Indonesia

The folly of self-selection as a developing country at the WTO

· November 15, 2021 · self-selection as developing country · , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , · No Comments

In prior posts I have reviewed efforts by the United States and others to have the WTO membership modify who is entitled to special and differential treatment in light of the rapid changes in economic capabilities of a number of countries who have classified themselves as “developing” countries at the WTO under the self-designation approach that has characterized the GATT and now the WTO. See, e.g., December 14, 2020:  WTO December 14th Heads of Delegation meeting – parting comments of U.S. Ambassador Dennis Shea, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/12/14/wto-december-14th-heads-of-delegation-meeting-parting-comments-of-u-s-ambassador-dennis-shea/; August 13, 2020 [updated August 27]:  The race to become the next WTO Director-General – where candidates are on important issues:  eligibility for special and differential treatment/self selection as a developing country, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/08/13/the-race-to-become-the-next-wto-director-general-where-candidates-are-on-important-issues-eligibility-for-special-and-differential-treatment-self-selection-as-a-developing-country/; February 15, 2020: The U.S. Modifies the List of Developing and Least Developed Countries Under U.S. Countervailing Duty Law, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/02/15/the-u-s-modifies-the-list-of-developing-and-least-developed-countries-under-u-s-countervailing-duty-law/; December 28, 2019: WTO Reform – Will Limits on Who Enjoys Special and Differential Treatment Be Achieved?, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2019/12/28/wto-reform-will-limits-on-who-enjoys-special-and-differential-treatment-be-achieved/.

The issue is one of importance because of the concern that many Members who have economically advanced to be fully internationally competitive or internationally competitive in significant areas of goods or services are not opening their markets to a level commensurate with their actual stage of development. A number of Members have indicated that they will not seek Special and Differential treatment in new agreements while maintaining rights under existing ones. The U.S., the EU and others have sought a more factual basis for any entitlement to differential treatment.

On November 10, 2021, Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala addressed the WTO Committee on Trade and Development (“CTD”) See WTO News Release, “Development issues should be at the heart of work at the WTO“— DG Okonjo-Iweala, 10 November 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/devel_10nov21_e.htm. The press release starts with an overview of the importance of development in the overall WTO mission,

“Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala highlighted the key role that trade plays in economic development during a meeting of the WTO’s Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) on 10 November. She stressed that development is a priority for the WTO and that the CTD plays an important role in addressing the development dimension in the multilateral trading system.

“DG Okonjo-Iweala stressed that the work of the WTO is important for developing and least  developed countries (LDCs),  hence, it is critical for the WTO to deliver on issues of importance to them. Trade is a significant driver for economic growth and poverty reduction and ultimately for development, she added.”

The press release later has a statement that “The Secretariat presented the findings of its latest report concerning the participation of developing economies in global trade.” The latest report is PARTICIPATION OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM, NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT, 28 October 2021, WT/COMTD/W/262.

The problem with the note from the Secretariat and the functioning of the Committee on Trade and Development and other aspects of the WTO work is that developing countries in the note is treated as all Members so designating themselves and hence provides little useful information on the role of countries in actual need of assistance. Data in the note is skewed by information on developing Asia — an area that includes China, Singapore, the Republic of Korea and Chinese Taipei (Taiwan). On pages 8-9 of the Secretariat note, the major “developing” country traders are reviewed. The top 15 developing country exporters in 2020 were Chins (34.0%), Republic of Korea (6.7%), Mexico (5.5%), Singapore (4.8%), Chinese Taipei (4.6%), United Arab Emirates (4.2%), Viet Nam (3.7%), India (3.6%), Malaysia (3.1%), Thailand (3.0%), Brazil (2.8%), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (2.3%), Turkey (2.2%), Indonesia (2.1%), South Africa (1.1%), other (16.4%). The top 15 importer developing countries included all of the top exporters with the exception of South Africa (Hong Kong, China was the 15th largest importer).

The World Bank provides Gross National Income per capita for most countries/territories (China blocks provision of data for Chinese Taipei). The latest data are for 2020 and include the following ranges for the four categories of World Bank countries:

Low income countries, less than $1,048/capita GNI

lower middle-income economies, $1,048-4,095/capita GNI

upper middle-income economies, $4,096-12,695/capita GNI

high income economies, $12,696 or more/capita GNI.

China in 2020 had a per capita GNI of $10,610; Singapore had a 2020 per capita GNI of $54,920; Republic of Korea had a 2020 per capita GNI of $32,860; Chinese Taipei had a per capita GDP in 2021 of $33,402; Mexico had a 2020 per capita GNI of 8,480; the United Arab Republic had a 2019 per capita GNI of $43,470; the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had a 2020 per capita GNI of $21,930; Hong Kong, China, had a 2020 per capita GNI of $48,630; Thailand had a 2020 per capita GNI of $7,050; Malaysia had a 2020 per capita GNI of $11,230; Turkey had a 2020 per capita GNI of $9,030; Brazil had a 2020 per capita GNI of $7,850.

See New World Bank country classifications by income level: 2021-2022, July 1, 2021, https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/new-world-bank-country-classifications-income-level-2021-2022; World Bank Country and Lending Groups, ← Country Classification, https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups; GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) – China, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=CN (lists all countries); Wikipedia, Economy of Taiwan, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Taiwan.

There is obviously no justification in high income economies receiving special and differential treatment as though they are developing countries in fact. Thus, data for Singapore, Korea, Hong Kong, UAE, Saudi Arabia shouldn’t be in the developing country data base. Similarly, China and Malaysia with per capita GNIs above $10,000 and purchasing power parity gross national income per capita (2019) above the minimum high income economy threshold ($16,790 for China; $28,830 for Malaysia) shouldn’t be eligible for special and differential treatment as a general rule. Brazil, Thailand, Turkey and Mexico while below $10,000 per capita GNI in 2020 have 2019 per capita purchasing power parity GNI higher than the high income economy threshold ($14,890 for Brazil; $26,840 for Mexico; $18,570 for Thailand; $27,660). There is no apparent logic in having these countries have automatic rights to special and differential treatment.

The Secretariat, of course, cannot change the classification of Members. But the lack of a rational standard for determining appropriateness of receiving special and differential treatment undermines the functioning of the WTO and permits countries who have succeeded at rapid economic development from assuming full obligations of WTO membership. The problem also results in statistical reports that are largely meaningless.

In a consensus based system like the WTO, the road to rationality will be long at best with many WTO Members who should have accepted full obligations by now continuing to hide behind the self-selection process to claim lesser obligations.

The APEC 2021 Ministerial Meeting Joint Statement — portion relevant to WTO 12th Ministerial Meeting

· November 10, 2021 · 12th Ministerial Conference, APEC · , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , · No Comments

The APEC 2021 Ministerial meeting was held remotely on November 8-9 and resulted in a joint statement which included ambitions of APECs 21 members for the upcoming 12th WTO Ministerial Conference which starts in Geneva at the end of November (November 30-December 3). New Zealand has chaired APEC in 2021. Because the APEC countries include members accounting for 38% of the world’s population, 62% of the world’s GDP and 48% of global trade in 2020 and includes both the United States and China among the 21 territories, what APEC members support for the upcoming WTO ministerial may offer a glimpse of what may be possible in Geneva in the coming weeks. The APEC Ministerial Meeting Joint Statement and a publication on APEC in Numbers can be found here. See 2021 APEC Ministerial Meeting Joint Statement, Wellington, New Zealand, 09 November 2021, https://www.apec.org/meeting-papers/annual-ministerial-meetings/2021/2021-apec-ministerial-meeting; APEC in Charts 2021, https://www.apec.org/docs/default-source/publications/2021/11/apec-in-charts-2021/221_psu_apec-in-charts-2021.pdf?sfvrsn=50537c36_2. APEC members include Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, China, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, United States, and Viet Nam.

While the Declaration contains coverage of a number of issues, it has a separate section on the World Trade Organization (pages 4-5, paras. 17-22). The six paragraphs from the Joint Statement are copied below.

“World Trade Organization

“17. APEC takes pride in its long history of active support for the rules-based multilateral trading system (MTS), with the WTO at its core. The MTS has been a catalyst for our region’s extraordinary growth and we will work together to improve it. We seek a responsive, relevant, and revitalised WTO. We must support the WTO and its membership to modernise trade rules for the twenty-first century. Together, we will engage constructively and cooperate to ensure the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12) is a success and delivers concrete results.

“18. As a priority for MC12, we see an opportunity for the WTO to demonstrate that the MTS can continue to help address the human catastrophe of the COVID-19 pandemic and facilitate recovery. We call for pragmatic and effective ministerial outcomes that makes it easier to respond swiftly and effectively to the COVID-19 pandemic and accelerate the recovery. Our priorities include supporting the facilitation of manufacturing, distribution, and supply chains of essential medical goods, including vaccines. We will work proactively and urgently in Geneva to support text-based discussions, including on a temporary waiver of certain intellectual property protections on COVID-19 vaccines.

“19. We reiterate our determination to negotiate effective disciplines on harmful fisheries subsidies in line with SDG 14.6, and call for agreement to a comprehensive and meaningful outcome by MC12 in a few weeks’ time.

“20. Despite its importance for ensuring global food security and sustainable economic development, agriculture is one of the most protected sectors in global trade. We recognise the need for a meaningful outcome on agriculture at MC12, reflecting our collective interests and sensitivities, with a view towards achieving substantial progressive reductions in support and protection, as envisaged in the continuation of the reform process provided in Article 20 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and existing mandates.

“21. We recognise the positive role that existing plurilateral negotiations and discussions are playing in progressing outcomes. APEC member participants in the relevant Joint Statement Initiatives (JSIs) call for conclusion of negotiations on services domestic regulation by MC12; and substantial progress by MC12 in the JSIs on e-commerce; micro, small and medium-sized enterprises; and investment facilitation for development. We take note of the efforts by the APEC economies who endorsed the Joint Declaration on Trade and Women’s Economic Empowerment to deliver an ambitious outcome at MC12 that supports the advancement of trade and gender equality.

“22, We continued our frank and constructive discussions regarding improvement to the WTO’s monitoring, negotiating and dispute settlement functions. We continue to support the ongoing and necessary reform work to improve the WTO’s functioning, including the importance of making progress on enhancing transparency to support its monitoring and negotiating functions. We will work together at the WTO and with the wider WTO membership to advance the proper functioning of the WTO’s negotiation and dispute settlement functions, which require addressing longstanding issues. We urge WTO members to seek a shared understanding of the types of reform needed.”

The Joint Statement has some specific items where outcomes are pursued — conclusion of the fisheries subsidies negotiations, some outcomes in the Joint Statement Initiatives (services domestic regulation should be completed; micro, small and medium-sized enterprises is completed; progress on others). As reviewed in yesterday’s post, WTO Members still have a challenging road to achieve a completed fisheries subsidies agreement at the 12th Ministerial. See November 9, 2021:  WTO Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations — a second revised text from November 8 holds out hope for a deal by MC12; how realistic is the hope?, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/11/09/wto-fisheries-subsidies-negotiations-a-second-revised-text-from-november-8-holds-out-hope-for-a-deal-by-mc12-how-realistic-is-the-hope/. Moreover, India, South Africa and others are raising objections to having any plurilaterals being negotiated included in the WTO which will complicate what comes out of the 12th Ministerial Conference (as opposed to encouraging Members to pursue plurilaterals outside of the WTO). See February 20, 2021:  Will India and South Africa (and others) prevent future relevance of the WTO?, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/02/20/will-india-and-south-africa-and-others-prevent-future-relevance-of-the-wto/; September 18, 2021: The WTO’s 12th Ministerial Conference in Late November – early December 2021 — the struggle for relevance, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/09/18/the-wtos-12th-ministerial-conference-in-late-november-early-december-2021-the-struggle-for-relevance/.

The Joint Statement also seeks “pragmatic and effective” outcomes in the health and trade space to address responding to the COVID pandemic. Specifics are lacking although there is support to expanding production and access to vaccines and other medical goods. While supporting text based negotiations in the area, including on a possible temporary waiver of some TRIPS provisions on COVID vaccines, the lack of greater specificity reflects differences in positions of APEC members.

Similarly, while supporting WTO reform in all three areas of WTO activity (monitoring, negotiating and dispute settlement), APEC members have significantly different views on what is needed in these areas. Hence only general language is included in the Joint Statement.

In a prior post, I have opined that recent actions by the U.S. and EU to find ways around the civil aircaraft and steel and aluminum frictions suggests that the U.S. may agree to the start of a process to review the dispute settlement system issues raised by it as part of the 12th Ministerial (a high EU priority) and that the U.S. and EU could coalesce around an outcome acceptable to both in the TRIPS waiver dispute. See November 2, 2021:  What does the U.S.-EU Agreement on steel and aluminum imply for the upcoming 12th WTO Ministerial Conference?, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/11/02/what-does-the-u-s-eu-agreement-on-steel-and-aluminum-imply-for-the-upcoming-12th-wto-ministerial-conference/.

China has opposed greater transparency obligations and has tied reform of industrial subsidies to looking at agricultural subsidies as well. A recent post of mine reviews the need for better information on subsidies. See October 30, 2021:  WTO reform — distortions to market access and the need for better information, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/10/30/wto-reform-distortions-to-market-access-and-the-need-for-better-information/. Despite differences of view on some issues among major Members, it is not out of the question that a reform program will cover an examination of all three functions going forward.

On agriculture, there is a shared view for a need for results at the WTO 12th Ministerial and reflects on the fact that Article 20 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture calls for periodic rounds of liberalization. However, the language of the Joint Statement doesn’t specify the areas where agreement is possible by the 12th Ministerial, reflecting different views among APEC members.

Nothing in the APEC Joint Statement addressed what, if anything should be agreed at the 12th WTO Ministerial on the climate crisis and what role trade can play in addressing the crisis. This omission is unfortunate but likely reflects large differences in views within APEC members on the topic. As I reviewed in a recent post, much more is needed but unlikely to come from the WTO and its members. See November 4, 2021:  The WTO and the environment — will the 2020s be different in terms of trade policies that are environmentally supportive?, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/11/04/the-wto-and-the-environment-will-the-2020s-be-different-in-terms-of-trade-policies-that-are-environmentally-supportive/.

Conclusion

The APEC 2021 Ministerial Meeting Joint Statement, being released three weeks before the start of the WTO’s 12th Ministerial Conference is a positive statement of support for the multilateral trading system. Coming from a group of WTO Members accounting for nearly 50% of global trade, it is a useful guide for topics these countries and territories will be pursuing in Geneva. Other group statements have been released as well as individual country or group objectives. But even within the APEC group of countries, large differences exist on outcomes of interest. With the exception of a possible conclusion to the fisheries subsidies negotiations and conclusions on several Joint Statement Initiatives, there may be only limited positive outcomes. There may be some limited agreement on the broad topic of health and trade and some agreement on topics for future negotiation. There may also be at least some provisions in a declaration dealing with the climate crisis and the important role trade can play in addressing the crisis.

Such a limited set of outcomes will likely be viewed as a success for an organization hamstrung by Members with no common vision for the role of the organization, with large differences in development levels, a cumbersome governance system and growing divergence on whether the organization can support global trade where market rules are not the required framework. More is needed for a truly relevant WTO and for a sustainable global trading system. The world is unlikely to achieve meaningful reform at the WTO in the coming decade. Progress, if any, will likely be slow and piecemeal.

WTO reduces transparency of Trade Policy Reviews — what is the possible justification?

· October 20, 2021 · Trade Policy Reviews · , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , · No Comments

Through September 2021, when a country went through a Trade Policy Review, a large amount of material was made available to the public at the time of the TPR meeting with additional information (minutes, questions and answers, corrections to Secretariat report and/or government report) released a number of months later. The WTO press releases at the time of the TPR meeting were similar. The one for Singapore from 22 and 24 September 2021 is typical.

As can be seen from the press release, the public could access the full report of the Secretariat, the full report of the Government of Singapore, the concluding comments of the Chairperson as well as an Executive Summary of the Secretariat report at the time of the two day meeting to review the reports. Moreover, minutes from the meeting were available to the public typically about six weeks after the meeting as were the written questions and written answers.

Beginning in October, the press release has been modified and far less information is made available immediately to the public. There have been two TPRs so far in October, the Republic of Korea (13 and 15 October) and China (20 and 22 October). A TPR of the Russian Federation is scheduled for next week.

The WTO press release for the Republic of Korea is copied below. The current one for China is similar.

All that is made available to the public at the time of the meeting is a short executive summary of the Secretariat report and the concluding remarks of the Chairperson. No reference is made to how to access the full report of the Secretariat or the Government (here Republic of Korea), nor is there an indication as to when minutes or written questions and written answers will be available.

There is nothing on the WTO webpage which describes why so little information is being provided beginning this month on new Trade Policy Reviews. For the public, the drastic reduction in transparency makes the WTO operations even less understandable.

If the WTO will be releasing all of the documents it has historically but with significant time delays on all documents, what is the justification? For 25 years, TPRs have been conducted with the type of information released that gave the public a good understanding of the Secretariat’s and the government’s review of its trade policy. That understanding has been timely, consistent with the meeting and supplemented within several months with minutes and the written questions and answers.

If the WTO is not intending on releasing all of the documents it has historically released, what is the possible justification?

China, which is going through a Trade Policy Review this week, also went through a TPR in 2018. In 2018, the Secretariat Report released to the public at the time of the TPR meeting was 193 pages (along with a summary of 6 pages). See WT/TPR/S/375. China’s Report on its trade policy was 23 pages. See WT/TPR/G/375. These documents are dated 6 June 2018. A revision to the Secretariat Report is dated 14 September 2018 and was also 193 pages ( WT/TPR/S/375/Rev.1). The Concluding remarks by the Chairperson are contained in a separate press release from the WTO at the time of the TPR meeting but linked from the main notice of the TPR. See WTO news, Trade Policy Review: China, 11 and 13 July 2018, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp475_e.htm linking to the concluding remarks of the Chairperson at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp475_crc_e.htm. The minutes of the meeting are contained in WT/TPR/M/375, 21 November 20218 and are 98 pages in length with statements from 66 Members (two on behalf of larger groups). The written questions and answers are contained in WT/TPR/M/375/Add.1, dated 1 February 2019 and being 729 pages in length. The WTO Members who submitted questions (including follow-up questions) are shown on pages 2-3 of the document.

Because the current TPR on China (20 and 22 October) does not provide either of the full reports (Secretariat and Government) and because there is no indication of when minutes or written questions and answers will be available, there is certainly delayed access and potentially denial of access of the same type of information on China (or any other country) that was been released in the past. This should be viewed as unacceptable by the WTO Secretariat and WTO Members and certainly should be so viewed by the public.

Conclusion

What is available to the public from a Trade Policy Review is critical for an understanding of concerns raised by WTO Members about any other Member’s trade policy as well as the level and openness of the response from the Member being reviewed. The Secretariat’s report is an important factual analysis of developments in the Member being reviewed. The recent curtailment of access to the full Secretariat Report and the full Government Report greatly harms transparency and the ability of the public to understand developments within WTO Members in a timely manner. Should the WTO cease to release any of the information heretofore available to the public in current and future TPRs, the WTO will be further damaging the public’s perception of the WTO and will be further retreating from openness and transparency towards the public..

USTR 2021 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers — areas of concern with a focus on China

· April 8, 2021 · U.S. 2021 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers · , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , · No Comments

Every year for the last 36 years, USTR releases a National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. This year’s forward provides a little background on the report. See USTR, 2021 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, page 1, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2021/2021NTE.pdf.

“The 2021 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE) is the 36th in an annual series that highlights significant foreign barriers to U.S. exports, U.S. foreign direct investment, and U.S. electronic commerce. This document is a companion piece to the President’s 2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report, published by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in March.

“In accordance with section 181 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by section 303 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 and amended by section 1304 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, section 311 of the Uruguay Round Trade Agreements Act, and section 1202 of the Internet Tax Freedom Act, USTR is required to submit to the President, the Senate Finance Committee, and appropriate committees in the House of Representatives, an annual report on significant foreign trade barriers. The statute requires an inventory of the most important foreign barriers affecting U.S. exports of goods and services, including agricultural commodities and U.S. intellectual property; foreign direct investment by U.S. persons, especially if such investment has implications for trade in goods or services; and U.S. electronic commerce. Such an inventory enhances awareness of these trade restrictions, facilitates U.S. negotiations aimed at reducing or eliminating these barriers, and is a valuable tool in enforcing U.S. trade laws and strengthening the rules-based system.”

This year’s report covers 65 countries or country groups, so not all trading partners are covered by the annual report. China has the largest section of the report for an individual country (36 pages) while the European Union (covering 27 countries) has the largest section overall (52 pages). Other important trading partners with significant sections in the report include India (24 pages), Russian Federation (20 pages), Japan (18 pages), Indonesia (16 pages), Republic of Korea (14 pages), Brazil (14 pages), Vietnam (14 pages). the USMCA partners had smaller sections — Canada (8 pages) and Mexico (12 pages). the countries covered account for nearly 100 percent of U.S. trade in goods and nearly 90% of U.S. services trade.

The USTR press release from March 31, 2021 (majority of release copied below) provides an outline of some of the major areas of concern. See USTR, Ambassador Tai releases 2021 National Trade Estimate Report, March 31, 2021, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/march/ambassador-tai-releases-2021-national-trade-estimate-report.

“Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports in 65 Trading Partners Detailed

“WASHINGTON – United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai today released the 2021 National Trade Estimate (NTE) Report, providing a detailed inventory of significant foreign barriers to U.S. exports of goods and services, investment, and electronic commerce.

“’The President’s Trade Agenda released earlier this month outlined a clear vision for supporting America’s working families by promoting a fair international trading system that boosts inclusive economic growth,’” said Ambassador Tai. ‘The 2021 NTE Report identifies a range of important challenges and priorities to guide the Biden Administration’s effort to craft trade policy that reflects America’s values and builds back better.’

“Published annually since 1985, the NTE Report is a comprehensive review of significant foreign trade barriers affecting U.S. exports of goods and services. The 570-page report examines 65 trading partners and country groups, including the U.S.’ largest trading partners, all 20 U.S. FTA partners, and other economies and country groupings of interest such as the Arab League, the United Kingdom (included as a separate entity for the first time in this report), and the European Union. Together, these economies account for 99 percent of U.S. goods trade and 87 percent of U.S. services trade. 

“The NTE Report covers significant trade barriers in 11 areas, including (1) import policies such as tariffs, import licensing and customs barriers; (2) technical barriers to trade; (3) sanitary and phytosanitary measures; (4) subsidies; (5) government procurement; (6) intellectual property protection; (7) services barriers; (8) barriers to digital trade and electronic commerce; (9) investment barriers; (10) competition; and (11) other barriers. 

“Taken as a whole, the NTE Report highlights significant barriers that present major policy challenges with implications for future U.S. growth opportunities, and the fairness of the global economy. Examples of these significant obstacles include: 

“Agricultural Trade Barriers:  The NTE Report details an array of tariff and nontariff barriers to U.S. agricultural exports across trading partners and regions, ranging from non-science-based regulatory measures, opaque approval processes for products of agricultural biotechnology, burdensome import licensing and certification requirements, and restrictions on the ability of U.S. producers to use the common names of the products that they produce and export. USTR will continue to engage foreign governments on barriers that hamper the ability of U.S. farmers, ranchers and food processors to access markets worldwide. 

“Digital Trade:  The 2021 NTE Report details restrictive data policies in India, China, Korea, Vietnam, and Turkey, among other countries; local software pre-installation requirements in Russia, Indonesian tariffs on digital products, and existing or proposed local content requirements for online streaming services in Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, EU, Mexico, Ukraine, and Vietnam; and discriminatory tax measures in Austria, India, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the UK. USTR will continue to engage foreign governments on digital policies that threaten the regulatory landscape for U.S. exporters of digital products and services and undermine U.S. manufacturers’ and service suppliers’ ability to move data across borders. 

“Excess Capacity:  China’s state-led approach to the economy and trade makes it the world’s leading offender in creating non-economic capacity, as evidenced by the severe and persistent excess capacity situations in several industries, including steel, aluminum, and solar, among others. China also is well on its way to creating severe excess capacity in other industries through its pursuit of industrial plans such as Made in China 2025, pursuant to which the Chinese government is doling out hundreds of billions of dollars to support Chinese companies and requiring them to achieve preset targets for domestic market share–at the expense of imports–and global market share in several advanced manufacturing industries. USTR will continue its bilateral and multilateral efforts to address these harmful trade practices.

“Technical Barriers to Trade:   Technical regulations or conformity assessment procedures that unnecessarily restrict trade or curb the movement of innovative products risk lost opportunities to capitalize on America’s leadership in science and high-tech manufacturing, services, and agriculture. The NTE Report’s many examples of this challenge range from non-transparent European Union chemical regulations to Chinese Information Technology cybersecurity and encryption standards, to Indian and Brazilian testing and certification rules for telecommunications equipment, to technology. 

“The United States is taking steps to address these issues, and encourage flexible regulatory approaches and transparent, open processes, with these and many other partners. Within APEC, for example, the United States is engaged in projects on cybersecurity and blockchain to identify key public policy issues, and has projects in development on aerial drones and 3D printing. Another key example is USTR’s bilateral and multilateral work on standards and regulations related to electric cars, to ensure that vehicles from different manufacturers can all be charged reliably.

“The NTE Report details thousands of individual barriers to specific manufactured goods, farm products, and services. Each can reduce U.S. opportunities to export, invent, support jobs, and raise wages and incomes. These range from Argentina’s imposition of quota limits on imported books in September 2020 to India’s 38.8 percent average tariff on agricultural goods; the anomalous technical standards Saudi Arabia applies to shoes and electronic equipment; Ecuador’s mandatory and cumbersome process for allocating import licenses for agriculture products such as meats and dairy products; Indonesian local content requirements across a broad range of sectors; and Russian bans on imported food.”

What the NTE has to say about China 

The United States has for many years raised multiple concerns with China’s practices which the U.S. views as distorting trade flows and impeding market access to China. While the U.S. and China have engaged bilaterally extensively since China’s WTO accession and the U.S. has pursued several dozen disputes against Chinese practices that were clearly contrary to WTO obligations of China, little overall progress has been made in resolving the wide array of Chinese government distortions created and maintained over the years. These distortions contribute to the extraordinary trade deficit the United States has with China. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, MONTHLY U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES, FEBRUARY 2021, April 7, 2021, https://www.bea.gov/news/2021/us-international-trade-goods-and-services-february-2021 (U.S. trade deficit in 2020 in goods with China was $310.2 billion; U.S. trade surplus in services was $22.1 billion; U.S. deficit in goods with China increased to $50.9 billion in the January – February 2021 period versus $42.1 billion in the first two months of 2020).

