

Administrative Licensing (problems continue to be experienced in a wide array of licensing situations)

Standards (ability of foreign companies to participate in establishing; development of Chinese standards regardless of international standards),

Secure and Controllable ICT Policies (cybersecurity law used to discriminate against foreign ICT prducts),

Encryption (“Onerous requirements on the use of encryption, including intrusive approval processes and, in many cases, mandatory use of indigenous encryption algorithms (e.g., for WiFi and 4G cellular products), continue to be cited by stakeholders as a significant trade barrier.”),

Competition Policy (“Many U.S. companies have cited selective enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law against foreign companies seeking to do business in China as a major concern, and they have highlighted the limited enforcement of this law against SOEs.” “Instead, these remedies seem to be designed to further industrial policy goals. Another concern relates to the procedural fairness of Anti-monopoly Law investigations of foreign companies. U.S. industry has expressed concern about insufficient predictability, fairness, and transparency in Antimonopoly Law investigative processes.”),

Pharmaceuticals (some long standing issues addressed in U.S.-China Phase I Agreement; others to be addressed in the future),

Medical devices (China’s “pricing and tendering procedures for medical devices and its discriminatory treatment of imported medical devices”),

Cosmetics (“concerns with China’s regulation of cosmetics.” “Despite years of United States engagement with China via the JCCT, the International Cooperation on Cosmetics Regulation, and other fora to share views and expertise regarding the regulation of cosmetics, as of March 2021 China has not yet addressed key U.S. trade concerns, including basic concerns such as the need to use international standards to facilitate cosmetics conformity assessment, nor has it provided assurances that U.S. intellectual property will be protected.”),

Export restraints (need to bring multiple cases at WTO on inputs where violate Protocol of Accession),

Value-added Tax Rebates and Related Policies (modifications of rates to change trade flows),

Import Ban on Remanufactured Products

Import Ban on Recyclable Materials

Trade Remedies (problems in transparency and procedural fairness; problems also in apparent use of trade remedies to go after trading partners who use WTO rights against Chinese products),

Government Procurement (failure to join the WTO GPA yet),

Corporate Social Credit System (“Foreign companies are concerned that the corporate social credit system will also be used by the Chinese Government to pressure them to act in accordance with relevant Chinese industrial policies or otherwise to make investments or conduct their business operations in ways that run counter to market principles or their own business strategies. Foreign companies are also concerned about the opaque nature of the corporate social credit system.”),

Other Non-Tariff Measures (“Key areas include China’s labor laws, laws governing land use in China, commercial dispute resolution and the treatment of non-governmental organizations. Corruption among Chinese Government officials, enabled in part by China’s incomplete adoption of the rule of law, is also a key concern.”).

Intellectual Property Protection (many issues were included in the U.S.-China Phase I Agreement, some progress on issues raised).

Trade Secrets (major area of concern and theft, some believed from government-supported entities; some improvements from U.S.-China Phase I Agreement),

Bad Faith Trademark Registration (a continuing major concern; some progress in U.S.-China Phase I Agreement),

Online Infringement (“Online piracy continues on a large scale in China, affecting a wide range of industries, including those involved in distributing legitimate music, motion pictures, books and journals, software, and video games.” Some progress made in the U.S.-China Phase I Agreement),

Counterfeit Goods (a major problem. “The Phase One Agreement requires China to take effective enforcement action against counterfeit pharmaceuticals and related products, including active pharmaceutical ingredients, and to significantly increase actions to stop the manufacture and distribution of counterfeits with significant health or safety risks. The Phase One Agreement also requires China to provide that its judicial authorities shall order the forfeiture and destruction of pirated and counterfeit goods, along with the materials and implements predominantly used in their manufacture. In addition, the Agreement requires China to significantly increase the number of enforcement actions at physical markets in China and against goods that are exported or in transit. It further requires China to ensure, through third party audits, that government agencies and SOEs only use licensed software.”).

Agriculture (“China remains a difficult and unpredictable market for U.S. agricultural exporters, largely because of
inconsistent enforcement of regulations and selective intervention in the market by China’s regulatory authorities. The failure of China’s regulators to routinely follow science-based, international standards, and guidelines further complicates and impedes agricultural trade. The Phase One Agreement addresses structural barriers to trade and aims to support a dramatic expansion of U.S. food, agriculture, and seafood product exports, which will increase U.S. farm and fishery income, generate more rural economic activity, and promote job growth. The Phase One Agreement addresses a multitude of non-tariff barriers to U.S. agriculture and seafood products, including for meat and meat
products, poultry, seafood, rice, dairy, infant formula, horticultural products, animal feed and feed additives, pet food, and products of agricultural biotechnology. The Agreement also includes enforceable commitments requiring China to purchase and import on average at least $40 billion of U.S. agricultural and seafood products per year in 2021 and 2022, representing an average annual increase of at least $16 billion over 2017 levels. China also agreed that it will strive to purchase and import an additional $5 billion of U.S. agricultural and seafood products each year.”).

Agricultural Domestic Support (China exceeds the limits allowed it; WTO dispute confirms China in violation of WTO obligations; U.S. seeking authorization to retaliate),

Tariff-rate Quota Administration (U.S. challenged China’s administration of TRQs on various products and won WTO dispute; U.S.-China Phase I Agreement requires China to comply on the products of concern),

Agricultural Biotechnology Approvals (China’s system has been a major problem for U.S. producers. U.S>-China Phase I Agreement includes commitments by China to address the major concerns of the U.S. in this area),

Food Safety Law (China’s actions have been quite burdensome and have failed to provide notices to the WTO in many cases. U.S>-China Phase I Agreement addresses the main concerns),

Poultry (China restricted U.S. exports after avian influenza in the U.S. and maintained restrictions despite actions by the U.S. that complied with World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) guidelines. U.S.-China Phase I Agreement has China committing to follow OIE guidelines and limiting restrictions to the region where there is a problem in future outbreaks),

Beef (“In the Phase One Agreement, China agreed to expand the scope of U.S. beef products allowed to be imported, to eliminate age restrictions on cattle slaughtered for export to China, and to recognize the U.S. beef and beef products’ traceability system. China also agreed to establish MRLs for three synthetic hormones legally used for decades in the United States consistent with Codex standards and guidelines. Where Codex standards and guidelines do not yet exist, China agreed to use MRLs established by other countries that have performed science-based risk assessments.”),

Pork (“China bans the use of certain veterinary drugs and growth promotants instead of accepting the MRLs set by Codex.” Some progress on opening the China market to U.S. pork products was made in the U.S.-China Phase I Agreement),

Horticultural Products (market access barriers for many U.S. products. U.S.-China Phase I Agreement obtains access for a number of products — fresh potatoes for processing, blueberries, nectarines and avocados from California, and barley, timothy hay and some other products.),

Value-added Tax Rebates and Related Policies (practice of varying rates on agricultural commodities).

Services (“In 2020, numerous challenges persisted in a number of services sectors. As in past years, Chinese regulators
continued to use discriminatory regulatory processes, informal bans on entry and expansion, case-by-case approvals in some services sectors, overly burdensome licensing and operating requirements, and other means to frustrate the efforts of U.S. suppliers of services to achieve their full market potential in China. These policies and practices affect U.S. service suppliers across a wide range of sectors, including express delivery, cloud computing, telecommunications, film production and distribution, online video and entertainment software, and legal services. In addition, China’s Cybersecurity Law and related draft and final implementing measures include mandates to purchase domestic ICT products and services, restrictions on cross-border data flows, and requirements to store and process data locally. China’s draft Personal Information Protection Law also includes restrictions on cross-border data flows and requirements to store and process data locally. These types of data restrictions undermine U.S. services suppliers’ ability to take advantage of market access opportunities in China. China also had failed to fully address U.S. concerns in
areas that have been the subject of WTO dispute settlement, including electronic payment services and theatrical film importation and distribution. The Phase One Agreement addresses a number of longstanding trade and investment barriers to U.S. providers of a wide range of financial services, including banking, insurance, securities, asset management, credit rating, and electronic payment services, among others. The barriers addressed in that Agreement
include joint venture requirements, foreign equity limitations, and various discriminatory regulatory requirements. Removal of these barriers should allow U.S. financial service providers to compete on a more level playing field and expand their services export offerings in the China market.”)

Banking Services (U.S.-China Phase I Agreement addresses some concerns re access including bank branches and supplying securities investment fund custody services),

Securities, Asset Management, and Futures Services (U.S.-China Phase I Agreement resulted in China eliminating limits on equity ownership and commits to nondiscrimination for U.S. suppliers of these services),

Insurance Services (despite commitments by China as part of the U.S.-China Phase I Agreement, U.S. participation in China’s insurance market remains very limited),

Electronic Payment Services (China has restricted access to foreign electronic payment services providers. U.S. won a WTO dispute and included provisions in U.S.-China Phase I Agreement. So far just one foreign electronic payment services provider has been licensed in China),

Internet-enabled Payment Services (major problems for foreign companies to obtain license to provide such services),

Telecommunications Services (range of barriers have limited foreign suppliers access to both basic telecom services and to value added services),

Internet Regulatory Regime (“China’s Internet regulatory regime is restrictive and non-transparent, affecting a broad range of commercial services activities conducted via the Internet, and is overseen by multiple agencies without clear lines of jurisdiction. China’s Internet economy had boomed over the past decade and is second in size only to that of the United States. Growth in China has been marked in service sectors similar to those found in the United States, including retail websites, search engines, online education, travel, advertising, audio-visual and computer gaming services, electronic mail and text, online job searches, Internet consulting, mapping services, applications, web domain registration, and electronic trading. However, in the Chinese market, Chinese companies dominate due in large part to restrictions imposed on foreign companies by the Chinese Government. At the same time, foreign companies continue to encounter major difficulties in attempting to offer these and other Internet-based services on a cross-border basis. China continues to engage in extensive blocking of legitimate websites and apps, imposing significant costs on both suppliers and users of web-based services and products. According to the latest data, China currently blocks a significant portion of the largest global sites. U.S. industry research has calculated that more than 10,000 foreign sites are blocked, affecting billions of dollars in business, including communications, networking, app stores, news, and other sites. Even when sites are not permanently blocked, the often arbitrary implementation of blocking, and the performance-degrading effect of filtering all traffic into and outside of China, significantly impair the supply of many cross-border services, often to the point of making them unviable.”),

Voice-over-Internet Protocol Services (“China’s regulatory authorities have restricted the ability to offer VOIP services interconnected to the public switched telecommunications network (i.e., to call a traditional phone number) to basic telecommunications service licensees.”),

Cloud Computing Services (foreign service providers can only operate in China by using a Chinese company and turning over brand, IP and other aspects; serious concern for U.S.),

Audio-visual and Related Services (“China prohibits retransmission of foreign TV channels, prohibits foreign investment in TV production, prohibits foreign investment in TV stations and channels in China, and imposes quotas on the amount of foreign programming that can be shown on a Chinese TV channel each day.”),

Theatrical Films (despite a WTO dispute and a resulting MOU where China agreed to expand number of U.S. films, China has not fulfilled its commitments)

Online Video and Entertainment Software Services (foreign suppliers are severely restricted),

Legal Services (very limited ability for foreign firms or foreign lawyers to practice in China)

Express Delivery Services (foreign service providers are banned from document delivery and face discriminatory and burdensome actions on package participation),

Data Restrictions (activities in China are likely to result in local storage requirements and limits on cross-border transfer; major concern to U.S. and many other countries).

Transparency (much work needed by China to meet obligations)

Publication of Trade-related Measures (WTO obligation to publish in one journal; spotty performance and many types of measures not published in the journal),

Notice-and-comment Procedures (little progress at sub-central government level; some progress at central government; U.S.-China Phase I Agreement commits China to provide 45 days notice and comment period for matters relating to the Agreement),

Translations (WTO commitment to provide translations in one of the three official WTO languages. “China does not publish translations of trade-related laws and administrative regulations in a timely manner (i.e., before implementation), nor does it publish any translations of trade-related measures issued by sub-central governments at all.”).

Conclusion

While the U.S. was the first country to produce a national trade estimate, a number of countries do so today. All trading partners have some practices which concern other trading partners, including the United States.

The length of the entry in the NTE for a give country is a reasonable indication both of the importance of the trade relationship and of the breadth of issues of concern. For the United States, the National Trade Estimate is a useful compilation of many of the major concerns raised by industries about problems in access to markets abroad or distortions created by practices of trading partners. Typically items found in the NTE will be part of USTR’s focus during the year in interactions with particular trading partners.

China is the country with the longest entry in the NTE and has been for many years. Considering the array of distortions and other problems identified in this year’s NTE, the focus on China is not surprising.

Some of the problems identified in this year’s NTE with China could be addressed through WTO reform, though China has indicated opposition to such an approach. On some of the issues, the U.S. has received repeated promises from China to address but without meaningful results to date.

What is clear is that U.S. trade relations with China are not balanced and haven’t been for the entire time of WTO membership for China. The challenge for the U.S. and the world is how to restore balance and save the global trading system. There are no obvious answers.

Biden Administration continues treatment of Hong Kong as no longer autonomous from China, inter alia, for purposes of marking of products

Terence P. Stewart · April 1, 2021 · Hong Kong, China dispute with U.S. on origin marking requirement · China, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Policy Act Report, United States, WT/DS597 · No Comments

The U.S. Department of State released on March 31, 2021 the 2021 Hong Kong Policy Act Report. See U.S. Department of State, Hong Kong Policy Act Report, Press Statement, March 31, 2021, https://www.state.gov/hong-kong-policy-act-report/; U.S. Department of State, 2021 Hong Kong Policy Act Report, REPORT, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, March 31 2021, https://www.state.gov/2021-hong-kong-policy-act-report/.

The Press statement is copied below (emphasis added).

“Over the past year, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has continued to dismantle Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy, in violation of its obligations under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Hong Kong’s Basic Law. In particular, the PRC government’s adoption and the Hong Kong government’s implementation of the National Security Law (NSL) have severely undermined the rights and freedoms of people in Hong Kong.

“Each year, the Department of State submits to Congress the Hong Kong Policy Act Report and accompanying certification. In conjunction with this year’s report, I have certified to Congress that Hong Kong does not warrant differential treatment under U.S. law in the same manner as U.S. laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 1997.

“This report documents many of the actions the PRC and Hong Kong governments have taken against Hong Kong’s promised high degree of autonomy, freedoms, and democratic institutions. These include the arbitrary arrests and politically-motivated prosecutions of opposition politicians, activists, and peaceful protesters under the NSL and other legislation; the postponement of Legislative Council elections; pressure on judicial independence and academic and press freedoms; and a de facto ban on public demonstrations.

“I am committed to continuing to work with Congress and our allies and partners around the world to stand with people in Hong Kong against the PRC’s egregious policies and actions. As demonstrated by the March 16 Hong Kong Autonomy Act update, which listed 24 PRC and Hong Kong officials whose actions reduced Hong Kong’s autonomy, we will impose consequences for these actions. We will continue to call on the PRC to abide by its international obligations and commitments; to cease its dismantlement of Hong Kong’s democratic institutions, autonomy, and rule of law; to release immediately and drop all charges against individuals unjustly detained in Hong Kong; and to respect the human rights of all individuals in Hong Kong.”

The Report covers a range of issues including discussion of:

national security law,
impact on rule of law,
arrests, bail, and investigations proceedings,
impact on democratic institutions,
progress towards universal suffrage and impact on the legislature,
impact on the judiciary,
Impact on Freedom of Assembly,
Impact on Freedoms of Speech and Association,
Impact on Freedom of the Press,
Disinformation/Malign Political Influence Activities,
Impact on Internet Freedoms,
Impact on Freedom of Movement,
Impact on Freedom of Religion or Belief,
Impact on U.S. Citizens,
Impact on Academics and Exchanges,
Areas of Remaining Autonomy,
U.S.-Hong Kong Cooperation and Agreements,
Export Controls,
Sanctions Implementation,
U.S. Sanctions
Hong Kong Policy Act Findings

The summary of the report is copied below.

“Consistent with sections 205 and 301 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (the “Act”) (22 U.S.C. 5725 and 5731) and section 7043(f)(3)(C) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2021 (Div. K, P.L. 116-260), the Department submits this report and the enclosed certification on conditions in Hong Kong from June 2020 through February 2021 (“covered period”).

“Summary

“The Department of State assesses during the covered period, the central government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) took new actions directly threatening U.S. interests in Hong Kong and inconsistent with the Basic Law and the PRC’s obligation pursuant to the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 to allow Hong Kong to enjoy a high degree of autonomy. In the Certification of Hong Kong’s Treatment under United States Laws, the Secretary of State certified Hong Kong does not warrant treatment under U.S. law in the same manner as U.S. laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 1997.

“By unilaterally imposing on Hong Kong the Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (NSL), the PRC dramatically undermined rights and freedoms in Hong Kong, including freedoms protected under the Basic Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Since the imposition of the NSL in June 2020, Hong Kong police arrested at least 99 opposition politicians, activists, and protesters on NSL-related charges including secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with a foreign country or external elements. These include 55 people arrested in January for organizing or running in pan-democratic primary elections in July 2020, 47 of whom were formally charged with subversion on February 28. Additionally, the Hong Kong government used COVID-19-related public health restrictions to deny authorizations for public demonstrations and postponed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (LegCo) elections for at least one year.”

Ongoing WTO dispute filed by Hong Kong

Hong Kong has filed a request for consultations and a request for a panel at the WTO to contest actions during the Trump Administration which resulted in a requirement that goods from Hong Kong exported to the United States be labeled as manufactured in China because of prior actions by China that limited Hong Kong autonomy. A panel has been established but not yet composed. See WTO, DS597: United States — Origin Marking Requirement, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds597_e.htm. I have reviewed the dispute in prior posts. See February 23, 2021, WTO Dispute Settlement Body meeting of February 22, 2021 — panels authorized in two matters; impasse on the Appellate Body remains, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/02/23/wto-dispute-settlement-body-meeting-of-february-22-2021-panels-authorized-in-two-matters-impasse-on-appellate-body-remains/; January 16, 2020, Request for the establishment of a WTO panel by Hong Kong, China contesting the U.S. origin marking requirement, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/16/request-for-the-establishment-of-a-wto-panel-by-hong-kong-china-contesting-the-u-s-origin-marking-requirement/.

What is clear from yesterday’s Hong Kong Policy Act Report is that the concerns in the United States on the actions by China to restrict Hong Kong’s autonomy have not gone away with the Biden Administration but have increased with the escalating actions by the Chinese government. While Hong Kong will pursue its challenge, one shouldn’t expect a change in U.S. position nor should one expect a resolution in the WTO in the next several years.

“Blowing up the trading system” — Clyde Prestowitz’s suggested way for the world to move forward in light of China’s economic system

Terence P. Stewart · March 31, 2021 · WTO reform · Canada, China, Clyde Prestowitz, European Union, France, Germany, Global Business Dialogue TTALK, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States · No Comments

The Global Business Dialogue (GBD) publishes periodically “THE TTALK QUOTES”. On March 30, 2021, GBD posted a TTALK Quotes on “CHINA, THE TRADING SYSTEM, AND THE ALTERNATIVES” with a quote from Clyde Prestowitz, ‘[There is] only one alternative – “blowing up the system” or, more politely, creating a new or alternative system.”

The quote is from a Washington Monthly article by Mr. Prestowitz from March 24, 2021 entitled, “Blow Up the Global Trading System, Yes, really. U.S. and international efforts to stop Beijing’s economic onslaught haven’t worked. It’s time for President Biden to go big,” https://washingtonmonthly.com/2021/03/24/blow-up-the-global-trading-system/. Mr. Prestowitz has a new book out, The World Turned Upside Down (Yale University Press, 2021) and some of the recommendations in the Washington Monthly article reflect his thinking from his new book.

While the title is provocative, the concerns expressed are similar to the ones reviewed in Amb. Dennis Shea’s remarks to the Coalition for a Prosperous America and those expressed last year by Mogens Peter Carl that China’s economic system isn’t consistent with the WTO rules and China has no intention of modifying its approach to global trade. See March 29, 2021: China and the WTO – remarks by Dennis C. Shea to the Coalition for a Prosperous America, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/29/china-and-the-wto-remarks-by-dennis-c-shea-to-the-coalition-for-a-prosperous-america/.

Unlike Mr. Carl’s call for market economy countries to withdraw from the WTO and start a new organization, Mr. Prestowitz proposes in the Washington Monthly article “Reinventing the Globalization System” which involves seven action steps.

The first is for the United States “to impose a Market Adjustment Charge (MAC) on all non-direct investment (not in new means of production) into the United States.” The MAC is explained in his new book (pages 276-277) but is a charge that would vary based on the size and trend of the U.S. trade deficit.

The second step “would be for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to adopt Keynes’ Bretton Woods proposal that all countries should have balanced trade in the medium to long term.” To achieve this result, a duty would be applied on imports from countries that run persistent trade surpluses.

The third step would be for the United States to seek strong enforcement within the IMF and by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

The fourth step would be forming a supersized FTA including USMCA, CPTPP and the EU, and open to other market economies. Prestowitz calls this grouping the “Free World Free Trade Agreement”.

The firth step addresses the need for market economies to improve their competitiveness against the state directed and massively subsidized world of China. The step calls for the creation of “a free world high technology leadership project”

The sixth step calls on the U.S. to reorganize government and concentrate resources to support the technology leadership initiative.

The final step involves actions the U.S. can take to spur domestic manufacturing (use of Defense Production Act, curbing corporate lobbying, and review corporate overseas investment plans.

In his book, Mr. Prestowitz has a chapter on actions the U.S. should take to regain its leadership position. It starts with a Market Access Charge, calls for the imposition of a value added tax and a host of actions to ensure the U.S. is “the world’s most competitive economy.” Page 278.

U.S. actions are aimed at improving U.S. competitiveness

A number of the actions Mr. Prestowitz calls for on U.S. competitiveness are similar to actions being introduced today in part 1 of President Biden’s American Jobs Plan (est. cost of $2.5 trillion). See White House Briefing Room, FACT SHEET: The American Jobs Plan, March 31, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan/. Excerpts are copied below. The full fact sheet is then embedded.

“While the American Rescue Plan is changing the course of the pandemic and delivering relief for working families, this is no time to build back to the way things were. This is the moment to reimagine and rebuild a new economy. The American Jobs Plan is an investment in America that will create millions of good jobs, rebuild our country’s infrastructure, and position the United States to out-compete China. Public domestic investment as a share of the economy has fallen by more than 40 percent since the 1960s. The American Jobs Plan will invest in America in a way we have not invested since we built the interstate highways and won the Space Race.

“The United States of America is the wealthiest country in the world, yet we rank 13^th when it comes to the overall quality of our infrastructure. After decades of disinvestment, our roads, bridges, and water systems are crumbling. Our electric grid is vulnerable to catastrophic outages. Too many lack access to affordable, high-speed Internet and to quality housing. The past year has led to job losses and threatened economic security, eroding more than 30 years of progress in women’s labor force participation. It has unmasked the fragility of our caregiving infrastructure. And, our nation is falling behind its biggest competitors on research and development (R&D), manufacturing, and training. It has never been more important for us to invest in strengthening our infrastructure and competitiveness, and in creating the good-paying, union jobs of the future.

“Like great projects of the past, the President’s plan will unify and mobilize the country to meet the great challenges of our time: the climate crisis and the ambitions of an autocratic China. It will invest in Americans and deliver the jobs and opportunities they deserve. But unlike past major investments, the plan prioritizes addressing long-standing and persistent racial injustice. The plan targets 40 percent of the benefits of climate and clean infrastructure investments to disadvantaged communities. And, the plan invests in rural communities and communities impacted by the market-based transition to clean energy.”

FACT-SHEET_-The-American-Jobs-Plan-_-The-White-House

Reform of the WTO or a different approach?

The U.S. is looking to push WTO reform and work with trading partners to address challenges posed by China’s economic model. The EU and Japan are similarly looking at WTO reform as a way forward. See, e.g., February 18, 2021, The European Commission’s 18 February 2021 Trade Policy Review paper and Annex — WTO reform and much more proposed, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/02/18/the-european-commissions-18-february-2021-trade-policy-review-paper-wto-reform-and-much-more-proposed/.

The G7 trade ministers are meeting today. See Reuters, UK trade minister tells G7: We must stop fragmentation of global trade, March 31, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/britain-trade-truss-idUSS8N2L708T. The seven G7 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US (EU participates as a guest). WTO reform is one of the topics being discussed today. The U.S., EU and Japan have been working on potential reforms to the Subsidies Agreement to address the massive industrial subsidies provided by China as well as looking at potential disciplines on state-owned/invested enterprises and forced technology transfer. However, in a consensus system like the WTO, it is hard to imagine meaningful reforms that will address Chinese distortions achieving results within the WTO.

The U.S. is not presently considering a “Free World Free Trade Agreement” as proposed by Mr. Prestowitz. The U.S. is also not proposing pulling out of the WTO as suggested last year by Mogens Peter Carl and entering into a new organization that is limited to market economies. Each of the U.S. and the EU have the ability to act unilaterally if necessary but obviously that is a less desirable approach to global governance.

So it is likely that the U.S., EU, Japan and other leading market economies will continue to seek reform within the WTO but with likely limited results putting pressure on free trade agreements or on plurilateral arrangements to achieve a trade regime acceptable to the major market economies.

Mr. Prestowitz’s article and recent book are well done and raise some interesting ideas for addressing U.S. trade concerns with China. Some of his ideas have been advocated for by others before and have significant potential whether they have much political possibility for adoption. But in a changing global trade environment, his writings are a useful contribution and worth reading by those in trade policy positions.

For the Biden Administration, new trade agreements do not appear to be a short-term objective. Getting control of the pandemic through vaccinations and building back better through the jobs bill are the two major priorities. Trade can contribute to both, but a push for Free World Free Trade Agreement is not likely in the Biden years.

Still China’s economic system and incompatibility with the WTO are major concerns for many countries including the United States. Reform of the WTO would obviously be the best outcome for addressing China’s distortions. While hope spring eternal, the Ministerial Conference in late November 2021 in Geneva will give an idea of whether meaningful WTO reform is likely in the cards in the coming years. Such reform is highly unlikely to happen during the 2020s, if ever.

Mr. Carl’s suggestion of mass withdrawal from the WTO and creation of a new entity of market economies is interesting in addressing the blocking capacity of China but seems improbable because of China’s size and importance. With no major economy having suggested any interest in the idea, it seems implausible in the 2020s, if ever.

Mr. Prestowitz’s idea for a super-FTA of market economies is doable within the WTO and simply depends on majors like the U.S., EU, Japan and others being willing to put in the effort. But the U.S. and EU have not been able to make meaningful progress on an FTA or even harmonization of regulations over recent decades. If past is prologue, it is unlikely that such an undertaking will occur in the 2020s either, if ever.

As British trade minister Liz Truss is reported to have said to her G7 fellow trade ministers, “We need to reverse the fragmentation of global trade and get the global system and WTO working again, otherwise we risk big countries going their own way and operating outside an agreed set of rules, which always spells trouble.” Reuters, UK trade minister tells G7: We must stop fragmentation of global trade, March 31, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/britain-trade-truss-idUSS8N2L708T. China has effectively been going its own way even after joining the WTO at the end of 2001. Actions by the U.S., EU and others in recent years have occasionally been outside of the agreed set of rules as well. So a fourth option is that of the collapse of the global trading system (actually or practically) with a law of the jungle reasserting itself.

Time will tell which direction global trade will take.

China and the WTO – remarks by Dennis C. Shea to the Coalition for a Prosperous America

Terence P. Stewart · March 29, 2021 · WTO reform, WTO without China · Amb. Dennis Shea, China, Coalition for a Prosperous America, European Union, Mogens Peter Carl, United States, World Trade Organization · No Comments

On March 26, 2021, the former Deputy USTR in Geneva during the Trump Administration, Amb. Dennis C. Shea, spoke to the Coalition for a Prosperous America. While the remarks were made in his individual capacity, the remarks reviewed the challenges for the World Trade Organization remaining relevant with the current activities of the People’s Republic of China. His remarks, entitled “Three hard truths” can be found on his linkedin page. See Remarks to CPA, 3.26.2021, https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6781608096750956544/?updateEntityUrn=urn%3Ali%3Afs_feedUpdate%3A%28V2%2Curn%3Ali%3Aactivity%3A6781608096750956544%29.

The three hard truths from his remarks are copied below.

“The first of these hard truths is that China’s economic system – with its unique melding of public, private, and Chinese Communist Party resources, all harnessed to advance industrial policy objectives – is incompatible with the WTO norms of market orientation, transparency, non-discrimination, and reciprocity.”

“The second hard truth is that the WTO has proven itself incapable of restraining the trade disruptive activities of the Chinese non-market economic system.”

“The third hard truth is that China does not want change at the WTO.”

Amb. Shea reviews in some detail the actions of China post-accession to move away from market reforms that trading partners expected from China’s accession to the WTO and why such actions frustrate the proper functioning of the WTO. He also reviews China’s willingness to retaliate against trading partners for their legitimate use of WTO rights and to punish trading partners for comments China views as against their interests. The import bans against Australian products when Australia urged an independent investigation into the source of the COVID-19 virus is one example mentioned. Finally, on the issue of not wanting change at the WTO, Amb. Shea reviews China’s opposition to every reform issue raised by the United States.

Amb. Shea’s remarks are worth a close read. While he doesn’t address a road forward, his well founded concerns about China’s role in the trading system and its incompatible economic system with WTO rules bring to mind a piece by a former EC Director General for Trade, Mogens Peter Carl which I reviewed in an earlier post. See July 25, 2020, A new WTO without China? The July 20, 2020 Les Echos opinion piece by Mogens Peter Carl, a former EC Director General for Trade and then Environment, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/07/25/a-new-wto-without-china-the-july-20-2020-les-echos-opinion-piece-by-mogens-peter-carl-a-former-ec-director-general-for-trade-and-then-environment/ . I reproduce much of that post below.

“Earlier this week (July 20), a former EC Director General for Trade, Peter Carl, penned an opinion piece in Les Echos with the provocative title, “A new WTO is needed without China” (literally A new WTO must see the day without China). https://www.lesechos.fr/idees-debats/cercle/opinion-une-nouvelle-omc-doit-voir-le-jour-sans-la-chine-1224748.

“Mr. Carl indicates in the opinion piece that ‘Europe’s trade policy has stagnated for twenty years. It no longer meets the demands of today’s world and the European public attributes the loss of millions of jobs to China.’ (all quotes from the opinion piece are informal translations by Google Translate ). The opinion is remarkable as it comes from a former senior EC trade official.

“‘Our policy is outdated and based on an outdated ideology that is identical to what it was before the arrival of China on the world state, after its accession to the WTO in 2001. Its centralized economy, its powerful industrial policy in all the key sectors, its enormous state subsidies, combined with a government apparatus and a political repression as powerful as those of the ex-USSR, swept large swathes of European and American industry. However, we act as if we were in the heyday of the 1990s, when our main competitors were other market economies, Japan, Korea, the United States. Our inaction resembles the ostrich policy and unilateral pacifism of the 1930s. We know the results. We must therefore protect our liberal economies and our open societies against adversaries. This requires a fundamental review of the trade policy of the European Union and the WTO.’

“Mr. Carl calls for a complete reform of the WTO with the EU teaming up with the U.S. and other like-minded Members but recognizes that meaningful reform will be blocked by China. ‘The solution: withdraw from the WTO and create a new international trade organization without China. Most countries would follow our example. We would return to an open world economic order between market economy countries sharing the same ideas, on the basis of clear and reinforced principles in favor of the free market.’ Mr. Carl advocates for the adoption of rules that would deal with ‘abuses’ of the China model including improved subsidy disciplines and ‘rules against social, environmental dumping and inaction on climate change.’ Such new rules are needed to permit the EU to green its economy.

“Mr. Carl, addressing concerns that his proposal represents a turn to managed trade, says simply that ‘This is what we already have, although only China manages it, and we are suffering the consequences.’

“That Mr. Carl felt the need to publish such a strongly worded opinion shows the underlying and growing tensions felt by major trading partners from a major economic power with a fundamentally different economic system than that pursued by the historic major players in world trade.

“For WTO Members and their businesses and workers, the rising discontent by many with the functioning of the WTO and its ability to achieve meaningful reform should be a wake-up call. The WTO to be relevant must have rules that address the world in the 21st century. The WTO must also be able to have Members assume increased responsibilities as their stage of economic development evolves. Similarly, the WTO must confront whether existing rules can be modified to generate greater coverage of practices by different types of economic systems. If not, the WTO must consider whether it can survive where all Members don’t follow similar economic systems.

“Unfortunately, there appears little likelihood that many of these critical reforms will be addressed in the coming years. China has objected to WTO Members trying to modify existing agreements to address distortions caused by China’s economic system. China has also objected to the U.S. effort to have Members consider whether WTO rules require Members to operate market-economy based systems. China and others have objected to U.S. efforts to define ‘developing country’ and effectively have Members take on obligations commensurate to their stage of economic development. Stated differently, China is working hard to defend the status quo and prevent consideration of reforms that would achieve greater balance among all WTO Members.

“While USTR Lighthizer and others have said that if the WTO didn’t exist, it would have to be created, Mr. Carl’s opinion suggests that one option that may take on greater appeal is the withdrawal from the WTO and the creation of a new international trade regime among countries with similar economic systems. Such a move away from the WTO would certainly involve enormous economic upheaval and political tensions. The more desirable course of action is to achieve timely reform of the WTO so that all Members feel the system achieves reasonable reciprocity.

“Time will tell whether WTO Members find a path forward or whether the WTO becomes less and less relevant and even ceases to function. In a Member driven organization, the answer lies with the membership.”

The WTO now has a new Director-General who is working to see if Members can achieve breakthroughs on the existing fisheries subsidies, make significant progress on Joint Statement Initiatives, while encouraging Members to limit export restraints on medical goods needed to address the COVID-19 pandemic, promote rapid return to trade growth post pandemic, and work on WTO reform.

The Biden Administration has a desire to work with trading partners in multilateral organizations like the WTO and has articulated the need of allies to work together to address problems caused by non-market economies like China. While the Biden Administration will certainly pursue WTO reform, Amb. Shea’s final paragraph of his remarks is on point.

“The Biden Administration has made working with friends and allies a hallmark of its diplomatic approach, particularly when it comes to China. When the Administration brings this approach to the WTO, I sincerely hope our friends and allies will appreciate the gravity of the moment and what’s at stake.”

When human rights violations create trade distortions — the case of China’s treatment of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang

Terence P. Stewart · March 24, 2021 · forced labor and child labor, human rights abuses · Australia, Canada, China, European Union, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States, Uyghurs · No Comments

Earlier this week, the EU added a series of individuals and companies to its sanctions list including Chinese officials and entities involved in the alleged extreme human rights abuses of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, as well as others in Russia, Libya and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. See European Council, EU imposes further sanctions over serious violations of human rights around the world, 22 March 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/03/22/eu-imposes-further-sanctions-over-serious-violations-of-human-rights-around-the-world/; Official Journal of the European Union, L 99 I, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/478 of 22 March 2021 implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses, Vol. 64, pages 1-12, 22 March 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2021:099I:FULL&from=EN. The Official Journal regulation has as one of the bases of concern for a number of countries where individuals or entities are included on the sanctions list the following, “The Union remains deeply concerned about serious human rights violations and abuses in different parts of the world, such as torture, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances or systematic use of forced labour committed by individuals and entities in China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Libya, Eritrea, South Sudan and Russia.” The regulation includes a page per person/entity being added. Some of the description of why WANG Junzheng has been added to the list is copied below.

“As Party Secretary and Political commissar of the XPCC since 2020, Wang Junzheng is involved in overseeing all policies implemented by the XPCC. In this position, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief, linked, inter alia, to the XPCC’s implementation of a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.

“He is also responsible for the XPCC’s systematic use of Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities as a forced workforce, in particular in cotton fields. As Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the XUAR since 2020, Wang Junzheng is involved in overseeing all the security policies implemented in Xinjiang, including the aforementioned programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. As Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR (February 2019 to September 2020), Wang Junzheng was responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he held a key political position in charge of overseeing and implementing the aforementioned programme.”

On the same day, the United States, United Kingdom and Canada issued a joint statement announcing sanctions on individuals and/or an entity in China involved with the alleged human rights abuses of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. See U.S. Department of State press release, Joint Statement on Xinjiang, March 22, 2021, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-xinjiang/. The body of the joint message is copied below.

“We, the Foreign Ministers of Canada and the United Kingdom, and the United States Secretary of State, are united in our deep and ongoing concern regarding China’s human rights violations and abuses in Xinjiang. The evidence, including from the Chinese Government’s own documents, satellite imagery, and eyewitness testimony is overwhelming. China’s extensive program of repression includes severe restrictions on religious freedoms, the use of forced labour, mass detention in internment camps, forced sterilisations, and the concerted destruction of Uyghur heritage.

“Today, we have taken coordinated action on measures, in parallel to measures by the European Union, that send a clear message about the human rights violations and abuses in Xinjiang. We are united in calling for China to end its repressive practices against Uyghur Muslims and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang, and to release those arbitrarily detained.

“We underline the importance of transparency and accountability and call on China to grant the international community, including independent investigators from the United Nations, journalists, and foreign diplomats, unhindered access to Xinjiang.

“We will continue to stand together to shine a spotlight on China’s human rights violations. We stand united and call for justice for those suffering in Xinjiang.”

Australia and New Zealand, while not imposing sanctions themselves, added their voices of concern over the alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang of the Uyghurs. See Minister of Foreign Affairs Australia, Joint statement on Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang, 23 March 2021, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/joint-statement-human-rights-abuses-xinjiang. The Joint Statement is copied below.

“The Australian and New Zealand Governments today reiterate their grave concerns about the growing number of credible reports of severe human rights abuses against ethnic Uighurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.

“In particular, there is clear evidence of severe human rights abuses that include restrictions on freedom of religion, mass surveillance, large-scale extra-judicial detentions, as well as forced labour and forced birth control, including sterilisation.

“Australia and New Zealand welcome the measures announced overnight by Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. We share these countries’ deep concerns, which are held across the Australian and New Zealand communities.

“Since 2018, when reports began to emerge about the detention camps in Xinjiang, Australia and New Zealand have consistently called on China in the United Nations to respect the human rights of the Uighur people, and other religious and ethnic minorities.

“Today, we underscore the importance of transparency and accountability, and reiterate our call on China to grant meaningful and unfettered access to Xinjiang for United Nations experts, and other independent observers.”

While China argues that their treatment of the Uyghurs is an internal matter, the allegations of serious human rights abuses have raised widespread international condemnation and increasing use of sanctions. The sanctions, however, typically are limited to freezing assets (if any) of individuals or entities in the sanctioning country, banning travel to the country imposing the sanctioning, etc.

Trade Implications

While allegations of human rights violations do not necessarily carry trade distortion implications, the case of the forced labor of Uighurs in Xinjiang clearly does. Xinjiang produces some 80% of the cotton grown in China, much of it produced by forced labor according to reports. As China is a major producer of textile and apparel products and a major exporter of the same, the distortions in trade flows should be obvious. Foreign cotton will have trouble competing in China with cotton produced with forced labor. Garment producers who don’t use the Chinese cotton will face distortions as competing against garments where a significant input has been obtained at artificially low prices. Some countries (e.g., the United States and Canada) have laws which permit them to prevent imports of products made with forced labor, although the breadth of the actions taken to date are typically quite limited.

In prior posts, I looked at the large number of products produced around the world with forced labor or with child labor and also looked specifically at the Chinese treatment of the Uyghurs reviewing a number of publications and reports. See Child labor and forced labor in cotton production — is there a current WTO mandate to identify and quantify the distortive effects?, January 25, 2021, ttps://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/25/child-labor-and-forced-labor-in-cotton-production-is-there-a-current-wto-mandate-to-identify-and-quantify-the-distortive-effects/ ; Forced labor and child labor — a continued major distortion in international trade for some products, January 24, 2021, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/24/forced-labor-and-child-labor-a-continued-major-distortion-in-international-trade-for-some-products/.

To ramp up pressure on China to reform its treatment of the Uyghurs, the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and all other countries concerned about the human rights should coordinate a broad-based denial of imports from China or from other countries where cotton from Xinjiang is part of the product until such time as the treatment of the Uyghurs has been corrected.

Seafood obtained from illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing — U.S. International Trade Commission report on estimated imports into the U.S.

Terence P. Stewart · March 22, 2021 · Fisheries Subsidies negotiations, illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, Uncategorized · Argentina, Canada, China, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Spain, Thailand, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. International Trade Commission, United States, Vietnam, Ways and Means Chairman Richard E. Neal, Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee Chairman Earl Blumenauer · No Comments

For twenty years, Members of the World Trade Organization have been negotiating disciplines on fisheries subsidies to help curb illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing). Achieving an agreement is critical to meeting the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 14.6. See, e.g., WTO, WTO members hold February cluster of meetings for fisheries subsidies negotiations, 24 February 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/fish_24feb21_e.htm. The WTO Members had hoped to conclude negotiations in 2020 and are working to conclude the negotiations by the 12th Ministerial Conference, now scheduled for the week of November 29, 2021 in Geneva. See WTO, Twelfth Ministerial Conference to take place in Geneva in late 2021, 1 March 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/minis_01mar21_e.htm.

On December 19, 2019, the Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means and the Chairman of the Trade Subcommittee of Ways and Means submitted a letter to the U.S. International Trade Commission requesting an investigation into IUU fishing and its effects on the U.S. industry. The text of the request is copied below.

“We are writing today to request that the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) conduct an investigation of the potential economic effects on U.S. fishermen of competition with illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) seafood imports. IUU seafood includes products obtained in contravention of fisheries management regulations or in violation of labor laws. Trade in IUU seafood products includes not only IUU catch that is sent directly to end markets, but also IUU raw material inputs that are further processed into aquaculture feed or seafood products for human consumption.

“Up to 31 percent of the global catch of fish reportedly comes from IUU fishing, at an estimated value of more than $23 billion per year. IUU fishing contributes to the overexploitation of fish stocks, threatens the livelihoods of coastal communities, jeopardizes food security, and harms marine ecosystems. IUU fishing also creates unfair competition for U.S. fishermen as imports account for 90 percent of U.S. seafood consumption. China plays an enormous role in the global production and trade of seafood and is the largest seafood trade partner of the United States. China also has been ranked as worst among 152 coastal countries based on the prevalence of IUU fishing and the country’s response to it.

“To better understand the size, scope, supply chains, pricing pressures, and potential economic effects of this problem, we request that the US ITC conduct an investigation, and prepare a report, pursuant to section 332(g) of the Tariff Act of 1930. Based on available information, we request that the Commission’s report provide, to the extent practicable:

“• A review of the existing data and literature on the prevalence of IUU products in the U.S. import market, and an overview of international mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement to address IUU fishing;

“• A description of the size and structure of the U.S. commercial fishing industry;

“A description of major global producers of IUU products, including but not limited to China, and country practices related to IUU production and exports.

“• An analysis of the extent to which IUU product is imported into the United States, as well as major U.S. import sources and global supply chains of such products; and

“• A quantitative analysis of the economic impact of IUU imports on U.S. commercial fishermen and U.S. commercial fishing production, trade, and prices.

“We request that the Commission deliver the report by 12 months from the date of this letter. As we intend to make the report available to the public, we request that confidential business information not be included in the report. Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.

“Sincerely,

“Richard E. Neal, Chairman
“Earl Blumenauer, Chairman, Trade Subcommittee”

The U.S. International Trade Commission released its report,which is dated February 2021, last week. See USITC, Seafood Obtained via Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: U.S. Imports and Economic Impact on U.S. Commercial Fisheries, Inv. 332-575, Publ. 5168 (February 2021). The request letter is included in the report at Annex A.

On March 18, 2021 Chairmen Neal and Blumenauer released a statement including statements from Oceana and from the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). See U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means, NEAL, BLUMENAUER STATEMENT ON THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION’S REPORT “SEAFOOD OBTAINED VIA ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, AND UNREGULATED FISHING: U.S. IMPORTS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT ON U.S. COMMERCIAL FISHERIES”, March 18, 2021, https://waysandmeans.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/neal-blumenauer-statement-us-international-trade-commission-s-report. The press release is copied below.

“WASHINGTON, DC—Today, the U.S. International Trade Commission released their findings pursuant to a Tariff Act of 1930 section 332 investigation requested by Chairman Richard E. Neal (D-MA) and Trade Subcommittee Chairman Earl Blumenauer (D-OR) on the economic impact of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) seafood, including the use of forced labor, on the U.S. fishing industry. The report found that the U.S. imported $2.4 billion worth of illegal seafood in 2019 and that addressing the illegal imports would create U.S. jobs, protect U.S. consumers and benefit U.S. fishers by an estimated $60.8 million.