The Trump Administration pursued a 301 investigation on a number of intellectual property concerns with China, conducted Section 232 national security investigations on steel and aluminum — two sectors where Chinese actions have created massive global excess capacity — and negotiated with China the U.S.-China Phase I Agreement which took effect in mid-February 2020. The Agreement both addressed a number of problems in agriculture, intellectual property and services and committed China to expanded purchases of goods and services from the United States in 2021-2022 (and going forward). The NTE reviews where Chinese commitments under the Phase I Agreement apply and what progress is being seen. On the purchase commitments, China has not come close to meeting the commitments in 2021 though there were increased imports from the U.S. of agricultural products and energy products. See, e.g., March 20, 2021, The U.S.-China Phase 1 Trade Agreement under the Biden Administration, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/20/the-u-s-china-phase-1-trade-agreement-under-the-biden-administration/. The U.S. has a long history of China promising reforms that are either not carried out or are undermined by additional restrictions. The list of areas of concern making it into the annual NTE is not exhaustive but illustrative of the challenges to obtaining conditions of fair trade with the world’s most populous nation and second largest economy.

Areas of concern for the United States with China shown in the 2021 NTE include:

Tariffs (there are some high agricultural tariffs, and the large tariffs imposed in retaliation to U.S. Section 232 actions on steel and aluminum and U.S. Section 301 actions for Chinese practices reviewed in the investigation).

Non-tariff barriers include

  • Industrial Policies (such as “Made in China 2025” and described generally as follows, “China continues to pursue a wide array of industrial policies that seek to limit market access for imported goods, foreign manufacturers, and foreign services suppliers, while offering substantial government guidance, resources, and regulatory support to Chinese industries. The beneficiaries of these constantly evolving policies are not only state-owned enterprises (SOEs) but also other domestic companies attempting to move up the economic value chain.),
  • State-Owned Enterprises (a number of concerns are raised including “China has also previously indicated that it would consider adopting the principle of ‘competitive neutrality’ for SOEs. However, China has continued to pursue policies that further enshrine the dominant role of the state and its industrial plans when it comes to the operation of state-owned and state-invested enterprises.”),
  • Industrial Subsidies (massive subsidies to industries creating excess capacity and causing harm to U.S. producers globally; U.S. is working with the EU and Japan on possible amendments to Subsidies Agreement to address certain aspects not effectively handled under existing rules)
  • Fisheries Subsidies (size of subsidies by China to its industry),
  • Excess Capacity (problem created in many sectors including steel, aluminum, solar panels and others through state programs, subsidies, etc.),
  • Indigenous Innovation (including preferences for IP developed in China),
  • Technology Transfer (301 investigation looked at “(1) the use of a variety of tools to require or pressure the transfer of technologies and IP to Chinese companies; (2) depriving U.S. companies of the ability to set market based terms in technology licensing negotiations with Chinese companies; (3) intervention in markets by directing or unfairly facilitating the acquisition of U.S. companies and assets by Chinese companies to obtain cutting-edge technologies and IP; and, (4) conducting or supporting cyber-enabled theft and unauthorized intrusions into U.S. commercial computer networks for commercial gains.”)
  • Investment Restrictions (different systems for domestic and foreign investment; discriminatory treatment),
  • Administrative Licensing (problems continue to be experienced in a wide array of licensing situations)
  • Standards (ability of foreign companies to participate in establishing; development of Chinese standards regardless of international standards),
  • Secure and Controllable ICT Policies (cybersecurity law used to discriminate against foreign ICT prducts),
  • Encryption (“Onerous requirements on the use of encryption, including intrusive approval processes and, in many cases, mandatory use of indigenous encryption algorithms (e.g., for WiFi and 4G cellular products), continue to be cited by stakeholders as a significant trade barrier.”),
  • Competition Policy (“Many U.S. companies have cited selective enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law against foreign companies seeking to do business in China as a major concern, and they have highlighted the limited enforcement of this law against SOEs.” “Instead, these remedies seem to be designed to further industrial policy goals. Another concern relates to the procedural fairness of Anti-monopoly Law investigations of foreign companies. U.S. industry has expressed concern about insufficient predictability, fairness, and transparency in Antimonopoly Law investigative processes.”),
  • Pharmaceuticals (some long standing issues addressed in U.S.-China Phase I Agreement; others to be addressed in the future),
  • Medical devices (China’s “pricing and tendering procedures for medical devices and its discriminatory treatment of imported medical devices”),
  • Cosmetics (“concerns with China’s regulation of cosmetics.” “Despite years of United States engagement with China via the JCCT, the International Cooperation on Cosmetics Regulation, and other fora to share views and expertise regarding the regulation of cosmetics, as of March 2021 China has not yet addressed key U.S. trade concerns, including basic concerns such as the need to use international standards to facilitate cosmetics conformity assessment, nor has it provided assurances that U.S. intellectual property will be protected.”),
  • Export restraints (need to bring multiple cases at WTO on inputs where violate Protocol of Accession),
  • Value-added Tax Rebates and Related Policies (modifications of rates to change trade flows),
  • Import Ban on Remanufactured Products
  • Import Ban on Recyclable Materials
  • Trade Remedies (problems in transparency and procedural fairness; problems also in apparent use of trade remedies to go after trading partners who use WTO rights against Chinese products),
  • Government Procurement (failure to join the WTO GPA yet),
  • Corporate Social Credit System (“Foreign companies are concerned that the corporate social credit system will also be used by the Chinese Government to pressure them to act in accordance with relevant Chinese industrial policies or otherwise to make investments or conduct their business operations in ways that run counter to market principles or their own business strategies. Foreign companies are also concerned about the opaque nature of the corporate social credit system.”),
  • Other Non-Tariff Measures (“Key areas include China’s labor laws, laws governing land use in China, commercial dispute resolution and the treatment of non-governmental organizations. Corruption among Chinese Government officials, enabled in part by China’s incomplete adoption of the rule of law, is also a key concern.”).

Intellectual Property Protection (many issues were included in the U.S.-China Phase I Agreement, some progress on issues raised).

  • Trade Secrets (major area of concern and theft, some believed from government-supported entities; some improvements from U.S.-China Phase I Agreement),
  • Bad Faith Trademark Registration (a continuing major concern; some progress in U.S.-China Phase I Agreement),
  • Online Infringement (“Online piracy continues on a large scale in China, affecting a wide range of industries, including those involved in distributing legitimate music, motion pictures, books and journals, software, and video games.” Some progress made in the U.S.-China Phase I Agreement),
  • Counterfeit Goods (a major problem. “The Phase One Agreement requires China to take effective enforcement action against counterfeit pharmaceuticals and related products, including active pharmaceutical ingredients, and to significantly increase actions to stop the manufacture and distribution of counterfeits with significant health or safety risks. The Phase One Agreement also requires China to provide that its judicial authorities shall order the forfeiture and destruction of pirated and counterfeit goods, along with the materials and implements predominantly used in their manufacture. In addition, the Agreement requires China to significantly increase the number of enforcement actions at physical markets in China and against goods that are exported or in transit. It further requires China to ensure, through third party audits, that government agencies and SOEs only use licensed software.”).

Agriculture (“China remains a difficult and unpredictable market for U.S. agricultural exporters, largely because of
inconsistent enforcement of regulations and selective intervention in the market by China’s regulatory authorities. The failure of China’s regulators to routinely follow science-based, international standards, and guidelines further complicates and impedes agricultural trade. The Phase One Agreement addresses structural barriers to trade and aims to support a dramatic expansion of U.S. food, agriculture, and seafood product exports, which will increase U.S. farm and fishery income, generate more rural economic activity, and promote job growth. The Phase One Agreement addresses a multitude of non-tariff barriers to U.S. agriculture and seafood products, including for meat and meat
products, poultry, seafood, rice, dairy, infant formula, horticultural products, animal feed and feed additives, pet food, and products of agricultural biotechnology. The Agreement also includes enforceable commitments requiring China to purchase and import on average at least $40 billion of U.S. agricultural and seafood products per year in 2021 and 2022, representing an average annual increase of at least $16 billion over 2017 levels. China also agreed that it will strive to purchase and import an additional $5 billion of U.S. agricultural and seafood products each year.”).

  • Agricultural Domestic Support (China exceeds the limits allowed it; WTO dispute confirms China in violation of WTO obligations; U.S. seeking authorization to retaliate),
  • Tariff-rate Quota Administration (U.S. challenged China’s administration of TRQs on various products and won WTO dispute; U.S.-China Phase I Agreement requires China to comply on the products of concern),
  • Agricultural Biotechnology Approvals (China’s system has been a major problem for U.S. producers. U.S>-China Phase I Agreement includes commitments by China to address the major concerns of the U.S. in this area),
  • Food Safety Law (China’s actions have been quite burdensome and have failed to provide notices to the WTO in many cases. U.S>-China Phase I Agreement addresses the main concerns),
  • Poultry (China restricted U.S. exports after avian influenza in the U.S. and maintained restrictions despite actions by the U.S. that complied with World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) guidelines. U.S.-China Phase I Agreement has China committing to follow OIE guidelines and limiting restrictions to the region where there is a problem in future outbreaks),
  • Beef (“In the Phase One Agreement, China agreed to expand the scope of U.S. beef products allowed to be imported, to eliminate age restrictions on cattle slaughtered for export to China, and to recognize the U.S. beef and beef products’ traceability system. China also agreed to establish MRLs for three synthetic hormones legally used for decades in the United States consistent with Codex standards and guidelines. Where Codex standards and guidelines do not yet exist, China agreed to use MRLs established by other countries that have performed science-based risk assessments.”),
  • Pork (“China bans the use of certain veterinary drugs and growth promotants instead of accepting the MRLs set by Codex.” Some progress on opening the China market to U.S. pork products was made in the U.S.-China Phase I Agreement),
  • Horticultural Products (market access barriers for many U.S. products. U.S.-China Phase I Agreement obtains access for a number of products — fresh potatoes for processing, blueberries, nectarines and avocados from California, and barley, timothy hay and some other products.),
  • Value-added Tax Rebates and Related Policies (practice of varying rates on agricultural commodities).

Services (“In 2020, numerous challenges persisted in a number of services sectors. As in past years, Chinese regulators
continued to use discriminatory regulatory processes, informal bans on entry and expansion, case-by-case approvals in some services sectors, overly burdensome licensing and operating requirements, and other means to frustrate the efforts of U.S. suppliers of services to achieve their full market potential in China. These policies and practices affect U.S. service suppliers across a wide range of sectors, including express delivery, cloud computing, telecommunications, film production and distribution, online video and entertainment software, and legal services. In addition, China’s Cybersecurity Law and related draft and final implementing measures include mandates to purchase domestic ICT products and services, restrictions on cross-border data flows, and requirements to store and process data locally. China’s draft Personal Information Protection Law also includes restrictions on cross-border data flows and requirements to store and process data locally. These types of data restrictions undermine U.S. services suppliers’ ability to take advantage of market access opportunities in China. China also had failed to fully address U.S. concerns in
areas that have been the subject of WTO dispute settlement, including electronic payment services and theatrical film importation and distribution. The Phase One Agreement addresses a number of longstanding trade and investment barriers to U.S. providers of a wide range of financial services, including banking, insurance, securities, asset management, credit rating, and electronic payment services, among others. The barriers addressed in that Agreement
include joint venture requirements, foreign equity limitations, and various discriminatory regulatory requirements. Removal of these barriers should allow U.S. financial service providers to compete on a more level playing field and expand their services export offerings in the China market.”)

  • Banking Services (U.S.-China Phase I Agreement addresses some concerns re access including bank branches and supplying securities investment fund custody services),
  • Securities, Asset Management, and Futures Services (U.S.-China Phase I Agreement resulted in China eliminating limits on equity ownership and commits to nondiscrimination for U.S. suppliers of these services),
  • Insurance Services (despite commitments by China as part of the U.S.-China Phase I Agreement, U.S. participation in China’s insurance market remains very limited),
  • Electronic Payment Services (China has restricted access to foreign electronic payment services providers. U.S. won a WTO dispute and included provisions in U.S.-China Phase I Agreement. So far just one foreign electronic payment services provider has been licensed in China),
  • Internet-enabled Payment Services (major problems for foreign companies to obtain license to provide such services),
  • Telecommunications Services (range of barriers have limited foreign suppliers access to both basic telecom services and to value added services),
  • Internet Regulatory Regime (“China’s Internet regulatory regime is restrictive and non-transparent, affecting a broad range of commercial services activities conducted via the Internet, and is overseen by multiple agencies without clear lines of jurisdiction. China’s Internet economy had boomed over the past decade and is second in size only to that of the United States. Growth in China has been marked in service sectors similar to those found in the United States, including retail websites, search engines, online education, travel, advertising, audio-visual and computer gaming services, electronic mail and text, online job searches, Internet consulting, mapping services, applications, web domain registration, and electronic trading. However, in the Chinese market, Chinese companies dominate due in large part to restrictions imposed on foreign companies by the Chinese Government. At the same time, foreign companies continue to encounter major difficulties in attempting to offer these and other Internet-based services on a cross-border basis. China continues to engage in extensive blocking of legitimate websites and apps, imposing significant costs on both suppliers and users of web-based services and products. According to the latest data, China currently blocks a significant portion of the largest global sites. U.S. industry research has calculated that more than 10,000 foreign sites are blocked, affecting billions of dollars in business, including communications, networking, app stores, news, and other sites. Even when sites are not permanently blocked, the often arbitrary implementation of blocking, and the performance-degrading effect of filtering all traffic into and outside of China, significantly impair the supply of many cross-border services, often to the point of making them unviable.”),
  • Voice-over-Internet Protocol Services (“China’s regulatory authorities have restricted the ability to offer VOIP services interconnected to the public switched telecommunications network (i.e., to call a traditional phone number) to basic telecommunications service licensees.”),
  • Cloud Computing Services (foreign service providers can only operate in China by using a Chinese company and turning over brand, IP and other aspects; serious concern for U.S.),
  • Audio-visual and Related Services (“China prohibits retransmission of foreign TV channels, prohibits foreign investment in TV production, prohibits foreign investment in TV stations and channels in China, and imposes quotas on the amount of foreign programming that can be shown on a Chinese TV channel each day.”),
  • Theatrical Films (despite a WTO dispute and a resulting MOU where China agreed to expand number of U.S. films, China has not fulfilled its commitments)
  • Online Video and Entertainment Software Services (foreign suppliers are severely restricted),
  • Legal Services (very limited ability for foreign firms or foreign lawyers to practice in China)
  • Express Delivery Services (foreign service providers are banned from document delivery and face discriminatory and burdensome actions on package participation),
  • Data Restrictions (activities in China are likely to result in local storage requirements and limits on cross-border transfer; major concern to U.S. and many other countries).

Transparency (much work needed by China to meet obligations)

  • Publication of Trade-related Measures (WTO obligation to publish in one journal; spotty performance and many types of measures not published in the journal),
  • Notice-and-comment Procedures (little progress at sub-central government level; some progress at central government; U.S.-China Phase I Agreement commits China to provide 45 days notice and comment period for matters relating to the Agreement),
  • Translations (WTO commitment to provide translations in one of the three official WTO languages. “China does not publish translations of trade-related laws and administrative regulations in a timely manner (i.e., before implementation), nor does it publish any translations of trade-related measures issued by sub-central governments at all.”).

Conclusion

While the U.S. was the first country to produce a national trade estimate, a number of countries do so today. All trading partners have some practices which concern other trading partners, including the United States.

The length of the entry in the NTE for a give country is a reasonable indication both of the importance of the trade relationship and of the breadth of issues of concern. For the United States, the National Trade Estimate is a useful compilation of many of the major concerns raised by industries about problems in access to markets abroad or distortions created by practices of trading partners. Typically items found in the NTE will be part of USTR’s focus during the year in interactions with particular trading partners.

China is the country with the longest entry in the NTE and has been for many years. Considering the array of distortions and other problems identified in this year’s NTE, the focus on China is not surprising.

Some of the problems identified in this year’s NTE with China could be addressed through WTO reform, though China has indicated opposition to such an approach. On some of the issues, the U.S. has received repeated promises from China to address but without meaningful results to date.

What is clear is that U.S. trade relations with China are not balanced and haven’t been for the entire time of WTO membership for China. The challenge for the U.S. and the world is how to restore balance and save the global trading system. There are no obvious answers.

U.S. Section 301 investigations on digital services taxes by trading partners — USTR seeks public comment on proposed tariffs in six of ten investigations and terminates investigations on Brazil, the Czech Republic, the European Union and Indonesia

· March 27, 2021 · Digital services tax · , , , , , , , , , , , · No Comments

While the Biden Administration is looking to develop agreed international taxation rules for digital services through the OECD/G20 Integrated Framework process, on Friday, March 26, 2021, USTR Katherine Tai announced next steps to maintain options while negotiations at the OECD continue. See USTR, USTR Announces Next Steps of Section 301 Digital Services Taxes Investigations, March 26, 2021, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/march/ustr-announces-next-steps-section-301-digital-services-taxes-investigations. Part of the press release is copied below.

“Six countries remain subject to potential action while broader international tax negotiations continue

“WASHINGTON – The United States Trade Representative (USTR) today announced the next steps in its Section 301 investigations of Digital Service Taxes (DSTs) adopted or under consideration by ten U.S. trading partners.  In January, USTR found that the DSTs adopted by Austria, India, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom were subject to action under Section 301 because they discriminated against U.S. digital companies, were inconsistent with principles of international taxation, and burdened U.S. companies.  USTR is proceeding with the public notice and comment process on possible trade actions to preserve procedural options before the conclusion of the statutory one-year time period for completing the investigations.
  
“’The United States is committed to working with its trading partners to resolve its concerns with digital services taxes, and to addressing broader issues of international taxation,’ said Ambassador Katherine Tai.  ‘The United States remains committed to reaching an international consensus through the OECD process on international tax issues.  However, until such a consensus is reached, we will maintain our options under the Section 301 process, including, if necessary, the imposition of tariffs.’

“The remaining four jurisdictions – Brazil, the Czech Republic, the European Union, and Indonesia – have not adopted or not implemented the DSTs under consideration when the investigations were initiated.  Accordingly, USTR is terminating these four investigations without further proceedings.  If any of these jurisdictions proceeds to adopt or implement a DST, USTR may initiate new investigations.” 

In prior posts, I have reviewed the investigations and reports released on the six investigations and on the French investigation which was completed earlier but where tariffs were postponed in mid-January 2021. See January 15, 2021, U.S. Section 301 investigations on digital services taxes by trading partners – USTR releases additional reports on January 14, 2021, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/15/u-s-section-301-investigations-on-digital-service-taxes-by-trading-partners-ustr-releases-additional-reports-on-january-14-2021/ (release of reports on Austria, Spain and the United Kingdom); January 8, 2021, U.S. Section 301 investigations on digital service taxes by trading partners – an update, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/08/u-s-section-301-investigations-on-digital-service-taxes-by-trading-partners-an-update/ (release of reports on India, Italy and Turkey); June 3, 2020, Digital Services Taxes – New U.S. Section 301 Investigations on Nine Countries and the European Union, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/06/03/digital-services-taxes-new-u-s-section-301-investigations-on-nine-countries-and-the-european-union/

Yesterday’s USTR press release included links to the Federal Register notices that will appear presumably next week. Each notice provides a timeline for written comments and a virtual hearing as well as the proposed list of products that could be imposed.

For example, the Federal Register notice on Austria states that “In particular, USTR proposes to impose additional tariffs of up to 25 percent ad valorem on an aggregate level of trade that would collect duties on goods of Austria in the range of the amount of the DST that Austria is expected to collect from U.S. companies. Initial estimates indicate that the value of the DST payable by U.S.-based company groups to Austria will be up to approximately $45 million per year. USTR further proposes that the goods of Austria subject to additional tariffs would be drawn from the preliminary list of products in the Annex to this notice, as
specified by the listed eight-digit tariff subheadings.” Similar language appears in each of the notices with the estimated taxes on U.S. digital services estimated at $55 million per year for India, $140 million for Italy, $155 million for Spain, $160 million for Turkey, $325 million for the United Kingdom. At an ad valorem additional duty of 25%, this means that if there is not a resolution to the issues at the OECD, duties could be applied by the U.S. on $180 million of goods from Austria, $220 million from India, $560 million from Italy, $620 million from Spain, $640 million from Turkey and $1.3 billion from the United Kingdom. Products listed in the Annex are the products from which USTR is proposing the U.S. would choose for additional duties.

All Federal Register notices seek comments on a range of issues. The language from the Turkey notice is copied below and is similar to that in each of the other five Federal Register notices.

“III. Request for Public Comments

“In accordance with section 304(b) of the Trade Act (19 U.S.C. 2414(b)), USTR invites comments from interested persons with respect to whether action is appropriate, and if so, the appropriate action to be taken.

“USTR requests comments with respect to any issue related to the action to be taken in this investigation. With respect to the proposed tariff action outline above, USTR specifically invites comments regarding:

“• The level of the burden or restriction on U.S. commerce resulting from Turkey’s DST, including the amount of DST payments owed by U.S. companies, the annual growth rate of such payments, and other effects, such as compliance costs.

“• The appropriate aggregate level of trade to be covered by additional duties.

“• The level of the increase, if any, in the rate of duty.

“• The specific products to be subject to increased duties, including whether the tariff subheadings listed in the Annex should be retained or removed, or whether tariff subheadings not currently on the list should be added.

“In commenting on the inclusion or removal of particular products on the preliminary list of products subject to the proposed additional duties, USTR requests that commenters address specifically whether imposing increased duties on a particular product would be practicable or effective to obtain the elimination of Turkey’s acts, policies, and practices, and whether imposing additional duties on a particular product would cause disproportionate economic harm to U.S. interests, including small- or medium-size businesses and consumers.

“Simultaneously with this notice, USTR also is requesting public comments on proposed trade actions in five other DST investigations initiated at the same time as the Turkey DST investigation. Certain interested persons may wish to provide written comments or oral testimony on multi-jurisdictional issues common to two or more investigations. To avoid duplication, the USTR portal will have a separate docket for multi-jurisdictional submissions, and USTR will hold a separate multi-jurisdictional hearing.

“To be assured of consideration, you must submit written comments on the proposed action by April 30, 2021, and post-hearing rebuttal comments by May 10, 2021 for the multi-jurisdictional hearing, and by May 14, 2021 for the Turkey DST hearing.”

All six notices provide the dates for requesting to appear, for submitting comments and for the hearing. The dates from the notices are copied below.

Austria notice

DATES:
April 21, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit requests to appear at a hearing, along with a summary of the testimony, by this date.

April 30, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit written comments by this date.

May 3, 2021: Multi-jurisdictional virtual hearing on proposed actions.

May 10, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit multi-jurisdictional hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

May 11, 2021 at 9:30 am: Virtual hearing on Austria DST proposed action.

May 18, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit Austria DST hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

India notice

DATES:
April 21, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit requests to appear at a hearing, along with a summary of the testimony, by this date.

April 30, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit written comments by this date.

May 3, 2021: Multi-jurisdictional virtual hearing on proposed actions.

May 10, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit multi-jurisdictional hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

May 10, 2021 at 9:30 am: Virtual hearing on India DST proposed action.

May 17, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit India DST hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

Italy notice

DATES:
April 21, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit requests to appear at a hearing, along with a summary of the testimony, by this date.

April 30, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit written comments by this date.

May 3, 2021: Multi-jurisdictional virtual hearing on proposed actions.

May 5, 2021 at 9:30 am: Virtual hearing on Italy DST proposed action.

May 10, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit multi-jurisdictional hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

May 12, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit Italy DST hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

Spain notice

DATES:
April 21, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit requests to appear at a hearing, along with a summary of the testimony, by this date.

April 30, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit written comments by this date.

May 3, 2021: Multi-jurisdictional virtual hearing on proposed actions.

May 6, 2021 at 9:30 a.: Virtual hearing on Spain DST proposed action.

May 10, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit multi-jurisdictional hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

May 13, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit Spain DST hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

Turkey notice

DATES:
April 21, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit requests to appear at a hearing, along with a summary of the testimony, by this date.

April 30, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit written comments by this date.

May 3, 2021: Multi-jurisdictional virtual hearing on proposed actions.

May 7, 2021 at 9:30 am: Virtual hearing on Turkey DST proposed action.

May 10, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit multi-jurisdictional hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

May 14, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit Turkey DST hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

United Kingdom notice

DATES:
April 21, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit requests to appear at a hearing, along with a summary of the testimony, by this date.

April 30, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit written comments by this date.

May 3, 2021: Multi-jurisdictional virtual hearing on proposed actions.

May 4, 2021 at 9:30 a.m.: Virtual hearing on the United Kingdom DST proposed action.

May 10, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit multi-jurisdictional hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

May 11, 2021: To be assured of consideration, submit the United Kingdom DST hearing rebuttal comments by this date.

The Federal Register notices issued by USTR on the six countries and the notice on terminating 301 investigations on Brazil, Czech Republic, European Union and Indonesia are embedded below and will appear in the Federal Register in the next week or so.

FRNAustria

FRNIndia

FRNItaly

FRNSpain

FRNTurkey

FRNUK

FRNDSTterminations

Conclusion

The Biden Administration has rejoined the effort to find an acceptable solution to the digital services tax issue within the OECD/G20 Integrated Framework and has reportedly made a major concession to facilitate movement in the talks. See Wall Street Journal, Yellen Removes Obstacle to Global Corporate-Tax Deal, February 26, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/yellen-removes-obstacle-to-global-corporate-tax-deal-11614363591 (“Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said Friday that the U.S. would no longer insist on a “safe harbor” under which some elements of the tax rules would be optional. The idea, proposed in late 2019 by her predecessor, Steven Mnuchin, drew objections from European counterparts, though talks on how it would work never advanced very far.”).