“’Far too much illegal seafood is making its way onto our dinner plates and more must be done,’ said Chairman Neal. ‘By building on what we fought to include in USMCA, enhancing the tracing of our seafood supply chains, and cracking down on IUU fishing practices, we can better protect our oceans and ultimately give Americans the peace of mind that they are eating safe, legal seafood.’

“’When people go to the grocery store, they want to know that the seafood is safe and legally caught, responsibly sourced, and honestly labeled. Unfortunately, too much illegal seafood is currently making its way into the country, undermining our hardworking U.S. fishing industry and putting consumers at risk,’ Blumenauer said. ‘It’s clear that we need stronger enforcement standards to protect individuals, workers, and fishing habitats.’

“Chairman Neal and Trade Subcommittee Chairman Blumenauer are joined by Oceana and WWF in recognizing the study.

“’Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing not only wreaks havoc on fisheries and ocean wildlife, but also undermines domestic fishers and seafood consumers. The United States has advanced programs to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud, but it’s clear that more needs to be done. The U.S. must expand Seafood Import Monitoring Program to all seafood, trace fish from boat to plate and expand transparency of fishing to help stop IUU products from entering the U.S. and competing with legally sourced seafood,’ said Beth Lowell, Deputy Vice President of U.S. Campaigns at Oceana.

“Michele Kuruc, Vice President of Ocean Policy at WWF noted that, ‘this report reminds us that the ramifications of illegal fishing go far beyond the health of our oceans. It depletes our oceans, fuels labor and human rights abuses, and leaves our domestic producers at an economic disadvantage. People are harmed, economies are hurt, and our oceans and planet are in peril. Eradicating illegal fishing requires a whole of government approach, as our current definitions, processes and efforts have far-reaching limitations. The good news is we have the tools, but they need to be strengthened to get the job done. The U.S. needs to expand the species covered by our current monitoring program. We need to track all imported species, not just a small group, to truly tackle this issue and protect our oceans, foster economic growth and empower people who rely on oceans for food and income.’”

Thus, the U.S., despite having some provisions to address IUU fishing, still accounts via imports for an estimated 10% of global IUU fishing ($2.4 billion of an estimated $23 billion global total).

The USITC Report

The U.S. International Trade Commission report is 468 pages including Annexes. The report is embedded below.

ITC-report-on-illegal-fishing

While many countries have some part of their marine capture or imports from other countries that are IUU, the USITC report focuses on certain countries and identifies the types of practices that are considered to result in marine capture being considered IUU.

“There are many fishing practices that can constitute an IUU violation. Often, a vessel may fish in an area where it is not authorized. Vessels may also fish during seasons in which particular fishing grounds are closed. IUU fishing also includes harvesting in excess of quotas set by fishery management authorities or misreporting the volume of landings to those authorities. Fishing with disallowed gear types or methods, or in violation of environmental restrictions such as those concerning bycatch, also constitute IUU fishing. Labor violations that have been widely documented in segments of the fishing industry include forced labor, human trafficking, child labor, and physical abuse of workers on board fishing vessels.” USITC Publ. 5168 at 11-12.

Below are some tables from the report which show the estimated volume of IUU imports from major sources of seafood imports into the United States and then some detail on the basis of IUU fishing from a subset of those countries. The tables are taken from pages 114, 115, 463, 14 and 15 of the USITC report respectively.

The USITC report covers a lot of ground and reviews existing literature and studies and provides its methodology for both estimating the share of imports that are IUU as well as the modeling used to estimate economic effects on domestic industry. It is clear that many countries contribute to the IUU problem. Some countries including the U.S. and the EU have tools available to deal with IUU imports and that such tools are viewed as helpful but not totally fit for purpose based on limited scope, at least in the United States.

Interest in the issue from the U.S. Congress and a focus of the Biden Administration on addressing both environmental- and labor- related issues implies that the U.S. will likely be looking for ways to beef up enforcement of the import monitoring program on seafood.

While the report doesn’t address fisheries subsidies, the report should nonetheless be helpful to WTO Members engaged in the fisheries subsidies negotiations. The report adds dimension to the importance of WTO Members reaching an ambitious agreement on fisheries subsidies as the challenges of IUU fishing are not only environmental in nature but also go to fairness in competition.

The U.S.-China Phase 1 Trade Agreement under the Biden Administration

Terence P. Stewart · March 20, 2021 · U.S.-China Phase I Agreement · China, United States · No Comments

The Biden Administration’s U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai during her confirmation hearing before the U.S. Senate Finance Committee and in written answers to questions from Senators was asked many questions about the China trade relationship and the myriad problems U.S. companies have faced in dealing with China or with Chinese imports into the U.S.. Ms. Tai noted in many answers that the “Biden-Harris Administration is engaged in a review of the policies in place to respond to China’s coercive and unfair trade practices * * *. I understand that a comprehensive strategy to confront the China challenge will be formulated based on that review.” Answer to Question 15 from Ranking Member Crapo (page 8).

Among the dozens of questions she received on China, Ms. Tai received a number that involved the U.S.-China Phase One Trade Agreement. For example, in response to a question from Senator Thune, Ms. Tai indicated that she would “assess China’s compliance with the Phase One deal to ensure it is living up to its commitments.” See Senate Finance Committee, Hearing to Consider the Nomination of Katherine C. Tai, of the District of Columbia, to be United States Trade Representative, with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Hearing Date: February 25, 2021, Questions for the Record, page 41, Senator Thune, Question 2, answer, https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Katherine%20Tai%20Senate%20Finance%20Committee%20QFRs%202.28.2021.pdf. The full question and answer are copied below.

“Question 2:

“As a result of the U.S.-China Phase One trade deal, the U.S. has seen export gains to China across many agricultural sectors including soybeans, corn, beef, and pork.

“If confirmed, how would you ensure that China follows through on its Phase One commitments, particularly for U.S. agriculture? What steps would you take to build upon these successes and ensure that U.S. farm and ranch exports to China are not unfairly restricted by tariff and nontariff barriers?

“Answer: The Biden-Harris Administration is engaged in a review of the policies in place to respond to China’s coercive and unfair trade practices, including with respect to agricultural products. I understand that a comprehensive strategy to confront the China challenge will be formulated based on that review. If confirmed, as part of that comprehensive review, I will assess China’s compliance with the Phase One deal to ensure it is living up to its commitments.“

Thus, one can expect that USTR under Amb. Tai will be continuing to monitor China’s implementation and enforcement of a wide range of changes to regulations an d practices intended to remove non-tariff barriers as well as tracking Chinese purchases of U.S. goods against the Annex 6.1 commitments made by China in the Phase I Agreement.

As reported in prior posts, both China and the U.S. have taken steps to implement parts of the Phase 1 Agreement that took effect on February 14, 2020, although the level of actual implementation remains unclear.

Prior posts on the U.S.-China Phase 1 Agreement can be found here: February 6, 2021, U.S.-China Phase I Trade Agreement – data through December 2020; China has increased purchases of agricultural and energy products above 2017 levels but did not reach first year agreed purchases in 2020 and won’t reached the agreed level even if measured from March 2020-February 2021, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/02/06/u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-data-through-december-2020-china-has-increased-purchases-of-agricultural-and-energy-products-above-2017-levels-but-did-not-reach-first-year-agreed-purchases-in/; January 9, 2021, U.S.-China Phase 1 Trade Agreement — Data through November 2020; China has increased purchases of agricultural and energy products above 2017 levels but will not reach first year agreed purchases in 2020 whether measured on a calendar basis or on a March 2020-February 2021 basis, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/09/u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-data-through-november-2020-china-has-increased-purchases-of-agricultural-and-energy-products-above-2017-levels-but-will-not-reach-first-year-agreed-purchases-in/; December 10, 2020, U.S.-China Phase I Trade Agreement – data through October 2020; while China has increased purchases of agricultural and some other products, China remains far behind on the agreed purchases in 2020 whether measured on a calendar basis or on a March 2020-February 2021 basis, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/12/10/u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-data-through-october-2020-while-china-has-increased-purchases-of-agricultural-and-some-other-products-china-remains-far-behind-on-the-agreed-purchases-in-2020-w/; November 13, 2020, U.S.-China Phase 1 trade agreement – Data through September 2020; USDA and USTR report on agriculture portion, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/11/13/u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-data-through-september-2020-usda-and-ustr-report-on-agriculture-portion/; October 10, 2020, U.S.-China Phase I Trade Agreement – first six months data on U.S. exports (March-August 2020) covered by the purchase commitments show China needing to triple purchases in next five months to meet first year commitments, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/10/10/u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-first-six-months-data-on-u-s-exports-march-august-2020-covered-by-the-purchase-commitments-show-china-needing-to-triple-purchases-in-next-six-months-to-meet-fi/; September 12, 2020, U.S.-China Phase I Trade Agreement – How is China Doing to Meet Purchase Commitments for the First Year; a Review of U.S. Domestic Exports through July 2020, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/09/12/u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-how-is-china-doing-to-meet-purchase-commitments-for-the-first-year-a-review-of-u-s-domestic-exports-through-july-2020/; August 8, 2020, U.S.-China Phase 1 trade agreement – review of U.S. domestic exports through June 2020, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/08/08/u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-review-of-u-s-domestic-exports-through-june-2020/; July 10, 2020, U.S.-China Phase 1 Trade Agreement – limited progress on increased U.S. exports to China (through May), https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/07/10/u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-limited-progress-on-increased-u-s-exports-to-china-through-may/; June 5, 2020, U.S.-China Phase I Deal is Failing Expanded U.S. Exports Even Before Recent Efforts by China to Limit Certain U.S. Agriculture Exports as Retaliation for U.S. Position on Hong Kong, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/06/05/u-s-china-phase-i-deal-is-failing-expanded-u-s-exports-even-before-recent-efforts-by-china-to-limit-certain-u-s-agriculture-exports-as-retaliation-for-u-s-position-on-hong-kong/; May 12, 2020, U.S.-China Phase I Agreement – some progress on structural changes; far behind on trade in goods and services, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/05/12/u-s-china-phase-i-agreement-some-progress-on-structural-changes-far-behind-on-trade-in-goods-and-services/; January 19, 2020, U.S.-China Phase 1 Agreement – Details on the Expanding Trade Chapter, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/01/19/u-s-china-phase-1-agreement-details-on-the-expanding-trade-chapter/; January 15, 2020, U.S.-China Phase 1 Trade Agreement Signed on January 15 – An Impressive Agreement if Enforced, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/01/15/u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-signed-on-january-15-an-impressive-agreement-if-enforced/.

This post looks at U.S. export data for January 2021, a month whose data reflects basically business in the last month of the Trump Administration.

Purchase Commitments

Annex 6.1 of the Phase I Agreement contains commitments for “additional U.S. exports to China on Top of 2017 baseline” for two years, 2020 and 2021. Article 6.3 of the Agreement states that “The Parties project that the trajectory of increases in the amounts of manufactured goods, agricultural goods, energy products, and services purchased and imported into China from the United States will continue in calendar years 2022 through 2025.

The Agreement lists 18 categories of goods grouped in three broad categories (manufactured goods, agriculture and energy) and five services categories. Chinese imports of goods and services from the United States under the Agreement are supposed to increase by $76.7 billion in the first year over levels achieved in 2017 and in the second year by $123.3 billion over 2017 levels. The categories and tariff items included in the goods categories are reviewed in Annex 6.1 of the Agreement and the attachment to Annex 6.1. In the confidential version of the agreement, growth levels are provided for each of the 23 categories of goods and services.

Article 6.2 of the Agreement defines the time period for the purchase commitments as being January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2021. So the first year by agreement was calendar year 2020. Calendar year 2021 is the second year of the agreement. The level of increases in U.S. exports to China for 2021 is as follows: manufactured goods $44.8 billion on top of 2017 base line of $58.4 billion (2021 total of $103.2 billion or an increase of 76.81% over 2017 actual); agriculture (including seafood) $19.5 billion on top of 2017 base line of $20.85 billion (2021 total of $40.35 billion or an increase of 93.51% over 2017 actual); energy $33.9 billion on top of 2017 base line of $7.6 billion (2021 total of $41.5 billion or an increase of 447.95% over 2017 actual); services $25.1 billion on top of 2017 base line for the selected services of $53.033 billion (2021 total of $78.133 billion or an increase of 47.33% over 2017 actual). Increases from 2017 for the calendar year 2020 agreed levels were lower than for 2021 (increases over 2017 of $32.9 billion, $12.5 billion, $18.5 billion and $12.8 billion respectively for manufactured goods, agriculture, energy and services). The breakout of services exports is not available for 2020 or January 2021. However, U.S. exports of all services to China for 2020 were $37.921 billion vs. $54.981 billion in 2017, a decline of 31% for all services, thus, U.S. services exports covered by the Phase I Agreement declined in 2020. See U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, MONTHLY U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES, JANUARY 2021, March 5, 2021, page 28, Exhibit 20b, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/current_press_release/ft900.pdf. While the BEA data don’t show exports of services in January by country, January 2021 total services exports are down from January 2020 (before the pandemic resulted in significant closures) with the largest reductions in travel followed by transport and by maintenance and repair services.

In 2017, the selected goods covered by Annex 6.1 were $86.795 billion of total U.S. domestic exports to China of $120.109 billion, meaning non-covered U.S. exports in 2017 were $33.314 billion. On services, the selected services covered by Annex 6.1 were $53.033 billion of total services exports to China of $54.981. So non-covered services were $1.948 billion. For goods, there were sharp declines in 2020 of U.S. exports to China of non-covered products from the levels achieved in 2017 (roughly $6.6 billion). Non-covered products are slightly up in January 2021 versus January 2017. While the services break out for 2020 is not yet available by country by type of service, total services exports to China (as reviewed above) were down 31% . The non-covered services are relatively small (just 3.5% of total services exports).

Since the Agreement took effect in mid-February, my analysis in prior posts has focused on the period since the agreement went into effect (for statistics, from March 1, 2020). This is consistent with the position that USTR and USDA took in the Trump Administration in an interim report released on October 23 looking at China’s compliance with its purchase commitments in agriculture. “It is worth noting that the Phase One Agreement did not go into effect until February 14, 2020, and March is the first full month of its effect. That means that we have seen seven months of agreement sales.” U.S. Trade Representative’s Office and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Interim Report on the Economic and Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, AGRICULTURAL TRADE, October 23, 2020, Page 1.

March 2020-January 2021 data compared to 2017 (other than February); January 2021 compared to January 2017

For purposes of this post, I will look at the March 2020 – January 2021 data compared to January and March-December 2017 data, but I will also look at the first month of 2021 compared to January 2017. In my last post in February, I had reviewed calendar 2020 data compared to 2017 data. The data analyzed is limited to goods since the services data is more limited and has been summarized above.

Looking at U.S. domestic exports for the March 2020 – January 2021 period and projecting for a full twelve months (March 2020-February 2021) shows China meeting 94.64% of first year agriculture commitments, and 51.06% above 2017 actual levels for all months other than February. Total Phase 1 products are projected at only 61.01% of first year commitments with manufactured goods at 52.78% and energy at 44.47%. While agriculture products are projected to exceed 2017 actual by $10.7 billion and energy is projected to exceed 2017 by $4.0 billion, manufactured goods are projected to be $10.2 billion smaller than 2017 actual. Compared to first year purchase commitments, total U.S. Phase I goods exports are projected to be $59.4 billion short of the agreed first year level.

If looking at a calendar year 2021, the data for January show increases for each of the three goods categories over January 201 but each category trails the level of increase needed to meet 2021 purchase commitments. Manufactured goods are up 4.39%, but the commitment levels are 76.81% higher than 2017 actual. Similarly, on agricultural products covered by the Phase I commitments, U.S. exports are up 58.51% from 2017 compared to the 2021 increase of 98.51% over 2017 needed to meet the commitments for 2021. On energy, U.S. exports are up 150.56% over January 2017 but far below the 447.99% increase needed to meet the Phase I commitments for 2021. For all Phase I goods, U.S. exports in January are up 33.34% but the annual increase to meet the Phase I commitment is 113.14%.

To meet first year commitments on a March 2020-February 2021 basis , China would have to import monthly 7.71 times the product from the United States as was done in the first eleven months in the next month (February). On a calendar basis, U.S. domestic exports in January 2021 missed the agreed level on goods by $5.375 billion (or an amount equal to 59.49% of January 2021 actual).

Looking at total U.S. domestic exports of goods to China for the period March 2020 – January 2021., U.S. exports were $109.313 billion ($9.938 billion/month) compared to $111.099 billion in 2017 for the eleven months (all other than February)($10.100 billion/month). These include both products covered by the Annex 6.1 commitments and other products. For January 2021, total U.S. domestic exports to China were $11.254 billion compared to $9.350 billion in January 2017.

Total 2017 U.S. domestic exports of goods to China were $120.1 billion. The Phase 1 Agreement calls for increases on a subset of goods of $63.9 billion in the first year. Thus, the target for the first year of the U.S.-China Phase 1 Agreement is U.S. exports to China of $184 billion if non-subject goods are exported at 2017 levels.

Other U.S. domestic exports not covered by the 18 categories in Annex 6.1 were $33.314 billion in 2017 (full year) and $30.806 billion for 2017 excluding February. For the period March 2020 – January 2021, non-covered products (which face significant tariffs in China based on retaliation for US 301 duties) have declined 18.86%, and total exports to China are down 1.61%. Looking at January 2021, other U.S. domestic exports (i.e., not covered by the Phase I Agreement) were down 13.05% from comparable levels in January 2017.

Thus, the first eleven months since the U.S.-China Phase 1 Agreement went into effect suggest that U.S. domestic exports of the Annex 6 goods will be $91.334 billion if the full year shows the same level of increase over 2017 for each of the 18 categories of goods; non-covered products would be $26.845 billion, for total U.S. domestic exports to China of $118.179 billion. This figure would be below 2017 and dramatically below the target of $184.0 billion (if noncovered products remain are at 2017 levels; $176.938 billion with noncovered products at estimated March 2020 – February 2021 levels) . The projected U.S. domestic exports to China would, however, be higher than the $109.72 billion in 2018 and the depressed figure of $94.100 billion in 2019.

If one looks at January 2021, U.S. domestic exports to China of Annex 6 goods were $8.981 billion, other exports of $2.274 billion, for total domestic exports in January 2021 of $11.254 billion, ahead of January 2017 but $5.375 billion behind the 2021 rate of increase over 2017 of 113.14%.

The 18 product categories included in Annex 6.1 of the Phase 1 Agreement show the following for January, March-December 2017, March 2020 – January 2021 and rate of growth for the first year of the Agreement (figures in $ million):

Product category	January, March-December 2017	March 2020 -January 2021	% change 11 mos. 2017 2020/2021	$ Value needed in next month to reach 1st year of Agreement vs. projected 1st year
manufactured goods
1. industrial machinery	$10,013.7	$11,612.1	+15.96%
2. electrical equipment and machinery	$3,966.0	$4,460.9	+12.48%
3. pharma- ceutical products	$1,939.6	$3,017.0	+55.54%
4. aircraft (orders and deliveries)	$15,212.8	$3,682.4	-75.79%
5. vehicles	$9,132.1	$5,659.5	-38.03%
6. optical and medical instruments	$2,901.3	$3,317.9	+14.36%
7. iron and steel	$1,093.3	$454.4	-58.44%
8. other manufactured goods	$10,092.7	$12,654.8	+25.39%
Total for mfg goods	$54,351.7	$44,858.9	-17.47%	$43,094.5
Agriculture
9. oilseeds	$11,171.5	$15,785.7	+41.30%
10. meat	$511.7	$2,968.5	+480.16%
11. cereals	$1,276.5	$3,384.2	+165.13%
12. cotton	$828.1	$1,855.8	+124.11%
13. other agricultural commodities	$4,148.3	$4,219.4	+1.71%
14. seafood	$1,173.6	$653.7	-44.30%
Total for agriculture	$19,109.7	$28,867.4	+51.06%	$1,788.7
Energy
15. liquefied natural gas	$365.8	$1,597.2	+336.6%
16. crude oil	$3,865.3	$6,881.4	+78.03%
17. refined products	$2,197.4	$1,655.9	-24.64%
18. coal	$403.4	$242.3	-39.94%
Total for energy	$6,831.9	$10,376.9	+51.89%	$14,477.9
Total for 1-18	$80,293.3	$84,103.2	+4.75%	$59,361.0

Conclusion

As reviewed in prior posts, the U.S.-China Phase 1 Agreement is a potentially important agreement which attempts to address a range of U.S. concerns with the bilateral relationship and obtain somewhat better reciprocity with the world’s largest exporter. The Phase 1 Agreement has left other challenges to a Phase 2 negotiation which has not yet begun. USTR Tai has indicated that the Biden Administration will monitor compliance by China with the terms of the Phase I Agreement.

While there has been some progress on non-trade volume issues that are included in the Phase 1 Agreement and some significant improvements in exports of U.S. agricultural goods, there has been very little forward movement in expanding total U.S. exports of goods to China in fact and a sharp decline in U.S. exports of services to China.

The differences in economic systems between China and the United States have made reliance on WTO rules less relevant to the Trump Administration as those rules presume market-based economies and presently don’t address the myriad distortions that flow from the Chinese state capital system. Thus, the Phase I Agreement was an effort to move the needle in trade relations with China to achieve greater reciprocity. It has had some limited success to date. While the Biden Administration is doing a full review of the challenges posed by China’s trade policies, it is good news that they will be working to see that the Phase I Agreement is fulfilled.

WTO reform — trade and environment issues to be examined should include addressing ocean/sea trawling effects on carbon capture/release

Terence P. Stewart · March 19, 2021 · carbon capture and release, fish trawling · China, Denmark, Italy, Russian Federation, Trade and Environment Committee\, United Kingdom, WTO · No Comments

While the WTO has had a Trade and Environment Committee since 1995 and interest on the intersection between trade and environment predates the formation of the WTO (i.e., back in the GATT), there has been renewed calls by many Members for increased activity in the WTO on trade and environment issue as part of the future agenda. The WTO provides a short history of WTO involvement in the area. See WTO, Trade and Environment, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_e.htm.

Ongoing talks on fisheries subsidies are aimed at helping make fishing sustainable and meeting one of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 14.6). See, e.g., WTO, Civil society call for fishing subsidies deal welcomed by Dr Ngozi and negotiations chair, 3 March 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/fish_01mar21_e.htm. There is interest in addressing plastics in the oceans (circular economy issues) and for some, an interest in restarting the Environmental Goods Agreement negotiations. See WTO, Role of trade in promoting circular economy highlighted at WTO Environment Week, 27 November 2019, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/envir_03dec19_e.htm; WTO, Plastic waste, ‘blue economy’ among issues taken up at trade and environment committee, 28 November 2018, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/envir_30nov18_e.htm.

In a New York Times article from Wednesday, there is interesting information on the effects of fish trawling on carbon release. See New York Times, Trawling for Fish May Unleash as Much Carbon as Air Travel, Study Says, March 1, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/17/climate/climate-change-oceans.html. The opening sentences of the article reads, “For the first time, scientists have calculated how much planet-warming carbon dioxide is released into the ocean by bottom trawling, the practice of dragging enormous nets along the ocean floor to catch shrimp, whiting, cod and other fish. The answer: As much as global aviation releases into the air.” The study referenced is an article that was published online by Nature on 17 March 2021 by 26 authors entitled “Protecting the global ocean for biodiversity, food and climate.” https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03371-z. The New York Times article notes that the study estimated that 1.9 million square miles of the sea floor is scraped every year which can release the carbon that is stored in the sea floor and that would remain captured for thousands of years if left undisturbed. The NYT article continues, “The carbon released from the sea floor leads to more acidified water, threatening marine life, and reduces the oceans’ capacity to absorb atmospheric carbon dioxide. China, Russia, Italy, the United Kingdom and Denmark lead the world in such trawling emissions.”

While carbon release from fish trawling is not presently part of the ongoing negotiations on fisheries subsidies nor a topic being discussed within the Committee on Trade and Environment (at least that I have seen), it would seem to be a topic that could meaningfully be examined within the WTO in an effort to have trade be sustainable and contribute to reducing carbon emissions. Some possible approaches within the WTO or by individual WTO Members could include identifying less environmentally damaging approaches (sharing experiences, best practices), potential negotiations to terminate or phase out such practices, review of such practices in trade policy reviews, inclusion within any carbon border adjustment plan adopted by Members.

Addressing the topic would appear to be an important opportunity to promote sustainable development as the world deals with and comes out of the pandemic. Let’s hope Members take an ambitious approach to the role the WTO can play on sustainable development.

Climate change and a border tax — will the U.S. and EU have a unified position at the WTO in 2021?

Terence P. Stewart · March 15, 2021 · carbon border adjustment mechanism · China, European Union, U.S. Special Envoy on Climate John Kerry, United States · No Comments

The European Union has been working on reducing its carbon footprint consistent with the Paris Agreement commitments and its updated 2030 reduction levels. Part of its effort has been to impose costs on carbon content of certain high energy-consuming industries. To avoid carbon leakage, the EU has been looking at the possibility of imposing a carbon border adjustment mechanism. The European Commission’s work program has the EC presenting a draft proposal of such a mechanism in the second quarter of 2021. See EU Green Deal (carbon border adjustment mechanism), https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12228-Carbon-Border-Adjustment-Mechanism. The Inception impact assessment released by the European Commission is embedded below.

090166e5ccbe6acd-2

The EU has indicated that whatever action it takes in its carbon border adjustment mechanism will be consistent with WTO obligations.

The Biden Administration, in the President’s 2021 Trade Policy Agenda, has indicated an openness to considering a carbon border adjustment. See 2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program, March 2021, page 3, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2021/2021%20Trade%20Agenda/Online%20PDF%202021%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda%20and%202020%20Annual%20Report.pdf. The section on “Putting the World on a Sustainable Environment and Climate Path” is copied below (emphasis added).

“The United States and the global community face a profound climate crisis, and the Biden Administration is committed to pursuing action at home and abroad to avoid the increasingly disruptive and potentially catastrophic impact of climate change. The United States will work with other countries, both bilaterally and multilaterally, toward environmental sustainability.

“As part of this whole-of-government effort, the trade agenda will include the negotiation and implementation of strong environmental standards that are also critical to a sustainable climate pathway. These standards will include promoting sustainable stewardship of natural resources, such as sustainable fisheries management, and preventing harmful environmental practices, such as illegal logging and wildlife trafficking. This comprehensive approach may also entail leveraging our strong bilateral and multilateral trade relationships to raise global climate ambition.

“The Biden Administration will work with allies and partners that are committed to fighting climate change. This will include exploring and developing market and regulatory approaches to address greenhouse gas emissions in the global trading system. As appropriate, and consistent with domestic approaches to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, this includes consideration of carbon border adjustments. Additionally, the Biden Administration will work with allies as they develop their own approaches and act against trading partners that fail to meet their environmental obligations under existing trade agreements.

“The trade agenda will support the Biden Administration’s comprehensive vision of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and achieving net-zero global emissions by 2050, or before, by fostering U.S. innovation and production of climate-related technology and promoting resilient renewable energy supply chains.”

President Biden’s Special Envoy on Climate traveled to the United Kingdom and to the European Union the week of March 8. See U.S. Department of State, Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry Engages European Allies on Climate Ambition, March 6, 2021, https://www.state.gov/special-presidential-envoy-for-climate-john-kerry-engages-european-allies-on-climate-ambition/ (traveling to London, Brussels and Paris March 8-10). A Financial Times article indicated that Special Envoy Kerry was pushing the European Commission to hold up any announcement on a carbon border adjustment mechanism until after the November 2021 meeting of parties to the Paris Agreement in Glasgow (COP26) to see if sufficient commitments were made to make such a mechanism unnecessary. The article indicated that a draft proposal was expected from the EC in June. See Financial Times, John Kerry warns EU against carbon border tax, March 12, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/3d00d3c8-202d-4765-b0ae-e2b212bbca98 (“The former secretary of state told the Financial Times he was ‘concerned’ about Brussels’ forthcoming plans for a carbon border adjustment mechanism and urged the EU to wait until after the COP26 climate change conference in Glasgow to move forward.”).

Obviously, Special Envoy Kerry’s comments prioritize diplomacy over development of a mechanism to deal with countries who are slow to address the pressing climate challenges. The EU system, of course, has a process for approving proposals like the carbon border adjustment mechanism which if followed as presently planned presumably would not result in adoption in 2021. It is not clear from the press article if the U.S. concern is with the planned June proposal or with ensuring that no adoption happens until after the Glasgow meeting in November. If the latter, there should be little problem for the EU to ensure no adoption in 2021, and the EC proposal could include language about the COP 26 meeting. If the former, postponing action by the EC would push back adoption by at least six months which may or may not be acceptable to the EU.

With USTR nominee Katherine Tai expected to be confirmed by the U.S. Senate later this week, it is unclear based on the press article of the meeting between the EC and Special Envoy Kerry if USTR would hold up efforts to find common ground with the EU on the trade approach on climate change, including on what a carbon border adjustment mechanism would look like so that there is a united front between the U.S. and the EU whenever the mechanism is presented (or at least adopted).

With China, the largest emitter, having announced that it will continue to increase it emissions until 2030, the efforts of the EU and U.S. to speed up the global reductions in emissions will face insurmountable obstacles if there isn’t greater efforts by all, including China. See Politico, US and EU search for a China climate doctrine that works, The first European trip by US climate envoy John Kerry sparks a joint effort to get China to cut its emissions, March 9, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/u-s-and-eu-search-for-a-china-climate-strategy-after-snub/.

There is little doubt that if all major emitters are not in solidarity on the need to increase the depth of carbon reductions quickly, there will be carbon border adjustment mechanisms put in place by the EU and likely by the U.S. to ensure actions taken in countries working hard toward major reductions in emissions by 2030 are not undermined by less ambitious objectives. A joint effort by the U.S. and EU would be more effective than the EU going it alone. Let’s hope common ground is found on how to proceed.

Today’s webinar hosted by Georgetown Law’s Institute for International Economic Law “Rethinking the WTO: Opportunity for Transatlantic Cooperation” — many areas for likely cooperation; some important challenges

Terence P. Stewart · March 10, 2021 · WTO reform · China, David Kleimann, European Union, Henry Gao, Jennifer Hillman, Joost Pauwelyn, Sabine Weyand, Thomas Graham, U.S-EU cooperation, United States · No Comments

On March 10, 2021 Georgetown Law’s Institute for International Economic Law (IIEL) held the second in a series of events on “Rethinking the WTO”, this time on “Opportunity for Transatlantic Cooperation”. See Georgetown Law, Rethinking the WTO: Opportunity for Transatlantic Cooperation, March 8, 2021, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/rethinking-the-wto-opportunities-for-transatlantic-cooperation/. The program was introduced by David Kleimann, Senior Visiting Research Fellow, IIEL. The program was moderated by Joost Pauwelyn, Murase Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown Law and also a professor at the Graduate Institute of Geneva. The four panelists included Sabine Weyand, Director General, Directorate General for External Trade, European Commission; Jennifer Hillman, Professor from Practice, Georgetown Law, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations and a former member of the WTO Appellate Body; Thomas Graham, partner at Cassidy Levy Kent and former member and Chair of the WTO Appellate Body; and Henry Gao, Associate Professor of Law, Singapore Management University, Dongfang Scholar Chair Professor, Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade and Advisory Board Member of the WTO Chairs Program.

Ms. Weyand provided an overview of the European Commission’s revised trade policy paper, focusing on the Annex dealing with WTO reform. I had reviewed the revised policy paper in a prior post. See February 18, 2021, The European Commission’s 18 February 2021 Trade Policy Review paper and Annex — WTO reform and much more proposed, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/02/18/the-european-commissions-18-february-2021-trade-policy-review-paper-wto-reform-and-much-more-proposed/. Ms. Weyand’s comments expressed hope that early statements by the Biden Administration meant that there were many areas for possible cooperation, although she started with reviving the Appellate Body — an area where cooperation is more challenging. She articulated that the EU was looking for an early commitment by the Biden team that the U.S. supported a two-tiered, binding, independent dispute settlement system — that which was promised in the Dispute Settlement Understanding. She acknowledged that the U.S. had valid concerns including on overreach on some cases.

Ms. Weyand reviewed areas where collaboration had occurred during the Trump Administration — the joint consultations on subsidies, SOEs, forced technology transfer — and opined that the process should be taken back up. She also mentioned new areas where rules were needed, including Joint Statement Initiatives (electronic commerce where the U.S. is active and others where the U.S. is not) where there should be opportunities for collaboration. She viewed that open plurilaterals were the likely necessary option for reform with benefits limited to those participating. She acknowledged that WTO Members need to address how to make folding plurilaterals into the WTO easier to do. The EU supports the U.S. view that the Special and Differential Treatment provisions and approach don’t make sense in 2021 though the revised policy.

Jennifer Hillman, after the disclaimer that she is not part of the Biden Administration and hence doesn’t speak for them, agreed that the early pronouncements by the Biden team showed significant areas of likely cooperation on WTO reform between the U.S. and the EU based on its revised trade policy paper. She believed that the period of time for getting collaboration started and showing early results was short and that many of the topics for collaboration would require time, hence raising concerns about the ability to actually see forward movement. During her direct comments, Ms. Hillman focused on areas other than dispute settlement. She noted that the concept of sustainable development appeared to have different meanings depending on whom one was talking to. For Europe, it seemed to focus on environment whereas for the Biden Administration there is a heavier focus on labor rights whereas for many WTO Members (developing and least developed countries), the focus would be development. She viewed it as important for the EU to realize focus on labor by U.S. in seeking and obtaining collaboration on sustainable development. She agreed on areas of cooperation on gender equality and empowerment of women and girls, on having the WTO contribute to addressing climate change, including on border taxes that are WTO consistent, on plurilaterals and the need for change to how Special and Differential Treatment is addressed, and on the need for new (e-commerce) or revised rules (industrial subsidies).

Thomas Graham, as a former Appelate Body who had left after eight years at the end of 2019 (his and a colleague’s departure reduced the number of Appellate Body Member below the number needed to hear an appeal), believed that the problems with the dispute settlement system could not be easily addressed and would take significant time to resolve in a way that would address the underlying problems. He urged greater accountability by Appellate Body members. He noted in particular the tension between the second and third sentences of DSU 3.2 (as referenced as well in 19.2) where the bar to creating rights and obligations (important to the U.S.) was neutered by actions of the Appellate Body in clarifying existing provisions (historically the focus of the EU). Mr. Graham did not see an easy resolution to this problem without changing the language itself. He also reviewed the Appellate Body’s elimination in effect of Art. 17.6(ii) of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Antidumping Agreement or ADA), a provision intended to grant discretion to administering authorities in interpreting provisions of the Agreement which were capable of more than one interpretation. Mr. Graham noted that members of the Appellate Body viewed there being either no or very few situations where the Antidumping Agreement provisions would be capable of more than one interpretation. He also raised the question of how Members would deal with past decisions made by and principles adopted by the Appellate Body. He referenced a commentary by Amb. Dennis Shea (the Trump Administration Deputy U.S. Trade Representative in Geneva) posted on the CSIS website on March 9, 2021, “No Quick Fixes for WTO Dispute Settlement Reform” and indicated the questions raised in the paper needed to be addressed. See Center for Strategic & International Studies, No Quick Fixes for WTO Dispute Settlement Reform, March 9, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/no-quick-fixes-wto-dispute-settlement-reform (article includes eight questions Amb. Shea believes the EU needs to answer as it thinks about WTO Dispute Settlement reform).

Mr. Gao provided his perspective on how the types of reform issues identified in the EC revised trade policy paper would be viewed by China, among others. Mr. Gao indicated that China has been unwilling to consider reforms which it views as discriminating against China. Thus, initiatives like the EU’s to start a plurilateral on competitive neutrality (SOEs, heavy subsidization, etc.) is viewed by China as aimed at them and hence will never be supported by China. China’s response has been to assert that there should be ownership neutrality (no special rules for SOEs or for differences in economic systems). China has participated in Joint Statement Initiatives where it does not view itself as targeted including e-commerce, domestic services regulation, investment for development, SMSEs, etc. China is supportive of restoration of the Appellate Body. On S&DT, China does not agree to a change in classification of Members but has agreed to take on responsibilities that it views as consistent with its level of development.

Observations

The above review is undoubtedly incomplete and doesn’t include the discussion during the question and answer portion., but hopefully provides enough of a summary to show large areas of agreement and some of caution between the U.S. and the EU. Both the EU and the US (under the Biden Administration) are putting a lot of focus on recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and both are interested in supporting global distribution of vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics through COVAX, though there are short term issues in terms of supplies for national needs for both the U.S. and EU.

In general, the two U.S. panelists agreed with Ms. Weyand that there are areas where cooperation between the U.S. and the EU is possible and viewed the revised EC trade policy paper as helpful, particularly in terms of perceived movement by the EU on dispute settlement. Mr. Gao’s comments show that any reform will not likely be easy or quick because of the large differences in views of existing Members and the challenges posed by China’s economic system to global commerce since consensus decision making permits China to effectively derail multilateral solutions and it can opt not to participate in plurilaterals that it views as not in its interests.

While the U.S. and EU have each articulated the need to have unilateral response capabilities if solutions can’t be found through the WTO or bilaterally, the EU position (and likely Biden Administration position) is that cooperation should be sought between the U.S., EU and possibly others before unilateral actions are taken to permit coordination.

Much of the forward movement at the WTO on new rules is likely to be through plurilateral deals. The JSIs are generating most of the energy at the moment. India and South Africa have submitted a paper arguing that such plurilaterals area not proper under the WTO or require consensus (which doesn’t exist) to be included within the WTO. See February 20, 2021, Will India and South Africa (and others) prevent future relevance of the WTO?, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/02/20/will-india-and-south-africa-and-others-prevent-future-relevance-of-the-wto/. Ms. Weyand’s position was that the WTO will need to find ways to incorporate the plurilaterals into the WTO or action will happen outside of the WTO which cannot be beneficial to the WTO. In a post in recent days, I have argued that the U.S. should joint the JSIs that it is not a party to. See March 9, 2021, The Biden Administration should join the Joint Statement Initiatives that it is not presently party to, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/09/biden-administration-should-join-the-joint-statement-initiatives-that-it-is-not-presently-part-to/. The new Director-General has also put significant emphasis for obtaining forward movement in the JSIs. So despite the current importance of the JSIs, there are challenges to how much the U.S. and EU can achieve through plurilaterals within the WTO without changes to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, and Members will be divided on having WTO plurilaterals where benefits are limited to the parties vs. all Members (i.e., non-MFN, but open for later membership of non-participants).

On Dispute Settlement, the EU has stated that it understands the long-standing U.S. concerns that are bipartisan and reflected both in the Biden Administration and in Congress. While Ms. Weyand’s view is that the U.S. must signal that it accepts a two-tier, binding, independent dispute settlement system early for negotiations to move forward, the comments of Thomas Graham and the paper by Amb. Shea suggest that such an early commitment may be inappropriate. This would be true if the underlying problems laid out over the last years by the U.S. cannot be rectified satisfactorily under such a system — currently unknown as negotiations haven’t taken place.

Since the problems for the U.S. and others with the Appellate Body flow in part from an ineffective mechanism for Members to correct Appellate Body errors (i.e., the negotiating a clarification and/or Ministerial Conference/General Council adoption of an interpretation (Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO Art. IX:2)), reform of the dispute settlement will likely exceed review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding and procedures.

Ms. Hillman has suggested and Mr. Graham has supported Ms. Hillman’s proposal for a separate process for trade remedy or trade defense cases in light of the large number of cases in the area where there has been longstanding disagreement on Appellate Body decisions and because of the failure of the Appellate Body to respect Art. 17.6(ii) of the Antidumping Agreement.

In earlier posts, I had suggested some modifications to Amb. Walker’s 2019 draft General Council Decision that (1) would interpret both DSU Art. 3.2 and 19.2 and possibly deal with the tension Mr. Graham reviewed in his comment and that have led to much of the overreach problem; (2) would address ADA Art. 17.6(ii); and (3) would deal with past erroneous decisions. See July 12, 2020, WTO Appellate Body reform – revisiting thoughts on how to address U.S. concerns, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/07/12/wtos-appellate-body-reform-revisiting-thoughts-on-how-to-address-u-s-concerns/ (relevant section copied below; modifications are in bold and underlined).

‘Overreach’

As provided in Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU, findings and recommendations of Panels and the Appellate Body and recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements. In a large number of Panel and Appellate Body reports, one or more parties and/or third parties have raised concerns about the Panel or Appellate Body adding to or diminishing the rights and obligations contrary to Articles 3.2 or 19.2 of the DSU.

To clarify situations where rights and obligations are being added to or diminished, Panels and the Appellate Body will not fill gaps in agreements, construe silence to indicate obligations or construe ambiguities in language of existing agreements to require a particular construction. Any such actions by a Panel or by the Appellate Body is inconsistent with Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU.

Any party to an Appellate Body report that raised at the DSB meeting considering adoption of the Appellate Body report concerns about the creation of rights or obligations inconsistent with Articles 3.2 or 19.2, will have 90 days from the adoption of this General Council decision to request a review of the Appellate Body decision. Such request will be for the limited purpose of having the Appellate Body determine whether on the specific issues raised where the party complained of creating rights or obligations the clarification of meaning provided in this General Council decision would result in a changed decision on the particular issue. The Appellate Body will render decisions on all such requests within 90 days and will accept no additional briefing or argument from parties. Where the report would have been different on one or more particular issues, it is sufficient for the Appellate Body to so indicate. Where the same decision on an issue would have been made, the Appellate Body shall provide a detailed explanation.

Panels and the Appellate Body shall interpret provisions of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“antidumping agreement”) in accordance with Article 17.6(ii) of that Agreement. Any party to an Appellate Body report that raised at the DSB meeting considering adoption of the Appellate Body report that Article 17.6(ii) was not applied in interpreting the antidumping agreement, will have 90 days from the adoption of this General Council decision to request a review of the Appellate Body decision. Such a request will be for the limited purpose of having the Appellate Body determine whether a different outcome on one or more issues would have resulted had the Appellate Body applied Article 17.6(ii) of the antidumping agreement. The Appellate Body will render decisions on all such requests within 90 days and will accept no additional briefing or argument from parties. Where the report would have been different on one or more particular issues, it is sufficient for the Appellate Body to so indicate. Where the same decision on an issue would have been made, the Appellate Body shall provide a detailed explanation.

There presumably are many other ways (and perhaps better ways) to deal with these issues, but the above suggests that solutions could be found that would support a two-tiered system. Perhaps, the EU proposal for what it needs from the U.S. early should be supplemented by an understanding that any such commitment assumes ability to address U.S. concerns meaningfully with a two-tier, binding, independent dispute settlement system.

Conclusion

Ms. Weyand’s statement was that cooperation between the U.S. and the EU was a necessary but not sufficient condition to a successful effort at WTO reform. The European Commission in its revised trade policy paper demonstrated some movement from prior positions that had made resolution of matters such as the impasse on the Appellate Body unlikely. Similarly, the Biden Administration has been indicating on a range of issues including environmental sustainability movement that makes a united front between the U.S. and EU more likely. Actions reported in the press in recent weeks show movement by both the U.S. and the EU to improve bilateral relations in the trade sphere. All are very promising signals.

But the path forward is complicated by a lack of common objectives with many third countries, including China. Hence, the correctness of the observation that U.S.-EU cooperation is necessary but not sufficient.

Programs like today’s IIEL program provide a useful opportunity for large numbers of members of the public to gain a better understanding of the possible road forward and challenges to be faced. All of the panelists (and moderator) did an excellent job. It will be interesting to see how the WTO responds in the coming months if the U.S. and EU can in fact mount a united front on reform.

Biden Administration should join the Joint Statement Initiatives that it is not presently party to

Terence P. Stewart · March 9, 2021 · Joint Statement Initiatives and Joint Declaration · Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, European Union, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, President Biden, Russian Federation, Switzerland, United States · No Comments

President Biden has made it clear that his Administration will work within multilateral organizations to the extent possible to move the U.S. agenda forward. During the Trump Administration, the U.S. participated actively in the World Trade Organization but was active in only one of the Joint Statement Initiatives that were initiated at the end of the Buenos Aires Ministerial Conference in late 2017.