At the same time, the U.S. has been and remains concerned about what it views as efforts by major trading partners to impose discriminatory taxes on major U.S. digital services companies. There were many U.S. Senators who expresssed deep concerns with the practices of trading partners in this area during Ambassador Tai’s confirmation hearing to become USTR. The action taken yesterday by USTR reflects the willingness of the Biden Administration to be prepared to impose tariffs on products from selected countries where investigations have resulted in previously released reports that identified significant problems under U.S. law. At the same time, USTR has made clear that the Administration’s preferred approach is through the OECD/G20 Integrated Framework process. And USTR has terminated the remaining four investigations where reports were not released.

All of the above indicate that the U.S. will put primary focus on the ongoing OECD negotiations while preserving options under U.S. law on investigations that had proceeded to a determination by holding public hearings and considering potential products on which to impose additional tariffs. USTR’s actions should generally be acceptable to the U.S. Congress while also letting the OECD negotiations play out in the coming months while preserving options if a negotiated outcome proves illusive.

Global vaccinations for COVID-19 — continued supply chain and production issues and a new wave of infections in many countries delay greater ramp up for some until late in the second quarter of 2021

· March 25, 2021 · COVID-19 vaccinations · , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , · No Comments

The world has witnessed the unprecedented development of a number of vaccines in record time to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic. The development has been the result of widespread cooperation in sharing information and the funding in part by governments and early orders for hundreds of millions of doses if vaccines proved efficacious and safe. In roughly one year since the virus was declared a pandemic by the WHO, individual vaccines have been produced and authorized by one or more governments (some by as many as 70 along with WHO approval).

According to the Financial Times COVID-19 vaccine tracker, as of March 25, nearly 490 million vaccine shots have been administered around the world (based on data from 166 locations). See Financial Times, Covid-19 vaccine tracker: the global race to vaccinate, 25 March 2021, https://ig.ft.com/coronavirus-vaccine-tracker/?areas=gbr&areas=isr&areas=usa&areas=eue&cumulative=1&populationAdjusted=1. The companies with approved vaccines have been ramping up production at their own and at licensed facilities in other countries. Because companies are racing to put in place 3-4 times the global capacity for all vaccines (3.5 billion doses) to produce COVID-19 vaccines (10-14 billion doses by the end of 2021) and because there are complex supply chains and production processes for the new vaccines, there have been various delays which have occurred both at manufacturers and at suppliers. This has been true in the U.S., in the EU, in India and other producing countries. While countries and producers are working on solutions, shortages of certain materials exist and can reduce production of finished vaccines globally.

While the WHO, GAVI, CEPI and UNICEF have set up COVAX to get vaccines to a total of 192 countries, including 92 low- and middle-income countries where materials will be supplied at discounted prices or for free and have a target of two billion doses to participating countries in 2021, there is an early reliance on AstraZeneca’s vaccine whether produced by AstraZeneca or through license by the Serum Institute (SII) in India, the world’s largest vaccine producer.

Unfortunately, many countries are going through a new wave of COVID-19 infections which puts pressure on governments to secure sufficient supplies to address domestic demand. See, e.g., European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, COVID-19 situation update worldwide, as of week 11, updated 25 March 2021, https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases (shows total new reported infections going up globally for the fourth week after a sharp decline after New Year’s). Countries showing large numbers of cases over the last two weeks (whether increases or decreases) include Ethiopia (21,227), Kenya (12,083), Libya (12,852), South Africa (17,646), Argentina (91,023), Brazil (995,861), Canada (48,021), Chile (77,561), Colombia (63,417), Ecuador (18,223), Mexico (66,683), Paraguay (26,252), Peru (98,323), United States (830,346), Uruguay (19,512), Bangladesh (19,938), India (416,683), Indonesia (80,522), Iran (119,383), Iraq (67,344), Jordan (109,594), Lebanon (43,964), Pakistan (38,371), Philippines 969,382), United Arab Emirates (29,506), Austria (39,842), Belgium (50,670), Bulgaria (43,115), Czechia (142,042), Estonia (20211), France (378,370), Germany (162,032), Greece (32,005), Hungary (111,929), Italy (308,890), Moldova (19,82), Netherlands (83,797), Poland (272,046), Romania (70,295), Russian Federation (133,24), Serbia (65,689), Spain (67,833), Sweden (61,666), Turkey (232,705), Ukraine (147,456), United Kingdom (78,063). While many countries do not produce COVID-19 vaccines, the list of countries includes many in the EU as well as Brazil, the United States and India. Brazil’s production of COVID-19 vaccines is not expected to start until May. Below I review developments on vaccination roll-outs in the United States, the European Union and India.

Vaccination roll-out in the U.S., EU and India — three important COVID-19 vaccination production areas

Under the Biden Administration, the United States has drastically improved its performance on COVID-19 vaccinations with 129.3 million vaccinations given by March 24 and with the President announcing his Administration’s revised goal of 200 million shots in arms in his first 100 days in office (April 29). See Financial Times, Biden doubles vaccine goal to 200m in first 100 days, 25 March 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/a1accbdf-0010-426c-9442-feb73b5c8a1d. While the U.S. focus is on getting the U.S. population vaccinated as the first priority, the U.S. has agreed to “loan” 1.5 million doses of AstraZeneca’s vaccine to Canada and 2.5 million doses to Mexico. The U.S., following a leader’s remote meeting of the Quad (U.S., Japan, India, Australia), agreed to work with the other Quad partners to produce one billion doses in India of a vaccine by the end of 2022 from a U.S. company that would be paid for by Japan and the U.S. and would receive distribution support from Australia for countries in the Indo-Pacific region. See March 12, 2021, COVID-19 vaccines – U.S., Japan, India and Australia agree to one billion doses for Indo-Pacific countries, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/12/covid-19-vaccines-u-s-japan-india-and-australia-agree-to-one-billion-doses-for-indo-pacific-countries/.

The European Union, a major producing location for COVID-19 vaccines and various inputs and a major exporter, has had rollout problems flowing from production problems at AstraZeneca’s EU facilities, concerns by many EU members on whether the vaccine from AstraZeneca was safe (small number of blot clot problems in those vaccinated) and other issues. See New York Times, Where Europe Went Wrong in Its Vaccine Rollout, and Why, March 20, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/20/world/europe/europe-vaccine-rollout-astrazeneca.html; Financial Times, Nordic nations hold off on AstraZeneca jab as scientists probe safety, 21 March 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/0ef3a623-f3a2-4e76-afbd-94a915b24ad5. With vaccination rates in the EU far behind the U.K. and the U.S. and a number of other countries, this has led to significant internal pressures to ensure that manufacturers were honoring contracts with the EU and has led to two temporary regulations (and an extension) giving EU members authority to stop exports outside of the EU (and excluding the shipments to COVAX low-and middle-income countries). See March 5, 2021, COVID-19 vaccines — France supports Italy’s blockage of a shipment to Australia; while Australia has asked the EU to permit the shipment, Australia will have its own production of AstraZeneca product by the end of March, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/05/covid-19-vaccines-france-supports-italys-blockage-of-a-shipment-to-australia-while-australia-has-asked-the-eu-to-permit-the-shipment-australia-will-have-its-own-production-of-astrazeneca-produc/; European Commission, Commission strengthens transparency and authorisation mechanism for exports of COVID-19 vaccines, 24 March 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_1352; European Commission, 24.3.2021 C(2021) 2081 final COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) …/… of 24.3.2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_1352; European Commission, Commission extends transparency and authorisation mechanism for exports of COVID-19 vaccines, 11 March 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_1121. Australia had a shipment stopped by Italy and the EC has been raising concerns in the United Kingdom.

In recent days, Indian producer Serum Institute has notified a number of customers that their orders would be delayed several months. GAVI COVAX has been notified as well, with 40 million doses in April and 50 million in May apparently unlikely to ship. Press articles attribute the delays to the needs within India, though SII has suggested delays are also due to availability issues on certain inputs. The Indian government claims it is simply adjusting schedules in light of internal needs and is not imposing an export ban per se. See, e.g., BBC News, India coronavirus: Why have vaccine exports been suspended?, 25 March 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-55571793; Wall Street Journal, India Suspends Covid-19 Vaccine Exports to Focus on Domestic Immunization, March 25, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/india-suspends-covid-19-vaccine-exports-to-focus-on-domestic-immunization-11616690859#:~:text=An%20Indian%20government%20official%20said,of%20the%20government’s%20vaccine%20program.&text=On%20Tuesday%2C%20the%20government%20said,to%20those%20older%20than%2045; Times of India, India has not banned Covid-19 vaccine exports, 25 March 2021, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-has-not-banned-covid-19-vaccine-exports-sources/articleshow/81693010.cms.

Conclusion

Much of the anticipated ramp up of COVID-19 vaccine production will be happening over the coming months, such that there should be dramatically greater vaccine availability in the coming months. That doesn’t help governments or populations waiting for vaccines. or that are going through a significant ramp up in infections. The pharmaceutical industry and major groups got together earlier this month to explore where the bottlenecks are in ramping up production. See March 12, 2021, The 8-9 March  “Global C19 Vaccine Supply Chain and Manufacturing Summit”, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/12/the-8-9-march-global-c19-vaccine-supply-chain-and-manufacturing-summit-efforts-to-ramp-up-production/ It is unclear the extent to which governments and industry are working together to solve bottlenecks in supply, to facilitate production ramp up, share experiences in reusing safely some critical materials that are in short supply, etc. During these critical months, greater cooperation in solving problems and facilitating expansion of production is needed and hopefully is occurring. Export restrictions have and will occur under various guises, reflecting internal political pressures. In the coming months and certainly by the third quarter of 2021, there should be large volumes of vaccine doses above and beyond what has been contracted by COVAX that will be available for use around the world. Time is obviously of the essence. Cooperation to solve supply chain bottlenecks and speed ramp-ups is the best short term option for speeding getting past the pandemic globally.

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Seafood obtained from illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing — U.S. International Trade Commission report on estimated imports into the U.S.

· March 22, 2021 · Fisheries Subsidies negotiations, illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, Uncategorized · , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , · No Comments

For twenty years, Members of the World Trade Organization have been negotiating disciplines on fisheries subsidies to help curb illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing). Achieving an agreement is critical to meeting the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 14.6. See, e.g., WTO, WTO members hold February cluster of meetings for fisheries subsidies negotiations, 24 February 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/fish_24feb21_e.htm. The WTO Members had hoped to conclude negotiations in 2020 and are working to conclude the negotiations by the 12th Ministerial Conference, now scheduled for the week of November 29, 2021 in Geneva. See WTO, Twelfth Ministerial Conference to take place in Geneva in late 2021, 1 March 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/minis_01mar21_e.htm.

On December 19, 2019, the Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means and the Chairman of the Trade Subcommittee of Ways and Means submitted a letter to the U.S. International Trade Commission requesting an investigation into IUU fishing and its effects on the U.S. industry. The text of the request is copied below.

“We are writing today to request that the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) conduct an investigation of the potential economic effects on U.S. fishermen of competition with illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) seafood imports. IUU seafood includes products obtained in contravention of fisheries management regulations or in violation of labor laws. Trade in IUU seafood products includes not only IUU catch that is sent directly to end markets, but also IUU raw material inputs that are further processed into aquaculture feed or seafood products for human consumption.

“Up to 31 percent of the global catch of fish reportedly comes from IUU fishing, at an estimated value of more than $23 billion per year. IUU fishing contributes to the overexploitation of fish stocks, threatens the livelihoods of coastal communities, jeopardizes food security, and harms marine ecosystems. IUU fishing also creates unfair competition for U.S. fishermen as imports account for 90 percent of U.S. seafood consumption. China plays an enormous role in the global production and trade of seafood and is the largest seafood trade partner of the United States. China also has been ranked as worst among 152 coastal countries based on the prevalence of IUU fishing and the country’s response to it.

“To better understand the size, scope, supply chains, pricing pressures, and potential economic effects of this problem, we request that the US ITC conduct an investigation, and prepare a report, pursuant to section 332(g) of the Tariff Act of 1930. Based on available information, we request that the Commission’s report provide, to the extent practicable:

“• A review of the existing data and literature on the prevalence of IUU products in the U.S. import market, and an overview of international mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement to address IUU fishing;

“• A description of the size and structure of the U.S. commercial fishing industry;

“A description of major global producers of IUU products, including but not limited to China, and country practices related to IUU production and exports.

“• An analysis of the extent to which IUU product is imported into the United States, as well as major U.S. import sources and global supply chains of such products; and

“• A quantitative analysis of the economic impact of IUU imports on U.S. commercial fishermen and U.S. commercial fishing production, trade, and prices.

“We request that the Commission deliver the report by 12 months from the date of this letter. As we intend to make the report available to the public, we request that confidential business information not be included in the report. Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.

“Sincerely,

“Richard E. Neal, Chairman
“Earl Blumenauer, Chairman, Trade Subcommittee”

The U.S. International Trade Commission released its report,which is dated February 2021, last week. See USITC, Seafood Obtained via Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: U.S. Imports and Economic Impact on U.S. Commercial Fisheries, Inv. 332-575, Publ. 5168 (February 2021). The request letter is included in the report at Annex A.

On March 18, 2021 Chairmen Neal and Blumenauer released a statement including statements from Oceana and from the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). See U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means, NEAL, BLUMENAUER STATEMENT ON THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION’S REPORT “SEAFOOD OBTAINED VIA ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, AND UNREGULATED FISHING: U.S. IMPORTS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT ON U.S. COMMERCIAL FISHERIES”, March 18, 2021, https://waysandmeans.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/neal-blumenauer-statement-us-international-trade-commission-s-report. The press release is copied below.

“WASHINGTON, DC—Today, the U.S. International Trade Commission released their findings pursuant to a Tariff Act of 1930 section 332 investigation requested by Chairman Richard E. Neal (D-MA) and Trade Subcommittee Chairman Earl Blumenauer (D-OR) on the economic impact of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) seafood, including the use of forced labor, on the U.S. fishing industry.  The report found that the U.S. imported $2.4 billion worth of illegal seafood in 2019 and that addressing the illegal imports would create U.S. jobs, protect U.S. consumers and benefit U.S. fishers by an estimated $60.8 million.

“’Far too much illegal seafood is making its way onto our dinner plates and more must be done,’ said Chairman Neal. ‘By building on what we fought to include in USMCA, enhancing the tracing of our seafood supply chains, and cracking down on IUU fishing practices, we can better protect our oceans and ultimately give Americans the peace of mind that they are eating safe, legal seafood.’

“’When people go to the grocery store, they want to know that the seafood is safe and legally caught, responsibly sourced, and honestly labeled. Unfortunately, too much illegal seafood is currently making its way into the country, undermining our hardworking U.S. fishing industry and putting consumers at risk,’ Blumenauer said. ‘It’s clear that we need stronger enforcement standards to protect individuals, workers, and fishing habitats.’

“Chairman Neal and Trade Subcommittee Chairman Blumenauer are joined by Oceana and WWF in recognizing the study.

“’Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing not only wreaks havoc on fisheries and ocean wildlife, but also undermines domestic fishers and seafood consumers. The United States has advanced programs to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud, but it’s clear that more needs to be done. The U.S. must expand Seafood Import Monitoring Program to all seafood, trace fish from boat to plate and expand transparency of fishing to help stop IUU products from entering the U.S. and competing with legally sourced seafood,’ said Beth Lowell, Deputy Vice President of U.S. Campaigns at Oceana.

“Michele Kuruc, Vice President of Ocean Policy at WWF noted that, ‘this report reminds us that the ramifications of illegal fishing go far beyond the health of our oceans. It depletes our oceans, fuels labor and human rights abuses, and leaves our domestic producers at an economic disadvantage. People are harmed, economies are hurt, and our oceans and planet are in peril.   Eradicating illegal fishing requires a whole of government approach, as our current definitions, processes and efforts have far-reaching limitations. The good news is we have the tools, but they need to be strengthened to get the job done.  The U.S. needs to expand the species covered by our current monitoring program. We need to track all imported species, not just a small group, to truly tackle this issue and protect our oceans, foster economic growth and empower people who rely on oceans for food and income.’”

Thus, the U.S., despite having some provisions to address IUU fishing, still accounts via imports for an estimated 10% of global IUU fishing ($2.4 billion of an estimated $23 billion global total).

The USITC Report

The U.S. International Trade Commission report is 468 pages including Annexes. The report is embedded below.

ITC-report-on-illegal-fishing

While many countries have some part of their marine capture or imports from other countries that are IUU, the USITC report focuses on certain countries and identifies the types of practices that are considered to result in marine capture being considered IUU.

“There are many fishing practices that can constitute an IUU violation. Often, a vessel may fish in an area where it is not authorized. Vessels may also fish during seasons in which particular fishing grounds are closed. IUU fishing also includes harvesting in excess of quotas set by fishery management authorities or misreporting the volume of landings to those authorities. Fishing with disallowed gear types or methods, or in violation of environmental restrictions such as those concerning bycatch, also constitute IUU fishing. Labor violations that have been widely documented in segments of the fishing industry include forced labor, human trafficking, child labor, and physical abuse of workers on board fishing vessels.” USITC Publ. 5168 at 11-12.

Below are some tables from the report which show the estimated volume of IUU imports from major sources of seafood imports into the United States and then some detail on the basis of IUU fishing from a subset of those countries. The tables are taken from pages 114, 115, 463, 14 and 15 of the USITC report respectively.

The USITC report covers a lot of ground and reviews existing literature and studies and provides its methodology for both estimating the share of imports that are IUU as well as the modeling used to estimate economic effects on domestic industry. It is clear that many countries contribute to the IUU problem. Some countries including the U.S. and the EU have tools available to deal with IUU imports and that such tools are viewed as helpful but not totally fit for purpose based on limited scope, at least in the United States.

Interest in the issue from the U.S. Congress and a focus of the Biden Administration on addressing both environmental- and labor- related issues implies that the U.S. will likely be looking for ways to beef up enforcement of the import monitoring program on seafood.

While the report doesn’t address fisheries subsidies, the report should nonetheless be helpful to WTO Members engaged in the fisheries subsidies negotiations. The report adds dimension to the importance of WTO Members reaching an ambitious agreement on fisheries subsidies as the challenges of IUU fishing are not only environmental in nature but also go to fairness in competition.

The WTO Informal Ministerial of January 29, 2021 — hope for progress at the WTO in 2021

· January 30, 2021 · Appellate Body reform, COVID-19, electronic commerce and digital trade, Fisheries Subsidies negotiations, Selection of WTO Director-General, Special and Differential Treatment, WTO Informal Ministerial · , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , · No Comments

Switzerland typically hosts an informal ministerial meeting of WTO trade ministers on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum’s January Davos event. This year both were handled remotely.

The informal ministerial was summarized in ten points by the Swiss Confederation President Guy Parmelin at the end of the event. President Parmelin’s statement is available here, https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/65098.pdf, and is copied below.

“Virtual Informal WTO Ministerial Gathering, 29 January 2021

“Personal Concluding Remarks by the Chair, President of the Swiss Confederation and Head of the Federal Department for Economic Affairs, Education and Research, Guy Parmelin, Switzerland

“29 Ministers and high officials representing a broad spectrum of the WTO membership attended this year’s Informal World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Gathering in virtual format. In concluding and with warm thanks to all participants for their contributions, I would like to summarise the main points from our discussions as follows:

“• Ministers stressed the urgency of the swift appointment of a new WTO Director-General as well as the confirmation of the date and venue of the 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12).

“• Ministers reiterated their determination to maintain a credible multilateral trading system and to restore a climate of mutual trust.

“• Ministers expressed their concerns about the enormous social and economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis. They highlighted the relevance of trade and the role of the WTO in containing the pandemic and promoting recovery. Many Ministers underlined the importance of ensuring the development of as well as an equitable and affordable access to medical goods, including vaccines. They addressed ways and means to achieve these goals, including the implementation of measures facilitating trade, the role of intellectual property and transparency.

“• Ministers regretted that the negotiations on fisheries subsidies could not be completed in accordance with the end-2020 deadline foreseen in SDG 14.6. In light of the significance of this process for the sustainability of global fisheries, Ministers concurred that a comprehensive and effective agreement on fisheries subsidies should be concluded as soon as possible. Ministers agreed to step up efforts with a view to finding mutually acceptable solutions consistent with all the elements of the negotiating mandate.

“• Ministers highlighted the importance of restoring a fully functional WTO dispute settlement system, which is a key pillar of the rules-based multilateral trading system.

“• Many participants argued for further progress in agricultural trade policy reform at MC12 and asked for an outcome on domestic support and other issues. The issues of public stockholding and the special safeguard mechanism were highlighted by several Ministers.

“• Many Ministers called for tangible outcomes, by MC12, on the Joint Statement Initiatives. Inter alia finalizing the process on Services Domestic Regulation and making substantial progress on E-commerce and Investment Facilitation as well as on Trade and Women’s Economic Empowerment.

“• The need to reform the WTO was widely acknowledged. A number of Ministers insisted on advancing diverse issues related to the special and differential treatment of developing and least developed countries. Some participants proposed to adjust WTO rules to present-day economic and competitive conditions.

“• Several Ministers supported new initiatives launched in response to global challenges such as the structured discussions on Trade and Environmental Sustainability.

“• Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to engage in the preparations for MC12 in order to advance key issues.”

The participants at this year’s informal ministerial included officials from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chad (coordinator for LDC Group), Chile, China, Egypt, European Union, India, Indonesia, Jamaica (Coordinator ACP Group), Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Mauritius (Coordinator African Group), Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland (Chair), Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and three officials with WTO roles — H.E. Mr. David Walker (New Zealand), WTO General Council Chair; H.E. Mr. Santiago Wills (Colombia), WTO Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules, H.E. Mr. Alan Wolff, WTO Deputy Director-General. The full list with titles is embedded below.

List-of-participants-at-virtual-informal-ministerial-1-29-2021-65099

The good news for the informal ministerial was the position taken by the United States representative who reportedly indicated that the United States was actively reviewing the issue of the next Director-General and was intent on actively working on WTO reform. See, e.g., Inside U.S. Trade’s World Trade Online, Biden administration strikes ‘constructive’ tone in first word on WTO approach, January 29, 2021, https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/biden-administration-strikes-%E2%80%98constructive%E2%80%99-tone-first-word-wto-approach; Politico, Biden administration joins call for ‘swift appointment’ of new WTO head, January 29, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/29/biden-world-trade-organization-463820. Under the Trump Administration, the United States had blocked the formation of consensus around Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala based on the U.S. view that Dr. Okonjo-Iweala did not have a sufficient trade background. See, e.g., January 26, 2021, Letter from variety of former U.S. officials to President Biden urges U.S. support for Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala as next WTO Director General, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/26/letter-from-variety-of-former-u-s-officials-to-president-biden-urges-u-s-support-for-dr-ngozi-okonjo-iweala-as-next-wto-director-general/. Hopefully, the current review of the issue by the Biden Administration, even ahead of President Biden’s trade team being confirmed by the U.S. Senate, will result in the U.S. joining the support for Dr. Okonjo-Iweala, permitting the WTO to approve a next Director-General.

It was also reported that the United States, consistent with the Biden Administration’s focus on the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change, expressed interest in promoting recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and concluding an ambitious fisheries subsidies agreement. See Inside U.S. Trade’s World Trade Online, Biden administration strikes ‘constructive’ tone in first word on WTO approach, January 29, 2021, https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/biden-administration-strikes-%E2%80%98constructive%E2%80%99-tone-first-word-wto-approach. Fisheries subsidies negotiations have been going on for some twenty years, and many Members have remained more concerned with keeping their subsidies in place than agreeing to disciplines that would create conditions for sustainable fishing going forward. The Interest in the Biden Administration in working within the WTO on joint steps to promote recovery from the pandemic is different from the approach pursued by the Trump Administration which didn’t want to look at actions possible within the WTO (other than limits on export restraints on agricultural goods) while the world was dealing with the pandemic. The U.S. statement should mean more interest in exploring issues like those raised by the Ottawa Group. See November 27, 2020, The Ottawa Group’s November 23 communication and draft elements of a trade and health initiative, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/11/27/the-ottawa-groups-november-23-communication-and-draft-elements-of-a-trade-and-health-initiative/.

Other issues flagged in the Swiss President’s concluding remarks are issues of particular interest to some or many countries but not topics of clear agreement. For example, while it is likely that the United States will look for ways to resolve its concerns about longstanding problems in the WTO’s dispute settlement system, particularly around the Appellate Body, it is unlikely that there will be a swift resolution of the U.S. concerns, and hence there will likely be a continued impasse for at least much of 2021 on the return of a functioning two-stage dispute settlement system.

Similarly on domestic support in agriculture and other agriculture issues flagged, certain WTO Members have not supported further liberalization in agriculture while pushing for limits on domestic subsidies and rollback of liberalization commitments undertaken in the Uruguay Round. It is unlikely that there will be forward movement on these issues without greater balance in terms of tariff reductions on major agricultural products. Moreover, as noted in a recent post, other major distortions in agriculture that are not presently identified as domestic subsidies include widespread use of child and forced labor on many agricultural products. See January 25, 2021, Child labor and forced labor in cotton production — is there a current WTO mandate to identify and quantify the distortive effects?, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/25/child-labor-and-forced-labor-in-cotton-production-is-there-a-current-wto-mandate-to-identify-and-quantify-the-distortive-effects/; January 24, 2021, Forced labor and child labor – a continued major distortion in international trade for some products, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/24/forced-labor-and-child-labor-a-continued-major-distortion-in-international-trade-for-some-products/. Such practices should be quantified and the level of potential distortion identified so WTO Members can decide how to address them in ongoing agriculture negotiations.

Progress is being made on Joint Statement Initiatives including e-commerce, services domestic regulation, investment facilitation and women’s empowerment. An open issue for these and topics in the sphere of trade and the environment (e.g., environmental goods agreement) is whether benefits provided by participants will be made available on an MFN basis or limited to participants, with the option of other Members to join in the future. See January 18, 2021, Revisiting the need for MFN treatment for sectoral agreements among the willing, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/18/revisiting-the-need-for-mfn-treatment-for-sectoral-agreements-among-the-willing/. For many Members liberalization could be speeded up if benefits in sectoral agreements go to those participating only while leaving the door open for other Members to join later when they see the value for them.

And on the important topic of WTO reform beyond the items listed above, there is little current agreement on how to deal with industrial subsidies and other practices that lead to massive global excess capacity, or on how to address access to special and differential treatment and many other areas of importance to some or many WTO Members.

Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff provided a statement during the virtual informal ministerial urging WTO Members to make 2021 a year of accomplishments. The WTO press release can be found here. WTO News, DDG Wolff urges WTO ministers to address the pandemic and make 2021 a year of action, 29 January 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/igo_29jan21_e.htm. DDG Wolff’s statement is copied below.

“My thanks to our Swiss hosts and to President Parmelin both for his remarks today and for his very thoughtful address on the occasion of the 25th anniversary celebration of the WTO last November.

“Ministers, you can make 2021 a year of substantial accomplishments at the WTO.

“There has already been a beginning.  In the first action of the year, Members accounting for most of the world’s agricultural exports committed to refrain from imposing export restrictions on purchases made by the World Food Program.

“The anticipated appointment of a new Director-General will bring needed leadership in moving toward concrete results.  But she can succeed only with your active engagement.

“I urge you not to wait for the Twelfth Ministerial Conference, delayed by the pandemic, to move negotiations forward to positive outcomes. 

“There is no reason why the twenty-year negotiation on fisheries subsidies cannot be concluded successfully — without a sacrifice of ambition — in the next few months.  Success hinges on Members’ willingness to accept a significant level of discipline on their own subsidies.  Political decisions and your active engagement will be required to bring about success.

“I urge you to address ‘trade and health’ forcefully and immediately.  Last year, trade made a vitally important contribution in supplying needed medical supplies to deal with COVID-19.  Proposals as to what more can be done must be deliberated now.  Cooperation on trade can accelerate access to vaccines.  There can be no higher priority.

“Consider how the WTO can further contribute to the economic recovery.  Members can take steps to ensure enhanced transparency, work to eliminate unnecessary barriers and agree that new restrictions will not be imposed.  Trade finance must be restored.  The WTO convened the major international financial organizations and banks to address this need in the aftermath of the financial crisis and it can do so now again.

“’Trade and climate’ must be on the WTO agenda.  Carbon border adjustment measures will likely result in conflicts unless Members engage in joint efforts to find mutually beneficial solutions.  The heightened interest of Members in a broad range of other environmental issues such as plastics pollution and the circular economy can be reflected in new agreements.   The WTO can be more visible as a steward of the planet by reviving and concluding the Environmental Goods Agreement. 

“The Joint Statement Initiatives on e-commerce, investment facilitation, and services domestic regulation can bear fruit this year, building on what was achieved with respect to small businesses last year.  In addition, more progress can be made on the economic empowerment of women through international trade.  

“Concerns over income inequality have been growing.  The WTO’s rules-based system needs to be seen not only among countries but also within countries, as responsive to the needs of workers, farmers and all who wish to engage in international trade.  But international trade rules cannot substitute for domestic policy actions to make growth more inclusive.  When large numbers of people are unhappy with how the economy is working for them, trade will often receive undeserved blame.  The WTO is about fairness.  Its work will never be done in pursuit of that objective, but further progress can be made this year.

“There can be an outcome on agriculture — at least a down-payment and a defined work program going forward.

“During 2021, the WTO can likely welcome new WTO Members, as it continues to move towards universal coverage.  Comoros and Bosnia-Herzegovina may be ready, and over a dozen others are making progress.

“Last but not least, ‘WTO reform’ can become a reality, with actions taken to —

“- facilitate rule-making with wide participation,

“- achieve heightened enforcement through binding dispute settlement in a manner agreed by all, and

“- provide a strong mandate for a Secretariat to deliver all needed support to Members and to achieving the mission of the WTO. 

“We should greet this year with optimism and re-dedication.  With your strong engagement, 2021 can be a year to remember for what is achieved.

“Thank you.”

A presentation from the WTO Secretariat to Ministers needs to be positive, forward looking, aspirational and inspirational. DDG Wolff’s statement yesterday provides all of that. The first item mentioned, the joint pledge from 79 WTO Members not to restrict agricultural exports to the UN World Food Programme for humanitarian purposes is a positive for the world but follows the December failure of the WTO General Council to agree to the same by all WTO Members. See January 23, 2021, WTO and the World Food Programme – action by 79 Members after a failed December effort at the General Council, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/23/wto-and-the-world-food-programme-action-by-79-members-after-a-failed-december-effort-at-the-general-council/.

The challenge for the WTO in 2021 will be whether Members can come together in fact to achieve many of the important opportunities and needs in front of the Membership. While the history of the WTO since 1995 and the major divisions among Members at the present time would strongly suggest that 2021 will not achieve many of the things that are needed and possible, hope springs eternal.

U.S. perspective

The Trump Administration did an excellent job of identifying problems with the operation of the WTO whether from the longstanding failures of the dispute settlement system, to the existential challenges to the viability of the WTO from major Members whose economies have not converged to a full market orientation, to the out-of-date rules around special and differential treatment to all who claim developing country status regardless of economic development of individual members, to the need for greater transparency in many areas, including importantly subsidies, to the failure of the WTO to update rules to address changing technology and trade issues.

The Biden Administration has indicated its intention to work within multilateral institutions, including the WTO. Early action by the United States on the Director-General selection issue could provide positive energy to WTO Members in the coming months. There are topics where success can be made in 2021 either multilaterally or plurilaterally. But a lot of what is needed for meaningful WTO reform will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in the short term. Hopefully, the Biden team will stay the course to achieve reform that both returns the WTO playing field to the level agreed at the time of concluding the Uruguay Round, finds ways to deal with the massive distortions not presently covered by WTO rules, works with others to bring the WTO into the 21st century and addresses the critical issues for global prosperity and sustainable development.

Forced labor and child labor — a continued major distortion in international trade for some products

· January 24, 2021 · forced labor and child labor · , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , · No Comments

In recent years, the United States has paid more attention to the trade distortions flowing from forced labor and child labor in other countries, particularly in China. While there has been significant progress in the last twenty years in reducing forced labor and child labor globally according to the International Labor Organization (“ILO”), the COVID-19 pandemic has seen some retrenchment and efforts by China to address minorities in country have created an international backlash and concern.

The ILO webpage on forced labor reflects the global nature of the problem. The webpage states in part,

“Although forced labour is universally condemned, ILO estimates show that 24.9 million people around the world are still subjected toit. Of the total number of victims of forced labour, 20.8 million (83 per cent) are exploited in the private economy, by individuals or enterprises, and the remaining 4.1 million (17 per cent) are in State-imposed forms of forced labour. Among those exploited by private individuals or enterprises, 8 million (29 per cent) are victims of forced sexual exploitation and 12 million (64 per cent) of forced labour exploitation. Forced labour in the private economy generates some US$ 150 billion in illegal profits every year: two thirds of the estimated total (or US$ 99 billion) comes from commercial sexual exploitation, while another US$ 51 billion is a result from forced economic exploitation in domestic work, agriculture and other economic activities (Note 1).

“Vestiges of slavery are still found in some parts of Africa, while forced labour in the form of coercive recruitment is present in many countries of Latin America, in certain areas of the Caribbean and in other parts of the world. In numerous countries, domestic workers are trapped in situations of forced labour, and in many cases they are restrained from leaving the employers’ home through threats or violence. Bonded labour persists in South Asia, where millions of men, women and children are tied to their work through a vicious circle of debt. In Europe and North America, a considerable number of women and children are victims of traffickers, who sell them to networks of forced prostitution or clandestine sweat-shops. Finally, forced labour is still used as a punishment for expressing political views.

“For many governments around the world, the elimination of forced labour remains an important challenge in the 21st century. Not only is forced labour a serious violation of a fundamental human right, it is a leading cause of poverty and a hindrance to economic development. ILO standards on forced labour, associated with well-targeted technical assistance, are the main tools at the international level to combat this scourge.”

ILO, International Labour Standards on Forced labour, https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-standards/forced-labour/lang–en/index.htm. See also ILO and Walk Free, 2017, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery, Forced Labor and Forced Marriage, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_575479.pdf.

Child labor involves more people – an estimated 152 million of which 73 million are involved in hazardous work. See ILO, International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour and Forced Labour (IPEC+), https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/flagships/ipec-plus/lang–en/index.htm.

While the incidence of forced labor and child labor is declining, the COVID-19 pandemic has complicated trends as these populations are most vulnerable. See, e.g., ILO, The International Labour Organization
and the US Department of Labor partnership to eliminate child labour and forced labour, 2019, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@ipec/documents/publication/wcms_710971.pdf (“The ILO’s most recent global estimates of child labour indicate, however, that significant progress is
being made. From 2000 to 2016, there was a net reduction of 94 million children in child labour and
the number of children in hazardous work was halved. In parallel, the ILO Worst Forms of Child
Labour Convention (No. 182) was ratified by 186 countries, reaching almost universal ratification.
The challenges ahead, however, remain formidable: in 2016, 152 million girls and boys were in child
labour and 25 million men, women and children were trapped in forced labour.”); ILO, COVID-19 impact on
child labour and forced labour: The response of the IPEC+ Flagship Programme, 2020, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—ed_norm/—ipec/documents/publication/wcms_745287.pdf (“COVID-19 has plunged the world into a crisis of unprecedented scope and scale. Undoubtedly, restoring global health remains the first priority, but the strict measures required are resulting in massive economic and social shocks. As lockdown, quarantine, physical distancing and other isolation measures to suppress transmission continue, the global economy has plunged into a recession. The harmful effects of this pandemic will not be distributed equally. They are expected to be most damaging in the poorest countries and in the poorest neighbourhoods, and for those in already disadvantaged or vulnerable situations, such as
children in child labour and victims of forced labour and human trafficking, particularly women and girls.
These vulnerable groups are more affected by income shocks due to the lack of access to social protection,
including health insurance and unemployment benefits. * * * Experience from previous crisis situations, such as the 2014 Ebola epidemic, has shown that these factors play a particularly strong role in exacerbating the risk to child labour and forced labour.”).

In China, the government’s efforts to “reeducate” minority populations (e.g., Uyghurs from the western region of Xinjiang) has led to allegations of forced labor on a range of products and actions by the United States to restrict certain imports from China from the region. The Washington International Trade Association is holding a virtual webinar on January 27 looking at the challenges in China and the forced labor problem of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the resulting U.S. ban on cotton and tomato products. See WITA, WITA’s Friday Focus on Trade, Vol. 206, January 22, 2021 (containing various articles on the China forced labor issue and referencing the webinar on January 27, WITA Webinar: The U.S. Moves Against Forced Labor in Xinjiang).

The U.S. Department of Labor in September released its 2020 list of products believed to be produced in foreign countries with forced labor or with child labor. See USDOL, 2020 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, September 2020, https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/child_labor_reports/tda2019/2020_TVPRA_List_Online_Final.pdf. The report provides the following statement of purpose:

“The U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL or the Department) has produced this ninth edition of the List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor in accordance with the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), as amended. The TVPRA requires USDOL’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB or the Bureau) to “develop and make available to the public a list of goods from countries that
[ILAB] has reason to believe are produced by forced labor or child labor in violation of international standards” (TVPRA List or the List; 22 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(2)(C)). It also requires submission of the TVPRA List to the United States Congress not later than December 1, 2014, and every 2 years thereafter (22 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(3)).

“The Frederick Douglass Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection Reauthorization Act of 2018 expanded ILAB’s mandate to require the TVPRA List to include, ‘to the extent practicable, goods that are produced with inputs that are produced with forced labor or child labor’” (22 U.S.C. 7112(b)(2)(C)).

“The TVPRA directs ILAB ‘to work with persons who are involved in the production of goods on the list … to create a standard set of practices that will reduce the likelihood that such persons will produce goods using [child labor or forced labor],’ and ‘to consult with other departments and agencies of the United States Government to reduce forced and child labor internationally and ensure that products made by forced labor and child labor in violation of international standards are not imported into the United States’ (22 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(2)(D)–(E)).” (pages 1 and 3).

This year’s publication lists 77 countries that have one or more products believed to be produced with child labor, with forced labor or with both child and forced labor. Fourteen countries are listed as having products believed to be produced with forced labor. Thirty-six countries are listed as believed to produce products with child and forced labor. Sixty-four countries produce some products with child labor. The 77 countries are listed below along with whether products are believed produced with child labor, forced labor, or child labor & forced labor.

Afghanistan — child larbor; child labor & forced labor

Angola — child labor & forced labor

Argentina — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Azerbaijan — child labor

Bangladesh – child labor; child labor & forced labor

Belize — child labor

Benin — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Bolivia — child labor; forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Brazil — child labor; forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Burkina Faso — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Burma — child labor; forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Cambodia — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Cameroon — child labor

Central African Republic — child labor

Chad — child labor

China — forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Colombia — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Costa Rica — child labor

Cote d’Ivoire — child labor & forced labor

Democratic Republic of the Congo — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Dominican Republic — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Ecuador — child labor

Egypt — child labor

El Salvador — child labor

Eswatini — child labor

Ethiopia — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Ghana — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Guatemala — child labor

Guinea — child labor

Honduras — child labor

India — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Indonesia — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Iran — child labor

Kazakhstan — child labor & forced labor

Kenya — child labor

Kyrgyz Republic — child labor

Lebanon — child labor

Lesotho — child labor

Liberia — child labor

Madagascar — child labor

Malawi — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Malaysia — forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Mali — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Mauritania — child labor

Mexico — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Mongolia — child labor

Mozambique — child labor

Nepal — child labor & forced labor

Nicaragua — child labor

Niger — child labor; forced labor

Nigeria — child labor; child labor & forced labor

North Korea — forced labor

Pakistan — child labor; forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Panama — child labor

Paraguay — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Peru — child labor; forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Philippines — child labor

Russia — forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Rwanda — child labor

Senegal — child labor

Sierra Leone –child labor; child labor & forced labor

South Sudan — child labor & forced labor

Sudan — child labor

Suriname — child labor

Taiwan — forced labor

Tajikistan — child labor & forced labor

Tanzania — child labor

Thailand — child labor; forced labor; child labor & forced labor

Turkey — child labor

Turkmenistan — child labor & forced labor

Uganda — child labor

Ukraine — child labor

Uzbekistan — forced labor

Venezuela — forced labor

Vietnam — child labor; child labor & forced labor

Yemen — child labor

Zambia — child labor

Zimbabwe — child labor

While the number of products obviously vary by country and category, the report categorized agriculture as having 68 child labor listings and 29 forced labor listings. This compares to manufacturing with 39 child labor and 20 forced labor listings; mining showed 32 child labor and 13 forced labor listings and pornography showed one each.

Looking at specific products for individual countries provides the most information.

As an example, China is shown as having the following products believed to be produced with forced labor — Artificial Flowers, Christmas Decorations, Coal, Fish, Footwear, Garments, Gloves, Hair Products, Nails, Thread/Yarn, and Tomato Products. China is also shown as having the following products believed to be produced with child labor and forced labor — Bricks, Cotton, Electronics, Fireworks, Textiles, and Toys. As a USDOL separate post notes, gloves, hair products, textiles, thread/yarn and tomato products were added in 2020 because of research on the forced labor situation in Xinjiang. See USDOL, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Against Their Will: The Situation in Xinjiang, Forced Labor in Xinjiang, 2020, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/against-their-will-the-situation-in-xinjiang. The document is embedded below.

Against-Their-Will_-The-Situation-in-Xinjiang-_-U.S.-Department-of-Labor

Looking at India, products believed to be produced with child labor include the following — Bidis (hand-rolled
cigarettes), Brassware, Cotton, Fireworks, Footwear, Gems, Glass Bangles, Incense (agarbatti), Leather Goods/
Accessories, Locks, Matches, Mica, Silk Fabric, Silk Thread, Soccer Balls, Sugarcane, Thread/Yarn. Products believed produced with child labor & forced labor include the following — Bricks, Carpets, Cottonseed (hybrid), Embellished Textiles, Garments, Rice, Sandstone, Stones.

While the USDOL reports don’t estimate the portion of exports from any country of individual products that are produced with child and/or forced labor, the trade consequences can be significant as such labor is artificially valued creating distortions in competitiveness and resulting trade flows. For example, the list of products for China are either important export products for China or important inputs into exported products. The same would true for India and for many other of the 77 countries on the list.

Conclusion

The U.S. has in place statutory provisions which permit the exclusion from entry into the United states of products produced with forced labor. The Trump Administration did a somewhat better job enforcing U.S. law on imports of products produced with child or forced labor. Much more can be done and should be done domestically.

Similarly, the ILO is working to eliminate forced labor and child labor consistent with UN Sustainable Development Goals. “The objective of the IPEC+ Global Flagship Programme – in line with Target 8.7 of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, adopted by the United Nations in 2015 – is to provide ILO leadership in global efforts to eradicate all forms of child labour by 2025 and all forms of contemporary slavery and human trafficking by 2030. It also aims to ensure that all people are protected from – and can protect themselves against – these gross human rights violations.” ILO, IPEC+ Global Flagship Programme Implementation, Towards a world free from child labour and forced labour, page 4, 2020, https://respect.international/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/wcms_633435.pdf.

The WTO could play a role in the fight against forced labor and child labor. Such labor practices distort global trade flows in addition to the challenges created for countries engaged in such practices in terms of poverty and human rights abuses. The WTO could gather information from Members on the volume of production and exports of products produced with child and forced labor both as finished products and as inputs into other products. Such an exercise would facilitate an understanding of the extent of global trade represented by such products and help focus attention on trade actions that could be taken to help Members eliminate such harmful practices. While it is unlikely that Members will agree to such a data gathering undertaking, one is surely needed and would add transparency to a source of an important global issue with trade as well as non-trade dimensions.

WTO and the World Food Programme — action by 79 Members after a failed December effort at the General Council

· January 23, 2021 · General Council, UN World Food Programme · , , , , , , , , , , · No Comments

The WTO issued a press release on Jnauary 21, 2021 entitled “Group of members issue joint pledge on humanitarian food purchases”. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/agri_21jan21_e.htm. As the press release notes,

“A group of nearly 80 WTO members issued a joint statement on 21 January pledging not to impose export restrictions on foodstuffs purchased by the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP) for humanitarian aid.

“’We recognize the critical humanitarian support provided by the World Food Programme, made more urgent in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and other crises,’ the group said in their statement, available here. ‘We therefore commit to not impose export prohibitions or restrictions on foodstuffs purchased for non-commercial humanitarian purposes by the World Food Programme.’

“Discussions regarding export restrictions on food purchases by the WFP have been taking place in the WTO’s Committee on Agriculture in Special Session as well as the General Council.

“The WFP is the United Nations agency charged with delivering food assistance in emergencies and combatting hunger.”

The submission by the 79 WTO Members is embedded below (WT/L/1109).

1109-1

While the pledge by the 79 WTO Members is a significant event, the fact that the full WTO membership was not willing at the December 2020 General Council meeting to commit to such action is problematic and a reflection of the inability of WTO Members to come together on a broad array of issues. This has reduced the relevance of the WTO as a negotiating forum and prevented the updating of multilateral rules. It has led to a proliferation of free trade agreements and actions outside of the WTO. Considering the role that the World Food Programme plays and the list of beneficiaries, it is also quite extraordinary that there wasn’t an agreed General Council Decision adopted in December.

The UN World Food Programme

The UN’s World Food Programme (“WFP”) has for fifty years supplied food to those in need around the world. Consider the overview from the WFP’s webpage, https://www.wfp.org/overview (emphasis in original).

“The World Food Programme (WFP) is the leading humanitarian organization saving lives and changing lives, delivering food assistance in emergencies and working with communities to improve nutrition and build resilience. 

“As the international community has committed to end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition by 2030, one in nine people worldwide still do not have enough to eat. Food and food-related assistance lie at the heart of the struggle to break the cycle of hunger and poverty. 

“For its efforts to combat hunger, for its contribution to bettering conditions for peace in conflict-affected areas and for acting as a driving force in efforts to prevent the use of hunger as a weapon of war and conflict, WFP was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2020. 

“In 2019, WFP assisted 97 million people – the largest number since 2012 –  in 88 countries. 

“On any given day, WFP has 5,600 trucks, 30 ships and nearly 100 planes on the move, delivering food and other assistance to those in most need. Every year, we distribute more than 15 billion rations at an estimated average cost per ration of US$ 0.61. These numbers lie at the roots of WFP’s unparalleled reputation as an emergency responder, one that gets the job done quickly at scale in the most difficult environments.

“WFP’s efforts focus on emergency assistance, relief and rehabilitation, development aid and special operations. Two-thirds of our work is in conflict-affected countries where people are three times more likely to be undernourished than those living in countries without conflict. 

“In emergencies, WFP is often first on the scene, providing food assistance to the victims of war, civil conflict, drought, floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, crop failures and natural disasters. When the emergency subsides, WFP helps communities rebuild shattered lives and livelihoods. We also work to strengthen the resilience of people and communities affected by protracted crises by applying a development lens in our humanitarian response.

“WFP development projects focus on nutrition, especially for mothers and children, addressing malnutrition from the earliest stages through programmes targeting the first 1,000 days from conception to a child’s second birthday, and later through school meals.

“WFP is the largest humanitarian organisation implementing school feeding programmes worldwide and has been doing so for over 50 years. In 2019, WFP provided school meals to more than 17.3 million children in 50 countries, often in the hardest-to-reach areas.

“In 2019, WFP provided 4,2 million metric tons of food and US$2.1 billion of cash and vouchers. By buying food as close as possible to where it is needed, we can save time and money on transport costs, and help sustain local economies. Increasingly, WFP meets people’s food needs through cash-based transfers that allow the people we serve to choose and shop for their own food locally.

“WFP also provides services to the entire humanitarian community, including passenger air transportation through the UN Humanitarian Air Service, which flies to more than 280 locations worldwide.

“Funded entirely by voluntary donations, WFP raised a record-breaking US$8 billion in 2019. WFP has 20,000 staff worldwide of whom over 90 percent are based in the countries where the agency provides assistance.

“WFP is governed by a 36-member Executive Board. It works closely with its two Rome-based sister organizations, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the International Fund for Agricultural Development. WFP partners with more than 1,000 national and international NGOs to provide food assistance and tackle the underlying causes of hunger.”

The countries in which WFP provides assistance are shown in the list from the WFP webpage, https://www.wfp.org/countries, and include many important trading countries like China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and many more in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Central and South America. Beneficiary countries include the following:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, The Caribbean, The Pacific, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

The December 2020 General Council meeting and proposed General Council Decision

During the December 2020 General Council meeting, there was an effort to adopt a General Council Decision entitled “PROPOSAL ON AGRICULTURE EXPORT PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS RELATING TO THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME DRAFT GENERAL COUNCIL DECISION,” WT/GC/W/810, TN/AG/46 (4 December 2020). The draft document was modified three times to add cosponsors. WT/GC/W/810/Rev.1, Rev.2, Rev.3. Concerns were raised by India, Pakistan and some African countries (from the above list, at least India and Pakistan and most, if not all others, were beneficiaries of assistance from the the WFP). Hence there was no agreement on adopting the draft General Council Decision. See Washington Trade Daily, December 16, 2020, pages 3-4, WTO Members Talk Food Procurement, https://files.constantcontact.com/ef5f8ffe501/1b51b4fa-b0a3-4a60-9165-8c5f6d7977a4.pdf; Washington Trade Daily, December 18, 2020, pages 5-6, India Questions WFP Exemption, https://files.constantcontact.com/ef5f8ffe501/ec47c599-5c0c-47fd-80cf-a46244c5af8b.pdf.

While WTO Members always have multiple concerns and agenda items being pursued, the failure of the membership as a whole to agree to something so limited in nature and so critical for addressing global hunger was disappointing to many and reflects the seeming inability of the WTO Membership to move forward as one on the vast majority of issues before the WTO.

Conclusion

In a post earlier this month, I argued for the need for the WTO to move to liberalization by the willing without benefits for non-participants but with agreements open to all to join. See January 18, 2021, Revisiting the need for MFN treatment for sectoral agreements among the willing, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/18/revisiting-the-need-for-mfn-treatment-for-sectoral-agreements-among-the-willing/. While the MFN issue doesn’t come into play for the 79 Member pledge not to restrict exports to the WFP, the failure of the full WTO membership to agree to the draft General Council Decision is a further manifestation of the need for new approaches to promote expanded trade liberalization.

In recent speeches, Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff has expressed both the lack of unity at the WTO on an issue of importance like the draft General Council Decision and also welcomed the joint pledge by the 79 WTO Members not to impose restrictions on exports to the WFP. See WTO press release, DDG Wolff outlines possible responses to calls for WTO reform, 13 January 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/ddgaw_13jan21_e.htm (“Less than a month ago, a General Council meeting took place which lasted over 15 hours (over two and a half days), a recent record for length. It had only one substantive trade policy item on its agenda for decision, the consideration of which produced no agreement. The issue was whether Members would agree to forego a modicum of the policy space they now have by agreeing not to impair procurements by the Nobel-Prize-winning World Food Program. A witness to the proceeding could be forgiven for perceiving drift of the organization in its not living up to its potential. Viewed through a different lens, this was no more than sovereigns reaffirming that they could not be bound without their consent.”); WTO press release, DDG Wolff stresses need to make progress in WTO negotiations to enhance resilience of farm sector, 22 January 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/ddgaw_22jan21_e.htm (“I welcome the pledge this week of WTO members accounting for most of world agricultural exports to refrain from imposing export restrictions on foodstuffs purchased by the World Food Programme for non-commercial humanitarian purposes.”).

If there is to be a WTO capable of reform, the Members will need to reconfirm core principles and find ways to agree instead of searching for excuses to oppose. The membership seems far from sharing a common vision or accepting core principles. Too often, Members are engaged in a search for blocking progress. While all Members undoubtedly share blame for the current challenges, on the topic of blocking the minor proposal to ensure the workings of the WFP, one can look to the Members who remain non-participants in the joint pledge as the problem on this particular issue.

Specifically, the list of those WTO Members pledging not to impose export restrictions on foodstuffs to the WFP is made up of 79 WTO Members, meaning 85 Members did not join the pledge (at least not yet). Some of the major Members who are not participating in the pledge include the following — Argentina, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, South Africa, the Philippines, Malaysia. the Russian Federation, Hong Kong (China), Turkey. In the WTO’s World Trade Statistical Review 2020, China, Indonesia, Argentina and India are among the top 10 exporters of agricultural products and of food in 2019; China, the Russian Federation and Hong Kong (China) are among the top ten importers in 2019. WTO, World Trade Statistical Review 2020, Tables A-13 and A-14, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2020_e/wts2020_e.pdf. China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Turkey are all beneficiaries of assistance from the WFP.