Thus, the United States is an active participant in the ongoing negotiations following the Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce (WT/MIN(17)/60, 13 December 2017), but is not a party to the other Joint Statement Initiatives. See Joint Ministerial Statement on Services Domestic Regulation (WT/MIN(17)/61, 13 December 2017); Joint Ministerial Statement on Investment Facilitation for Development (WT/MIN(17)/59, 13 December 2017); Joint Ministerial Statement, Declaration on the Establishment of a WTO Informal Work Programme for MSMEs (WT/MIN(17)/58, 13 December 2017); Joint Declaration on Trade and Women’s Economic Empowerment on the Occasion of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires in December 2017.

While India and South Africa have challenged the legitimacy of the Joint Statement Initiatives (JSIs), a great deal of the energy in the WTO in the last several years has been put into the JSIs. See, e.g., February 20, 2021, Will India and South Africa (and others) prevent future relevance of the WTO?, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/02/20/will-india-and-south-africa-and-others-prevent-future-relevance-of-the-wto/; WTO, Coordinators of joint initiatives cite substantial progress in discussions, 18 December 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/jsec_18dec20_e.htm. The WTO press release is copied below.

“The coordinators of the joint initiatives on e-commerce, investment facilitation, services domestic regulation and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) said on 18 December that substantial progress has been achieved in their respective discussions and that they are on track to deliver concrete results or additional progress at the WTO’s 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) scheduled for next year.

“In their communication, the coordinators noted that they have delivered summary statements to WTO members outlining how far the four initiatives have advanced since they were launched three years ago, where they stand today, and what their next steps in the discussions will be.

“’What these statements clearly show is the substantial progress [of the initiatives] in a short period of time, that they are on track to delivering concrete results or progress at MC12, and that they are contributing to building a more responsive, relevant and modern WTO — which will be critical to restoring global trade and economic growth in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis.’

“’These initiatives have grown into an increasingly important part of the agenda of the WTO, with an expanding number of participants from both the developed and developing worlds that account for a significant part of the WTO’s membership, and based on the principles of openness, transparency and inclusiveness,’ the coordinators added.

“The new joint initiatives were launched at the WTO’s 11th Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires in December 2017 with the aim of commencing negotiations or discussions on issues of increasing relevance to the world trading system.

“The joint initiative coordinators are Ambassador José Luis Cancela Gómez (Uruguay) for the Informal Working Group on MSMEs; Ambassadors George Mina (Australia), Yamazaki Kazuyuki (Japan) and Tan Hung Seng (Singapore) for the Joint Statement Initiative on E-Commerce; Deputy Permanent Representative Jaime Coghi Arias (Costa Rica) for the Joint Statement Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation; and Ambassador-designate Mathias Francke (Chile) for the Structured Discussions on Investment Facilitation for Development.

“The coordinators noted that the consolidated negotiating text on e-commerce will provide a foundation for intensified negotiations in 2021. They highlighted that the negotiations on services domestic regulation are at a ‘mature stage’, with a genuine potential for an outcome by MC12.

“The coordinators also said that substantive provisions of an investment facilitation agreement are being negotiated by the participating members in this initiative. In addition, they noted the recent announcement by the Informal Working Group on MSMEs of a package of declarations and recommendations to help small business trade internationally.

“The coordinators underscored that the shared and ultimate goal of these initiatives is to strengthen and reinforce the multilateral trading system, that they are open to all WTO members, and that they seek the participation of as many members as possible.

“The coordinators stated: ‘The initiatives on e-commerce, investment facilitation, services domestic regulation, and MSMEs clearly demonstrate that the WTO can respond to new economic and technological challenges in a flexible, pragmatic, and timely way. These initiatives — and their innovative approach to cooperation and negotiation — can provide a valuable illustration of WTO reform in action.’”

While the Joint Declaration Trade and Women’s Economic Empowerment on the Occasion of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires in December 2017 is not treated as a JSI, it does have many Members supporting the Declaration and engaging in the informal work programme.

Some of the other countries participating in all of the JSIs and Joint Declaration

While the number of WTO Members participating in the JSIs and supporting the Joint Declaration vary, the following is a partial list of Members who are signatories to all of the JSIs and the Joint Declaration. Other than the Electronic Commerce initiative, the U.S. is presently not a signatory or participant in any of the other JSIs or Joint Declaration.

Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, European Union, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Switzerland are participants in all of the JSIs and supportive of the Joint Declaration. Dozens of other Members are participating in some or many of the JSI’s that the U.S. is not presently supporting or active in.

Conclusion

While the United States has a large agenda of issues it wishes to address at the WTO (including trade and the environment, WTO reform, industrial subsidies), it makes no sense that the United States would not actively participate in work programs where most of the major economies are active and where new rules will be relevant to areas of significance for the United States as well as for trading partners. While the work program on women and trade is in an informal working group, President Biden has made empowerment of women an important priority for his Administration as a range of actions during International Women’s Day made clear. See, e.g., March 8, 2011, March 8, 2021, International Women’s Day — statements of UN Women Executive Director, heads of WTO, UNCTAD and International Trade Centre, and U.S. Executive Orders and Statement by President Biden, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/08/march-8-2021-international-womens-day-statements-of-un-women-executive-director-heads-of-wto-unctad-and-international-trade-centre-and-u-s-executive-orders-and-statement-by-president-biden/. Similarly, MSMEs are an important part of the U.S. economy and a major driver of economic growth. The U.S. has a very strong services sector which has an interest in domestic regulatory issues both in the U.S. and as addressed overseas. Finally, the U.S. is both a major investor in foreign countries and a recipient of large amounts of foreign investment and has a significant interest in helping the global community address issues involved in investment in developing and least developed countries on a more predictable basis.

Hopefully, the Biden Administration when its USTR nominee is confirmed in the coming days, will opt to engage in all of the JSIs. It is time.

WTO Director-General opinion piece in the Financial Times and recent actions by the U.S.

Terence P. Stewart · March 3, 2021 · COVID-19, Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala · AstraZeneca, CEPI, China, COVAX, GAVI, GSK, India, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Pfizeer/BioNTech, Russia, Sanofi, United States, WHO · No Comments

WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala on her second day on the job in Geneva had an opinion piece in the Financial Times taking to the public her message to the WTO membership that “WTO members must intensify co-operation”. Financial Times, Opinion, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala: WTO members must intensify co-operation, March 2, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/0654600f-92cc-47ad-bfe6-561db88f7019. To a large extent, the opinion piece reflects her opening statement to the General Council on March 1st. See March 1, 2021, WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala’s opening statement at the March 1 General Council meeting, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/01/wto-director-general-ngozi-okonjo-iwealas-opening-statement-at-the-march-1-general-council-meeting/. The opinion piece starts with the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and the need for equitable and affordable access to vaccines and other medical goods. The Director-General (DG) then goes through the reforms and ongoing negotiations that need to be addressed. The topics include completion of the fisheries subsidies negotiations, dispute settlement reform, updating the rule book to include topics like digital trade and other Joint Statement initiatives, restarting negotiations on environmental goods and services, various topics in agriculture (market access, domestic subsidies, removal of export restrictions on farm products purchased for humanitarian purposes by the World Food Programme) and rules to address distortions flowing from industrial subsidies to state-owned enterprises.

For this post, I will focus on the access to vaccines issue and recent actions by the United States (but also others) on this topic.

Two paragraphs from the opinion piece lay out the views of the Director-General on access to vaccines. They are copied below.

“However, for the global economy to return to sustained growth, we must intensify co-operation to ensure equitable and affordable access to vaccines, therapetics and diagnostics. The WTO can and must play a more forceful role in encouraging members to minimise or remove export restrictions and prohibitions that hinder supply chains for medical goods and equipment.

WTO members have a further responsibility to reject vaccine nationalism and protectionism while co-operating on promising new treatments and vaccines. We must find a ‘third way’ on intellectual property that preserves the multilateral rules that encourage research and innovation while promoting licensing agreements to help scale-up manufacturing of medical products. Some pharmaceutical companies such as AstraZeneca, Johnson & Johnson, and the Serum Institute of India are already doing this.”

While India and South Africa have sought a waiver for all WTO Members from most TRIPS Agreement obligations during the pandemic, that proposal has not received the backing from various developed countries with pharmaceutical industries, a fact the new DG saw first hand during the General Council meeting of March 1-2 where the TRIPS Council reported that there was not yet agreement on what to recommend on the proposal. Rather through the WHO, GAVI and CEPI and the creation of COVAX to buy vaccines for low- and middle-income countries and others wishing to participate, the expectation has been that some 2 billion doses would be available through COVAX in 2021 starting in February and ramping up, with 1.3 billion doses going to 92 countries needing assistance.

In her opening statement to the General Council, DG Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala indicated that COVAX would not be enough even though shipments had started. The latest COVAX interim distribution forecast is embedded below and dates from February 3 and shows the number of doses from the AstraZeneca/Serum Institute, from AstraZeneca’s own facilities and from Pfizer/BioNTech.

COVAX-Interim-Distribution-Forecast

Press accounts identify Ghana as the first recipient from COVAX, but other countries have already received the vaccines as well. See, e.g., World health Organization, First COVID-19 COVAX vaccine doses administered in Africa, March 1, 2021,https://www.who.int/news/item/01-03-2021-first-covid-19-covax-vaccine-doses-administered-in-africa; Pan American Health Organization, Colombia receives the first vaccines arriving in the Americas through COVAX, March 1, 2021, https://www.paho.org/en/news/1-3-2021-colombia-receives-first-vaccines-arriving-americas-through-covax. The Financial Times vaccine tracker shows that by March 3, 2021, 268.6 million doses had been administered in 128 locations/countries. Financial Times, Covid-19 vaccine tracker: the global race to vaccinate, March 3, 2021, https://ig.ft.com/coronavirus-vaccine-tracker/?areas=gbr&areas=isr&areas=usa&areas=eue&cumulative=1&populationAdjusted=1.

In recent weeks, the United States confirmed it was contributing $4 billion to COVAX ($2 billion immediately and $2 billion over the rest of 2021 and 2022). Other countries and the EU increased contributions as well and some countries have agreed to send some vaccine doses as well. See February 19, 2021, COVAX’s efforts to distribute COVID-19 vaccines to low- and middle income countries — additional momentum received from G-7 virtual meeting, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/02/19/covaxs-efforts-to-distribute-covid-19-vaccines-to-low-and-middle-income-countries-additional-momentum-from-g-7-virtual-meeting/

From a recent WHO release it is clear that GAVI and the other COVAX partners are working at expanding available vaccines and seeking additional funding beyond what has already been provided or promised. Vaccines from Johnson & Johnson and potentially from Novavax were identified. See UN News, Equitable vaccine delivery plan needs more support to succeed: COVAX partners, March 2, 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1086142. The release is embedded below.

Equitable-vaccine-delivery-plan-needs-more-support-to-succeed_-COVAX-partners-_-_-UN-News

“intensify co-operation”

There have been efforts at co-operation from the beginning as AstraZeneca’s licensing of its product to India’s Serum Institute demonstrated.

In the United States, President Biden on March 2 announced co-operation between Merck and Johnson & Johnson where Merck will convert two facilities to help in the production of the Johnson & Johnson vaccine. This has been supported by the United States through use of the Defense Production Act to speed access to equipment needed for the conversion. Merck is a major vaccine producer but doesn’t have a viable COVID-19 vaccine of its own. See NPR, How The White House Got 2 Pharma Rivals To Work Together On COVID-19 Vaccine, March 3, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/03/03/973117712/how-the-white-house-got-2-pharma-foes-to-work-together-on-covid-19-vaccine. This is the type of co-operation that DG Okonjo-Iweala referenced in her opinion piece yesterday.

Johnson & Johnson in late February had struck an arrangement with Sanofi in France for similar cooperation at one of Sanofi’s facilities in France. Similarly, Sanofi had earlier struck a deal with Pfizer-BioNTech. See Sanofi, Sanofi to provide manufacturing support to Johnson & Johnson for their COVID-19 vaccine to help address global supply demands, February 22, 2021, https://www.sanofi.com/-/media/Project/One-Sanofi-Web/Websites/Global/Sanofi-COM/Home/media-room/press-releases/2021/20200222-Sanofi-statement-EN.pdf.

The world’s largest vaccine producer, GlaxoSmithKline, has entered an agreement to help produce CureVac produce some of CureVac’s first generation COVID-19 vaccine in 2021 and “to jointly develop next generation mRNA vaccines for COVID-19 with the potential for a multi-valent approach to address multiple emerging variants in one vaccine.” See GSK, GSK and CureVac to develop next generation mRNA COVID-19vaccines, 3 February 2021, https://www.gsk.com/en-gb/media/press-releases/gsk-and-curevac-to-develop-next-generation-mrna-covid-19-vaccines/.

There are, of course, other vaccine producers — China has multiple vaccines developed, Russia, India, Cuba has two in development — including companies who do not have a COVID-19 vaccine in development. Thus, additional opportunities for co-operation should exist for those producers as well.

Conclusion

There is understandably great focus within the WTO and its Members in getting past the COVID-19 pandemic and getting economies back on growth paths. The rapid development of vaccines has been critical and has seen extraordinary success in the 15 months since COVID-19 was first identified. The R&D efforts globally have been stunning and have received some government support which has undoubtedly been important particularly in giving pharmaceutical companies an assist in early efforts to ramp up production. There is no question that the R&D efforts would not have occurred at the level that has taken place without strong intellectual property protections.

There has been great efforts by the WHO along with GAVI and CEPI to prepare to be able to get large quantities of vaccines to low- and middle-income countries when vaccines are available including by contracting with multiple companies pursuing a vaccine, reserving capacity, etc. There have been efforts by many countries to help build support for the COVAX approach and to provide funding for the purchase of vaccines for those in need. The effort is having success and can be more successful as 2021 moves into the second quarter and as countries, NGOs, businesses and individuals contribute to see that there is adequate funding for the effort being undertaken.

In addition to COVAX, a number of countries have been sending some of their production of vaccines to other countries. These include China, Russia and India. The U.S. has been in discussions with Japan, Australia and India for helping in getting vaccines to some countries as well. See Financial Times, US and Asia allies plan Covid vaccine strategy to counter China, March 3, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/1dc04520-c2fb-4859-9821-c405f51f8586. These efforts are likely to accelerate as 2021 moves into the 3rd and 4th quarters.

Moreover, many of the major Western pharmaceutical companies engaged in vaccine production have partnered with other companies around the world to expand capacity and production of vaccines that have proven successful. So cooperation is already occurring. The Biden Administration’s efforts in recent weeks with Johnson & Johnson and Merck show that government involvement to encourage cooperation for expanding capacity and production and providing assistance in terms of availability of supplies can be an important assist to ramping up production.

Thus, the track record to date does not support a waiver of most TRIPS obligations as has been requested by the world’s largest producer of vaccines (India) and South Africa. Private companies have worked with partners on developments and in a number of cases on producing vaccines. Early success vaccines like Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna have led to significant increases in plans for production by those companies through their own operations or through partnering with others. A number of other vaccines are now approved in major markets or are close to being approved. Significant funding has been provided or promised to make vaccines available to those in need at no cost.

All of the above is “the third way” sought by the new Director-General. It is already working. The WTO should focus its efforts on export restraints on medical goods and collaborate with other multilateral organizations to understand bottlenecks in capacity expansions, supply chain issues, distribution challenges and other aspects to determine if there are matters requiring WTO attention.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION: MAKING MSMES COMPETITIVE IN GREEN TECH

Terence P. Stewart · February 27, 2021 · climate change · Australia, Canada, Chile, China, European Union, Japan, Singapore, SMSEs, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States · No Comments

Climate change is a major global concern. Indeed, the UN has indicated there is less than a year for countries to get serious about saving the planet by getting their updated national climate action plans (NDCs) submitted. See Time, ‘If This Task Was Urgent Before, It’s Crucial Now.’ U.N. Says World Has 10 Months to Get Serious on Climate Goals, February 26, 2021,https://time.com/5942546/un-emissions-targets-climate-change/; UN Climate Change, Greater Climate Ambition Urged as Initial NDC Synthesis Report Is Published, 26 February 2021, https://unfccc.int/news/greater-climate-ambition-urged-as-initial-ndc-synthesis-report-is-published (“’2021 is a make or break year to confront the global climate emergency. The science is clear, to limit global temperature rise to 1.5C, we must cut global emissions by 45% by 2030 from 2010 levels. Today’s interim report from the UNFCCC is a red alert for our planet. It shows governments are nowhere close to the level of ambition needed to limit climate change to 1.5 degrees and meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. The major emitters must step up with much more ambitious emissions reductions targets for 2030 in their Nationally Determined Contributions well before the November UN Climate Conference in Glasgow,’ said UN Secretary-General António Guterres.”).

While the largest polluters — China and the United States — haven’t submitted updated NDCs, the Biden Administration is planning on hosting a climate summit in the summer and plans on having more ambitious plans for the U.S. prepared by that time. See Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership, February 23, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/23/roadmap-for-a-renewed-u-s-canada-partnership/ (“The Prime Minister and the President expressed their commitment to have their two countries work together on cooperative action ahead of the US-hosted Leaders’ Climate Summit that will allow both countries to increase their climate ambition. The President, in addition to acknowledging Canada’s new strengthened national climate plan and its globally ambitious price on pollution, reiterated his aim to have ready the US nationally determined contribution (NDC) in advance of the Summit and welcomed the Prime Minister’s aim to announce the enhanced 2030 emissions target for its NDC by the Summit as well.”).

At the World Trade Organization, many countries are anxious to explore ways that trade can facilitate addressing the challenges from climate change. Because of the large share of employment around the world by micro-, small- and medium’sized businesses (MSMEs), such businesses are playing and will have to play a critical role in adopting technologies to permit reduction of pollutions threatening the planet.

On February 25, 2021 a group of WTO Members (largely developed countries) submitted a communication to the WTO membership outlining ways that MSMEs can use intellectual property to green their businesses. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION: MAKING MSMES COMPETITIVE IN GREEN TECH, COMMUNICATION FROM AUSTRALIA, CANADA, CHILE, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, SINGAPORE, SWITZERLAND, THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES, IP/C/W/675 (26 February 2021). The paper lays out the purpose of the communication in its introduction copied below.

“1. Some of today’s critical global challenges include climate change, biodiversity loss, environmental degradation and food security. As an example, climate change matters to our health and increases the risk of infections and pandemics.1

“2. Several international efforts such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Convention on Biological Diversity, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement are designed to address these challenges. In this context, the role of Green Technology2 is important to provide new alternatives to address these challenges and create opportunities that have economic, social, and environmental benefits, as underscored by the framework of the SDGs. Of these, several underline the importance of Environmentally Sound Technologies (ESTs) for the accomplishment of the above objectives.

“3. Micro-, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (MSMEs) can play a pivotal role in this change towards more sustainability. As they provide for more than 50 percent of employment (G20/OECD, 2015), they can constitute core engines of innovation and growth. MSMEs working in the green tech sector represent key economic actors in the effort towards finding solutions to address the abovementioned global challenges. The role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) to enhance the competitiveness of MSMEs should be looked at closely. IPRs enhance the dissemination and protection of innovations – which is key for MSMEs, including those in the green tech sector (Friesike, Jamali, Bader et al, 2009). This submission presents IPR approaches for making MSMEs more competitive in green tech.

“1 Harvard T.H Chan School of Public Health: https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/cchange/subtopics/coronavirus-and-climate-change/ (last consulted: 09.01.2021).”

The communication then provides information on international and national approaches to helping SMSEs obtain IP protection and/or obtain through license or otherwise existing IP technologies to address greening their businesses. For example, on international approaches, the communication reviews the role WIPO and WTO play in providing easy access to lots of information on intellectual property systems of many countries. WIPO has set up support through WIPO Green to facilitate collaboration on environmentally sound technologies (ESTs) including what technologies are available for licensing, etc.

“5. One important initiative to accelerate the development and dissemination of ESTs is WIPO GREEN, a marketplace designed to connect providers and seekers of ESTs. All technologies listed in the online database of WIPO GREEN are available for license, collaboration, joint ventures, and sale. In addition to establishing a network of various partners, WIPO GREEN contains a database of IP experts, supports acceleration projects in different countries and produces briefs and seminars for various green tech areas. It is thus particularly valuable for MSMEs, given that it facilitates the diffusion of their technologies and provides information to technology providers and seekers in all countries.”

The communication from the WTO Members also includes information on the Technology Mechanism provided by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and provides information on classification of green technology patents by WIPO, the European Patent Office (EPO) and US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).

On national approaches Members can take, the communication focuses on actions the national patent office can take.

“12. There are several ways for IP offices to assist MSMEs in making the best use of IPRs.

“• IP offices can provide basic guidance and assistance on various IPR aspects. By preparing reader-friendly IP material, including patent and trademark basics, examination overviews, information on patent searching and resources on legal assistance that could be used by inventors and businesses in the green tech sector, individual questions and needs may be met.

“• IP offices may provide support in the form of assisting applicants with patent searches, landscape analyses and also facilitate free legal assistance.

“• Specifically with a view to promoting ESTs, IP offices could consider accelerated patent examination procedures for such green tech patent applications. This process shortens the time between application and grant, enabling MSMEs to attain financial support more quickly.

“• Customized workshops, seminars, or awards for the best green tech inventions may also help to make MSMEs that are involved in the green tech sector more aware of the benefits that the IP system may hold for them.”

The complete communication is embedded below.

W675-1

Conclusion

While there are presently limited environmental negotiations going on at the WTO (fisheries subsidies), the global race to address a warming world requires greater focus by WTO Members on the role trade can play to improve the global response. Restarting the environmental goods negotiations is one obvious area for negotiations. Addressing carbon leakage through national laws and international negotiations is another. Encouraging collaboration to spread green technology requires no negotiations but is a potentially important component in the global response. Hence the February 25 communication is a valuable contribution to increasing the global focus on how to address the challenges of a warming planet.

Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership — Implications for WTO initiatives

Terence P. Stewart · February 24, 2021 · Uncategorized · Canada, China, European Union, President Joseph Biden, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Russia, United States · No Comments

On February 23, 2021 President Biden and Prime Minister Trudeau had a virtual meeting to review a wide range of topics and released an agreed “Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership”. Major topics addressed included (1) combating COVID-19, (2) building back better (i.e., economic recovery after the pandemic), (3) accelerating climate ambitions, (4) advancing diversity and inclusion, (5) bolstering security and defense and (6) building global alliances. A number of these topics are relevant to the work of the World Trade Organization (ongoing or possible). See Roadmap for a Renewed U.S. Canada Partnership, February 23, 2021,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/23/roadmap-for-a-renewed-u-s-canada-partnership/. This post reviews briefly some of the issues in the roadmap that resonate more broadly in a global trade context.