While there is much that needs to be done for the restoration of the WTO’s relevance, the pledge by 79 Members suggests that liberalization by the willing may be the only road forward.

Malaysia files request for consultations with the European Union and Certain Member States on certain measures concerning palm oil and oil palm crop-based biofuels at the WTO on January 15

· January 19, 2021 · dispute settlement · , , , · No Comments

Malaysia filed the second request for consultations of 2021 on January 15, 2021. The request for consultations addresses the European Union, France and Lithuania and certain enumerated measures pertaining to palm oil and oil palm crop-based biofuels. See WT/DS600/1 (15 January 2021). France and Lithuania have already adopted laws and regulations implementing and EU provision which Malaysia views as violating a wide range of WTO obligations. As other EU members are working on possible implementing laws and regulations, Malaysia is keeping open the possibility of raising issues with additional EU members.

Because the dispute involves the interface of EU efforts to reduce greenhouse gases and trade restricting effects on certain biofuels that the EU views as not sufficiently promoting the reduction greenhouse gases, it will likely draw a lot of attention. The background part of the request for consultations lays out the Malaysian concerns.

“A. Background

“1. Malaysia is the world’s second largest producer of palm oil. In 2019, Malaysia produced around 19.86 million metric tonnes of crude palm oil, accounting for 28% of world palm oil production and 33% of world palm oil exports.1 In 2019, Malaysia exported around 1.9 million metric tonnes of palm oil to the EU. The palm oil industry directly employs more than one million Malaysians and 40% of all palm oil plantations in Malaysia are owned or farmed by smallholder farmers, who have benefited from oil palm cultivation.2 Palm oil production and export has been a major factor in Malaysia reducing poverty from 50% in the 1960s, down to less than 5% today.

“2. As one of the biggest producers and exporters of palm oil and palm oil products, Malaysia recognises that it has an important role to play in fulfilling the growing global need for oils and fats in a sustainable manner. Malaysia is a responsible producer of palm oil and has long taken the lead in the continuous process of making palm oil production more sustainable and environmentally friendly. As of December 2020, nearly 90% of Malaysia’s total oil palm cultivation has obtained Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO) certification. Additionally, as at that date, 428 of Malaysia’s 452 oil palm mills, corresponding to around 95% of total milling capacity, received the MSPO certification. Most recently, on 1 January 2020, Malaysia made the MSPO certification mandatory.

“3. It is important to recall Malaysia’s commitment at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, where it pledged to maintain at least 50% of the country’s landmass under forest cover. On the basis of data from 2018, about 55.3% of Malaysia’s 33 million hectares (ha) land areas are under forest cover, exceeding the country’s pledge made at the Rio Earth Summit.

“4. In the context of addressing the environmental risks posed by the extensive use of fossil fuels, the EU and its Member States have, since 2009, adopted a policy of promoting the use of biofuels by setting national targets for the use of renewable energy in various sectors, including the transport sector. This policy led to a rapid increase in the EU consumption of biofuels, produced mainly from food crops.

“5. While the measures taken by the EU and EU Member States under this policy pursue the reduction of greenhouse gas (‘GHG’) emissions and the achievement of commitments under international climate agreements, some of these measures contravene their WTO obligations. In 2018 and 2019, the EU adopted legislative measures that, in simple terms, define palm oil as an unsustainable feedstock for the production of biofuel. The EU further argues that only palm oil production entails a high risk of indirect land-use change (‘ILUC’). On that basis, oil palm crop-based biofuels cannot be counted towards EU renewable energy targets.3

“6. Generally speaking, the measures adopted by the EU, as well as the related measures adopted by EU Member States, confer unfair benefits to EU domestic producers of certain biofuel feedstocks, such as rapeseed oil and soy, and the biofuels produced therefrom, at the expense of palm oil and oil palm crop-based biofuels from Malaysia. These measures may also discriminate against Malaysian palm oil and oil palm crop-based biofuels in favour of ‘like products’ from third countries.

“7. Malaysia submits that the measures adopted by the EU and its Member States currently already limit and will increasingly limit the volume of Malaysian palm oil and oil palm crop-based biofuels that can be counted towards reaching EU renewable energy targets and, consequently, that will be sold in the EU market.

“fn1 Malaysian Palm Oil Council (MPOC), Malaysian Palm Oil Industry. Available at:
http://mpoc.org.my/malaysian-palm-oil-industry/. Malaysian Palm Oil Board, Production 2019. Available at
http://bepi.mpob.gov.my/index.php/en/production/production-2019/production-of-oil-palm-products-
2019.html.

“fn 2 Malaysian Palm Oil Council (MPOC). Available at http://theoilpalm.org/about/http://theoilpalm.org/about/.

“fn 3 See European Commission, Factsheet, Indirect Land Use Change, 17 October 2012, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/MEMO_12_787 (accessed 13 January 2021). See also Recitals 80 and 81 of the RED II.”

The full request for consultations is embedded below.

600-1

The Malaysian request for consultations raises similar allegations of WTO violations by the EU and member states as a case filed by Indonesia in late 2019 where a panel was finally composed on November 12, 2020. See European Union — Certain measures concerning palm oil and oil palm crop-based biofuels, WT/DS593/10 (composition of panel). Malaysia and many other countries are third parties in that dispute.

The WTO alleged violations in Malaysia’s request for consultations are the following for the EU, France, Lithuania and other EU members.

“C. Legal basis for the complaint in respect of the EU measures

“31. With regard to the EU measures, as embodied and developed in the respective legal instruments as specified in para. 22 herein and as applied by the relevant authorities, Malaysia considers that these measures are inconsistent with the EU’s obligations under the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement. In particular, the measures are inconsistent with:

“GATT 1994

“i. Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, because the measures at issue, which limit and will progressively phase out oil palm crop-based biofuels from being counted towards reaching EU renewable energy targets and which provide criteria for certifying low ILUC-risk biofuels, discriminate among ‘like’ feedstocks and derived biofuels originating in third countries;

“ii. Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, because the measures at issue, which limit and will progressively phase out oil palm crop-based biofuels from being counted towards reaching EU renewable energy targets and which provide criteria for certifying low ILUC-risk biofuels, accord less favourable treatment to imported palm oil and oil palm crop-based biofuels than they do to ‘like’ domestic feedstocks and derived biofuels, thereby modifying the conditions of competition to the detriment of the imported palm oil and oil palm crop-based biofuels, in particular from Malaysia;

“iii. Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994, because the measures at issue, which limit and will progressively phase out oil palm crop-based biofuels from being counted towards reaching EU renewable energy targets and which provide criteria for certifying low ILUC-risk biofuels, are administered in a manner that is not uniform, impartial and/or reasonable; and

“iv. Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, because the measures at issue, which limit and will progressively phase out oil palm crop-based biofuels from being counted towards reaching EU renewable energy targets, and which provide criteria for certifying low ILUC-risk biofuels, restrict the importation of palm oil and oil palm crop-based biofuels.

“TBT Agreement

“v. Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, because the measures at issue, which limit and will progressively phase out oil palm crop-based biofuels from being counted towards reaching EU renewable energy targets, being technical regulations within the meaning of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, have a detrimental impact on the competitive conditions in the EU market of Malaysia’s imports of oil palm crop-based biofuels compared with ‘like products’ imported into the EU from other countries and compared with ‘like’ domestic products;
vi. Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, because the measures at issue, which limit and will progressively phase out oil palm crop-based biofuels from being counted towards reaching EU renewable energy targets, being technical regulations within the meaning of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, are more trade-restrictive than necessary to achieve the objectives pursued by the measures;

“vii. Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, because the measures at issue, which limit and will progressively phase out oil palm crop-based biofuels from being counted towards reaching EU renewable energy targets, being technical regulations within the meaning of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, are not based on the relevant international standards;

“viii. Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement, because the EU, in preparing, adopting or applying the measures at issue, which limit and will progressively phase out oil palm crop-based biofuels from being counted towards reaching EU renewable energy targets, being technical regulations within the meaning of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, has failed, upon the request of Malaysia, to explain the justification for those measures in terms of Articles 2.2 to 2.4 of the TBT Agreement;

“ix. Article 2.8 of the TBT Agreement, because the measures at issue, which limit and will progressively phase out oil palm crop-based biofuels from being counted towards reaching EU renewable energy targets, being technical regulations within the meaning of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, are based on an abstract and unsubstantiated high-ILUC risk concept instead of the performance of such biofuels;

“x. Article 2.9 of the TBT Agreement, because the measures at issue, which limit and will progressively phase out oil palm crop-based biofuels from being counted towards reaching EU renewable energy targets, being technical regulations within the meaning of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, were adopted without the required timely publication and notification of these measures and organising an adequate process for commenting;

“xi. Article 5.1.1 of the TBT Agreement, because the EU, by preparing, adopting or applying the measures at issue, which provide criteria for certifying low ILUC-risk biofuels, being conformity assessment procedures within the meaning of Annex 1.3 of the TBT Agreement, treats suppliers of oil palm crop-based biofuels from Malaysia less favourably than domestic suppliers of ‘like’ biofuels or suppliers from other WTO Members in a comparable situation;

“xii. Article 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement, because the EU, by preparing, adopting or applying the measures at issue, which provide criteria for certifying low ILUC-risk biofuels, being conformity assessment procedures within the meaning of Annex 1.3 of the TBT Agreement, creates unnecessary obstacles to international trade;
xiii. Article 5.2 of the TBT Agreement, because the EU failed to make available the conformity assessment procedures to certify low ILUC-risk;

“xiv. Article 5.6 of the TBT Agreement, because the EU, with regards to the measures at issue, which provide criteria for certifying low ILUC-risk, being conformity assessment procedures within the meaning of Annex 1.3 of the TBT Agreement, neither notified nor enter into meaningful consultations, or allowed for comments on such conformity assessment procedures;

“xv. Article 5.8 of the TBT Agreement, because the EU neither promptly published nor otherwise made available the measures at issue, which provide criteria for certifying low ILUC-risk biofuels, being conformity assessment procedures within the meaning of Annex 1.3 of the TBT Agreement; and

“xvi. Articles 12.1 and 12.3 of the TBT Agreement, because the EU, in the preparation and application of the measures at issue referred to above, failed to take into account the circumstances specific to developing countries, in particular Malaysia, where palm oil and oil palm crop-based biofuels are produced.

“D. Legal basis for the complaint in respect of the EU Member States’ measures

“a. France

“32. The set of advantages granted by France for oil crop-based biofuels, as embodied and developed in the respective legal instruments, as specified in paragraphs 24 to 27 herein, and as applied by the relevant authorities, are inconsistent with the obligations of France under the GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement. In particular, the set of advantages described above, as contained in the mentioned legal instruments, are inconsistent with:

“GATT 1994

“i. Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, because the measures at issue, under which the tax on petrol and diesel is only reduced when they contain biofuels other than oil palm crop-based biofuels, discriminates against ‘like’ biofuels by granting an advantage, in the form of a tax reduction, to biofuels of some countries, that is not granted to all WTO Members, and in particular not to Malaysia, and

“ii. Article III:2 of the GATT 1994, because the measures at issue, under which the tax on petrol and diesel is only reduced when they contain biofuels other than oil palm crop-based biofuels, indirectly applies a tax on imported oil palm crop-based biofuels: (1) in excess to ‘like’ domestic biofuels; or (2) which is not similar to the tax on ‘directly competitive and substitutable’ domestic biofuels, and affords protection to the production of these domestic biofuels.

“SCM Agreement

“iii. Articles 3 and 5 of the SCM Agreement, because the measures at issue, under which the French Government reduces the tax on petrol and diesel containing crop-based biofuel other than oil palm crop-based biofuels and excludes petrol and diesel containing oil palm crop-based biofuels from this tax reduction, amount to a subsidy within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement which is: (1) a prohibited import substitution subsidy within the meaning of Article 3.1(b); and/or (2) an actionable subsidy causing an adverse effect on the interests of Malaysia within the meaning of Article 5(c) of the SCM Agreement.

“b. Lithuania

“33. Concerning Lithuania’s measures (including any annexes thereto, amendments, supplements, replacements, renewals, extensions, implementing measures or any other related measures, and any exemptions applied), as implemented and/or applied by the latter in line with its obligations as a EU Member State regarding the transposition of the RED II, Malaysia claims that those measures are inconsistent with the same WTO obligations as provided for in paragraph 31 and/or 32 herein.

“c. Other EU Member States

“34. Malaysia contends that to the extent that any other EU Member State transposes the RED II and further implement and/or apply any measure(s) according to its obligations as regards the limitation and/or phasing out of oil palm crop-based biofuels from being counted towards reaching renewable energy targets, regardless of whether the said measures are explicit or implicit in their treatment of oil palm crop-based biofuels, such measure(s) shall be inconsistent with the same WTO obligations as provided for in paragraph 31 and/or 32 herein.”

With the Indonesian case now in the briefing stage, a panel report could be available in late 2021 or in the front half of 2022 depending on delays flowing from the continued limitations imposed by the pandemic. The Malaysian case will likely trail the Indonesian case by six months or more.

Neither Indonesia nor Malaysia are signatories to the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement Pursuant To Article 25 Of The DSU. The EU has in at least one case where the party challenging EU actions was not a signatory opted to file an appeal into the void when it was dissatisfied with the panel report. See 28 August 2020:  Notification of Appeal  by the European Union in  DS494: European Union — Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports from Russia (Second Complaint) (WT/DS494/7). Thus, whether reform of the Appellate Body moves forward in the next year to address U.S. concerns may be important to a final resolution of the two cases. The WTO is a long distance from resolving the current impasse on the Appellate Body, but perhaps there will be reengagement during the second half of 2021.

Comments

It is surprising that with the pressing importance of working to address climate change and the EU efforts at leadership that the EU appears not to have found a way to work with trading partners like Malaysia or achieve a common science-based understanding as to which biofuels help reduce greenhouse gases. For trade and environment issues to gain a greater role within the WTO (as Members need them to do), all Members working to achieve sustainable development objectives have to feel that the rules of trade will support their effort, provide guidance as to what more is needed and not close those Members out of the market of a trading partner.

U.S. Section 301 investigations on digital services taxes by trading partners — USTR releases additional reports on January 14, 2021

· January 15, 2021 · Digital services tax · , , , , , , , , , , , · No Comments

On January 8, 2021, I reviewed in a post the release of the first three of ten reports on investigations under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, on countries’ digital services taxes (DSTs). See January 8, 2021, U.S. Section 301 investigations on digital service taxes by trading partners – an update, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/08/u-s-section-301-investigations-on-digital-service-taxes-by-trading-partners-an-update/ (release of reports on India, Italy and Turkey). The release of the three reports was accompanied by a decision to postpone indefinitely the imposition of additional duties on France for its DST to permit a coordinated response on all eleven countries following the completion of all investigations. The Federal Register notices on the India, Italy and Turkey investigations and the postponement of imposition of duties on France for its DST were published on January 12. See 86 FR 2477-78 (Italy); 86 FR 2478-79 (India); 86 FR 249-80 (France); 86 FR 2480 (Turkey).

On January 14, USTR released three additional reports on the DSTs of Austria, Spain and the United Kingdom and released a status report on the remaining four investigations on Brazil, the Czech Republic, the European Union, and Indonesia. See USTR press release, USTR Releases Findings and Updates in DST Investigations,
01/14/2021, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/january/ustr-releases-findings-and-updates-dst-investigations. The press release is embedded below but, similar to the earlier reports, found that “each of the DSTs discriminates against U.S. companies, is inconsistent with prevailing
principles of international taxation, and burden or restricts U.S. commerce.”

USTR-Releases-Findings-and-Updates-in-DST-Investigations-_-United-States-Trade-Representative

The press release notes that “’The taxation of companies that engage in international trade in goods and services is an important issue,’ stated U.S. Trade Representative Robert E. Lighthizer. ‘The best outcome would be for countries to come together to find a solution.’” As noted in the January 8 post, there is an ongoing process through the OECD/G20 Integrated Framework to find a solution by mid-2021.

For the four investigations where USTR has not yet published reports, USTR released a status report yesterday, reflecting the reality that the Trump Administration is in its final week and such unfinished investigations and issuance of reports will await the incoming Biden Administration. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Section 301 Investigations, Status Update on Digital Services Tax Investigations of Brazil, the Czech Republic, the European Union, and Indonesia, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/StatusUpdate301InvestigationsBEUIndCR.pdf. The twenty page status report is embedded below.

StatusUpdate301InvestigationsBEUIndCR

The status update is organized as reviewed in the opening paragraph of the update.

“In this Status Update, USTR reports on the progress of the four investigations, offers brief descriptions of the four jurisdictions’ approach to digital services taxes, and describes our preliminary, high-level concerns. In the sections that follow, we address: the procedural developments in the four investigations (Section I); a description and preliminary analysis of Brazil’s DST proposal (Section II); a description and preliminary analysis of the Czech Republic’s DST proposal (Section III); a description and preliminary analysis of the EU’s
approach to digital services taxes (Section IV); and a description and preliminary analysis of Indonesia’s DST proposal (Section V).”

There is little doubt that when the four pending investigations are completed, there will be similar findings to those in the prior seven completed investigations.

As reviewed in the January 8 post, the OECD was to hold a virtual meeting on January 14-15, 2021 in an effort to obtain public input to refine the draft documents released in October and to help resolve remaining issues. The 11th plenary meeting of the 137 participating countries of the OECD/G20 Integrated Framework will be held virtually on January 27-29.

For the incoming Biden Administration, it will be facing in the early months of the new Administration critically important negotiations on the OECD/G20 proposals as well as the need to complete the investigations on the four unfinished 301 investigations on DSTs. The outcome and interplay of both will have significant implications for global trade and for fairness in international taxation.

Below are the reports on Austria, Spain and the United Kingdom and the notices sent to the Federal Register on each of the three investigations.

AustriaDSTSection301Report

AustriaDSTFRN

SpainDSTSection301Report

SpainDSTFRN

UKDSTSection301Report

UKDSTFRN

First dispute settlement cases of 2021 at the WTO — Costa Rica requests consultations with Panama for various restrictions on agricultural products viewed as violating SPS obligations and more; EU requests establishment of a panel to address its concerns with Indonesia’s export restrictions on inputs for stainless steel

· January 14, 2021 · Dispute Settlement Body · , , , · No Comments

Costa Rica’s request for consultations

Costa Rica has filed the first request for consultations at the WTO in 2021. Its request was filed on January 11, 2021 and posted on the WTO website on January 14. See PANAMA – MEASURES CONCERNING THE IMPORTATION OF CERTAIN PRODUCTS FROM COSTA RICA, REQUEST FOR CONSULTATIONS BY COSTA RICA, WT/DS599/1, G/AG/GEN/179, G/SPS/GEN/1873, G/L/1383 (14 January 2021). Costa Rica alleges a host of restraints imposed on various agricultural exports from Costa Rica including on “(i) strawberries; (ii) milk
products; beef; pork; processed poultry meat; cured beef, pork and poultry products (including ham, sausages, mortadella, bacon, chorizo made of pork, chicken and turkey, pâté, pepperoni, salami, legs, ribs, loin of pork, roast beef and beef loin); prepared beef, pork and chicken, chicken and turkey breast, pork rind and dry chorizo; and fish food; (iii) pineapples; and (iv) plantains and bananas.” (Page 1).

Costa Rica’s request for consultations reviews the lengthy efforts at communicating with Panama and the apparent failure of Panama to respond or to provide inspections of facilities in some cases. Costa Rica has been seeking resolution with Panama over the last two years without results. Costa Rica has raised some of the issues in the Committee on Agriculture during 2020. See WTO Committee on Agriculture, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE MEETING HELD ON 28 JULY 2020, NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT, G/AG/R/95 (19 October 2020)(“The Committee adopted the agenda with the following additions: • Under Part 1.A: The Review Process, matters relevant to the implementation of Commitments under the reform programme raised under Article 18.6 of the Agreement on Agriculture: o Costa Rica raised matters relating to non-tariff barriers to agricultural trade during the COVID-19 pandemic by Panama”). The question from Costa Rica and Panama’s limited response are embedded below.

View-Question-Answer

Indeed press articles from the summer of 2020 reviewed the growing trade concerns that Costa Rica had with Panama’s restrictions on Costa Rica’s exports of agricultural products. See, e.g., MENAFN, Costa Rica protests Panama trade blockade to World body, 8/7/2020, https://menafn.com/1100601315/Costa-Rica-protests-Panama-trade-blockade-to-World-body (“A growing trade dispute between Costa Rica and Panama has landed on the world stage as Costa Rica notified the Agriculture Committee of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that Panama has blocked the entry of Costa Rican products of animal origin to the Panamanian market for over three months. In a statement, issued on Thursday, August 6, the Minister ofAgriculture and Livestock, Renato Alvarado Rivera, and the Minister of Foreign Trade, Dyalá Jiménez Figueres, said that the blockade constitutes ‘a serious commercial problem between both countries.'”); CentralAmericaData.com, Trade Dispute Between Panama and Costa Rica, August 7, 2020, https://www.centralamericadata.com/en/article/main/Trade_Dispute_Between_Panama_and_Costa_Rica.

The bulk of the alleged violations by Panama are to obligations under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”), with GATT 1994 Article violations (e.g., failure to provide most favored nation access) alleged as well. The request for consultations is embedded below.

599-1

Costa Rica will have a long road (likely measured in years) in pursuing its dispute with Panama and at present, has no second stage dispute settlement option. While Costa Rica has joined the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement Pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU, Panama is not a signatory. Hence, absent agreement on how to proceed after a panel report, Panama could file an appeal which could not be heard until such time as there is a resolution to the Appellate Body impasse.

The challenge Costa Rica is having with Panama on restraints based on claims of SPS problems has become increasingly common. For example, while most observers perceive that the wide range of import restrictions by China on goods from Australia flow from China’s unhappiness with Australia’s positions on unrelated matters, China has imposed restrictions often claiming SPS or other problems. See, e.g., 9news, Aussie cherries labelled ‘inferior’ by China, growers worried, January 14, 2021, https://www.9news.com.au/national/china-trade-dispute-cherry-exporters-targeted/9f734bf9-ba2f-4259-bce0-758ff0913cc3. For the more likely reason for Chinese restrictions see my prior post (December 22, 2020, China’s trade war with Australia – unwarranted and at odds with China’s portrayal of itself as a strong supporter of the WTO, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/12/22/chinas-trade-war-with-australia-unwarranted-and-at-odds-with-chinas-portrayal-of-itself-as-a-strong-supporter-of-the-wto/) and last week’s article (South China Morning Post, China-Australia relations: bans on Australian imports ‘beginning to bite’ as commodity exports fall, 8 January 2021, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3116808/china-australia-relations-bans-australian-imports-beginning).

The EU’s request for establishment of a panel to address its concerns with export restraints on raw materials from Indonesia

The EU filed its request for establishment of a panel today, January 14, 2021. The European Commission’s Directorate of Trade issued a press release entitled “EU files WTO panel request against illegal export restrictions by Indonesia on raw materials for stainless steel” and the request for establishment of a panel is also available from the same website. Both documents are embedded below.

EU-files-WTO-panel-request-against-illegal-export-restrictions-by-Indonesia-on-raw-materials-for-stainless-steel-Trade-European-Commission

tradoc_159271

The EU request for establishment of a panel raise two issues where Indonesia’s actions are alleged to violate GAT 1994 Article XI:1 which provides, “No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.” The actions of Indonesia from the request are copied below.

“Indonesia has restricted exports of nickel ore to different extents and under different rules since at least 2014. In January 2014 nickel was excluded from the regime on the necessary processing and purification of mining commodities for export, which effectively outlawed exports of nickel ore. From January 2017 to December 2019 exports of nickel ore with a concentration below 1.7% were permitted subject to certain conditions, while those of nickel ore with a higher concentration remained prohibited. Since January 2020 all exports of nickel ore, regardless of its concentration, are banned.” (page 1 of request for establishment of a panel)

“Indonesia applies domestic processing requirements with regard to certain raw materials, notably nickel ore and iron ore, prior to them being exported. Domestic processing requirements oblige mining companies to enhance the value of the relevant raw materials through the conduct of certain processing and/or purification operations in Indonesia before exporting them.” (page 2)

While the EU is a signatory to the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement Pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU but Indonesia is not. Should the EU be successful in its dispute with Indonesia at the panel stage, Indonesia could take an appeal to the Appellate Body which at least at present could not hear it. The EU would likely retaliate against Indonesia if an appeal were pursued where the Appellate Body is not functioning.

Conclusion

It is not surprising that new requests for consultations and new requests for the establishment of a panel continue despite the current inoperability of the second stage dispute settlement (the Appellate Body). As panels have been taking a long time in rendering panel reports, it is possible that reform of the Appellate Body will be accomplished before either the Costa Rica case against Panama or the EU case against Indonesia get to a panel decision. It is also obviously the case that the Dispute Settlement Understanding encourages parties to disputes to resolve them at any time, so neither case may reach a point where an appeal is considered. Alternatively, the parties could agree to not appeal from any panel report or otherwise find a mutually agreeable solution without appeal. However, if either or both cases get to a stage where an appeal is taken, either the case will sit awaiting the return of a functioning Appellate Body or the winning party may opt to take unilateral action and retaliate even though not authorized by WTO DSU provisions.

The following from the WTO webpage on Dispute Settlement, Appellate Body, provides a list of disputes where appeals have been taken but the Appellate Body is not in a position to resolve at the present time. The list and note are copied below (but don’t contain quote marks). There are presently 16 disputes where appeals have been filed where the Appellate Body is not currently working the appeals.

Current Notified Appeals (1)

  • 17 December 2020:  Notification of Appeal by Indonesia in DS484: Indonesia — Measures Concerning the Importation of Chicken Meat and Chicken Products (Article 21.5 — Brazil) (WT/DS484/25)
     
  • 26 October 2020:  Notification of Appeal by United States in DS543: United States — Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China (WT/DS543/10)
     
  •  28 September 2020: Notification of Appeal by United States in DS533: United States — Countervailing Measures on Softwood Lumber from Canada (WT/DS533/5)
     
  •  28 August 2020:  Notification of Appeal  by the European Union in  DS494: European Union — Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports from Russia (Second Complaint) (WT/DS494/7)
     
  •  28 July 2020: Notification of Appeal by Saudi Arabia in DS567: Saudi Arabia — Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (WT/DS567/7)
     
  •  18 December 2019: Notification of Appeal by the United States in DS436: United States — Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India (Article 21.5 — India) (WT/DS436/21)
     
  • 6 December 2019: Notification of Appeal by the European Union in DS316: EC and certain member States — Large Civil Aircraft (Article 21.5 — EU) (WT/DS316/43)
     
  • 19 November 2019: Notification of Appeal by India in DS541: India — Export Measures (WT/DS541/7)
     
  • 9 September 2019: Notification of Appeal by Thailand in DS371: Thailand — Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines (Article 21.5 — Philippines II) (WT/DS371/30)
     
  • 15 August 2019: Notification of Appeal by the United States in DS510: United States — Certain Measures Relating to the Renewable Energy Sector (WT/DS510/5)
     
  • 4 June 2019: Notification of Appeal by Canada in DS534: United States — Anti-Dumping Measures Applying Differential Pricing Methodology to Softwood Lumber from Canada (WT/DS534/5)
     
  • 25 January 2019: Notification of Appeal by the United States in DS523: United States — Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Pipe and Tube Products from Turkey (WT/DS523/5)
     
  • 9 January 2019: Notification of Appeal by Thailand in DS371: Thailand — Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines (Article 21.5 — Philippines) (WT/DS371/27)
     
  • 14 December 2018: Notification of Appeal by India in DS518: India — Certain Measures on Imports of Iron and Steel Products (WT/DS518/8)
     
  • 20 November 2018: Notification of Appeal by Panama in DS461: Colombia — Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles, Apparel and Footwear (Article 21.5 — Colombia)(Article 21.5 — Panama) (WT/DS461/28)
     
  • 21 September 2018: Notification of Appeal by the European Union in DS476: European Union and its member States — Certain measures Relating to the Energy Sector (WT/DS476/6)

Notes

  1. This refers to current cases in which notifications of appeal have been made. As indicated in the opening paragraphs, at the current time the Appellate Body is unable to review any of these notified appeals given the ongoing vacancies.  Back to text

U.S. Section 301 investigations on digital service taxes by trading partners — an update

· January 8, 2021 · Digital services tax · , , , , , , , , , , , · No Comments

For all countries the question of tax base erosion and profit shifting during a period of tremendous growth in e-commerce has been important as countries struggle to secure funding sources in a rapidly changing global marketplace. Concerns about tax revenue sources has grown during the COVID-19 pandemic as e-commerce has surged and may countries tax revenues have shrunk which stimulus outlays have soured.

For a number of years the OECD and the G20 have been working with many other countries in what is called an integrated framework to examine how international taxation needs to change to reflect the changed economic environment. The U.S. unhappiness with many trading partners on the question of digital service taxes is the early adoption of taxes on digital services before the completion of international negotiations and, in particular, taxes which appear to the U.S. to discriminate against U.S. companies who often are major global players in e-commerce and digital services.

In a post from early June, I reviewed the actions of the United States in response to actions by trading partners to introduce digital services taxes (DST), including a first investigation under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (“section 301”) on France on their DST and the initiation of investigations under section 301 on nine other countries and the European Union. While USTR had identified additional tariffs of 100% on a variety of French products, the imposition of duties was postponed until January 6, 2021 to give negotiators time to reach an agreement within the OECD. See June 3, 2020:  Digital Services Taxes – New U.S. Section 301 Investigations on Nine Countries and the European Union, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/06/03/digital-services-taxes-new-u-s-section-301-investigations-on-nine-countries-and-the-european-union/.

Earlier this week, USTR issued three reports on three countries from the 2020 investigations — on India, Italy and Turkey. Parts of the USTR press release are copied below and, similar to the report on France, found the DSTs of the three countries were discriminatory to U.S. companies, contrary to international tax principles and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. See USTR press release, USTR Releases Findings in DST Investigations,
01/06/2021, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/january/ustr-releases-findings-dst-investigations.

“Washington, DC – The U.S. Trade Representative has issued findings in Section 301 investigations of Digital Service Taxes (DSTs) adopted by India, Italy, and Turkey, concluding that each of the DSTs discriminates against U.S. companies, is inconsistent with prevailing principles of international taxation, and burden or restricts U.S. commerce.

“The findings on each of the DSTs are supported by comprehensive reports, which are being published today on USTR’s website.

“USTR is not taking any specific actions in connection with the findings at this time but will continue to evaluate all available options.

“The Section 301 investigations of the DSTs adopted by India, Italy, and Turkey were initiated in June 2020, along with investigations of DSTs adopted or under consideration by Austria, Brazil, the Czech Republic, the European Union, Indonesia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. USTR expects to announce the progress or completion of additional DST investigations in the near future.”

Similarly, on January 7, 2021, USTR announced that it was postponing introduction of tariffs on French products that were due to kick in on January 6 to provide the agency with the ability to coordinate its actions based on the results of the other ongoing investigations. See USTR press release, Suspension of Tariff Action in France Digital Services Tax Investigation, 01/07/2021, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/january/suspension-tariff-action-france-digital-services-tax-investigation. The press release is copied below.

“Washington, DC – The U.S. Trade Representative has determined to suspend the tariff action in the Section 301 investigation of France’s Digital Services Tax (DST). The additional tariffs on certain products of France were announced in July 2020, and were scheduled to go into effect on January 6, 2021. The U.S. Trade Representative has decided to suspend the tariffs in light of the ongoing investigation of similar DSTs adopted or under consideration in ten other jurisdictions. Those investigations have significantly progressed, but have not yet reached a determination on possible trade actions. A suspension of the tariff action in the France DST investigation will promote a coordinated response in all of the ongoing DST investigations.

“The suspension of the France DST tariffs is set out in a notice sent for publication in the Federal Register.”

The three notices on the India, Italy and Turkey investigations were sent to the Federal Register on January 6 and will appear in the Federal Register next week. The same is true on the postponement of tariffs on France which was forwarded yesterday to the Federal Register and which should appear next week as well.

The three USTR reports released on January 6 and the four notices sent to the Federal Register by USTR on January 6 or 7 are embedded below.

Report-on-Indias-Digital-Services-Tax

Report-on-Italys-Digital-Services-Tax

Report-on-Turkeys-Digital-Services-Tax

IndiaDSTFRNJLB

ItalyDSTFRNJLB

TurkeyDSTFRNJLB

FRN-France-DST-Modification-2021.01.07

The OECD/G20 Integrated Framework talks

The OECD/G20 Integrated Framework negotiations on arriving at tax policies for an increasingly digitalized global economy have been ongoing for a number of years and include 137 countries.

The OECD/G20 Integrated Framework project released a series of reports on policy issues and approaches to address international taxation in the age of digitalisation in early October to address base erosion profit shifting (“BEPS”) and have moved the target date for completion from the end of 2020 to mid-2021. The reports released attempt to address at least some of the U.S. concerns. The OECD has sought public comments, received more than 270 comments and is holding a virtual meeting on January 14-15 in an effort to obtain public input to refine the draft documents and help resolve remaining issues. The 11th plenary meeting of the 137 participating countries of the OECD/G20 Integrated Framework will be held virtually on January 27-29.

A series of documents released in October that permit a better understanding of the complexities involved in seeking a way forward are listed next. For non-tax readers, the “Top 10 Frequently Asked Questions” is a good primer on the issues and challenges. See OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, Addressing the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy, HIGHLIGHTS, October 2020, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/brochure-addressing-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-october-2020.pdf; OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Tax Challenges Arising
from Digitalisation – Report on Pillar One Blueprint, October 2020, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/tax-challenges-arising-from-digitalisation-report-on-pillar-one-blueprint-beba0634-en.htm; OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Report on Pillar Two Blueprint, October 2020, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/tax-challenges-arising-from-digitalisation-report-on-pillar-two-blueprint-abb4c3d1-en.htm; OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, Reports on the Pillar One and Pillar Two Blueprints, 12 October 2020 – 14 December 2020, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-reports-on-pillar-one-and-pillar-two-blueprints-october-2020.pdf; OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Economic Impact Assessment, October 2020, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/tax-challenges-arising-from-digitalisation-economic-impact-assessment-0e3cc2d4-en.htm; OECD, Tax Issues Arising from Digitalisation, Top 10 Frequently Asked Questions, October 2020, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/top-10-frequently-asked-questions-tax-challenges-digitalisation.pdf; Public consultation meeting on the Reports on the Pillar One and Pillar Two Blueprints (Date 14-15 January 2021), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-meeting-reports-on-the-pillar-one-and-pillar-two-blueprints.htm; 11th meeting of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS (Date 27-28 January 2021 (Inclusive Framework plenary); 29 January 2021 (Tax and Development briefings)), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/oecd-g20-inclusive-framework-on-beps-meeting-january-2021.htm.

To understand some of the concerns of U.S. businesses or business groups with actions of particular trading partners, a review of several comments to the OECD/G20 may be useful. I embed below comments from the American Chamber of Commerce Ireland, Amazon and the Business Roundtable. The Amcham Ireland paper comments on non-discrimination, multilateralism, administrability and certainty, avoiding double taxation, durability, efficiency, scope, safe harbour, segmentation and the interaction with the US’s Global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI). Amazon explores issues in the two pillar blueprints dealing with segmentation, sourcing, user location/IP address, business-to-business sales, reasonable steps/evidence requirements, double tax relief, dispute prevention and resolution, marketing and distribution safe harbour, GILTI Co-existence, framework for implementation, double-tax relief, application of STTR, and additional areas for simplification. The Business Roundtable (BR) has an overview section in which they “affirm certain principles of international income taxation” as being critical to a strong and growing global economy. One of the principles is that taxation should be of net business profits, not gross revenue. BR also provides seven comments on specific aspects of Pillar One and/or Two which are similar to concerns raised by the other U.S. interests. Comment 4 states “An agreement on Pillar One must include repeal of existing unilateral measures and a commitment to refrain from imposing any new unilateral measures aimed at profit reallocation or the digital economy.” It is the unilateral actions of trading partners that are perceived to discriminate against U.S. companies, often base tax on revenue versus profit and deviate from other established international taxation principles that is causing concern in the U.S. business community and resulting in U.S. investigations under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended.

American-Chamber-of-Commerce-Ireland

Amazon

Business-Roundtable-BRT

Conclusion

With the Trump Administration in its last twelve days, it is unknown if USTR will be able to complete the remaining seven 301 investigations on Austria, Brazil, the Czech Republic, the European Union, Indonesia, Spain, and the United Kingdom to accompany the three reports released on the 6th of January dealing with India, Italy, and Turkey and the earlier report and proposed action on France. My guess is that this will be a primary focus of USTR in the next week and a half so that a full set of reports is available and possibly a recommendation for action on all eleven reports. Whether the remaining investigations are completed by January 20 or not, the Biden Administration will be confronted with the ongoing OECD/G20 process with a target completion in the front half of 2021 and a host of governments implementing DSTs unilaterally ahead of any agreement among the Integrated Framework members. Action under 301 is an option should trading partners pursue approaches to DSTs that in fact discriminate against U.S. companies or deviate from what the OECD/G20 process is likely to generate as a final package.

2021 – how quickly will COVID-19 vaccines bring the pandemic under control?

· January 3, 2021 · COVID-19 · , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , · No Comments

News accounts report many countries starting to receive at least some doses of vaccines. In the United States, two vaccines have received emergency use authorization (“EUA”)(the Pfizer/BioNTech and the Moderna vaccines). The Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine has received approval (emergency use or other) in a number of countries (EU, Canada, United Kingdom, Bahrain) and was the first vaccine to receive an EUA from the World Health Organization. See WHO press release, WHO issues its first emergency use validation for a COVID-19 vaccine and emphasizes need for equitable global access, December 31, 2020, https://www.who.int/news/item/31-12-2020-who-issues-its-first-emergency-use-validation-for-a-covid-19-vaccine-and-emphasizes-need-for-equitable-global-access. As the WHO press releases indicates, “The WHO’s Emergency Use Listing (EUL) opens the door for countries to expedite their own regulatory approval processes to import and administer the vaccine. It also enables UNICEF and the Pan-American Health Organization to procure the vaccine for distribution to countries in need.”

AstraZeneca will likely seek emergency use authorization in the United States in January and Johnson & Johnson in February. AstraZeneca has received an emergency use authorization in the United Kingdom. It has also been given EUA by India (along with a vaccine from Bharat Biotech). See New York Times, India Approves Oxford-AstraZeneca Covid-19 Vaccine and 1 other, January 3, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/03/world/asia/india-covid-19-vaccine.html.

A recent Financial Times article includes a graph showing the number of citizens in various countries who have received a first vaccination shot. See Financial Times, European leaders under pressure to speed up mass vaccination, January 1, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/c45e5d1c-a9ea-4838-824c-413236190e7e. The countries shown as having started vaccinations include China, the U.S., the U.K., Kuwait, Mexico, Canada, Chile, Russia, Argentina, Iceland, Bahrain, Oman, Israel, and fourteen of the 27 members of the EU).

Similarly an article from CGTN on January 1, 2021 shows a number of countries who are buying COVID-19 vaccines from China including Hungary and a number of others while vaccines from China are in stage 3 trials in a number of countries. CGTN, 1 January 2021, Hungary to focus on EU, Chinese coronavirus vaccine purchases, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-01-01/Hungary-to-focus-on-EU-Chinese-coronavirus-vaccine-purchases-WHm11NYjni/index.html. “By the end of 2020, UAE became the first country to roll out a Chinese vaccine to the public. Pakistan also announced on Thursday that they will purchase 1.2 million COVID-19 vaccine doses from China’s Sinopharm after China officially approved the vaccine for general public use. Sinovac’s CoronaVac shot, another candidate vaccine in China, has been signed up for purchase deals with Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, Chile, and Singapore. The company is also in supply talks with Malaysia and the Philippines.”

So the good news at the beginning of 2021 is that effective vaccines are starting to be distributed. Many others are in late stages of trials, giving hope to a significant number of vaccines approved for use in the coming months. The WHO’s list of vaccines in development and their status can be found on the WHO website at this cite. https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/draft-landscape-of-covid-19-candidate-vaccines. How quickly approved vaccines can be produced, distributed and vaccinations given globally will determine when the pandemic will be brought under control. There are many challenges that the world faces in getting to the hoped for situation of a pandemic that is in the past.

For example, even in developed countries, governments are finding that there are significant hurdles in getting production volumes up to promised levels, and much greater challenges in going from production to distribution to vaccinations. In the United States, the Trump Administration had aimed at having 20 million vaccinations accomplished by the end of 2020. Only 13.071 million doses were distributed by the end of the year according to the US CDC and only 4.2 million vaccinations (first shot of two shots) occurred. See Center for Disease Prevention and Control, COVID-19 Vaccinations in the United States, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#vaccinations (viewed Jan. 3, 2021). President-elect Biden is talking about an aggressive program to get 100 million vaccinations (as the current vaccines require 2 shots, this means 50 million people) vaccinated in the first 100 days of his Administration (by the end of April). To achieve this objective will require cooperation from Congress in providing sufficient funding to build up the capabilities at the state and local levels. Health care infrastructure has been reduced over the last dozen years with a reduction of some 50,000 health care workers in the U.S. The huge COVID-19 case load in the United States and record hospitalizations also have health care operations across the United States overextended. So despite having sufficient vaccines on order from four companies where EUAs have been or will likely be granted in the near future to permit vaccination of all Americans by fall, there are enormous practical challenges to making the vaccinations happen in fact. And that is before the challenges of convincing portions of the population of the safety of the vaccines and the need for the vast majority of people to be vaccinated to achieve herd immunity.

Similar challenges exist in many other parts of the world as well. For example, in both the EU and India the roll out of vaccines is proceeding slower than desired. See, e.g., The Guardian, BioNTech criticises EU failure to order enough Covid vaccine, January 1, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/01/france-to-step-up-covid-jabs-after-claims-of-bowing-to-anti-vaxxers; Politico, France under pressure to speed up coronavirus vaccine rollout, January 3, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/france-under-pressure-to-speed-up-coronavirus-vaccine-rollout/; New York Times, India Approves Oxford-AstraZeneca Covid-19 Vaccine and 1 other, January 3, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/03/world/asia/india-covid-19-vaccine.html (“The Serum Institute, an Indian drug maker that struck a deal to produce the Oxford vaccine even before its effectiveness had been proven, has managed to make only about one-tenth of the 400 million doses it had committed to manufacturing before the end of the year.”).

The WHO/GAVI/CEPI effort to get vaccines to the world on a equitable basis has much of its vaccine commitments in products still in the testing stage although roughly one billion doses can be available for a vaccine currently approved on an emergency use basis in the U.K. and India (the AstraZeneca vaccine) through COVAX agreements with AstraZeneca directly and with an Indian producer who can be asked to produce one of two potential vaccines, including the AstraZeneca one. See WHO, COVAX Announces additional deals to access promising COVID-19 vaccine candidates; plans global rollout starting Q1 2021, 18 December 2020, https://www.who.int/news/item/18-12-2020-covax-announces-additional-deals-to-access-promising-covid-19-vaccine-candidates-plans-global-rollout-starting-q1-2021.

“Geneva/Oslo, 18 December 2020

“COVAX, the global initiative to ensure rapid and equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines for all countries, regardless of income level, today announced that it had arrangements in place to access nearly two billion doses of COVID-19 vaccine candidates, on behalf of 190 participating economies. For the vast majority of these deals, COVAX has guaranteed access to a portion of the first wave of production, followed by volume scales as further supply becomes available. The arrangements announced today will enable all participating economies to have access to doses in the first half of 2021, with first deliveries anticipated to begin in the first quarter of 2021 – contingent upon regulatory approvals and countries’ readiness for delivery.

“Given these are arrangements for 2 billion doses of vaccine candidates which are still under development, COVAX will continue developing its portfolio: this will be critical to achieve its goal of securing access to 2 billion doses of safe and effective, approved vaccines that are suitable for all participants’ contexts, and available by the end of 2021. However, today’s announcements offer the clearest pathway yet to end the acute phase of the pandemic by protecting the most vulnerable populations around the world. This includes delivering at least 1.3 billion donor-funded doses of approved vaccines in 2021 to the 92 low- and middle-income economies eligible for the COVAX AMC.

“The new deals announced today include the signing of an advance purchase agreement with AstraZeneca for 170 million doses of the AstraZeneca/Oxford candidate, and a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Johnson & Johnson for 500 million doses of the Janssen candidate, which is currently being investigated as a single dose vaccine.. These deals are in addition to existing agreements COVAX has with the Serum Institute of India (SII) for 200 million doses – with options for up to 900 million doses more – of either the AstraZeneca/Oxford or Novavax candidates, as well as a statement of intent for 200million doses of the Sanofi/GSK vaccine candidate.

“In addition to this, COVAX also has – through R&D partnership agreements – first right of refusal in 2021 to access potentially more than one billion doses (based on current estimates from the manufacturing processes under development) that will be produced, subject to technical success and regulatory approval, by candidates in the COVAX R&D Portfolio.”

* * *

“The COVAX Facility currently has 190 participating economies. This includes 98 higher-income economies and 92 low- and middle-income economies eligible to have their participation in the Facility supported via the financing mechanism known as the Gavi COVAX AMC. Of the 92 economies eligible to be supported by the COVAX AMC, 86 have now submitted detailed vaccine requests, offering the clearest picture yet on actual global demand for COVID-19 vaccines.

“In addition to gathering detailed information on participating economies’ vaccine requests, COVAX, through Gavi, UNICEF,WHO, the World Bank, and other partners has been working closely with all countries in the Facility, particularly AMC-eligible participants, to help plan and prepare for the widespread roll out of vaccines. Conditions that determine country readiness include regulatory preparedness as well as the availability of infrastructure, appropriate legal frameworks, training, and capacity, among other factors.

“’Securing access to doses of a new vaccine for both higher-income and lower-income countries, at roughly the same time and during a pandemic, is a feat the world has never achieved before – let alone at such unprecedented speed and scale,’ said Dr. Seth Berkley, CEO of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, which leads on procurement and delivery for COVAX. ‘COVAX has now built a platform that offers the world the prospect, for the first time, of being able to defeat the pandemic on a global basis, but the work is not done: it’s critical that both governments and industry continue to support our efforts to achieve this goal’.

“Early pledges towards 2021 fundraising targets

“To achieve this ambitious goal, COVAX currently estimates it needs to raise an additional US$ 6.8 billion in 2021 – US$ 800 million for research and development, at least US$ 4.6 billion for the COVAX AMC and US$ 1.4 billion for delivery support.

“Support for the COVAX AMC will be critical to ensuring ability to pay is not a barrier to access. Thanks to the generous support of sovereign, private sector, and philanthropic donors, the AMC has met its urgent 2020 fundraising target of US$ 2 billion, but at least US$ 4.6 billion more is needed in 2021 to procure doses of successful candidates as they come through the portfolio.”

In the United States and in the EU, governments are looking to expand volumes of proven vaccines while awaiting approval of other vaccine candidates. See Pfizer press release, PFIZER AND BIONTECH TO SUPPLY THE U.S. WITH100 MILLION ADDITIONAL DOSES OF COVID-19VACCINE, December 23, 2020, https://www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-detail/pfizer-and-biontech-supply-us-100-million-additional-doses; Pfizer press release, PFIZER AND BIONTECH TO SUPPLY THEEUROPEAN UNION WITH 100 MILLIONADDITIONAL DOSES OF COMIRNATY®, December 29, 2020, https://www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-detail/pfizer-and-biontech-supply-european-union-100-million; HHS, Trump Administration purchases additional 100 million doses of COVID-19 investigational vaccine from Moderna, December 11, 2020, https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/12/11/trump-administration-purchases-additional-100-million-doses-covid-19-investigational-vaccine-moderna.html.

Conclusion

The world is anxiously awaiting the resolution of the pandemic through the approval and distribution of effective vaccines on a global basis in 2021. The good news is that a number of vaccines have been approved in one or more countries and billions of doses of approved vaccines will likely be produced in 2021. The efforts of the WHO, GAVI and CEPI and the generosity of many nations, private and philanthropic organizations will mean people in nearly all countries will receive at least some significant volume of vaccines in 2021. As most vaccines require two shots, the number of people vaccinated in 2021 in an optimistic scenario is probably less than two billion. The world population at the beginning of 2021 is 7.8 billion people. Thus, 2021, even under an optimistic scenario, will not likely result in the eradication of the pandemic around the world.

Even in countries like the United States, the United Kingdom and the 27 members of the European Union where advance purchases should result in sufficient doses being available to vaccinate all eligible members of society, there are massive challenges in terms of distribution and vaccinating the numbers of people involved and educating the populations on the safety and benefits of the vaccines. Thus, even in wealthier countries it will be optimistic to achieve the desired levels of vaccination by the end of 2021.

The Director-General of the WHO in his year-end message laid out the likely situation for the world in 2021, the availability of vaccines but the continued need to be vigilant and adhere to preventive measures to control the pandemic and the need to work collectively to ensure equitable and affordable access to vaccines for all. See WHO,COVID-19: One year later – WHO, Director-General’s new year message, December 30, 2020, https://www.who.int/news/item/30-12-2020-covid-19-anniversary-and-looking-forward-to-2021 (Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General)

“As people around the world celebrated New Year’s Eve 12 months ago, a new global threat emerged.

“Since that moment, the COVID-19 pandemic has taken so many lives and caused massive disruption to families, societies and economies all over the world.

“But it also triggered the fastest and most wide-reaching response to a global health emergency in human history.

“The hallmarks of this response have been an unparalleled mobilization of science, a search for solutions and a commitment to global solidarity.

“Acts of generosity, large and small, equipped hospitals with the tools that health workers needed to stay safe and care for their patients.

“Outpourings of kindness have helped society’s most vulnerable through troubled times.

“Vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics have been developed and rolled out, at record speed, thanks to collaborations including the Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator.

“Equity is the essence of the ACT Accelerator, and its vaccine arm, COVAX, which has secured access to 2 billion doses of promising vaccine candidates.

“Vaccines offer great hope to turn the tide of the pandemic.

“But to protect the world, we must ensure that all people at risk everywhere – not just in countries who can afford vaccines –are immunized.

“To do this, COVAX needs just over 4 billion US dollars urgently to buy vaccines for low- and lower-middle income countries.

“This is the challenge we must rise to in the new year.

“My brothers and sisters, the events of 2020 have provided telling lessons, and reminders, for us all to take into 2021.

“First and foremost, 2020 has shown that governments must increase investment in public health, from funding access to COVID vaccines for all people, to making our systems better prepared to prevent and respond to the next, inevitable, pandemic.

“At the heart of this is investing in universal health coverage to make health for all a reality.

“Second, as it will take time to vaccinate everyone against COVID, we must keep adhering to tried and tested measures that keep each and all of us safe.

“This means maintaining physical distance, wearing face masks, practicing hand and respiratory hygiene, avoiding crowded indoor places and meeting people outside.

“These simple, yet effective measures will save lives and reduce the suffering that so many people encountered in 2020.

“Third, and above all, we must commit to working together in solidarity, as a global community, to promote and protect health today, and in the future.

“We have seen how divisions in politics and communities feed the virus and foment the crisis.

“But collaboration and partnership save lives and safeguard societies.

“In 2020, a health crisis of historic proportions showed us just how closely connected we all are.

“We saw how acts of kindness and care helped neighbors through times of great struggle.

“But we also witnessed how acts of malice, and misinformation, caused avoidable harm.

“Going into 2021, we have a simple, yet profound, choice to make:

“Do we ignore the lessons of 2020 and allow insular, partisan approaches, conspiracy theories and attacks on science to prevail, resulting in unnecessary suffering to people’s health and society at large?

“Or do we walk the last miles of this crisis together, helping each other along the way, from sharing vaccines fairly, to offering accurate advice, compassion and care to all who need, as one global family.

“The choice is easy.

“There is light at the end of the tunnel, and we will get there by taking the path together.

“WHO stands with you – We Are Family and we are In This Together.

“I wish you and your loved ones a peaceful, safe and healthy new year.”

We all want to have the COVID-19 pandemic in the rearview mirror as 2021 progresses. There is hope for significant progress this year. How much progress will depend on the will of governments and peoples to focus on the eradication of the pandemic and to support the dramatic ramp up of production, distribution and vaccination of the world’s people.