Combating COVID-19

For example, on combating COVID-19, several of the paragraphs in the roadmap review working together to help ensure equitable access to vaccines through COVAX. Whether sufficient vaccines can be made available to low- and middle-income countries is a matter of concern to many WTO Members including some who have been pushing for waiving TRIPS Agreement obligations during the pandemic. Many developed countries have viewed there being adequate flexibility within the TRIPS Agreement to address the present pandemic and have pointed to the collective efforts of the WHO, GAVI and CEPI in setting up COVAX to procure billions of doses of vaccines both for countries needing assistance and for other countries wanting to acquire vaccines through COVAX. The big issue for COVAX has been adequate funding. The U.S. is donating $2 billion in the near term and another $2 billion over the rest of 2021 and 2022. Canada has also made pledges of support to COVAX. Thus, the roadmap is both supportive of global efforts to get vaccines to countries in need and likely supportive of opposing efforts to waive TRIPS rights and obligations during the pandemic. Some excerpts from the combating COVID-19 section are copied below.

“The top priority of the President and the Prime Minister is to end the COVID-19 pandemic. They agreed to strengthen comprehensive and cross-sectoral efforts to control the pandemic, collaborate on public health responses, and build resilience against future outbreaks.

‘The Prime Minister and the President committed to working closely together to defeat the virus, including by surging the health and humanitarian response to the global pandemic, responding to new variants, following expert advice, and supporting global affordable access to and delivery of COVID-19 vaccines, including through the COVAX Facility.

“The leaders emphasized their strong support for the multilateral institutions that are on the front lines of COVID-19 response, including the World Health Organization (WHO) and UN development agencies, and committed to rapidly fulfilling national pledges to COVAX.”

While not addressed in the roadmap document, both Canada and the U.S. at the WTO have been supportive of not imposing restrictions on agricultural exports and through the G-20 have been supportive of limiting the role of export restraints on medical goods. There is discussion in the building back better section of strengthening “Canada-U.S. supply chain security” which may have implications for whether some actions relevant to medical goods are adopted that will diversify supply or encourage more production within the U.S. and Canada.

The interest by the United States under the Biden Administration in supporting multilateral organizations like the WTO may also suggest that the U.S. will now be more amenable to working with the Ottawa Group (of which Canada is a member) on the Trade and Health Initiative that was introduced last December. See Government of Canada, Minister Ng announces tabling of Ottawa Group’s Trade and Health Initiative at WTO General Council, December 17, 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2020/12/minister-ng-announces-tabling-of-ottawa-groups-trade-and-health-initiative-at-wto-general-council.html (“Through this Trade and Health Initiative, Canada and the other 12 Ottawa Group member nations are calling for further cooperation among all WTO members to strengthen global supply chains and facilitate the flow of essential medicines and medical supplies, including vaccines, amid the current crisis. The Trade and Health Initiative identifies a range of actions that members are encouraged to adopt. These include implementing trade-facilitating measures in the areas of customs and services, limiting export restrictions, temporarily removing or reducing tariffs on essential medical goods, and improving transparency overall.”); December 18, 2020, The WTO ends the year with General Council and Dispute Settlement Body meetings, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/12/18/the-wto-ends-the-year-with-general-council-and-dispute-settlement-body-meetings/; November 27, 2020, The Ottawa Group’s November 23 communication and draft elements of a trade and health initiative, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/11/27/the-ottawa-groups-november-23-communication-and-draft-elements-of-a-trade-and-health-initiative/.

Building back better (recovery from the pandemic)

Much of the section on building back better addresses the collective needs to support groups that have been disproportionately affected by the pandemic including “women, youth, underrepresented groups and indigenous peoples.” Assistance to such groups and to small and medium-sized enterprises is an important component of building back better. It also reflects present WTO focus on helping women and micro-, small- and medium-sized businesses better participate in the global economy and in international trade in particular. Actions by Canada and the U.S. will be pursued in part under existing commitments within the USMCA but also will be supportive of WTO initiatives and UN Sustainable Development Goals.

Other agreed steps by Canada and the U.S. in this section deal with building supply chain for battery development and production which is consistent with the leaders’ objective of advancing reductions in greenhouse gases. The U.S. and Canada also encourage “international regulatory cooperation” to enhance “economic competitiveness” “while maintaining high standards of public health, safety, labor, and environmental protection.” As reviewed below, trade and climate change/environment are likely to be of greater interest within the WTO moving forward. The WTO SPS and TBT Agreements also encourage international regulatory cooperation to facilitate trade. Thus, U.S.-Canada actions are supportive of existing rights and obligations and leading the way on future needs.

Accelerating Climate Ambitions

With the U.S. having rejoined the Paris Agreement since President Biden took office, the U.S. position is now more aligned with Canada and with that of the European Union in terms of needing “to increase the scale and speed of action to address the climate crisis and better protect nature.” Of particular interest is the commitment to action against countries who don’t take adequate action to reduce greenhouse gases .

“The President also restated his commitment to holding polluters accountable for their actions. Both the President and the Prime Minister agreed to work together to protect businesses, workers and communities in both countries from unfair trade by countries failing to take strong climate action.”

The language in the roadmap suggests that the U.S. and Canada will be interested in exploring options similar to those being prepared by the European Union on a duty or tax on imported products produced with higher levels of greenhouse gases to prevent leakage. The incoming Director-General has acknowledged that Members are looking at how to make trade help address the climate crisis. See APPOINTMENT OF THE NEXT DIRECTOR-GENERAL, STATEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL ELECT DR. NGOZI OKONJO-IWEALA TO THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE WTO GENERAL COUNCIL, 15 February 2021, JOB/GC/250 (16 February 2021)(para. 1.14, “1.14. We should also work to ensure that the WTO best supports the green and circular economy and addresses more broadly the nexus between trade and climate change. Trade and environmental protection can be mutually reinforcing, both contributing to sustainable development. It will be important for Members to reactivate and broaden the negotiations on environmental goods and services. This would help promote trust and encourage Members to explore further ways in which trade can contribute positively to an improved climate. Care must, however, be taken to ensure that any disciplines are not used arbitrarily or as a disguised restriction on trade, and that they take into account the need for developing countries to be assisted to transition to the use of greener and more environmentally friendly technologies.”); February 16, 2021, Special Session of the General Council at WTO appoints Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala as the seventh Director-General, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/02/16/special-session-of-the-general-council-at-wto-appoints-dr-ngozi-okonjo-iweala-as-the-seventh-director-general/.

Building Global Alliances

While much broader than just trade, the commitment to multilateralism announced by President Biden and Prime Minister Trudeau included “firm commitment to the United Nations, G7 and G20, as well as NATO, the WTO, and the Five Eyes community.” Both Canada and the United States support significant reform at the WTO. One can expect closer collaboration between the U.S. and Canada on many reform initiatives at the WTO.

This section of the roadmap also addresses the need to jointly address China. “They also discussed ways to more closely align our
approaches to China, including to address the challenges it presents to our collective interest and to the international rules-based order. This includes dealing with its coercive and unfair economic practices, national security challenges, and human rights abuses, while cooperating with China on areas where it is in our interest, such as climate change.” WTO reform to be meaningful will have to have elements that will address the noncoverage of various actions by state-capital countries like China that distort global trade flows, create massive excess capacity, force technology transfer, limit transparency and market access in fact. While some efforts can be through consultations by the U.S. with other trading partners like Canada and the EU, multilateral reform is also critical for the functioning of the global trading system.

Conclusion

President Biden’s efforts are restoring strong relationships with our neighbors and renewed engagement with multilateral organizations has been apparent during the first five weeks of his Presidency. Yesterday’s virtual meeting between President Biden and Prime Minister Trudeau reflects the strong bonds between the U.S. and Canada. The roadmap presents areas of joint interest and future activity to deepen our close partnership. The roadmap also has a number of signals of likely U.S.-Canada cooperation in global trade and on WTO reform which should attract support from a number of other major trading partners at the WTO.

The roadmap and joint press statements are embedded below.

Roadmap-for-a-Renewed-U.S.-Canada-Partnership-_-The-White-House

Remarks-by-President-Biden-and-Prime-Minister-Trudeau-of-Canada-in-Joint-Press-Statements-_-The-White-House

COVAX’s efforts to distribute COVID-19 vaccines to low- and middle income countries — additional momentum from G-7 virtual meeting

Terence P. Stewart · February 19, 2021 · COVID-19 · Brazil, China, European Union, Germany, India, Israe, Russian Federation, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, vaccinations · No Comments

With the COVID-19 pandemic affecting populations around the world with more than 110 million people having been infected and with more than 2.4 million deaths, the world is anxiously awaiting vaccines to permit vaccinations for vulnerable populations. The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (Gavi) and the World Health Organization (WHO) are co-leads of the COVAX initiative which seeks to provide equitable global access to COVID-19 vaccines. More than 2 billion vaccine doses have been or are being contracted to supply to 92 low- and middle-income countries as well as other countries who have agreed to buy vaccines through COVAX.

The World Health Organization’s Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus has expressed concern about “vaccine nationalism” as large and wealthier countries have contracted for large amounts of vaccines. In a joint statement with the UNICEF Executive Director on February 10, the WHO DG laid out what is needed in 2021 to achieve vaccine equitable distribution. See In the COVID-19 vaccine race, we either win together or lose together, Joint statement by UNICEF Executive Director Henrietta Fore and WHO Director-General Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, 10 February 2021, https://www.who.int/news/item/10-02-2021-in-the-covid-19-vaccine-race-we-either-win-together-or-lose-together. The joint statement is embedded below.

In-the-COVID-19-vaccine-race-we-either-win-together-or-lose-together

The problem of vaccine availability can be traced to a number of sources including the inability to predict which development efforts would succeed, efforts by governments to support development through funding and advance contracts which do not always support the early vaccine successes, challenges of approval processes in different countries and more. However, it is clear that in the early days of the vaccine rollout, a handful of countries have been able to obtain the largest amount of vaccine doses and to provide vaccinations to citizens. For example, the Financial Times has an update of its “Covid-19 vaccine tracker: the global race to vaccinate” published today (February 19) that looks at data for 99 countries or territories where vaccinations are reported through mid-February. Of a global total of 194.4 million vaccinations, 91.6% are reported by the following 10 countries or groups of countries: United States, 57.2 million; China 40.5 million; European Union, 24.7 million; United Kingdom, 17.0 million; India, 10.2 million; Israel, 7.1 million; Brazil 6.2 million; Turkey, 5.9 million; United Arab Emirates, 5.4 million; Russian Federation, 3.9 million. Of the 99 countries or territories, 24 reported vaccinations of at least 10/100 residents, an additional 30 reported vaccinations of at least 5.0-9.9/100 residents and an additional 10 reported vaccinations of at least 3.0-4.9/100. Gavi views 3% as the percent of population needed to be vaccinated to address health care workers. See Financial Times, Covid-19 vaccine tracker: the global race to vaccinate, February 19, 2021, https://ig.ft.com/coronavirus-vaccine-tracker/?areas=gbr&areas=usa&areas=eue&areas=ind&cumulative=1&populationAdjusted=0

At today’s G-7 virtual meeting, there were new pledges from G-7 countries to contribute to COVAX to permit the purchase of vaccine doses contracted and with some countries agreeing to share surplus vaccine doses with the world’s poorest countries. The Gavi press release of today is embedded below.

G7-backs-Gavis-COVAX-Advance-Market-Commitment-to-boost-COVID-19-vaccines-in-worlds-poorest-countries-_-Gavi-the-Vaccine-Alliance

In the December 2020 stimulus package, Congress authorized some funding for COVAX. President Biden outlined the U.S. contributions in a Fact Sheet posted on the White House webpage yesterday and at the G-7 virtual meeting today. See White House, Fact Sheet: President Biden to Take Action on Global health through Support of COVAX and Calling for Health Security Financing, February 18, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/18/fact-sheet-president-biden-to-take-action-on-global-health-through-support-of-covax-and-calling-for-health-security-financing/; New York Times, Biden Declares ‘America is Back’ on International Stage: Live Updates, February 19, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/02/19/world/g7-meeting-munich-security-conference#global-leaders-chart-a-new-course-in-post-trump-era. The fact sheet is embedded below and reports the U.S. will be contributing $2.0 billion quickly and $2.0 billion more over the remainder of 2021 and 2022.

Fact-Sheet_-President-Biden-to-Take-Action-on-Global-Health-through-Support-of-COVAX-and-Calling-for-Health-Security-Financing-_-The-White-House

Conclusion

Much of the activity at the WTO over the last year has focused on the trade challenges flowing from the COVID-19 pandemic. Trade restrictions on exports of medical goods and agricultural goods have been tracked with various efforts to minimize scope and duration. Efforts at expediting the movement of medical goods and agricultural products have also been pursued, and debates have occurred on whether TRIPS rights should be waived during the pandemic to improve access to medical goods during the pandemic. Most advanced countries with pharmaceutical producers have argued that there are sufficient flexibilities within the WTO TRIPS Agreement to handle the current challenges. At the same time over recent years there have been efforts through the WHO, CEPI and GAVI and with the assistance of UNICEF to provide the infrastructure to permit collective purchasing of vaccines and other medical goods and the collection of funds to permit assisting low- and middle-income countries in terms of vaccine availability. COVID-19 is a truly global pandemic. The pressure on governments to find solutions is obviously enormous. Actions like those by the G-7 today and by other governments, NGOs and others to address the COVID-19 challenge are along the lines of what is needed to have more equitable distribution of vaccines. As the UN and WHO keep saying, no one is safe until all are safe.

The challenges for COVAX are huge and the goal for 2021 is to get 20% of the populations part of the program vaccinated. Developed countries and others able to do so need to continue to cooperate to see that these goals for 2021 are met and that further help is available moving into 2022. A study commissioned by the ICC estimates the global costs of not moving quickly to get all people in the world vaccinated at being more than $8 trillion — a figure that dwarfs the costs to get the vaccines produced, distributed and shots given. Hopefully, the world will cooperate and do what is needed to see that all countries can recover from the current pandemic in a timely manner.

U.S.-China Phase 1 Trade Agreement — Data through December 2020; China has increased purchases of agricultural and energy products above 2017 levels but did not reach first year agreed purchases in 2020 and won’t reach the agreed level even if measured from March 2020-February 2021

Terence P. Stewart · February 6, 2021 · U.S.-China Phase I Agreement · China, United States · No Comments

U.S. December export data were released earlier this week. While there are some improvements in some categories of merchandise exports in December (particularly in major agricultural categories, liquefied natural gas and crude oil), China remains far behind its overall commitments in the U.S.-China Phase I Trade Agreement for first year purchases of U.S. goods. As reported in prior posts, both China and the U.S. have taken steps to implement parts of the Phase 1 Agreement that took effect on February 14, 2020, although the level of actual implementation remains unclear. With a change of U.S. Administrations on January 20, 2021, it is unclear what the Biden Administration’s approach will be to China and its myriad trade practices that have been of concern to businesses, workers, Congress and the prior Administration.

Prior posts on the U.S.-China Phase 1 Agreement can be found here: January 9, 2021, U.S.-China Phase 1 Trade Agreement — Data through November 2020; China has increased purchases of agricultural and energy products above 2017 levels but will not reach first year agreed purchases in 2020 whether measured on a calendar basis or on a March 2020-February 2021 basis, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/09/u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-data-through-november-2020-china-has-increased-purchases-of-agricultural-and-energy-products-above-2017-levels-but-will-not-reach-first-year-agreed-purchases-in/; December 10, 2020, U.S.-China Phase I Trade Agreement – data through October 2020; while China has increased purchases of agricultural and some other products, China remains far behind on the agreed purchases in 2020 whether measured on a calendar basis or on a March 2020-February 2021 basis, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/12/10/u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-data-through-october-2020-while-china-has-increased-purchases-of-agricultural-and-some-other-products-china-remains-far-behind-on-the-agreed-purchases-in-2020-w/; November 13, 2020, U.S.-China Phase 1 trade agreement – Data through September 2020; USDA and USTR report on agriculture portion, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/11/13/u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-data-through-september-2020-usda-and-ustr-report-on-agriculture-portion/; October 10, 2020, U.S.-China Phase I Trade Agreement – first six months data on U.S. exports (March-August 2020) covered by the purchase commitments show China needing to triple purchases in next five months to meet first year commitments, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/10/10/u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-first-six-months-data-on-u-s-exports-march-august-2020-covered-by-the-purchase-commitments-show-china-needing-to-triple-purchases-in-next-six-months-to-meet-fi/; September 12, 2020, U.S.-China Phase I Trade Agreement – How is China Doing to Meet Purchase Commitments for the First Year; a Review of U.S. Domestic Exports through July 2020, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/09/12/u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-how-is-china-doing-to-meet-purchase-commitments-for-the-first-year-a-review-of-u-s-domestic-exports-through-july-2020/; August 8, 2020, U.S.-China Phase 1 trade agreement – review of U.S. domestic exports through June 2020, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/08/08/u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-review-of-u-s-domestic-exports-through-june-2020/; July 10, 2020, U.S.-China Phase 1 Trade Agreement – limited progress on increased U.S. exports to China (through May), https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/07/10/u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-limited-progress-on-increased-u-s-exports-to-china-through-may/; June 5, 2020, U.S.-China Phase I Deal is Failing Expanded U.S. Exports Even Before Recent Efforts by China to Limit Certain U.S. Agriculture Exports as Retaliation for U.S. Position on Hong Kong, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/06/05/u-s-china-phase-i-deal-is-failing-expanded-u-s-exports-even-before-recent-efforts-by-china-to-limit-certain-u-s-agriculture-exports-as-retaliation-for-u-s-position-on-hong-kong/; May 12, 2020, U.S.-China Phase I Agreement – some progress on structural changes; far behind on trade in goods and services, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/05/12/u-s-china-phase-i-agreement-some-progress-on-structural-changes-far-behind-on-trade-in-goods-and-services/; January 19, 2020, U.S.-China Phase 1 Agreement – Details on the Expanding Trade Chapter, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/01/19/u-s-china-phase-1-agreement-details-on-the-expanding-trade-chapter/; January 15, 2020, U.S.-China Phase 1 Trade Agreement Signed on January 15 – An Impressive Agreement if Enforced, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/01/15/u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-signed-on-january-15-an-impressive-agreement-if-enforced/.

An unusual aspect of the Phase 1 Agreement is agreement by China to increase imports from the United States of various categories of goods and services during the first two years of the Agreement with 18 categories of goods grouped in three broad categories (manufactured goods, agriculture and energy) and five services categories. Chinese imports of goods and services from the United States under the Agreement are supposed to increase by $76.7 billion in the first year over levels achieved in 2017 and in the second year by $123.3 billion over 2017 levels. The categories and tariff items included in the goods categories are reviewed in Annex 6.1 of the Agreement and the attachment to Annex 6.1. In the confidential version of the agreement, growth levels are provided for each of the 23 categories of goods and services.

While the COVID-19 pandemic has affected trade flows for most countries including both China and the United States and while bilateral relations between the U.S. and China have deteriorated since the signing of the Phase 1 Agreement, China continues to indicate its intention to honor the Phase I Agreement. Article 6.2 of the Agreement defines the time period for the purchase commitments as being January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2021. So the first year by agreement is calendar year 2020.

However, since the Agreement took effect in mid-February, my analysis has focused on the period since the agreement went into effect (for statistics, from March 1, 2020). This is consistent with the position that USTR and USDA took in an interim report released on October 23 looking at China’s compliance with its purchase commitments in agriculture. “It is worth noting that the Phase One Agreement did not go into effect until February 14, 2020, and March is the first full month of its effect. That means that we have seen seven months of agreement sales.” U.S. Trade Representative’s Office and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Interim Report on the Economic and Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, AGRICULTURAL TRADE, October 23, 2020, Page 1.

For purposes of this post, I will look at the March-December data, but I will also reference calendar 2020 data.

Looking at U.S. domestic exports for the March – December period and projecting for a full twelve months (March 2020-February 2021) shows China meeting 94.31% of first year agriculture commitments, and significantly above 2017 actual levels. Total Phase 1 products are projected at only 59.81% of first year commitments with manufactured goods at 52.37% and energy at 41.70%. While agriculture products are projected to exceed 2017 actual by $10.6 billion and energy is projected to exceed 2017 by $3.3 billion, manufactured goods are projected to be $10.5 billion smaller than 2017 actual. Compared to first year purchase commitments, total U.S. Phase I goods exports are projected to be $60.5 billion short of the agreed first year level.

If calendar year 2020 is examined, then U.S. domestic exports of all Phase 1 goods met only 55.64% of the agreed levels with manufactured goods at 51.80%, agricultural products at 81.58% and energy goods at 35.92%.

Under either first year period examined, agricultural and energy product have exceeded what was achieved in 2017 during the first year, though that will not be the case for manufactured goods. Under neither scenario do any of the three goods groupings meeting the first year agreed commitments.

To meet first year commitments, China would have to import monthly 5.03 times the product from the United States as was done in the first ten months in the next two months (January – February). On a calendar basis, U.S. domestic exports missed the agreed level on goods by $66.8 billion

Under the March-February analysis using data through December, the U.S. domestic exports of goods covered by Phase I to China for the first ten months were slightly ahead of 2017 levels ($75.1 billion vs. $73.6 billion) and are projected to exceed the actual 2017 U.S. exports ($90.125 billion projected vs. $86.795 billion 2017 actual). The calendar year 2020 missed the 2017 actual by almost $3 billion ($83.849 billion vs. the 2017 actiual of $86.795 billion). Moreover, since non-covered U.S. exports have declined in 2020 versus 2017, under neither scenario do total U.S. domestic exports reach the 2017 level of $120 billion ($117.258 billion projected for the March-February period; $110.576 billion actual for calendar 2020).

U.S. export data on services are available quarterly for some of the relevant categories and annually for certain information. Total U.S. services exports to all countries are down 20.40% for calendar year 2020. Services trade data with China for 2020 is available for the first nine months of 2020 and shows U.S. exports of services down 34.08% in the first three quarters of 2020 versus 2019. 2019 US exports of services to China were $56.537 billion, slightly higher than 2017 US exports of services to China of $54.981 billion. See U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, November 2020 (January 7, 2021) and December 2020 (February 5, 2021). The Phase 1 Agreement with China has large increases in U.S. services exports in the first year of the agreement ($12.8 billion over 2017 levels). Thus, the limited data available indicate that U.S. services exports to China will likely miss 2017 levels by more than 32% and will obviously not show any gain above 2017.