World COVID-19 pandemic peaks on November 26 and starts to slowly recede

· November 29, 2020 · COVID-19 · , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , · 2 Comments

The most recent surge in COVID-19 cases (up from 3.57 million cases over a fourteen day period in early August to over 5 million for fourteen days on October 22 to over 8 million new cases for fourteen days on November 17), seems to have peaked on November 26 with 8,296,264 new cases over fourteen days and has been slowly receding for the last three days, down to 8,142,629 new cases during the period November 16-29. Total cases since the end of December 2019 now stand at 62,271,031 as of November 29 according to the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) publication “COVID-19 situation update worldwide, as of 29 November 2020”.

The World Health Organization puts out a publication that tracks cases and deaths on a weekly basis. COVID-19 Weekly Epidemiological Update (data as of 22 November). While it breaks countries and territories into different configuarations that the ECDC, the publication shows new cases in the period November 16-22 declining 6% in Europe and in South East Asia while increasing 11% in the Americas, 5% in the Eastern Mediterranean, 15% in Africa and 9% in the Western Pacific. Because of the large spike in cases in the September – November period in many parts of the world, deaths in the November 16-22 period increased in all regions — up 10% in Europe, 15% in the Americas, 4% in South-East Asia, 10% in the Eastern Mediterranean, 30% in Africa and 1% in the Western Pacific. The latest report is embedded below.

20201124_Weekly_Epi_Update_15

The graphs in the WHO publication show by region the trajectory of new cases and deaths over time. The chart showing aggregate data show a flattening of total new cases in the last weeks of November while the number of deaths globally are sharply increasing.

The WHO Africa region peaked in the summer and has declined until the last few weeks when there has been some increase in both cases and deaths.

The Americas saw a peak in both new cases and deaths in the July period with some declines in new cases until the second half of September when the current surge started and accelerated in November. Deaths declined until early October before starting to grow again.

The Eastern Mediterranean peaked in May-June for both cases and deaths, declined through August/September and have surged to new heights with continued upward trajectory as of November 22.

The WTO European Region had an early surge of cases and deaths in the March-April period. Deaths receded sharply through August. While new cases have increased since summer, there was a massive increase in the September – end of October period in new cases and rising deaths through November.

The WHO South-East Asia region saw a huge increase in cases and deaths in the May-August period, peaking in early September and declining since then. Much of the data for the region reflect activity in India.

The Western Pacific Region has had several peaks in terms of deaths and in new cases, though the numbers are the lowest of any WHO region. The latest peak in new cases was in early August with some increase in the October-November period. Deaths last peaked in early September and have declined through November.

The United States

Turning back to the ECDC data, the United States continues to have more confirmed cases (13,246,651) than any other nation and more confirmed deaths from COVID-19 (266,063) than any other nation. The United States is also still experiencing a surge in new cases and rising deaths. October 31 was the first day that ECDC data show the U.S. recording 100,000 new cases in a single day. Since November 5, the U.S. has had more than 100,000 new cases every day up to November 29. It is the only country to record one million new cases in a week and the only country to record two million new cases in fourteen days. For the last fourteen days, the U.S. recorded 2,341,760 new cases. The U.S., which accounts for 4.3% of the global population, accounts for 21.27% of all COVID-19 cases that have been reported since December 2019 and accounted for 28.76% of new cases in the last two weeks. The rate of increase remains high for the United States — up 31.67% from the 1,778,530 new cases in the two weeks ending November 15. There are concerns that the number of new cases will continue to increase into the new year based on the high rate of infections in many parts of the country, major potential spreading events around holidays in November (Thanksgiving) and December, and limited compliance with basic requirements for limiting the spread of the virus.

The number of deaths from COVID-19 that the U.S. accounts for has declined from roughly 20% to 18.30% as of November 29. In the last two week, while the U.S. has the largest number of deaths in the two weeks, the percent of total deaths accounted for by the U.S. in the November 16-29 period was 14.65%. However, many cities, communities and even states are at or nearing the limits of the health care capacity with hospitalizations now about 90,000, limits on health care professionals with the surging cases and some challenges on personal protective equipment. Thus, models used by the government projects a continued rise in the number of deaths in the coming months.

While the first vaccine could receive emergency approval for distribution in the U.S. as early as December 10, and the U.S. could have two or three vaccines in distribution in early 2021, the United States will unfortunately likely be a major part of the continued high rate of infections and deaths well into 2021.

Europe

While Europe had faced early challenges in a number of western European countries in February-April and very high death rates in a number of countries, the second wave of cases following the relaxation of restrictions in time for summer vacations accounted for the vast majority of the incrase in new cases during the October and early November time period. In earlier posts, I showed that Europe and the U.S. accounted for nearly all of the increase from 5 million new cases in the two weeks ending October 22 to the more than 8 million new cases in the two weeks ending November 17. See November 17, 2020, New COVID-19 cases over a fourteen day period continue to soar past eight million, up from five million on October 22, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/11/17/new-covid-19-cases-over-a-fourteen-day-period-continue-to-soar-past-eight-million-up-from-five-million-on-october-22/

While some of the major countries, including France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and others have seen significant reductions in the number of new cases in recent weeks from the extraordinary figures recorded in late October, early November, numbers remain very high for a number of countries including Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania and Luxembourg — all of whom had new cases/100,000 population in the last fourteen days that were higher than the United States.

Because deaths lag new cases by a number of weeks, it is perhaps less surprising that much of Europe had deaths/100,000 population in the last fourteen days that were higher than the United States, most at rates that were two-three times the U.S. rate. The rate for the world in total was 1.82 deaths per 100,000 population for the November 16-29 period. The U.S. was 3.38 times the global average at 6.22 deaths per 100,000 population in that two week period. The following 25 European countries exceeded the U.S. rate: France (11.76 deaths/100,000 population); Italy (16.04); Spain (8.31); United Kingdom (9.40); Armenia (12.81); Austria (13.47); Belgium (18.84); Moldova (6.50); Poland (16.65); Portugal (10.30); Romania (11.50); Serbia (7.11); Switzerland (14.98); Bulgaria (23.69); Croatia (15.92); Czechia (18.74); Greece (11.08); Hungary (16.12); Lithuania (8.12); Luxembourg (13.19); Malta (6.79); Slovenia (19.85); Bosnia and Herzegovina (20.75); Georgia (13.19); and North Macedonia (20.12).

With new restrictions in recent weeks bringing new cases down in a number of European countries, death rates should start to decline as well in the coming weeks. Challenges in terms of superspreader events in Europe include holiday travel and events and winter holidays and sports. Germany has proposed placing restrictions on the ski season to try to minimize increased cases from a sport popular across much of Europe. See DW, 26 November 2020, Coronavirus: Germany seeks EU-wide ban on ski trips, https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-germany-seeks-eu-wide-ban-on-ski-trips/a-55732273.

The EU has contracts with at least six pharmaceutical companies or groups for vaccines if approved. The EU and United Kingdom will start to see vaccine dosages within weeks assuming approval in their jurisdictions.

Other countries

While much of the rest of the world has not seen great increases in the number of cases that is not true for all countries. For example, Iran which had 136,753 new cases in the November 2-15 period showed 186,274 new cases in the November 16-29 period (+36.21%). Jordan, which has a total number of cases of 210,709 since the end of December has recorded 65.54% of that total in the last four weeks (68,698 new cases during November 2-15; 69,404 new cases during November 16-29). Similarly, Morocco which has a total of 349,688 cases since December 2019 has more than 37% recorded in the last four weeks (69,127 during November 2-15; 61,477 during November 16-29).

In the Americas the following countries in addition to the United States have two week totals to November 29 greater than 100,000 new cases: Argentina (108,531); Brazil (441,313); Colombia (108,609). The following countries besides the United States have more than one million cases since late December 2019: Argentina (1,413,362); Brazil (6,290,272); Colombia (1,299,613), Mexico (1,100,683). Eleven other countries have more than 100,000 cases (with Peru having 960,368). Other than the U.S., countries are facing different trend lines, many down, some showing increases (e.g., Brazil, Canada, Dominican Republic, Paraguay).

In Asia, while India continues to see declines in the number of new cases, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Palestine, South Korea, showed increased in the most recent two weeks, some quite large. This is in addition to Iran reviewed previously.

In Africa, South Africa has the most cases and saw an increase from 23,730 new cases during November 2-15 to 35,967 during November 16-29. Morocco was reviewed above. Most other major countries in Africa saw declines in recent weeks.

Conclusion

The world in the first eleven months of 2020 has struggled to get the COVID-19 pandemic under control with several major surge periods. The global number of new cases seems to have plateaued over the last week or so at extraordinarily high levels and the death rates has been climbing after a long period where deaths appeared to be declining. It is likely that the death rate will continue to increase for the rest of 2020.

After a period during the summer and early fall where restrictions in a number of countries were being relaxed, many countries in the norther hemisphere are reimposing various restrictions in an effort to dampen the spread of the coronavirus. While trade has significantly rebounded from the sharp decline in the second quarter of 2020, services trade remains more than 30% off of 2019 levels driven by the complete collapse of international travel and tourism. Many WTO members have put forward communications on actions that could be considered to speed economic recovery. The most recent was the Ottawa Group’s communication about a possible Trade and Health Initiative. See November 27, 2020, The Ottawa Group’s November 23 communication and draft elements of a trade and health initiative, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/11/27/the-ottawa-groups-november-23-communication-and-draft-elements-of-a-trade-and-health-initiative/.

The WTO TRIPS Council has a request for a waiver from most TRIPS obligations for all WTO Members on medical goods and medicines relevant to COVID-19 on which a recommendation is supposed to be forwarded to the General Council by the end of 2020 though it is opposed by a number of major Members with pharmaceutical industries. See November 2, 2020, India and South Africa seek waiver from WTO intellectual property obligations to add COVID-19 – issues presented, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/11/02/india-and-south-africa-seek-waiver-from-wto-intellectual-property-obligations-to-address-covid-19-issues-presented/.

With vaccines very close to approval in major markets like the United States and the European Union, there will be increased focus on efforts to ensure availability of vaccines and therapeutics and diagnostics globally on equitable and affordable terms. GAVI, CEPI and the WHO have been leading this initiative with the support of many governments and private sector players. Pharmaceutical companies also have global distribution plans being pursued in addition to the above efforts.

So there hopefully is light at the end of the tunnel that the COVID-19 pandemic has imposed on the world. But vaccines without vaccinations won’t solve the pandemic’s grip. So communication and outreach globally will be critical to seeing that available vaccines are properly used. And all peoples need to be able to access the vaccines, some of which will be less available simply because of the infrastructure needs to handle the vaccines.

Trade policy options to minimize trade restrictions coupled with global cooperation and coordination should result in the world being able to rebuild in 2021 and beyond as more and more of the world is vaccinated.

Multilateral efforts to help the poorest countries deal with debt, make available trade finance and other actions continue to be a pressing need. Better plans and preparation for pandemics of the future are clearly needed. Reports suggest that many of the poorest countries have experienced loss of a decade or more of economic advancement during the pandemic. Building back greener and in a sustainable manner is critical for all.

The efforts of developed country governments and others to provide the stimulus domestically to reduce the downward spiral of the individual national economies and the global economy has been critical to limiting the damage at home and abroad. But the assumption of large amounts of debt will also pose significant challenges moving forward because of the greatly heightened national debt/GDP ratios that have developed and may restrict options for individual governments moving forward.

What is certain is that 2020 will be remembered as a year in which a virus inflicted enormous damage to the global health and to the global economy. Collectively, the level of spread has been far greater than should have been possible. Many nations were not prepared. Some, like the United States, exacerbated the problems through a lack of national government planning and messaging. Others like many in Europe, having done a good job of controlling the spread in the early months, made major mistakes as they opened up for summer vacations and didn’t deal with the problems that resulted from the reopening and experienced breathtaking surges which roughly doubled the global daily rate of new cases in five-six weeks and have led to the reimposition of a series of restrictions to try to tame the pandemic a second time. We collectively are better than the results achieved to date. The number of deaths in advanced countries is simply disgraceful.

2021 offers the opportunity for the world to come together and put COVID-19 behind us. Whether we will come to the end of 2021 and feel that this global nightmare is behind us and that there are national and global game plans to rebuild in a greener and more sustainable manner with greater opportunities for all is the question. Hopefully, the answer will be yes.

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership signed on November 15, 2020

· November 16, 2020 · RCEP, Uncategorized · , , , , , , , , , , , , , · No Comments

On Sunday, November 15, 2020, fifteen countries signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership which will “enter into force for those signatory States that have deposited their instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval, 60 days after the date on which at least six signatory States which are Member States of ASEAN and three signaotry States other than Members States of ASEAN have deposited their instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval with the Depositary.” RCEP Article 20.6.2.

The fifteen countries signing the RCEP are the ten ASEAN countries — Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam — and five others (Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea). India had participated in negotiations but withdrew in late 2019. According to a CNN article, “The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership spans 15 countries and 2.2 billion people, or nearly 30% of the world’s population, according to a joint statement released by the nations on Sunday, when the deal was signed. Their combined GDP totals roughly $26 trillion and they account for nearly 28% of global trade based on 2019 data.” CNN Business, November 16, 2020, China signs huge Asia Pacific trade deal with 14 countries, https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/16/economy/rcep-trade-agreement-intl-hnk/index.html.

The Joint Statement released on the 15th is copied below.

“Joint Leaders’ Statement on The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)

“We, the Heads of State/Government of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam – Australia, China, Japan, Korea and New Zealand, met virtually on 15 November 2020, on the occasion of the 4th RCEP Summit.

We were pleased to witness the signing of the RCEP Agreement, which comes at a time when the world is confronted with the unprecedented challenge brought about by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) global pandemic. In light of the adverse impact of the pandemic on our economies, and our people’s livelihood and well-being, the signing of the RCEP Agreement demonstrates our strong commitment to supporting economic recovery, inclusive development, job creation and strengthening regional supply chains as well as our support for an open, inclusive, rules-based trade and investment arrangement. We acknowledge that the RCEP Agreement is critical for our region’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and will play an important role in building the region’s resilience through inclusive and sustainable post-pandemic economic recovery process.”

https://asean.org/joint-leaders-statement-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership-rcep-2/

The agreement has twenty chapters some of which have annexes:

  1. Initial Provisions and General Definitions
  2. Trade in Goods
  3. Rules of Origin
  4. Customs Procedures and Trade Facilitation
  5. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
  6. Standards, Technical Regulations, and Conformity Assessment Procedures
  7. Trade Remedies
  8. Trade in Services
  9. Temporary Movement of Natural Persons
  10. Investment
  11. Intellectual Property
  12. Electronic Commerce
  13. Competition
  14. Small and Medium Enterprises
  15. Economic and Technical Cooperation
  16. Government Procurement
  17. General Provisions and Exceptions
  18. Institutional Provisions
  19. Dispute Settlement
  20. Final Provisions

The full RCEP agreement and country schedules of tariff commitments can be found in English at the webpage for RCEP, https://rcepsec.org/legal-text/ as well as on various individual signatory web pages. See, e.g., the Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/not-yet-in-force/rcep/rcep-text-and-associated-documents.

A summary of the agreement from the ASEAN webpage is embedded below. https://asean.org/storage/2020/11/Summary-of-the-RCEP-Agreement.pdf.

Summary-of-the-RCEP-Agreement

From the chapter titles, it is clear that the Agreement does not deal with issues such as labor or environment. While there is a chapter on trade remedies, a review shows no expanded rules on industrial subsidies – a matter of concern for many countries dealing with China. Similarly, under the competition chapter, the only reference (and it is indirect) to state-owned or state-invested enterprises is contained in Article 13.3.5 (“Article 13.3: Appropriate Measures against Anti-Competitive
Activities”). “Each Party shall apply its competition laws and regulations to all entities engaged in commercial activities, regardless of their ownership. Any exclusion or exemption from the application of each Party’s competition laws and regulations, shall be transparent and based on grounds of public policy or public interest.” (Emphasis added).

RCEP Chapter 7, Trade Remedies

While subsequent posts will look at other aspects of the RCEP Agreement, this post looks at Chapter 7, Trade Remedies. For convenience, the chapter is embedded below.

rcep-chapter-7

Safeguard actions

Section A of Chapter 7 deals with RCEP safeguard measures. The RCEP safeguard measure is intended to be available for a transitional period that extends to a period that is eight years after the tariff elimination or reduction on a specific good is scheduled to occur. Relief can be in the form either of stopping tariff reductions or snapping the tariff back to the MFN rate at the lower of the rates applicable at the date of entry into force of the Agreement for the country in question or the MFN rate on the date when the transitional RCEP safeguard measure is put in place. There is a three year limit on relief, with a one year extension in certain circumstances. If relief is for more than a year, the relief provided is to be reduced “at regular intervals”. Relief is not available against imports from a RCEP party whose imports are less than 3% of total imports from the RCEP parties or if the RCEP party is a Least Developed Country. RCEP has three members who are Least Developed Countries (LDCs) according to the UN’s 2020 list – Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. Compensation is required and if not agreed to, then the party subject to the RCEP safeguard “may suspend the application of substantially equivalent concessions” on goods from the party applying the safeguard. No compensation is required during the first three years of relief if there has been an absolute increase in imports. No compensation will be requested from an LDC.

RCEP countries preserve their rights under the WTO to pursue global safeguard measures. RCEP parties are not to apply both a RCEP safeguard and a global safeguard to the same good at the same time.

Antidumping and Countervailing Duties

Section B of Chapter 7 deals with antidumping and countervailing duties. While the Section starts by noting that parties “retain their rights and obligations under Article VI of GATT 1994, the AD Agreement, and the SCM Agreement,” the section adds clarity to notice and consultation requirements, timing of notice and information required for verification, maintaining a non-confidential file available to all parties and other matters. The biggest addition to parties rights and obligations is the acceptance of a “Prohibition on Zeroing” in dumping investigations and reviews. Article 7.13.

“When margins of dumping are established, assessed, or reviewed under
Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 9, and Article 11 of the AD Agreement, all individual margins, whether positive or negative, shall be
counted for weighted average-to-weighted average and transaction-to- transaction comparison. Nothing in this Article shall prejudice or affect
a Party’s rights and obligations under the second sentence of subparagraph 4.2 of Article 2 of the AD Agreement in relation to weighted average-to-transaction comparison.”

Considering the centrality of the WTO dispute settlement decisions on “zeroing” to the U.S. position on overreach by the Appellate Body, the actions of the RCEP parties to add the obligation contained in RCEP Art. 7.13 to their approach to antidumping investigations will almost certainly complicate the ability of the WTO to move past the impasse on the Appellate Body.

Conclusion

The RCEP Agreement is an important FTA in the huge number of such agreements entered by countries around the world. There will certainly be advantages for the RCEP countries from the regional trade liberalization and the common rules of origin adopted.

Pretty clearly, the RCEP has not dealt with some of the fundamental challenges to the global trading system from the rise of economic systems that are not premised on market-economy principles. While such issues can be addressed in the WTO going forward, the ability of China to get a large number of trading partners to open their markets without the addressing of the underlying core distortions from the state directed economic system that China employs suggests that the road to meaningful reform has gotten longer with the RCEP Agreement.

Nor have the RCEP countries chosen to include within the RCEP action on issues like the environment which are of growing importance to the ability to have sustainable development. Again while such issues can be addressed in the WTO, they are also being addressed in bilateral and plurilateral agreements by other countries and including some of the RCEP countries. Thus, RCEP is a lost opportunity for leadership by China on issues of great importance to its citizens and those of all RCEP parties.

As November approaches, Europe and the United States facing rapidly growing new COVID-19 cases

· October 26, 2020 · COVID-19 · , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , · No Comments

The number of new cases of COVID-19 reported globally skyrocketed during the October 12-25 period (5,431,119), up 24.37% from the September 28 – October 11 period (4,336,825). Data are from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control worldwide update series. Global confirmed cases to date are now 42,758,015.

The United States which has more confirmed cases (8,576,725) than any other nation and more confirmed deaths from COVID-19 (224,899), saw the number of new cases surge by 34.0% over the last two weeks with daily records set twice in the last week (both days over 80,000 new cases). The U.S. recorded the extraordinary number of 908,980 new cases during the fourteen day period July 20-August 2. That number declined to 740,721 during August 3-16 and further declined to 600,417 new cases in the August 17-30 period and was further reduced to 524,526 new cases in the August 31-September 13 period. The downtrend was reversed during September 14-27, when the number of new cases increased to 592,690 or a daily average of 42,335 cases. During September 28-October 11, the United States recorded 640,149 new cases (45,725/day). During October 12-25, the United States recorded 857,778 new cases and will likely surpass the prior two week peak in the next two weeks.

The United States regained the dubious distinction of recording the largest number of new cases in the last two weeks as India’s number of new cases continues to decline to 811,005 new cases from its peak of 1,238,176 new cases during the September 14-27 period. India is the only country to have recorded more than one million cases in a two week period. The United States appears likely to join India in the coming weeks.

Brazil (297,998 new cases) lost its hold on third place to France (367,624 new cases). Brazil’s new cases have been falling since July 20-August 2 (633,017 new cases) to 609,219 new cases during August 3-16, 529,057 new cases during August 17-30, 469,534 new cases during August 31-September 13, 402,304 new cases during September 14-27, 364,646 during September 28-October 11 and 297,998 new cases in October 12-25 (a decline of 52.92% since the end of July).

With the tremendous overall global growth and the declining volume of new cases in India and Brazil, the share of total new cases in the last fourteen days and since the end of December 2019 accounted for by India, Brazil and the United States declined to 36.21% in the most recent fourteen days from 47.31% in September 28-October 11. and from 54.33% during September 14-27 and down from 58.34% in the August 31-September 13 period. The three countries account for 51.04% of total cases since late December 2019 in the prior two weeks down from 53.25% of all cases confirmed since late December 2019 as of October 11.

The United States with 4.3% of global population has accounted for 20.06% of total confirmed cases since December 2019 — 4.67 times the share of total cases our population would justify. With the large increase in the most recent two weeks, the U.S. was 15.79% of the total new cases during the last two weeks (up from 14.66% during Sept. 28-October 11) or 3.67 times the U.S. share of global population. The U.S. also accounts for 19.53% of total deaths or 4.54 times the U.S. share of global population.

Changing pattern of growth in cases, Europe experiencing a spike in cases surpassing its first wave

Much of Europe is in a massive build-up of new cases, rivaling or exceeding the challenges faced during the March-April time period. This is resulting in reimposition of some restrictions by some European countries with a fair amount of pushback from citizens weary of the restrictions.

France has been hit hardest in terms of the number of new cases with the October 12-25 number of new cases reaching 367,624 up 92.04% from the 191,427 new cases in September 28-October 11 which was up from 153,535 in the September 14-27 period. The current number of new cases compares to the prior peak in the March 30-April 12 period of 56,215 new cases (or is 6.54 times the prior peak in the latest two week period).

The United Kingdom is similarly facing major challenges as the last two weeks saw new cases of 263,166 up 62.88% from the 161,567 new cases in September 28-October 11 which was more than twice the 64,103 new cases in September 14-27 and just 32,422 new cases in the August 31-September 13 period. The United Kingdom’s prior peak in the April 13-26 period was 69,386 new cases. So the most recent two weeks is at a level that is 3.79 times the prior peak.

Spain’s number of new COVID-19 cases rose to 185,020, an increase of 27.93% rom the September 28-Ocotber 11 period with 144,631 new cases. Spain’s peak in the spring had been in the period March 30-April 12 with 81,612 new cases. Thus, the last two weeks were 2.27 times the Spring peak number of new cases.

Italy’s last two weeks saw a breathtaking spike to 155,015 new cases, 3.74 times the number of new cases from the prior two week period September 28-October 11 when Italy recorded 41,390 new cases which was nearly double the number of cases in the September 14-27 period (21,807 new cases). Italy’s most recent two weeks was 2.59 times the prior peak for Italy in the Spring during the March 30-April 12 period of 59,799 new cases.

Czechia which spiked following summer vacations saw its number of new cases during October 12-25 surge to 136,790 up from 46,080 new cases in the September 28-October 11 period and 23,893 new cases in the September 14-27 period and 11,307 new cases in the August 31 – September 13 period. Czechia largely escaped the March-April wave in Europe. The data for the last eight weeks constitutes 86.95 percent of Czechia’s total recorded cases since December 2019.

Belgium surged to 133,439 new cases in the October 12-25 period more than tripling the 40,791 new cases recorded in the September 28-October 11 period which more than doubling the numbers from September 14-27 of 17,797.

Poland, which had largely escaped the Spring wave of infections, recorded 120,308 new cases in the latest two week period (Oct. 12-25) up from 35,658 new cases in the September 28-October 11 period.

The Netherlands nearly doubled its number of new cases in the October 12-25 period (112,649) compared to the number of new cases in the September 28-Ocotber 11period (59,561). The last two weeks constitute 40.13% of total cases the Netherlands has recorded since December 2019.

Germany’s new cases in the October 12-25 period surged to 106,317 from 38,724 new cases during the September 28-October 11 period. The Spring peak for Germany had been during the March 30-April 12 period (67,932 new cases).

The Russian Federation saw continued increases in the number of new cases during the October 12-25 period (228,793) up from 141,513 in the September 28-October 11 period which was up 86,209 new cases in the September 14-27 period. Russia’s earlier peak was during the May 11-24 period when Russia recorded 137,206 new cases.

Ukraine recorded 81,144 new cases during the October 11-25 period compared to 60,762 new cases in September 28-October 11, and 43,645 new cases in the September-27 period.

Many other European countries saw large increases as well in the last two weeks, though the number of new cases are smaller those the countries reviewed above.

Developing country hot spots

Still a very large part of the new cases are in developing countries as has been true for the last few months although many countries, including India and Brazil are seeing many fewer new cases in the last two weeks. While India and Brazil had by far the largest number of new cases from developing countries, they were followed by Argentina (197,440), Colombia (104,964), Iran (66,452), Indonesia (57,028), Mexico (55,807), Iraq (49,029), Morocco (48,063), Peru (40,126), the Philippines (30,893), Turkey (25,753), South Africa (23,350), Chile (20,947), Bangladesh (20,434) and then dozens of other countries with smaller numbers of new cases. Of the listed developing countries, only Argentina, Colombia, Iran, Morocco, Turkey and South Africa saw increases from the September 28-October 11 period.

Deaths/100,000 population

The United States has the largest number of deaths of any country to date (224,899) and had the largest number of deaths in the last two weeks (10,522). Because the number of deaths typically follows increases in new cases (with a significant lag), the U.S. saw the number of new deaths increase 6.5% from the prior two weeks deaths (9,880). The countries with the highest number of deaths per 100,000 population for the last two weeks were the following: Argentina (11.24), Armenia (5.54), Moldova (5.22), Israel (5.06), Romania (4.94), Belgium (4.91), Iran (4.86), Colombia (4.65), Costa Rica (4.08), Mexico (4.00), Poland (3.63), Panama (3.44), Chile (3.27), and the United States (3.20). All other countries (including all other developed countries) had lower rates of death per 100,000 population. For all countries, the death rate over the last two weeks was 1.02 deaths/100,000 population. So the U.S.’s death rate over the last two weeks was 2.91 times the global average and was much higher than many large and/or developed countries. China’s number was so low, it was 0.00 people/100,000 population; France was 2.93, Germany 0.50, India 0.75, Italy 1.77, Japan 0.07, South Korea 0.05, Singapore 0.02, United Kingdom 2.98, Taiwan 0.00, Canada 0.90, Australia 0.03, New Zealand 0.00.

If looking at the entire period since the end of December 2019 through October 25, the average number of deaths for all countries per 100,000 of population has been 15.16 deaths. The nine countries (of 86 which account for over 98% of total deaths) with the highest death rates/100,000 for the full period are: Peru (10.87), Belgium (93.73), Bolivia (74.93), Brazil (74.34), Spain (74.04), Ecuador (72.19), Chile (73.30), Ecuador (72.19), Mexico (69.56), the United States (68.34). The United States death rate has been 4.51 times the global rate and many times higher than nearly all other developed countries and most developing countries. Consider the following examples: China, where the virus was first found, has a death per 100,000 population of just 0.33 people. India’s data show 8.67 per 100,000 population; Germany has 12.08; Japan has 1.35; Korea is just 0.89; Canada is 26.52; Switzerland is 21.96; Poland is 11.46; Ukraine is 14.30; Norway is 5.24; Australia is 3.59; New Zealand is 0.52.

Conclusion

The world in the first ten months of 2020 has struggled to get the COVID-19 pandemic under control. While many countries in Europe and some in Asia and the major countries in Oceania had greatly reduced the number of new cases over time, there has been a significant resurgence in many of these countries (particularly in Europe where current rates of new cases are greater than during the March-April initial wave) as their economies reopen, travel restrictions are eased, schools reopen in many countries and fall comes to the northern hemisphere. But the number of new cases continues to rage in a few countries in the Americas, with the United States heading to new records. While there are growing number of cases in many developing countries in Asia and Africa, many countries are seeing significant declines with relatively smaller number of cases in Africa in total than in other continents.

A recent WTO Secretariat information paper showed that there has been a reduction in shortages of many medical goods needed to handle the COVID-19 pandemic which is obviously good news, although as the global total of new cases continues to rise, there may yet be additional challenges in terms of supply. See 18 September 2020, Information Note, How WTO Members Have Used Trade Measures to Expedite Access to COVID-19 Critical Medical Goods and Services, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/services_report_16092020_e.pdf.

Despite significant expansion of production of PPE around the world and despite progress within GAVI on its program for outreach with various vaccines when developed (including securing production capacity in a number of countries), and other relevant medical goods and the ongoing efforts of CEPI on vaccine developments, and the license agreements that have been entered into by a number of the major groups developing vaccines for COVID-19, India and South Africa have filed a waiver request from most TRIPs obligations “in relation to prevention, containment of treatment of COVID-19”. The waiver request would apply to all WTO Members for a number of years (yet to be determined). See Communication from India and South Africa, Waiver from Certain Provisions of the TRIPs Agreement for the Prevention, Containment and Treatment of COVID-19, 2 October 2020, IP/C/W/669. While I will address the waiver request in a later post, it is hard to imagine that the normal requirements for seeking a waiver have been met with the current communication. Based on the readout of the October 20, 2020 TRIPs Council meeting, it is likely that the waiver request will generate significant controversy in the coming three months and could complicate current efforts at greater global cooperation in addressing the pandemic.

With the third round of consultations for a new Director-General concluding on Tuesday, October 27, whoever the new Director-General ends up being can add the waiver request to the list of highly controversial matters that confront the WTO heading towards the end of 2020.

World COVID-19 pandemic continues to spin out of control — more than 4.3 million new cases in last two weeks

· October 11, 2020 · COVID-19 · , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , · No Comments

After plateauing in terms of new cases during August, COVID-19 new cases are increasing rapidly for the world as a whole. For the period September 28-October 11, data compiled by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control show new cases in the world being 4,366,825 — an increase of 6.24% from the prior two weeks. Thee period September 14-27, dshow new cases i at 4,110,081. That compares to 3,780,469 new cases in the August 31-September 13 period and 3,558,360 for August 17-30, 3,624,548 for August 3-16 and 3,568,162 for the July 20-August 2 period. Total cases since the end of December 2019 are now at 37.268 million.

The United States which has more confirmed cases (7,718,947) than any other nation and more confirmed deaths from COVID-19 (214,377), saw the number of new cases increase over the last two weeks following the change in direction recorded in the prior two weeks after three two week periods where the U.S. saw a decline in new cases. The U.S. recorded the extraordinary number of 908,980 new cases during the fourteen day period July 20-August 2. That number declined to 740,721 during August 3-16 and further declined to 600,417 new cases in the August 17-30 period and was further reduced to 524,526 new cases in the August 31-September 13 period. The downtrend was reversed during September 14-27, when the number of new cases increased to 592,690 or a daily average of 42,335 cases. During September 28-October 11, the United States recorded 640,149 new cases (45,725/day). That number is likely to continue upward as recent days have seen the United States recording new cases at more than 50,000/day.

The United States had the second largest number of new cases, following only India whose number of new cases has started a slow descent from its peak of 1,238,176 new cases two weeks ago, with 1,061,274 new cases recorded during September 28-October 11. India is the only country to have recorded more than one million cases in a two week period.

Brazil maintains its hold on third place though its new cases are falling since July 20-August 2 (633,017 new cases) to 609,219 new cases during August 3-16, 529,057 new cases during August 17-30, 469,534 new cases during August 31-September 13, 402,304 new cases during September 14-27 and 364,646 during September 28-October 11.

India, the United States and Brazil accounted for 47.31% of the new global cases during the last two weeks, down from 54.33% during September 14-27 and down from 58.34% in the August 31-September 13 period. The three countries account for prior two weeks) and account for 53.25% of all cases confirmed since late December 2019.

The United States with 4.3% of global population has accounted for 20.70% of total confirmed cases since December 2019 — 4.81 times the share of total cases our population would justify. With the increase in the most recent two weeks, the U.S. was 14.66% of the total new cases during the last two weeks (Sept. 28-October 11) or 3.41 times the U.S. share of global population. The U.S. also accounts for 19.97% of total deaths or 4.64 times the U.S. share of global population.

Changing pattern of growth in cases, developing world still experiencing significant volume of new cases

As reviewed above the United States is seeing a rising number of cases over the last four weeks, a trend that unfortunately seems certain to continue in the near future.

Many developed countries have seen a second wave of cases, as will be reviewed below, which has increased the percent of global new cases occurring in developed countries.

Still a very large part of the new cases are in developing countries as has been true for the last few months. While India and Brazil had by far the largest number of new cases from developing countries, they were followed by Argentina (181,412), Colombia (96,709), Mexico (87,897), Indonesia (57,613), Iraq (54,155), Iran (53,167), Peru (45,496), the Philippines (35,670), Morocco (31,157), Chile (23,616), South Africa (21,398), Turkey (21,065), Bangladesh (19,200) and then dozens of other countries with smaller numbers of new cases. Of the listed developing countries, only Argentina, Mexico, Indonesia, Iran, Morocco, Chile and South Africa saw increases from the September 14-27 period.

Continued developed country resurgence in new cases

With the reopening of some international travel and with the end of the summer holiday season and the start of cooler weather in fall for northern hemisphere countries, there has been a noticeable surge of new cases in many developed countries, particularly in Western Europe where is it generally described as the coming of a second wave of COVID-19 cases.

France’s spike continued with 191,427 new cases in September 28-October 11 up from 153,535 in the prior two weeks. France’s most recent numbers are 3.36 times the number recorded in August 17-30 period (57,009 new cases) and 1.89 times the number in the August 31-September 13 period, 101,381.

Spain’s spike seems to have plateaued and started a decline in the September 28-Ocotber 11 period with 144,631 new cases. For August 17-30, Spain saw 96,473 new cases. The August 31-September 13 period saw a further large increase for Spain to 127,040 cases. For the period from September 14-27, Spain’s numbers further increased to 150,155.

The United Kingdom is facing major challenges as the last two weeks saw new cases more than double to 161,567 from 64,103 new cases in September 14-27 and just 32,422 new cases in the August 31-September 13 period.

The Netherlands more than doubled its number of new cases during September 28-Ocotber 11 to 59,561 from 27,584 new cases during September 14-27 and just 11,374 during August 31-September 13.

Germany showed a significant increase in the most recent two weeks to 38,724 from 24,712 the prior two weeks and 17,657 new cases in the period from the end of August to mid September.

Czechia which spiked following summer vacations saw its number of new cases during September 28-October 11 grow to 46,080 from 23,893 the prior two weeks and from 11,307 in the August 31 – September 13 period.

Italy jumped to 41,390 new cases during September 28-October up from 21,807 during September 14-27.

Belgium added 40,791 in the September 28-October 11 period more than doubling the numbers from September 14-27 of 17,797.

Romania added 31,168 in the last two weeks up from 18,849 the prior two week.

The Russian Federation had a large spike in the last two week up to 141,513 from 86,209 in the September 14-27 period.

Ukraine saw 60,762 new cases in September 28-October 11, up from 43,645 new cases the prior two weeks.

Canada has seen a second wave in the last four weeks, with new cases in August 31-September 13 time period being 8,468, followed by 15,530 during September 14-27 and 26,466 during September 28-October 11.

Israel’s second wave which reached 73,883 new cases during September 14-27, saw a decline to 62,903 new cases in the September 28-October 11 period.

Deaths/100,000 population

The United States has the largest number of deaths of any country to date (214,377) and had the second largest number of deaths in the last two weeks (9,880) behind only India (13,381). Both the U.S. and India saw the number of new deaths decline from the prior two weeks. The countries with the highest number of deaths per 100,000 population for the last two weeks were the following: Argentina (17.95), Israel (5.87), Mexico (5.80), Ecuador (5.27), Costa Rica (4.91), Colombia (4.70), Moldova (4.43), Brazil (4.17), Bolivia (4.03), Panama (3.74), Spain (3.62), Chile (3.59), Iran (3.50), Romania (3.46), Peru (3.33), and the United States (3.00). All other countries (including all other developed countries) had lower rates of death per 100,000 population. For all countries, the death rate over the last two weeks was 1.03 deaths/100,000 population. So the U.S.’s death rate over the last two weeks was 2.91 times the global average and was much higher than many large and/or developed countries. China’s number was so low, it was 0.00 people/100,000 population; France was 1.47, Germany 0.19, India 1.01, Italy 0.53, Japan 0.06, South Korea 0.06, Singapore 0.00, United Kingdom 1.18, Taiwan 0.00, Canada 0.86, Australia 0.11, New Zealand 0.00.

If looking at the entire period since the end of December 2019 through October 11, the average number of deaths for all countries per 100,000 of population has been 14.14 deaths. The nine countries (of 86 which account for over 98% of total deaths) with the highest death rates/100,000 for the full period are: Peru (102.19), Belgium (88.82), Bolivia (72.02), Brazil (71.17), Spain (70.16), Ecuador (70.15), Chile (70.03), Mexico (65.56), the United States (65.15). With the exception of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico Peru and the United States, each of the other top countries overall has shown a drastic reduction since their peaks in April and as reflected in the experience in the last two weeks (the European countries were typically less than 1 death per 100,000). The United States death rate has been 4.61 times the global rate and many times higher than nearly all other developed countries and most developing countries. Consider the following examples: China, where the virus was first found, has a death per 100,000 population of just 0.33 people. India’s data show 7.93 per 100,000 population; Germany has 11.58; Japan has 1.28; Korea is just 0.84; Canada is 25.62; Switzerland is 20.98; Poland is 7.83; Ukraine is 11.11; Norway is 5.16; Australia is 3.56; New Zealand is 0.52.

Conclusion

The world in the first nine and a half months of 2020 has struggled to get the COVID-19 pandemic under control. While many countries in Europe and some in Asia and the major countries in Oceania had greatly reduced the number of new cases over time, there has been a significant resurgence in many of these countries (particularly in Europe) as their economies reopen, travel restrictions are eased, schools reopen in many countries and fall comes to the northern hemisphere. But the number of new cases continues to rage in much of the Americas (and there is a new surge in Canada and the start of resurgence in the U.S.), in parts of Asia (in particular India) and in limited parts of Africa. A recent WTO Secretariat information paper showed that there has been a reduction in shortages of many medical goods needed to handle the COVID-19 pandemic which is obviously good news, although as the global total of new cases continues to rise, there may yet be additional challenges in terms of supply. See 18 September 2020, Information Note, How WTO Members Have Used Trade Measures to Expedite Access to COVID-19 Critical Medical Goods and Services, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/services_report_16092020_e.pdf.

In the northern hemisphere, countries are going into fall where there will likely be greater time spent indoors which could result in a significant spike in cases which could further stretch the global ability to respond.

Moreover, in many countries, stimulus packages have run their course such that large scale increases in unemployment could happen in the coming weeks. This has been the case in the United States even though the President and many of those closest to him have tested positive for COVID-19. Efforts at a new stimulus package have stalled despite a House which passed a package back in May and a second package in recent weeks. It remains unclear if anything will happen before the national elections on November 3. The result has been tens of thousands of employees furloughed in the airline industry, at major employers like Disney and will likely be the case for many state and local government employees with the start of the fiscal year in October and the obligation for most states to run a balanced budget. The failure of a new stimulus initiative will significantly increase the braking action on the economy from the pandemic in the fourth quarter of 2020 in the United States.

Similarly as countries in much of the developed world take new restrictive actions to address the second wave of cases, there will likely be significant ongoing effects to the global economy and international trade.

The last four weeks (beginning on September 14 through October 11) have seen the global number of new cases continue to grow after six weeks in July and most of August of what appeared to be a peak or plateau. For the reasons reviewed above, October – December are likely to see continued growth in the global number of new cases.

The progress on developing safe and effective vaccines is encouraging and has been sped by the willingness of major economies like the U.S. and the EU to fund manufacturing ahead of actual approval of the promising vaccines. Still the timing of outcomes remains unknown though anticipated by the end of 2020 and first part of 2021. China has been distributing one of its vaccines to parts of its population in advance of formal clearance of stage three trials. The Russians have been lining up customers for their vaccine even though the stage three trials are only underway and the results will lag the initial rollout of the vaccine. For other countries (the U.S., European Union, Japan, etc.) the rollout of vaccines if approved will take time to get large parts of the global population vaccinated. It is unclear what the global capacity will be to produce vaccines proven to be safe and effective, although reports suggest a likely significant shortfall despite government assistance in the global supplies that will be available in 2021. This uncertainty about likely capacities, plus the large purchases made by major western governments (U.S., EU, U.K., Japan), will likely place a large cloud over much if not all of 2021 in terms of distribution of vaccines even in an optimistic scenario.

With the world collectively unable to get the pandemic under control in many parts of the world, with likely increases this fall and winter, with fatigue in many countries on the actions needed to slow the spread of the virus and, in at least some countries, the mixed messages from government on the correct actions needed to gain control, the rest of 2020 will be very challenging. With the global death count now over one million, there have already been tens of thousand and likely hundreds of thousands of deaths that didn’t need to occur. The prospect of tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands more dying needlessly hang over the global community as an inexplicable failure of at least some governments to protect their citizens and to cooperate for a comprehensive global response.

In last two weeks global COVID-19 cases increased by more than 4.1 million as virus continues to spin out of control

· September 27, 2020 · COVID-19 · , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , · No Comments

After plateauing in terms of new cases during August, COVID-19 new cases are increasing rapidly for the world as a whole. For the period September 14-27, data compiled by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control show new cases in the world topping four million for the first time — 4,110,081. That compares to 3,780,469 new cases in the August 31-September 13 period and 3,558,360 for August 17-30, 3,624,548 for August 3-16 and 3,568,162 for the July 20-August 2 period. Total cases since the end of December 2019 are now above 32.9 million.

The United States which has more confirmed cases (7,078,798) than any other nation and more confirmed deaths from COVID-19 (204,497), saw the number of new cases increase over the last two weeks after three two week periods where the U.S. saw a decline in new cases. The U.S. recorded the extraordinary number of 908,980 new cases during the fourteen day period July 20-August 2. That number declined to 740,721 during August 3-16 and further declined to 600,417 new cases in the August 17-30 period and was further reduced to 524,526 new cases in the August 31-September 13 period. The downtrend was reversed these past two week, when the number of new cases increased to 592,690 or a daily average of 42,335 cases. The United States had the second largest number of new cases, following only India whose number of new cases is continuing to increase, and were 1,238,176 in the last two weeks, slightly higher than the 1,211,623 new cases reported in the August 31-September 13 period. India is the only country to have recorded more than one million cases in a two week period and appears to have plateaued at a rate of more than 88,000/day over the last month.

Brazil maintains its hold on third place though its new cases are falling since July 20-August 2 (633,017 new cases) to 609,219 new cases during August 3-16, 529,057 new cases during August 17-30, 469,534 new cases during August 31-September 13 and down to 402,304 new cases during September 14-27.

India, the United States and Brazil accounted for 54.33% of the new global cases during the last two weeks (down from 58.34% in the prior two weeks) and account for 54.04% of all cases confirmed since late December 2019 (up from 54.01% through two weeks ago).

The United States with 4.3% of global population has accounted for 21.51% of total confirmed cases since December 2019 — five times the share of total cases our population would justify. With the increase in the most recent two week after six weeks of declines, the U.S. was 14.42% of the total (up from 13.87% of new cases during August 17-30) or 3.35 times the U.S. share of global population. The U.S. also accounts for 20.55% of total deaths or 4.78 times the U.S. share of total population.

Continued growth of cases in the developing world

With the number of new cases in the United States declining over most of the last two months, the trend of new cases being focused on the developing world has shifted with a resurgence in Europe following the summer vacation period with a renewal of at least some international travel. While India and Brazil had by far the largest number of new cases from developing countries, they were followed by Argentina (166,781), Colombia (97,074), Peru (77,301), Iraq (73,883), Mexico (62,458), Iraq (59,191), Indonesia (56,582), the Philippines (43,393), Iran (43,146), Turkey (23,331), Chile (23,313), Bangladesh (21,829), South Africa (21,284) and then dozens of other countries with smaller numbers of new cases. Of the listed developing countries, only India, Argentina, Iraq, Indonesia, Iran and Turkey saw increases from the August 31-September 13 period.

Developed country resurgence in new cases

With the reopening of some international travel and with the end of the summer holiday season, there has been a noticeable surge of new cases in a number of developed countries, particularly in Western Europe where is it generally described as the coming of a second wave of COVID-19 cases. France overtook Spain for the most new cases during September 14-27 with a total of 153,535. France nearly doubled the large number it had experienced in the August 17-30 period (57,009 new cases) in the August 31-September 13 period with new cases reaching 101,381. Spain continues to show large increases for a developed country that had gotten the COVID-19 spread under control until recently. For August 17-30, Spain saw an additional 96,473 new cases. The August 31-September 13 period saw a further large increase for Spain to 127,040 cases. For the period from September 14-27, Spain’s numbers further increased to 150,155. The United Kingdom nearly doubled the number of new cases to 64,103 up from 32,422 new cases in the August 31-September 13 period. The Netherlands more than doubled its number of new cases during September 14-27 from the prior two week period going to 27,584 new cases from 11,374. Germany showed a significant increase in the most recent two weeks to 24,712 from the prior two weeks (17,657 new cases; two weeks before that 17,538 new cases). Czechia which spiked following summer vacations saw its number of new cases grow to 23,893 from 11,307 in the August 31 – September period; Italy added 21,807 (up from 19,444 the prior two weeks); Romania added 18,849 (up from 16,553 in the prior two weeks). Other countries in Europe (Russia (86,209 new cases), Ukraine (43,645 new cases) and Hungary (12,189 new cases)) as well as Israel (73,883 new cases) also saw significant additional new cases.

Deaths/100,000 population

The United States has the largest number of deaths of any country to date (204,497) and had the second largest number of deaths in the last two weeks (10,796) behind only India (15,917), though the U.S. number of new deaths declined slightly from the prior two weeks while India’s number of new deaths continued to climb. The countries with the highest number of deaths per 100,000 population for the last two weeks were the following: Argentina (9.68), Colombia (5.09), Brazil (4.83), Peru (4.76), Costa Rica (4.72), Bolivia (4.61), Mexico (4.42), Panama (3.96), Chile (3.67), Puerto Rico (3.65), Israel (3.97) and the United States (3.28). All other countries (including all other developed countries) had lower rates of death per 100,000 population. For all countries, the death rate over the last two weeks was 0.98 deaths/100,000 population. So the U.S.’s death rate over the last two weeks was 3.35 times the global average and was much higher than many large and/or developed countries. China’s number was so low, it was 0.00 people/100,000 population; France was 1.18, Germany 0.13, India 1.16, Italy 0.36, Japan 0.08, South Korea 0.08, Singapore 0.00, United Kingdom 0.52, Spain 3.16, Taiwan 0.00, Canada 0.25, Australia 0.27, New Zealand 0.02.

If looking at the entire period since the end of December 2019 through September 13, the average number of deaths for all countries per 100,000 of population has been 13.10 deaths. The nine countries (of 86 which account for over 98% of total deaths) with the highest death rates/100,000 for the full period are: Peru (98.87), Belgium (87.07), Bolivia (67.79), Spain (66.54), Chile (66.44), Ecuador (64.89), United Kingdom (62.97), Brazil (67.00), the United States (62.14). With the exception of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and the United States, each of the other top countries overall has shown a drastic reduction since their peaks in April and as reflected in the experience in the last two weeks (the European countries were typically less than 1 death per 100,000). The United States death rate has been 4.74 times the global rate and many times higher many other developed countries and most developing countries. Consider the following examples: China, where the virus was first found, has a death per 100,000 population of just 0.33 people. India’s data show 6.92; Germany has 11.39; Japan has 1.22; Korea is just 0.78; Canada is 24.76; Switzerland is 20.81; Poland is 6.38; Ukraine is 8.87; Norway is 5.07; Australia is 3.45; New Zealand is 0.52.

Conclusion

The world in the first nine months of 2020 has struggled to get the COVID-19 pandemic under control. While many countries in Europe and some in Asia and the major countries in Oceania have greatly reduced the number of new cases over time, there has been a significant resurgence in many of these countries (particularly in Europe) as their economies reopen, travel restrictions are eased and as schools reopen in many countries. But the number of new cases continues to rage in much of the Americas (other than Canada), in parts of Asia (in particular India) and in limited parts of Africa. A recent WTO Secretariat information paper showed that there has been a reduction in shortages of many medical goods needed to handle the COVID-19 pandemic which is obviously good news, although as the global total of new cases continues to rise, there may yet be additional challenges in terms of supply. See 18 September 2020, Information Note, How WTO Members Have Used Trade Measures to Expedite Access to COVID-19 Critical Medical Goods and Services, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/services_report_16092020_e.pdf.

In the northern hemisphere, countries are going into fall where there will likely be greater time spent indoors which could result in a significant spike in cases which could further stretch the global ability to respond.

Moreover, in many countries, stimulus packages have run their course such that large scale increases in unemployment could happen in the coming weeks. This is obviously the case in the United States in the airline industry (but also elsewhere) and will likely be the case for many state and local government employees with the start of the fiscal year in October and the obligation for most states to run a balanced budget. See, e.g., Bloomberg Businessweek, September 23, 2020, Airlines Face Desolate Future as Attempts to Reopen Crumble, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-23/coronavirus-pandemic-airlines-face-empty-future-as-crisis-continues?utm_campaign=news&utm_medium=bd&utm_source=applenews. The failure of a new stimulus initiative will significantly increase the braking action on the economy from the pandemic in the fourth quarter of 2020.

The September 14-27 period has seen the global number of new cases continue to grow after six weeks in July and most of August of what appeared to be a peak or plateau. October – December are likely to see continued growth in the global number of new cases.

The progress on developing safe and effective vaccines is encouraging and has been sped by the willingness of major economies like the U.S. and the EU to fund manufacturing ahead of actual approval of the promising vaccines. Still the results of the phase three trials are not yet in and as a temporary delay by AstraZeneca with its phase three trial showed, the timing of outcomes remains unknown though anticipated by the end of 2020 and first part of 2021. China has been distributing one of its vaccines to parts of its population in advance of formal clearance of stage three trials. The Russians have been lining up customers for their vaccine even though the stage three trials are only underway and the results will lag the initial rollout of the vaccine. For other countries (the U.S., European Union, Japan, etc.) the rollout of vaccines if approved will take time to get large parts of the global population vaccinated. It is unclear what the global capacity will be to produce vaccines proven to be safe and effective, although reports suggest a likely significant shortfall despite government assistance in the global supplies that will be available in 2021. This uncertainty about likely capacities, plus the large purchases made by major western governments (U.S., EU, U.K., Japan), will likely place a large cloud over much if not all of 2021 in terms of distribution of vaccines even in an optimistic scenario.

The ride is likely to get more complicated going forward with the world collectively unable to get the pandemic under control in many parts of the world, with likely increases this fall and winter, with fatigue in many countries on the actions needed to slow the spread of the virus and, in at least some countries, the mixed messages from government on the correct actions needed to gain control. With the global death count nearing one million, there have already been tens of thousand and likely hundreds of thousands of deaths that didn’t need to occur. The prospect of tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands more dying needlessly hang over the global community. 2020 has proven to be a very challenging year. Time will tell if the challenge is confined to this year or continues to inflict substantial costs in 2021 and beyond.