Looking at total U.S. domestic exports of goods to China for the period March-December 2020, U.S. exports were $98.059 billion ($9.806 billion/month) compared to $101.749 billion in 2017 ($10.175 billion/month). These include both products covered by the Annex 6.1 commitments and other products. For calendar year 2020 total U.S. domestic exports to China were $110.576 billion ($9.215 billion/month) compared to $120.109 billion in 2017 ($10.009 billion/month).

Other U.S. domestic exports not covered by the 18 categories in Annex 6.1 were $33.314 billion in 2017 (full year). For the period March – December, non-covered products (which face significant tariffs in China based on retaliation for US 301 duties) have declined 18.55%, and total exports to China are down 3.63%. Looking at 2020 calendar figures show other U.S. domestic exports (i.e., not covered by the Phase I Agreement) were down 19.78% from comparable levels in 2017.

Thus, the first ten months since the U.S.-China Phase 1 Agreement went into effect suggest that U.S. domestic exports of the Annex 6 goods will be $90.125 billion if the full year shows the same level of increase over 2017 for each of the 18 categories of goods; non-covered products would be $27.133 billion, for total U.S. domestic exports to China of $117.259 billion. This figure would be below 2017 and dramatically below the target of $184.0 billion (if noncovered products remain are at 2017 levels; $177.421 billion with noncovered products at estimated 2020 levels) . The projected U.S. domestic exports to China would, however, be higher than the $109.72 billion in 2018 and the depresssed figure of $94.100 billion in 2019.

If one looks at calendar year 2020 actual data, U.S. domestic exports to China of Annex 6 goods were $83.849 billion, other exports of $26.726 billion, for total domestic exports in 2020 of $110.576 billion even further behind 2017.

To achieve the target level of U.S. exports in the January-February 2021 period, U.S. domestic exports of the 18 categories of goods in Annex 6.1 would have to be $75.573 billion ($37.786 billion/month) an amount that is 5.02 times the monthly rate of exports of the 18 categories to China in the March – December 2020 period ($7.512 billion/month).

As noted earlier, if one uses the 2020 calendar period, U.S. domestic exports of goods in Annex 6.1 fell $66.846 billion short of the first year agreed amounts.

Chinese data on total imports from all countries (in U.S. dollars) for calendar year 2020 show a decline of 1.1% from 2019. http://english.customs.gov.cn/statics/report/monthly.html. General Administrator of Customs of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Total Export & Import Values, December 2020 (in USD). China’s imports from the U.S. were up 9.8% during the same time period, but show imports from the U.S. substantially larger than U.S. domestic exports ($134.907 billion vs. $110.576 billion, though Chinese imports would be CIF value vs. FAS value for U.S. exports and may include U.S. exports to third countries or territories that end up in China).

The 18 product categories included in Annex 6.1 of the Phase 1 Agreement show the following for March-December 2017, March-December 2020 and rate of growth for the first year of the Agreement (figures in $ million):

Product category	March-December 2017	March-December 2020	% change 2017-2020 March-December	$ Value needed in next two months to reach 1st year of Agreement vs. projected 1st year
manufactured goods
1. industrial machinery	$8,241.5	$10,380.4	+11.78%
2. electrical equipment and machinery	$3,628.4	$4,050.7	+11.64%
3. pharma- ceutical products	$1,833.2	$2,708.2	+48.68%
4. aircraft (orders and deliveries)	$14,287.1	$3,405.9	-76.16%
5. vehicles	$8,591.0	$5,339.5	-37.85%
6. optical and medical instruments	$2,708.7	$3,024.1	+11.64%
7. iron and steel	$1,000.0	$428.2	–57.19%
8. other manufactured goods	$9,233.2	$11,531.5	+24.89%
Total for mfg goods	$50,152.2	$40,819.5	-19.19%	$50,449.9
Agriculture
9. oilseeds	$9,412.8	$13,249.3	+40.76%
10. meat	$474.1	$2,692.4	+467.93%
11. cereals	$1,110.1	$2,881.0	+159.53%
12. cotton	$699.6	$1,638.9	+134.27%
13. other agricultural commodities	$3,852.4	$3,920.0	+1.75%
14. seafood	$1,128.0	$629.8	-44.18%
Total for agriculture	$16,676.9	$25,011.4	+49.98%	$ 8,340.3
Energy
15. liquefied natural gas	$365.8	$1,295.2	+254.05%
16. crude oil	$3,726.8	$6,388.7	+71.43%
17. refined products	$1,953.0	$1,447.9	-25.80%
18. coal	$353.1	$159.7	-54.78%
Total for energy	$6,398.7	$9,291.5	+45.21%	$16,782.5
Total for 1-18	$73,587.8	$75,122.4	+2.09%	$75,572.7

China has recovered more quickly from COVID-19 economic challenges than has the U.S. However, as reviewed above, their total imports from all countries are down 1.1% in calendar year 2020 while up 9.8% from the United States. Thus, the Phase 1 Agreement appeaers to have contributed to some improved U.S. export performance to China even if China is far away from meeting the year one commitments.

Conclusion

As reviewed in prior posts, the U.S.-China Phase 1 Agreement is a potentially important agreement which attempts to address a range of U.S. concerns with the bilateral relationship and obtain somewhat better reciprocity with the world’s largest exporter. The Phase 1 Agreement has left other challenges to a Phase 2 negotiation which has not yet begun. It is unclear what the Biden Administration approach will be.

The differences in economic systems between China and the United States have made reliance on WTO rules less relevant to the Trump Administration as those rules presume market-based economies and presently don’t address the myriad distortions that flow from the Chinese state capital system. Thus, the Phase I Agreement was an effort to move the needle in trade relations with China to achieve greater reciprocity. It has had some limited success to date. It will be interesting to see the approach on trade with China taken by the Biden Administration when its trade team is onboard.

COVID-19 agricultural fall out — higher prices for many consumers and greater food insecurity

Terence P. Stewart · February 3, 2021 · COVID-19 · Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, European Union, food insecurity, Georgia, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Taiwan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, World Bank, World Bank President David Malpass · No Comments

The World Bank’s President David Malpass in a February 1st posting on Voices flagged the challenges for many of the world’s poorest people flowing from the COVID-19 pandemic — higher food prices, greater hunger, more people pushed into extreme poverty. See World Bank blog,COVID crisis is fueling food price rises for world’s poorest, February 1, 2021, https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/covid-crisis-fueling-food-price-rises-worlds-poorest. The post was originally published in the Guardian. The post is copied in its entirety below (emphasis in the original webpost).

“Over the last year, COVID-19 has undone the economic, health and food security of millions, pushing as many as 150 million people into extreme poverty. While the health and economic impacts of the pandemic have been devastating, the rise in hunger has been one of its most tangible symptoms.

“Income losses have translated into less money in people’s pockets to buy food while market and supply disruptions due to movement restrictions have created local shortages and higher prices, especially for perishable food. This reduced access to nutritious food will have negative impacts on the health and cognitive development of COVID-era children for years to come.

“Global food prices, as measured by a World Bank food price index, rose 14% last year. Phone surveys conducted periodically by the World Bank in 45 countries show significant percentages of people running out of food or reducing their consumption. With the situation increasingly dire, the international community can take three key actions in 2021 to increase food security and help prevent a larger toll on human capital.

“The first priority is enabling the free flow of food. To avoid artificial shortages and price spikes, food and other essential goods must flow as freely as possible across borders. Early in the pandemic, when perceived shortages and panic generated threats of export bans, the international community helped keep food trade flows open. Credible and transparent information about the state of global food inventories – which were at comfortable levels pre-COVID – along with unequivocal free-trade statements from the G20, World Trade Organization, and regional cooperation bodies helped reassure traders, and led to helpful policy responses. Special rules for agriculture, food workers and transport corridors restored supply chains that had been briefly disrupted within countries.

“We need to remain vigilant and avoid backsliding into export restrictions and hardened borders that make food – and other essentials – scarce or more costly.

“The second priority is bolstering social safety nets. Short-term social safety nets offer a vital cushion for families hit by the health and economic crises. In Ethiopia, for example, households that experienced problems in satisfying their food needs initially increased by 11.7 percentage points during the pandemic, but participants in our long-running Productive Safety Net program were shielded from most of the negative effects.

“The world has mounted an unprecedented social protection response to COVID-19. Cash transfers are now reaching 1.1 billion people, and innovative delivery mechanisms are rapidly identifying and reaching new groups, such as informal urban workers. But ‘large scale’ is not synonymous with ‘adequate’. In a review of COVID-19 social response programs, cash transfer programs were found to be:

“–Short-term in their duration – lasting just over three months on average

“–Small in value – an average of $6 (£4.30) per capita in low-income countries

“–Limited in scope – with many in need remaining uncovered

“The pandemic has reinforced the vital imperative of increasing the world’s investments in social protection systems. Additional measures to expedite cash transfers, particularly via digital means, would also play an important role in reducing malnutrition.

“The third priority is enhancing prevention and preparedness. The world’s food systems endured numerous shocks in 2020, from economic impacts on producers and consumers to desert locust swarms and erratic weather. All indicators suggest that this may be the new normal. The ecosystems we rely on for water, air and food supply are under threat. Zoonotic diseases are on the rise owing to growing demographic and economic pressures on land, animals and wildlife.

“A warming planet is contributing to costlier and more frequent extreme weather events. And as people pack into low-quality housing in urban slums or vulnerable coastal areas, more are living in the path of disease and climate disaster.

“Development gains can be wiped out in the blink of an eye. Our experience with hurricanes or seismic events shows that it is more effective to invest in prevention, before a catastrophe strikes. That’s why countries need adaptive social protection programs – programs that are connected to food security early warning systems and can be scaled up in anticipation of shocks.

“The time is long overdue to shift to practices that safeguard and increase food and nutrition security in ways that will endure. The to-do list is long and urgent. We need sustained financing for approaches that prioritize human, animal and planetary health; restore landscapes and diversify crops to improve nutrition; reduce food loss and waste; strengthen agricultural value chains to create jobs and recover lost incomes; and deploy effective climate-smart agriculture techniques on a much greater scale.

“The World Bank Group and partners are ready to help countries reform their agriculture and food policies and redeploy public finance to foster a green, inclusive, and resilient recovery.

“Focusing on food security would address a basic injustice: almost one in 10 people live in chronic hunger in an age of food waste and plenty. This focus would also strengthen our collective ability to weather the next storm, flood, drought, or pandemic – with safe and nutritious food for all.”

Food insecurity is an issue for all countries although most pressing for the poorest countries

The challenges noted by the World Bank President also face most other countries. For example, in the United States, there has been a massive increase in the number of people getting food from food banks and estimates are that one in seven Americans needs food assistance. Feeding America, The Impact of Coronavirus on Food Insecurity, October 2020, https://www.feedingamerica.org/research/coronavirus-hunger-research (“Combining analyses at the national, state, county, and congressional district levels, we show how the number of people who are food insecure in 2020 could rise to more than 50 million, including 17 million children.”) The challenges for schools not being able to have in school education has complicated the challenge in the United States as millions of children receive food from their schools but need alternative sources when schools are not able to provide in school classes. See, e.g., Brookings Institution, Hungry at Thanksgiving: A Fall 2020 update on food insecurity in the U.S., November 23, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/11/23/hungry-at-thanksgiving-a-fall-2020-update-on-food-insecurity-in-the-u-s/ (reviews the increase in food insecurity and the various safety net programs in the U.S. attempting to address).

World Trade Organization involvement in addressing the problem

The World Trade Organization is directly involved in addressing the first priority identified by World Bank President Malpass — enabling the free flow of food. However, the WTO also monitors government support efforts and has the ability to be tackling trade and environment issues which could affect the third priority by reducing climate change.

WTO Members under WTO rules can impose export restraints under certain circumstances and in the first half of 2020, a number of members imposed export restraints on particular agricultural products and many imposed export restraints on certain medical goods. At the same time, the lockdown of countries had significant effects on the movement of goods and people. Many WTO Members have urged limiting such restraints and the WTO Secretariat has monitored both restraints imposed, when such restraints have been lifted (if they have), and trade liberalization efforts to speed the movement of important goods. See, e.g., WTO, COVID-19 and world trade, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/covid19_e.htm; WTO, COVID-19 AND AGRICULTURE: A STORY OF RESILIENCE, INFORMATION NOTE, 26 August 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/agric_report_e.pdf; WTO, COVID-19: Measures affecting trade in goods, updated as of 1 February 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_goods_measure_e.htm. The August paper on COVIDE-19 and Agriculture is embedded below.

agric_report_e

There have been a number of proposals by certain WTO Members to forego export restraints on agricultural products during the pandemic. None have been acted upon by the membership as a whole, but the communications often reflect commitments of certain Members to keep agricultural markets open during the pandemic. See, e.g., RESPONDING TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC WITH OPEN AND PREDICTABLE TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD PRODUCTS, STATEMENT FROM: AUSTRALIA; BRAZIL; CANADA; CHILE; COLOMBIA; COSTA RICA; ECUADOR; EUROPEAN UNION; GEORGIA; HONG KONG, CHINA; JAPAN; REPUBLIC OF KOREA; MALAWI; MALAYSIA; MEXICO; NEW ZEALAND; NICARAGUA; PARAGUAY; PERU; QATAR; KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA; SINGAPORE; SWITZERLAND; THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU; UKRAINE; UNITED ARAB EMIRATES; UNITED KINGDOM; UNITED STATES; AND URUGUAY, WT/GC/208/Rev.2, G/AG/30/Rev.2, 29 May 2020. The document is embedded below.

208R2-3

More can and should be done, including a WTO-wide agreement to forego agricultural export restraints during the current pandemic or future pandemics. However, there are strong objections to any such limits from a number of WTO Members including large and important countries like China, India and South Africa.

Indeed, efforts to get agreement at the December 2020 General Council meeting that countries would not block agricultural exports to the UN’s World Food Programme for humanitarian purposes was blocked by a number of countries. While 79 WTO Members in January 2021 provided a joint pledge not to prevent agricultural exports to the UN World Food Programme, it is a sign of the sensitivity of food security to many countries that a very limited humanitarian proposal could not obtain the agreement of all WTO Members in a period of hightened need by many of the world’s poorest countries. See January 23, 2021, WTO and the World Food Programme – action by 79 Members after a failed December effort at the General Council, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/23/wto-and-the-world-food-programme-action-by-79-members-after-a-failed-december-effort-at-the-general-council/.

Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic has extracted a huge cost from the world economy, has pushed tens of millions of people into extreme poverty, has cost hundreds of millions people employment (full or partial), is complicating the education of the world’s children with likely long lasting effects, has exposed potential challenges to achieving global cooperation on a range of matters including the desirability of limiting or not imposing export restraints on agricultural and medical goods.

While the focus of countries and the media in the last several months has shifted to access to vaccines and ensuring greater equitable distribution of such vaccines at affordable prices, there remains much that needs to be done to better address food insecurity during the pandemic. International organizations like the World Bank, IMF and WTO, countries, businesses and NGOs need to se that both core issues are addressed in the coming months.

Early trade action by Biden Administration — reinstating aluminum duties on imports from the United Arab Emirates

Terence P. Stewart · February 2, 2021 · Section 232 tariffs on aluminum products · Canada, China, European Union, India, Israel, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States · No Comments

On February 1, 2021, President Biden revoked an action by the Trump Administration on aluminum products from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE’s exports of aluminum had been subject to additional duties as a result of an investigation of global imports of aluminum under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, where the Secretary of Commerce found that imports were a threat to national security and President Trump had imposed additional duties of 10%. Countries with security relationships with the United States were able to seek alternative approaches to addressing U.S. concerns.

The United States and the UAE have a security relationship of importance to the U.S. Specifically, the United States had worked with the UAE in its efforts to secure greater recognition for the state of Israel. The Abraham Accords Peace Agreement: Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization Between the United Arab Emirates and the State of Israel was agreed by the UAE and Israel on August 13, 2020, signed at the White House on September 15, 2020 and ratified by the two governments in mid-October 2020.

Shortly before leaving office, on January 19, 2021, President Trump through Proclamation 10139 indicated that tariffs would be lifted on imports of aluminum from the UAE with an effective date of 12:01 a.m. on February 3, 2021. In their place, quotas at “historic levels” were agreed to on aluminum exports to the U.S. from the UAE. The Trump Proclamation is found at 86 FR 6,825-31 (January 25, 2021) and is embedded below.

2021-01711

By proclamation on February 1, 2021, President Biden revoked President Trump’s Proclamation 10139. The discussion contained in President Biden’s Proclamation indicates that his Administration views Section 232 as an important tool, that the aluminum industry is critical to U.S. national security and that the tariffs that were imposed on aluminum were having the desired effect prior to the pandemic and were worth maintaining. The Biden Proclamation is reproduced below. While it is not yet published in the Federal Register, the Proclamation can be found on the White House website in the briefing room. See A Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States, February 1, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/02/01/a-proclamation-on-adjusting-imports-of-aluminum-into-the-united-states/.

BRIEFING ROOM

A Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States

FEBRUARY 01, 2021 • PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS

ADJUSTING IMPORTS OF ALUMINUM INTO THE UNITED STATES

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

Proclamation 10139 of January 19, 2021 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States), amended Proclamation 9704 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States), as amended, with respect to tariffs on certain imports of aluminum articles proclaimed under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1862). Proclamation 10139 provides that those amendments will not take effect until 12:01 a.m. on February 3, 2021.
I consider it is necessary and appropriate in light of our national security interests to maintain, at this time, the tariff treatment applied to aluminum article imports from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) under Proclamation 9704, as amended, as they are currently in effect as of this date. Accordingly, and as provided for in clause (6) of Proclamation 10139, I am terminating the modifications contained in that proclamation before they take effect.
Proclamation 9704 applied tariffs to help ensure the economic viability of the domestic aluminum industry — an industry that the Secretary of Commerce had previously identified as essential to our critical industries and national defense. Because robust domestic aluminum production capacity is essential to meet our current and future national security needs, Proclamation 9704 aimed to revive idled aluminum facilities, open closed smelters and mills, preserve necessary skills, and maintain or increase domestic production by reducing United States reliance on foreign producers.
In my view, the available evidence indicates that imports from the UAE may still displace domestic production, and thereby threaten to impair our national security. Proclamation 9704 authorized the Secretary of Commerce to grant exclusions from the aluminum tariffs based on specific national security considerations or if specific imported aluminum articles were determined not to be produced sufficiently in the United States, such that the imports would not diminish domestic production. Tellingly, there have been 33 such exclusion requests for aluminum imported from the UAE, covering 587,007 metric tons of articles, and the Secretary of Commerce has denied 32 of those requests, covering 582,007 metric tons. This indicates the large degree of overlap between imports from the UAE and what our domestic industry is capable of producing.
Since the tariff on aluminum imports was imposed, such imports substantially decreased, including a 25 percent reduction from the UAE, and domestic aluminum production increased by 22 percent through 2019, before the coronavirus pandemic began. In light of that history, I believe that maintaining the tariff is likely to be more effective in protecting our national security than the untested quota described in Proclamation 10139.
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, authorizes the President to adjust the imports of an article and its derivatives that are being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.
Section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483), authorizes the President to embody in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States the substance of statutes affecting import treatment, and actions thereunder, including the removal, modification, continuance, or imposition of any rate of duty or other import restriction.
Now, Therefore, I, Joseph R. Biden Jr., President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, do hereby proclaim that Proclamation 10139, including the Annex, is revoked.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this
first day of February, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-one, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-fifth.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

___________________________________________________________

Pending WTO disputes; UAE does not have a pending dispute with the U.S.

While China, India, the European Union, Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzerland and Turkey all have ongoing panel proceedings at the WTO challenging the U.S. imposition of duties on steel and aluminum pursuant to Section 232 investigations, the UAE is not a country that has filed a request for consultations on the additional duties on aluminum on its exports to the United States. See WT/DSB 544 (China), WT/DSB547 (India), WT/DSB/548 (European Union), WT/DSB/552 (Norway), WT/DS554 (Russian Federation), WT/DS556 (Switzerland) and WT/DS564 (Turkey); challenges by Canada and Mexico were withdrawn after agreement with the United States (WT/DS550 (Canada) and WT/DS551 (Mexico). The panel reports were to go to parties in the fall of 2020 and released to the public once translations into the official languages was accomplished. But no report has been released to date. With the impasse on the Appellate Body, it is unclear if the Biden Administration will opt to file appeals should the panel reports not recognize the U.S. national security concerns. Thus, absent a decision by the Biden team, should it lose the WTO cases and not appeal, to eliminate the additional duties on imports from all countries, the UAE’s exports will continue to face the additional 10% duties for the foreseeable future.

Broader interest in Biden Administration approach to Section 232

A recent article in Politico reviews contact by the EU with the Biden team last week seeking an immediate end to tariffs on imports from the EU of both steel and aluminum with a corresponding withdrawal of EU retaliatory tariffs if accomplished. As noted in the Politico article, the tariffs are supported by steel producers, unions (e.g., the USW has many workers in both the steel and aluminum industries) and the primary aluminum producers. Politico, Biden, in first trade move, reimposes a Trump tariff, February 1, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/01/biden-aluminum-tariff-uae-464794.

Conclusion

It is unlikely that the U.S. will agree to withdraw the 232 duties at the present time. The Biden team doesn’t have its trade people in place; there are pending WTO disputes; the underlying problems of global excess capacity in both steel and aluminum continue on with no resolution in sight. The main driver of the excess capacity has been China (though others have contributed). There are no WTO rules that permit effective addressing of such problems, and China has largely ignored calls by its trading partners to address the problem in a meaningful manner.

Still the reversal of President Trump’s January 19, 2021 Proclamation is an interesting first step in the trade arena by the Biden Administration to emphasize that restoring economic health to the U.S. economy is an important component of his starting game plan (along with meaningfully addressing the pandemic). Trade issues will likely be seen through that prism even as the U.S. works within multilateral organizations and with allies on a host of issues of common interest and concern.

The WTO Informal Ministerial of January 29, 2021 — hope for progress at the WTO in 2021

Terence P. Stewart · January 30, 2021 · Appellate Body reform, COVID-19, electronic commerce and digital trade, Fisheries Subsidies negotiations, Selection of WTO Director-General, Special and Differential Treatment, WTO Informal Ministerial · Amb. David Walker, Amb. Santiago Wills, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chad, Chil, China, Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff, Egypt, European Union, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, President of the Swiss Confederation Guy Parmelin, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States · No Comments

Switzerland typically hosts an informal ministerial meeting of WTO trade ministers on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum’s January Davos event. This year both were handled remotely.

The informal ministerial was summarized in ten points by the Swiss Confederation President Guy Parmelin at the end of the event. President Parmelin’s statement is available here, https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/65098.pdf, and is copied below.

“Virtual Informal WTO Ministerial Gathering, 29 January 2021

“Personal Concluding Remarks by the Chair, President of the Swiss Confederation and Head of the Federal Department for Economic Affairs, Education and Research, Guy Parmelin, Switzerland

“29 Ministers and high officials representing a broad spectrum of the WTO membership attended this year’s Informal World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Gathering in virtual format. In concluding and with warm thanks to all participants for their contributions, I would like to summarise the main points from our discussions as follows:

“• Ministers stressed the urgency of the swift appointment of a new WTO Director-General as well as the confirmation of the date and venue of the 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12).

“• Ministers reiterated their determination to maintain a credible multilateral trading system and to restore a climate of mutual trust.

“• Ministers expressed their concerns about the enormous social and economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis. They highlighted the relevance of trade and the role of the WTO in containing the pandemic and promoting recovery. Many Ministers underlined the importance of ensuring the development of as well as an equitable and affordable access to medical goods, including vaccines. They addressed ways and means to achieve these goals, including the implementation of measures facilitating trade, the role of intellectual property and transparency.

“• Ministers regretted that the negotiations on fisheries subsidies could not be completed in accordance with the end-2020 deadline foreseen in SDG 14.6. In light of the significance of this process for the sustainability of global fisheries, Ministers concurred that a comprehensive and effective agreement on fisheries subsidies should be concluded as soon as possible. Ministers agreed to step up efforts with a view to finding mutually acceptable solutions consistent with all the elements of the negotiating mandate.

“• Ministers highlighted the importance of restoring a fully functional WTO dispute settlement system, which is a key pillar of the rules-based multilateral trading system.

“• Many participants argued for further progress in agricultural trade policy reform at MC12 and asked for an outcome on domestic support and other issues. The issues of public stockholding and the special safeguard mechanism were highlighted by several Ministers.

“• Many Ministers called for tangible outcomes, by MC12, on the Joint Statement Initiatives. Inter alia finalizing the process on Services Domestic Regulation and making substantial progress on E-commerce and Investment Facilitation as well as on Trade and Women’s Economic Empowerment.

“• The need to reform the WTO was widely acknowledged. A number of Ministers insisted on advancing diverse issues related to the special and differential treatment of developing and least developed countries. Some participants proposed to adjust WTO rules to present-day economic and competitive conditions.

“• Several Ministers supported new initiatives launched in response to global challenges such as the structured discussions on Trade and Environmental Sustainability.

“• Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to engage in the preparations for MC12 in order to advance key issues.”

The participants at this year’s informal ministerial included officials from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chad (coordinator for LDC Group), Chile, China, Egypt, European Union, India, Indonesia, Jamaica (Coordinator ACP Group), Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Mauritius (Coordinator African Group), Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland (Chair), Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and three officials with WTO roles — H.E. Mr. David Walker (New Zealand), WTO General Council Chair; H.E. Mr. Santiago Wills (Colombia), WTO Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules, H.E. Mr. Alan Wolff, WTO Deputy Director-General. The full list with titles is embedded below.

List-of-participants-at-virtual-informal-ministerial-1-29-2021-65099

The good news for the informal ministerial was the position taken by the United States representative who reportedly indicated that the United States was actively reviewing the issue of the next Director-General and was intent on actively working on WTO reform. See, e.g., Inside U.S. Trade’s World Trade Online, Biden administration strikes ‘constructive’ tone in first word on WTO approach, January 29, 2021, https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/biden-administration-strikes-%E2%80%98constructive%E2%80%99-tone-first-word-wto-approach; Politico, Biden administration joins call for ‘swift appointment’ of new WTO head, January 29, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/29/biden-world-trade-organization-463820. Under the Trump Administration, the United States had blocked the formation of consensus around Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala based on the U.S. view that Dr. Okonjo-Iweala did not have a sufficient trade background. See, e.g., January 26, 2021, Letter from variety of former U.S. officials to President Biden urges U.S. support for Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala as next WTO Director General, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/26/letter-from-variety-of-former-u-s-officials-to-president-biden-urges-u-s-support-for-dr-ngozi-okonjo-iweala-as-next-wto-director-general/. Hopefully, the current review of the issue by the Biden Administration, even ahead of President Biden’s trade team being confirmed by the U.S. Senate, will result in the U.S. joining the support for Dr. Okonjo-Iweala, permitting the WTO to approve a next Director-General.

It was also reported that the United States, consistent with the Biden Administration’s focus on the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change, expressed interest in promoting recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and concluding an ambitious fisheries subsidies agreement. See Inside U.S. Trade’s World Trade Online, Biden administration strikes ‘constructive’ tone in first word on WTO approach, January 29, 2021, https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/biden-administration-strikes-%E2%80%98constructive%E2%80%99-tone-first-word-wto-approach. Fisheries subsidies negotiations have been going on for some twenty years, and many Members have remained more concerned with keeping their subsidies in place than agreeing to disciplines that would create conditions for sustainable fishing going forward. The Interest in the Biden Administration in working within the WTO on joint steps to promote recovery from the pandemic is different from the approach pursued by the Trump Administration which didn’t want to look at actions possible within the WTO (other than limits on export restraints on agricultural goods) while the world was dealing with the pandemic. The U.S. statement should mean more interest in exploring issues like those raised by the Ottawa Group. See November 27, 2020, The Ottawa Group’s November 23 communication and draft elements of a trade and health initiative, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/11/27/the-ottawa-groups-november-23-communication-and-draft-elements-of-a-trade-and-health-initiative/.

Other issues flagged in the Swiss President’s concluding remarks are issues of particular interest to some or many countries but not topics of clear agreement. For example, while it is likely that the United States will look for ways to resolve its concerns about longstanding problems in the WTO’s dispute settlement system, particularly around the Appellate Body, it is unlikely that there will be a swift resolution of the U.S. concerns, and hence there will likely be a continued impasse for at least much of 2021 on the return of a functioning two-stage dispute settlement system.

Similarly on domestic support in agriculture and other agriculture issues flagged, certain WTO Members have not supported further liberalization in agriculture while pushing for limits on domestic subsidies and rollback of liberalization commitments undertaken in the Uruguay Round. It is unlikely that there will be forward movement on these issues without greater balance in terms of tariff reductions on major agricultural products. Moreover, as noted in a recent post, other major distortions in agriculture that are not presently identified as domestic subsidies include widespread use of child and forced labor on many agricultural products. See January 25, 2021, Child labor and forced labor in cotton production — is there a current WTO mandate to identify and quantify the distortive effects?, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/25/child-labor-and-forced-labor-in-cotton-production-is-there-a-current-wto-mandate-to-identify-and-quantify-the-distortive-effects/; January 24, 2021, Forced labor and child labor – a continued major distortion in international trade for some products, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/24/forced-labor-and-child-labor-a-continued-major-distortion-in-international-trade-for-some-products/. Such practices should be quantified and the level of potential distortion identified so WTO Members can decide how to address them in ongoing agriculture negotiations.

Progress is being made on Joint Statement Initiatives including e-commerce, services domestic regulation, investment facilitation and women’s empowerment. An open issue for these and topics in the sphere of trade and the environment (e.g., environmental goods agreement) is whether benefits provided by participants will be made available on an MFN basis or limited to participants, with the option of other Members to join in the future. See January 18, 2021, Revisiting the need for MFN treatment for sectoral agreements among the willing, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/18/revisiting-the-need-for-mfn-treatment-for-sectoral-agreements-among-the-willing/. For many Members liberalization could be speeded up if benefits in sectoral agreements go to those participating only while leaving the door open for other Members to join later when they see the value for them.

And on the important topic of WTO reform beyond the items listed above, there is little current agreement on how to deal with industrial subsidies and other practices that lead to massive global excess capacity, or on how to address access to special and differential treatment and many other areas of importance to some or many WTO Members.

Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff provided a statement during the virtual informal ministerial urging WTO Members to make 2021 a year of accomplishments. The WTO press release can be found here. WTO News, DDG Wolff urges WTO ministers to address the pandemic and make 2021 a year of action, 29 January 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/igo_29jan21_e.htm. DDG Wolff’s statement is copied below.

“My thanks to our Swiss hosts and to President Parmelin both for his remarks today and for his very thoughtful address on the occasion of the 25th anniversary celebration of the WTO last November.

“Ministers, you can make 2021 a year of substantial accomplishments at the WTO.

“There has already been a beginning. In the first action of the year, Members accounting for most of the world’s agricultural exports committed to refrain from imposing export restrictions on purchases made by the World Food Program.

“The anticipated appointment of a new Director-General will bring needed leadership in moving toward concrete results. But she can succeed only with your active engagement.

“I urge you not to wait for the Twelfth Ministerial Conference, delayed by the pandemic, to move negotiations forward to positive outcomes.

“There is no reason why the twenty-year negotiation on fisheries subsidies cannot be concluded successfully — without a sacrifice of ambition — in the next few months. Success hinges on Members’ willingness to accept a significant level of discipline on their own subsidies. Political decisions and your active engagement will be required to bring about success.

“I urge you to address ‘trade and health’ forcefully and immediately. Last year, trade made a vitally important contribution in supplying needed medical supplies to deal with COVID-19. Proposals as to what more can be done must be deliberated now. Cooperation on trade can accelerate access to vaccines. There can be no higher priority.

“Consider how the WTO can further contribute to the economic recovery. Members can take steps to ensure enhanced transparency, work to eliminate unnecessary barriers and agree that new restrictions will not be imposed. Trade finance must be restored. The WTO convened the major international financial organizations and banks to address this need in the aftermath of the financial crisis and it can do so now again.

“’Trade and climate’ must be on the WTO agenda. Carbon border adjustment measures will likely result in conflicts unless Members engage in joint efforts to find mutually beneficial solutions. The heightened interest of Members in a broad range of other environmental issues such as plastics pollution and the circular economy can be reflected in new agreements. The WTO can be more visible as a steward of the planet by reviving and concluding the Environmental Goods Agreement.

“The Joint Statement Initiatives on e-commerce, investment facilitation, and services domestic regulation can bear fruit this year, building on what was achieved with respect to small businesses last year. In addition, more progress can be made on the economic empowerment of women through international trade.

“Concerns over income inequality have been growing. The WTO’s rules-based system needs to be seen not only among countries but also within countries, as responsive to the needs of workers, farmers and all who wish to engage in international trade. But international trade rules cannot substitute for domestic policy actions to make growth more inclusive. When large numbers of people are unhappy with how the economy is working for them, trade will often receive undeserved blame. The WTO is about fairness. Its work will never be done in pursuit of that objective, but further progress can be made this year.

“There can be an outcome on agriculture — at least a down-payment and a defined work program going forward.

“During 2021, the WTO can likely welcome new WTO Members, as it continues to move towards universal coverage. Comoros and Bosnia-Herzegovina may be ready, and over a dozen others are making progress.

“Last but not least, ‘WTO reform’ can become a reality, with actions taken to —

“- facilitate rule-making with wide participation,

“- achieve heightened enforcement through binding dispute settlement in a manner agreed by all, and

“- provide a strong mandate for a Secretariat to deliver all needed support to Members and to achieving the mission of the WTO.

“We should greet this year with optimism and re-dedication. With your strong engagement, 2021 can be a year to remember for what is achieved.

“Thank you.”

A presentation from the WTO Secretariat to Ministers needs to be positive, forward looking, aspirational and inspirational. DDG Wolff’s statement yesterday provides all of that. The first item mentioned, the joint pledge from 79 WTO Members not to restrict agricultural exports to the UN World Food Programme for humanitarian purposes is a positive for the world but follows the December failure of the WTO General Council to agree to the same by all WTO Members. See January 23, 2021, WTO and the World Food Programme – action by 79 Members after a failed December effort at the General Council, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/23/wto-and-the-world-food-programme-action-by-79-members-after-a-failed-december-effort-at-the-general-council/.

The challenge for the WTO in 2021 will be whether Members can come together in fact to achieve many of the important opportunities and needs in front of the Membership. While the history of the WTO since 1995 and the major divisions among Members at the present time would strongly suggest that 2021 will not achieve many of the things that are needed and possible, hope springs eternal.

U.S. perspective

The Trump Administration did an excellent job of identifying problems with the operation of the WTO whether from the longstanding failures of the dispute settlement system, to the existential challenges to the viability of the WTO from major Members whose economies have not converged to a full market orientation, to the out-of-date rules around special and differential treatment to all who claim developing country status regardless of economic development of individual members, to the need for greater transparency in many areas, including importantly subsidies, to the failure of the WTO to update rules to address changing technology and trade issues.

The Biden Administration has indicated its intention to work within multilateral institutions, including the WTO. Early action by the United States on the Director-General selection issue could provide positive energy to WTO Members in the coming months. There are topics where success can be made in 2021 either multilaterally or plurilaterally. But a lot of what is needed for meaningful WTO reform will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in the short term. Hopefully, the Biden team will stay the course to achieve reform that both returns the WTO playing field to the level agreed at the time of concluding the Uruguay Round, finds ways to deal with the massive distortions not presently covered by WTO rules, works with others to bring the WTO into the 21st century and addresses the critical issues for global prosperity and sustainable development.

Child labor and forced labor in cotton production — is there a current WTO mandate to identify and quantify the distortive effects?

Terence P. Stewart · January 25, 2021 · forced labor and child labor · Amb. Dennis Shea, Argentina, Azerbaizan, Brazil, China, cotton, Egypt, India, Kyrgyz Republic, Mali, Pakistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United States, Uzbekistan, Zambia · No Comments

In yesterday’s post (January 24), I reviewed the continued widespread human rights issue of child labor and forced labor in the production of a wide range of products (agricultural, manufactured, mined products) in many countries around the world. Such actions raise trade concerns by distorting the costs of production of products made with such labor and hence potentially skewing trade flows towards producers “benefitting” from the use of such labor. See January 24, 2021: Forced labor and child labor – a continued major distortion in international trade for some products, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/24/forced-labor-and-child-labor-a-continued-major-distortion-in-international-trade-for-some-products/. In the United States, imports of products made with such labor are supposed to be banned. I had concluded by arguing that the WTO should develop information that would help Members understand the quantity of products that are made with child or forced labor and permit Members to then decide what actions were needed to eliminate or offset such practices.

I received a comment on yesterday’s post from Amb. Dennis Shea, the Former Deputy United States Trade Representative and Chief of Mission on international trade issues in Geneva and the Permanent Representative of the U.S. to the WTO (2017-January 2021). Amb. Shea’s comment focused on cotton. He said, “The WTO’s Committee on Agriculture in Special Session (COA-SS) and its Cotton Subcommittee are charged with examining all trade-distorting policies affecting the cotton sector in order to discharge its mandate properly. It seems to me that the COA-SS and Cotton Subcommittee should examine recent reports of widespread forced labor in the picking of cotton in the Xinjiang Province of China. It is my understanding that Xinjiang accounts for nearly 20 percent of global cotton exports, so it’s probably not a stretch to say that forced labor practices there (horrific from a human rights standpoint) are also distorting global cotton prices.”

While cotton is but one of many products believed to be produced by child and/or forced labor, it is an important product globally. The fact that there may be an existing WTO mechanism for developing the relevant information is potentially important.

In yesterday’s post, I had referenced an upcoming WITA virtual webinar, The U.S. Moves Against Forced Labor in Xinjiang, being held this Wednesday, January 27. One of the speakers at the event is Dr. Adrian Zenz, Senior Fellow in China Studies, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, Washington, D.C. One of the papers referenced in a recent WITA note is by Dr. Zenz for the Center for Global Policy entitled “Coercive Labor in Xinjiang: Labor Transfer and the Mobilization of Ethnic Minorities to Pick Cotton” (December 2020), https://cgpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/20201214-PB-China-Zenz-1-3.pdf. The paper confirms that Xinjiang produces 20% of global cotton and nearly 84.9% of all cotton produced in China. Id. at 3. The Executive Summary of the paper states in part (page 3) —

“The evidence shows that in 2018, three Uyghur regions alone mobilized at least 570,000 persons into cotton-picking operations through the government’s coercive labor training and transfer scheme. Xinjiang’s total labor transfer of ethnic minorities into cotton picking likely exceeds that figure by several hundred thousand.

“Despite increased mechanization, cotton picking in Xinjiang continues to rely strongly on manual labor. In 2019, about 70 percent of the region’s cotton fields had to be picked by hand – especially the high-quality
long-staple cotton predominantly grown in southern Xinjiang’s Uyghur regions, where mechanized picking shares are low. State policies have greatly increased the numbers of local ethnic minority pickers, reducing
reliance on outside Han Chinese migrant laborers. The intensive two- to three-month period of cotton picking represents a strategic opportunity to boost rural incomes, and therefore plays a key role in achieving the state’s poverty alleviation targets. These targets are mainly achieved through coercive labor transfers.

“Cotton picking is grueling and typically poorly paid work. Labor transfers involve coercive mobilization
through local work teams, transfers of pickers in tightly supervised groups, and intrusive on-site surveillance by government officials and (in at least some cases) police officers. Government supervision teams monitor pickers, checking that they have a “stable” state of mind, and administer political indoctrination sessions. Some regions put Uyghur children and elderly persons into centralized care while working-age adults
are away on state-assigned cotton-picking work assignments. While not directly related to the campaign of mass internment, these labor transfers can include persons who have been released from internment camps.

“The data presented in this report provides strong evidence that the production of the majority of Xinjiang’s cotton involves a coercive, state-run program targeting ethnic minority groups.”

China is not the only country where the U.S. Department of Labor has identified production of cotton is likely done with child labor, forced labor or child labor and forced labor. See USDOL, 2020 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, September 2020, https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/child_labor_reports/tda2019/2020_TVPRA_List_Online_Final.pdf. Indeed many of the world’s largest cotton producers are listed in the report as likely producing cotton with child labor, forced labor or both child labor and forced labor:

Child labor: Argentina, Azerbaizan, Brazil, Egypt, India, Kyrgyz Republic, Mali, Turkey, Zambia.

Forced labor: Pakistan, Uzbekistan

Child labor and forced labor: China, India (cottonseed), Turkmenistan.

In the past there has been one WTO dispute on subsidies to cotton producers in the United States. See UNITED STATES – SUBSIDIES ON UPLAND COTTON, WT/DS267 (case brought by Brazil). I have been unable to find information on the WTO webpage that indicates the question of child or forced labor as a subsidy or other form of nontariff barrier has ever been examined at the WTO whether on cotton or more broadly.

For the last seventeen years, there has been concern about distortions to the cotton trade and the harm to countries for which cotton is a major export product. The breakout of cotton occurred at the request of the so-called Cotton Four — Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali. See Cotton, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/cotton_e.htm.

“Cotton is discussed at the WTO on two tracks: 1) the trade reforms needed to address subsidies and high trade barriers for cotton, and 2) the assistance provided to the cotton sector in developing countries.

“The trade aspects of cotton are handled by the Committee on Agriculture in Special Session including through dedicated discussions on trade in cotton. The development assistance aspects of cotton are discussed in the meetings of the ‘Director-General’s Consultative Framework Mechanism on Cotton’.

“These various tracks of discussion have been developed over the years as a response to a series of proposals to address the sector tabled by four African countries — Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali — known as the Cotton Four or C4.”

While WTO Members are supposed to be reporting information on various categories of data (including domestic support) on cotton and on non-tariff barriers affecting trade in cotton, the latest WTO Secretariat compilation of information does not indicate that Members were asked about or provided information on the benefits to domestic cotton production from child labor and/or forced labor. See COTTON — BACKGROUND PAPER BY THE SECRETARIAT, TN/AG/GEN/34/Rev.13, TN/AG/SCC/GEN/13/Rev.13, 2 November 2020 (and Add.1 and Add.2); COTTON — MINISTERIAL DECISION OF 7 DECEMBER 2013, WT/MIN(13)/41, WT/L/916, 11 December 2013 (“3. In this context, we therefore undertake to enhance transparency and monitoring in relation to the trade-related aspects of cotton. To this end, we agree to hold a dedicated discussion on a biannual basis in the context of the Committee on Agriculture in Special Session to examine relevant trade-related developments across the three pillars of Market Access, Domestic Support and Export Competition in relation to cotton. 4. The dedicated discussions shall be undertaken on the basis of factual information and data compiled by the WTO Secretariat from Members’ notifications, complemented, as appropriate, by relevant information provided by Members to the WTO Secretariat. 5. The dedicated discussions shall in particular consider all forms of export subsidies for cotton and all export measures with equivalent effect, domestic support for cotton and tariff measures and non-tariff measures applied to cotton exports from LDCs in markets of interest to them.”); COTTON — MINISTERIAL DECISION OF 19 DECEMBER 2015, WT/MIN(15)/46, WT/L/981, 21 December 2015. The background paper (without addenda) is embedded below.

TNAGGEN34R13

Thus, there is an existing forum for developing information on all distortions to the cotton market. Yet, to date, the WTO subcommittee on Cotton is not examining the widespread issue of child labor and forced labor as part of its information gathering. This is unfortunate but could be addressed if there is a will to in fact flag all distortions.

There can be arguments pro and con on whether all child labor and forced labor constitutes actionable subsidies under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. While I believe that the practices identified as being used in Xinjiang constitute actionable subsidies (government action which provides inputs (labor) at rates lower than market), there can be no doubt that the failure of governments to eliminate child labor and forced labor distorts competition between those obtaining products through the use of such labor and others who are not using such labor. The use of child labor and forced labor are universally condemned and supposed to be eliminated by 2025 (child labor) or 2030 (forced labor) pursuant to the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

The WTO can and should develop the factual basis for an understanding of the trade distortions flowing from child labor and forced labor. The existence of a current program at the WTO on cotton to develop information on all forms of subsidies and all forms of non-tariff barriers is a good place to start the exercise. My thanks to Amb. Shea for flagging the potential existing vehicles within the WTO to address at least cotton.